A weapon without the ability to use it is a pile of scrap metal.
Exposing the liberal myths about the weakness of the Russian Navy, the obsolescence of the ship composition in the absence of a replacement under construction, the slow construction time of ships and the general uselessness of the fleet.
The dilemma: high quality, fast and cheap. Choose two items out of three. Not easy? And for whom it is easy!
- commented military analyst Jörgen Elfving in an interview with SvD.
As the classic said: I myself know about the troubles of the fatherland, but it's a shame when a foreigner shares these feelings with me. But hasn't the military analyst J. Elving heard about the PSA procedure that all new American ships go through? Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) - Mandatory return to shipyard after first months of service? What for? And then the same as our "Ivan Gren"!
I wonder how the analyst would comment on the following paragraph:
"It has been 23 months since the commissioning, but the fleet has not received a combat-ready ship."
“Ivan Gren” has nothing to do with it. This is the Pentagon's claim of the Northrop shipyard, signed by the head of the naval forces D. Winter (2007).
As you may have guessed, the complaint went unheeded. The functionality of the landing craft San Antonio continued to fail over the following years.
2008 year. The ship did not go out on the voyage due to the breakage of the docking chamber wall. Arriving late in the Persian Gulf, it was out of order again (urgent repairs were required in Bahrain). Another failure of the power plant control system happened during the passage of the Suez Canal: the engines spontaneously switched to reverse, which almost led to a navigation accident with unpredictable consequences.
The little-known episodes of the San Antonio service are an example of the "tin" that takes place where, in theory, this should not be.
You've probably heard of more epic cases before reading this article. Zamvolt, stalled in the Panama Canal. The epic with the aircraft carrier "Ford" (launching - 2013, for the first time was able to crawl out to sea on its own turbines only in 2017, real combat readiness - 20 … twentieth year), it's endless.
But France, sir. At the very first launch into the sea at the newest aircraft carrier “Charles de Gaulle” a propeller blade fell off. All subsequent training campaigns SDG began and ended in the same way: complaints and failure. 2002 - radiation accident, the crew receives fivefold radiation doses. 2008 - The aircraft carrier unexpectedly broke down three months after the overhaul was completed. 2010 - led a detachment of warships. The next day I crawled to Toulon in tow: the entire power supply system on de Gaulle was out of order.
These are the “successes”. Want more?
French super-submarine of the Barracuda class. Fourth generation, unique features. What's in reality? The lead Suffren has not yet been launched. Although exactly TEN years have passed since the laying of the submarine! Y-yes … Strategic missile carriers are being built in Russia in less time.
K-551 "Vladimir Monomakh". Bookmark - 2006. Launching - 2012. In December 2014, St. Andrew's flag was raised on the ship.
SSBN "Prince Vladimir". Laid down in 2012 Launched on November 17, 2017.
SSBNs of project 955 (955A) "Borey" are 170 meters long. A clot of combat matter weighing 15,000 tons. Against the background of such a bulk, the French "Barracuda" is just a baby: 3, 5 times less displacement, there is no question of any launch of 30-ton missiles from a submarine.
The construction cycle is 6 years. Too much by Western standards, another "analyst" will correct. The Americans launch their Virginias in three years. It is only necessary to point out that three years have passed since the installation of ready-made modules (sections) of the future submarine on the slipway. The real start of construction, metal cutting and manufacturing of mechanisms for an American submarine, usually begins three years before its official "bookmark".
A much more serious point is the number of ships under construction. Here, the American shipyards make the domestic “Sevmash” and “Yantar” clean. In-line production, the annual commissioning of several large combat units - nuclear-powered ships, destroyers, landing ships.
The more pennants, the stronger the fleet. On the one hand, yes. On the other hand, it’s not so simple.
The big closet falls louder
In its current state, the American navy is redundant. Reminds me of the situation with Soviet tanks in 1941.
Billions of contracts, the latest ships. And the real increase in combat effectiveness is by a penny.
