Starting from the day the world learned about the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) of US President R. Reagan, and to the present time, a considerable amount of science (and unscientific) fiction on the topic of "Star Wars" has moved into professional military-political publications and even statements of the highest military leaders. Some directly argue that "… an attack from space now decides everything and decides in a very short time."
Let's try, however, to figure out what should be considered real and what are imaginary, and it is possible or impossible to cope with the first.
POTENTIAL ARENA FOR ARMED FIGHT
Today, more than 125 countries are involved in space activities. The leaders here are the United States and Russia, a growing role is played by France, China, Japan, Germany, Great Britain, Canada, India, Pakistan, Argentina are increasingly active. In near-earth space there are about 780 spacecraft (SC), of which 425 belong to the United States, 102 - Russia, 22 - China. By 2015, the number of orbital constellations will increase by more than 400 satellites.
The security of military, dual and civilian orbital systems has become an essential component of the overall security, economic and scientific activities of practically all developed countries. Space systems are an integral part of the combat potential of the armed forces of leading countries. Operating military spacecraft make up about 40% of the total number of orbiters. The overwhelming majority of them belong to the United States, whose allocations for military space programs are much larger than all other space states combined.
Given the persistence of political and military contradictions between the leading powers and alliances of states, as well as rapid scientific and technological progress, space, due to its growing peaceful and military importance, in the near future may become a new arena for an arms race, the possible use of force and even terrorist acts.
At the same time, in comparison with other spaces of military operations (land, sea, air), space is characterized by the greatest restrictions. They are due to both the objective laws of astrodynamics, discovered by Newton and Kepler, and the enormous cost and technical complexity of space activities (predictability of orbits, precession, rotation of the Earth and orbital rotation of the satellites themselves, the most severe weight and size and resource constraints for spacecraft, the inherent fragility of their design, high energy consumption of launch and maneuvering, etc.).
This explains the fact that until now space vehicles provide only information support for the armed forces used in the three traditional environments of military operations, as well as ballistic missiles and missile defense systems that are not deployed in outer space (that is, in near-earth orbits).
SPACE WEAPONS: HISTORY AND CURRENT STATE
As a zone of "transit" and testing of weapons, outer space was used already in the 50-60s of the last century - first for nuclear tests, the passage of ballistic missiles, and then for their interception by anti-missile defense systems. However, the deployment of weapons for direct use in space and from space has not taken on a large scale.
In the Soviet Union, the main elements of an anti-satellite system (PSS) based on ballistic missiles were created by 1967, then tested at altitudes up to 1000 km, and in 1978, under the designation "IS-M" (later "IS-MU"), the complex was adopted for service. The last of twenty tests of the system (including five on real targets) took place on June 18, 1982. In August 1983, the USSR committed itself not to be the first to launch any types of such weapons into outer space. The IS-MU complex remained in operation until 1993, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree withdrawing it from service. Until the beginning of the 90s, the Contact system was being developed, designed to destroy spacecraft at altitudes up to 600 km. MiG-31 fighters were used as carriers of interceptor missiles.
A powerful intensification of work on space weapons took place in the USSR in the early 1980s in connection with the American Strategic Defense Initiative program, announced by President R. Reagan on March 23, 1983. Dozens of very expensive Soviet R&D and R&D projects were structured according to symmetric and asymmetric measures and formalized in the form of the SK-1000, D-20 and SP-2000 programs. In the early 1990s, these programs were largely phased out.
For today's Russia, in the foreseeable future, the implementation of such large-scale projects is impossible due to the collapse of cooperatives of developers and limited financial resources. However, in the event of the start of the deployment of space weapons in the United States, a certain part of the programs, especially those concerning asymmetric measures, may be revived.