The ships go into operation without the equipment provided for by the project. The newest "Zamvolt" was built without a long-range radar, they were ashamed to equip it even with a short-range defense complex. The rest of the destroyers built in the 2010s also have a reduced composition of weapons. The reasons are cost savings, as well as the lack of technical readiness of promising systems.
At one time, the same practice "sinned" the Soviet Navy, which is customary to raise the standard. Head BOD pr. 1155 ("Udaloy") until the end of his days went without air defense equipment. The second ship of the series ("Vice-Admiral Kulakov") also entered service with one air defense system, instead of the two laid down according to the project. It received an additional air defense system only 30 years later: during the modernization in 2010, it was installed on it, in general senseless as the main air defense system, the Gibka-2 complex.
By the way, the modern Russian Navy does not do such nonsense. On the contrary, military experts are expressing concern about the overloading of ships with various weapons. Often not matching the official rank of the ship in terms of power.
The armament of the "Thundering" corvette (project 20385) includes a zonal air defense missile system "Redut" (the range of destruction is tens of kilometers), eight "Calibers", artillery and anti-submarine weapons, a helicopter, and also three (!) Sonar stations. In terms of its capabilities, the Russian “corvette” (TFR, a ship of the 3rd rank) is approaching the western destroyers.
Our “incredible allies” have all the berths filled with ships for which there are currently no combat missions. Following the number of crews, the number of admiral posts is growing. And the level of personnel training is declining. The ships are controlled by just anyone; in 2017 alone, there were three incidents with destroyers.
The Russian Navy has the opposite problem. The number of missions is multiplying every day: "Syrian express trains", a battle group in the Mediterranean Sea, Baltic shallow waters, launches of "Caliber", the Arctic and the Far Eastern frontier, then - everywhere. And there are clearly not enough ships.
But this is only at first glance. Despite endless complaints, any task set objectively receives a worthy decision from the Russian Navy.
With the support of the military operation in Syria, the elderly BDK cope better than the 11 notorious AUGs and the armada of the US Navy amphibious forces. Or does anyone have doubts about this?
Unanimously.
And if so, then the current composition of the fleet corresponds to the tasks facing it. According to the plans, rearmament is underway, the fleet receives new ships (more on this below).
The conclusion is consistent with the numbers. As of November 2017, the Navy had 211 pennants. Among them there are 48 nuclear submarines, 6 missile cruisers (one in the process of modernization), 16 large anti-submarine ships (BOD) and destroyers - surface ships of the ocean zone. As well as 21 large landing ships.
Some of the ships are under repair. This is fine. Those same Yankees will hardly be able to simultaneously bring five out of ten “Nimitzes” into the sea.
The figure of 211 combat units in itself refutes any myths about the weakness and insignificance of the Russian fleet.
The Navy even has its own aircraft carrier. A completely real and combat-ready aircraft carrier. Last winter, the air wing of the TAVKR "Admiral Kuznetsov" inflicted 1,500 strikes on the targets of IS terrorists (prohibited in Russia).
On the way to Syria, the TAVKR set up a dense smoke screen over the English Channel. Only the lazy did not laugh at the Russian "chimney" then. But “Kuznetsov” is not alone. The French "de Gaulle" also had a problem: on the move, vibration and noise in the stern reached 100 dB, a third of the new ship was unsuitable for habitation.
Better, let's laugh together at the "Orlan", which does not leave a smoky trail behind it at all.
Rearmament. Frigates instead of cruisers
Which country's fleet has received a squadron of missile-carrying submarines over the past 5 years? The only country I know is Russia.
Together with three strategic submarine cruisers (+1 under construction, in a high degree of readiness), the ship's composition was replenished with a multipurpose nuclear submarine (K-560, project 885 "Ash"), six diesel-electric submarines and three frigates (actually 4, "Admiral Kasatonov" is ready to the passage of State tests).
These are only the most significant projects. Stars of the first magnitude.
Now many will say that the frigate is not at all what the Russian Navy is worthy of. Where is the former power, where are the cruisers and destroyers?
It is hard to believe from the outside, but the 5000-ton frigate of the early XXI century. superior in combat capabilities to missile cruisers built in the 80s.
What is not on the frigate "Admiral of the Fleet Gorshkov", what could be proud of the 11000-ton cruisers of pr. 1164 ("Moscow", "Marshal Ustinov", "Varyag")?
Instead of 16 "Volcanoes" in two rows, the covers of 16 vertical launchers are hidden behind the peaceful bulwark of the frigate. In each - CD of the "Caliber" family with a range of destruction of targets of 2500 km. Or - an anti-ship option. At the same time, it is far from obvious what constitutes a great danger for the enemy - the Soviet supersonic anti-ship missile system or the subsonic “Caliber” flying over the water itself, accelerating when approaching the target to a speed of ~ Mach 3.
Anti-aircraft armament - 32 "Reduta" launchers, instead of 8 drum launchers of the S-300F complex, with 64 SAM ammunition. Despite the reduction in ammunition, the new missiles allow them to hit targets at twice the range. A multifunctional radar "Polyment" has twice as many missile guidance channels and has no restrictions on the sector of view (4 fixed phased antennas, oriented along the horizon).
The cruiser has two short-range air defense systems of the Osa-M type.
Thanks to the UVP, a modern frigate has considerable flexibility in the use of weapons. Some of the cells can be used to accommodate 9M100 short-range missiles (four in each cell, which will significantly increase the ammunition load).
Given the above, we can talk about the superiority of the frigates over the cruisers of the Soviet era. And the frigates Admiral Gorshkov and Admiral Kasatonov themselves can be considered direct rivals of the American destroyers with the Aegis system.
The designers of the frigate probably saved on the habitability of the personnel. Of course we did. After all, the number of the crew of the new ship is only 200 people. against five hundred on board the RRC.
Autonomy? Meets modern standards for destroyer class ships. 4000 miles is enough to cross the ocean.
Is seaworthiness worse? Hmmm … Do you know how long Christopher Columbus's karakka was? About 30 meters. Tell those sailors about the 135-meter frigate.
Not convinced? Then another example: in terms of displacement, the "Gorshkov" are three times larger than the British destroyers that covered the Arctic convoys.
By the way, on modern ships there are no combat posts on the upper deck. And the conduct of battle in a 9-point storm is excluded for reasons of common sense.
The process of shrinking ships over the past 70 years is an inevitable consequence of automation, the development of electronics and missile weapons. The current heroes are miniature "shells" against the background of the cruisers pr. 68-bis (built in the late 1940s - early 1950s). 18 thousand tons of full military equipment - against 11 thousand for the missile cruiser "Slava" and 5 thousand for the frigate.
Let's sum up
The loud headline "Russia does not need ships" can be paraphrased as follows: "Russia does not need ships, except for those that are in the Navy and are planned to be built in the coming years."
Complaints about the lack of an adequate replacement for aging Soviet-era ships can be left at the General Staff checkpoint. The real state program for the rearmament of the fleet was created taking into account all existing geopolitical conditions, the tasks of the Navy and the capabilities of the military-industrial complex.
Leave alone the dreams of "nuclear super destroyers and a" promising aircraft carrier ". They will build it when at least some adequate need and meaning appears in this. Currently, we are witnessing the obvious (for some - incredible): modest ships cope with serious strategic tasks better than all the fleets of "incredible allies".
If we have already started talking about the prospects, then, objectively, the only type of large surface ship that could prove himself to the fullest in the conduct of hostilities (on the example of recent events with the participation of the Navy - Syria and South Ossetia), is the American concept of the strike "Zamvolta". I'm not even talking about how much noise such a “gunboat” could make in the Baltic, overexciting our Baltic neighbors.
Otherwise, what's the point of building ships without a clear concept of their use?
Well, I said everything I wanted to. Now is the time for your fair criticism.