In the United States, work on anti-satellite systems began in 1957. In the 1980s, an aircraft-based MSS based on the F-15 fighter and the SREM-Altair satellite interceptor missile was developed and successfully tested (at altitudes up to 1000 km) in 1984-1985. The system was mothballed in 1988. Currently, in the stage of R&D, ground and flight tests, the most readily available MSS based on a modified sea-based anti-missile system "Aegis" (Aegis) with missiles "Standard-3" (SM-3), tested with the interception of a satellite in February 2008 year. Also being developed army MSSs of land mobile basing (KEASat), laser anti-satellite and anti-missile systems of air basing (ABL), ground anti-satellite laser complex "MIRAKL" are being tested. A number of systems are in the stage of search R&D and R&D, in particular, space-based electronic countermeasures (RED), autonomous micro-spacecraft designed to protect and diagnose malfunctions of US spacecraft.
The project of a system for destroying objects on Earth from space appeared in 1987 in the form of a space-based gliding vehicle (SBGV). In 2010, another version of the X-37B (X-37B) system of this type, a compact unmanned aerospace shuttle, was tested. However, the operational and strategic feasibility of such systems in modern conditions raises great doubts. There are no combat missions that could be solved by a space-based or partially orbital-type system more efficiently and / or cheaper than using existing nuclear and high-precision conventional missile (ballistic and aerodynamic) and ground, air and sea-based aircraft.
In addition to the United States and Russia, China has joined the work on anti-satellite weapons. In 2007, it became known about the first successful (after three previous failures) test of anti-satellite weapons in the PRC - the fact of intercepting the Chinese spacecraft "Fenyun-1-3" at an altitude of 860 km was established.
POWER STRATEGIC CONCEPTS AND INTERESTS
In January 2001, the Commission on Space Affairs, authorized by the US Congress, set three tasks for placing weapons in space: protecting existing US space systems, preventing the enemy from using space, and striking from space against any targets on earth, at sea or in the air. In the same vein, in 2006, US President George W. Bush approved the guidance document "National Space Policy". The stake was placed on the unconditional superiority of the United States in the development of space weapons of all types and on the rejection of any restrictions in this area.
After the arrival of the administration of President Barack Obama in June 2010, a new "US National Space Policy" was approved. While, as before, it is focused on maintaining American leadership in scientific and technological terms and in ensuring security (including the advanced development of intelligence, communications, and navigation systems), at the same time it focuses on close international cooperation, free access to space for all countries, openness and transparency of actions in the space sector. This is a significant difference from the space doctrine of the previous administration. It was also stated that the United States is ready to consider proposals for the control of space weapons, if they are equal, verifiable and improve the security of the United States.
There is no doubt that the United States has deployed the largest "assets" in space, on which both its peaceful life and the functioning of its strategic and general-purpose forces depend. Therefore, the United States, firstly, is much more interested than others in the security of its orbital systems and, secondly, it is much more interested in ensuring the safety of its own spacecraft than in creating a threat to the satellites of other countries. Apparently, this is why the United States, far ahead of other powers in space weapons technology, has so far limited itself to individual experiments, but has not embarked on a wide deployment of space weapon systems in combat strength, relying on the "side" anti-satellite potential of strategic and operational-tactical missile defense systems. …
Due to financial constraints and organizational and technical problems of the defense industry complex, the current Russian military space programs are significantly inferior to the American ones in terms of scale and degree of development. However, insistent recommendations on the need to create space weapons in Russia, primarily MSS, are increasingly appearing in the professional press and in various forums. This is justified by the tasks of direct counteraction to the space systems of information support of the current high-precision conventional weapons of the United States, and in the future - by the goals of combating the orbital vehicles of their possible space missile defense.
In 2006, probably in response to a challenge from the United States, the President of the Russian Federation approved the Concept of Aerospace Defense. It seems that in light of the importance of the topic, the time has come to adopt and publish a comprehensive Russian concept of national space policy.
Probably, China objectively has similar interests to Russia in this area, although its priorities may differ. Perhaps the PRC is less concerned about US precision-guided conventional weapons, but more than Russia is concerned about US space missile defense projects due to the relative limitations of its nuclear deterrent potential.
DRAFT AGREEMENTS AND SUBJECT OF AGREEMENTS
At present, space law does not prohibit the placement in space of any non-weapons of mass destruction (WMD) weapon prohibited under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. There is also no ban on anti-satellite weapons of any kind. After the US withdrawn from the ABM Treaty in 2002, the testing and deployment of space-based missile defense systems or their components in space has not been limited in any way.
On February 12, 2008, Russia and China jointly submitted for consideration by the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva a draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Use of Force or Threat of Force against Space Objects (DPROK). Prior to this, the problem has been discussed here for over five years. In accordance with article II of the draft PPWT, the participating States undertake not to launch any objects with any type of weapon into orbit around the Earth, not to install such weapons on celestial bodies and not to place such weapons in outer space in any other way, not to resort to the use of force or threat force against space objects.
At the same time, systems of the "Earth-to-space" class, which are the most rapidly developing and can enter the combat strength in the foreseeable period, are not included in the subject of the treaty. Instead, only space-based missile defense, MSS and space-to-Earth systems are affected, which are more distant, if ever, ever created. This is a significant departure from the Soviet position of the 1980s, which was not very realistic, but all-encompassing. The RF-PRC initiative has brought some positive results, but rather in a political and propaganda vein, and not as a step towards the practical limitation of space weapons.
The long-term experience of initiatives and negotiations on this issue testifies that among diplomats and experts there are huge ambiguities and discrepancies even regarding the very subject of contractual and legal regulation. It is more or less generally accepted that space weapons are weapons designed and tested for strikes against any targets and at the same time based on space objects (that is, having completed at least one full revolution in near-earth orbit), as well as weapons of any kind based on, created and tested for strikes against space objects (that is, having completed at least one revolution in near-earth orbit). Thus, any ground, sea and air-based ballistic missiles and missile defense systems are excluded, since they do not make a complete revolution around the Earth and do not intercept targets that have made such a revolution.
This kind of definition of space weapons is very broad in scope. The disadvantage is that it is formulated by referring to the environment of their basing (space) and to the environment of finding the targets of destruction (space), and not to the specific technical characteristics of the weapon. By analogy, one can imagine how intractable the task of disarmament measures would be if the subject of the agreements were designated, say, "any sea-based weapon or weapon to destroy naval targets." Another drawback is the blurring of the boundaries of the definition. For example, the same aforementioned American system "X-37B" can be considered a space weapon when tested with a full revolution around the Earth, but not with a partially orbital test.
The experience of successful negotiations on disarmament in the past has always been built around the fixed technical characteristics of weapons systems and the agreed designations of their types and types. For example, under the new START Treaty of 2010, a cruise missile “means a missile that is an unmanned weapon delivery vehicle equipped with its own propulsion system, the flight of which along most of its trajectory is ensured through the use of aerodynamic lift” (Protocol, Ch. 1, p. 21). Moreover, missiles tested for a range of over 600 km are classified as strategic ALCMs.
At present, there are no such characteristics in relation to space weapons due to the wide variety, multi-purpose and different stages of development of such systems.
A particular difficulty is the prohibition of destruction systems based on directional energy transfer, primarily lasers. Their damaging effect varies widely depending on the energy of the radiation, the area of the reflector, the distance to the target and the transmission medium of the beam. They can be used both to destroy satellites and ballistic missiles, as well as to detect, probe and identify objects in space, on the ground and under water, target other weapon systems, and in the future - for the rapid transfer of a huge amount of information, that is, for communication.
A complex "patchwork" is created by strategic missile defense systems of any kind, which have an immanent anti-satellite potential at orbital heights up to about 1000 km. In addition to intercepting missiles at an early stage of the acceleration section of the trajectory and the final section of the entry into the atmosphere, targets for missile defense systems fly through the same space environment in which most spacecraft rotate in orbits with an apogee within 1000 km. Satellites in these orbits move slightly faster than the final stages and missile warheads (about 8 km / s and 5-7 km / s, respectively), but otherwise they are easier targets for interception.
Unfortunately, the draft DPROK RF - PRC from 2008 does not answer any of the above questions, and the problem of control does not concern at all.
CONTROL PROBLEMS
For practical disarmament, in contrast to declarative propaganda, control over the observance of agreements is the most important and indispensable condition. In most of the previous and existing disarmament treaties, the center of gravity of control falls on the phase of deployment and stay of weapon systems in combat composition (ABM Treaty, SALT-1, START-1, RSD-RMD, CFE Treaty, CWC, Prague START Treaty). The 1967 Outer Space Treaty also refers to this phase (in terms of non-deployment of weapons of mass destruction in outer space), but does not provide for any control measures.
To a much lesser extent, the control measures of the aforementioned disarmament treaties cover the stage of testing weapons systems (as applied to the CFE Treaty, they do not cover at all). The exceptions were START-1, according to which missile tests were tightly controlled (including a ban on encryption of telemetry information), as well as the CTBT, which is fully related to testing. As for the stage of creation, that is, the development of weapons systems before the test stage, it was not affected by any treaty, except for the ABM Treaty (causing great controversy), as well as the CWC and the BTWC, and the latter was never provided with a control system.
Unlike historical experience, space weapons are the most difficult to prohibit or restrict at the stage of deployment and stay in combat strength, especially when it comes to deployment in space, as in the DPROK project of 2008. It would be extremely difficult to identify prohibited satellites with weapons on board among the approximately 800 spacecraft in different orbits with the help of the national technical means of monitoring (NTSC). It is even more difficult to prove their belonging to a prohibited type without inspection in space or descent to Earth, which is hardly acceptable to states. The same applies to the pre-launch inspection of a payload, which can reveal military or commercial secrets.
As for land, air or sea-based space weapons, which are most likely in the foreseeable future (but are not affected by the DPROK project of 2008), the picture here is ambiguous. The easiest way would be to prohibit systems like the Soviet IS-MU by the method of prohibiting some types of ICBMs (for example, partially orbital). With regard to aircraft-based systems such as the American F-15 SREM-Altair system deployed in the 1980s and the Soviet development of the PSS based on the MiG-31 fighter, control would be difficult due to the multi-purpose and massive presence of such aircraft in the combat composition, as well as small dimensions of interceptor missiles, allowing storage in airfield storage facilities. Of course, such MSS have special guidance systems, but their prohibition would "invade" the general control infrastructure of the space complex and therefore is unrealistic.
PROSPECTS FOR AGREEMENTS
Negotiations to ban space weapons can become a practical task in the context of resuscitating the entire disarmament process, especially if the Obama administration begins in practice to revise the US military space policy. In this case, taking into account the past experience, it will probably be necessary to re-approach the subject, format and methods of contractual and legal regulation.
It is pertinent to recall that the practical basis of the strategic arms treaties was not the abstract peaceful aspirations of the powers, but the balance of asymmetric military interests of the parties (for example, limiting mobile and heavy ICBMs in exchange for limiting ALCMs and SLBMs under START I). In the space sphere, an obvious balance of such interests of the parties could be the prohibition or severe restriction of anti-satellite systems in exchange for refusal to develop space missile defense systems, meaning space-based strike systems (interceptors). The first is beneficial to the United States, and the second to Russia and China. In such a treaty format, the technical "patchwork" of missile defense and missile defense systems, which makes it difficult to ban one without banning the other, can contribute to measures to limit them in aggregate. (The problem of strategic high-precision conventional systems through space cannot be resolved - this is the subject of other negotiations.)
Instead of a ban on deployment and as a way of indirectly solving this problem, the agreement could consist in a ban on testing any orbital-based anti-satellite systems and strike missile defense systems (interceptor systems of any kind). In this case, we are talking about tests with the actual destruction of a target satellite, or a ballistic missile, or its elements on a flight path, which were carried out in the USSR in the 60-80s, in the USA - in the 80s and in 2008, and in China in 2007. Undoubtedly, without full-scale tests, such complex and innovative systems will not be deployed in the combat composition of the space forces.
Control over such an agreement can rely on the NTSC of the parties, preferably in combination with measures of facilitation and some transparency. For example, the existing notification format for all rocket launches, including space ones, should be confirmed and expanded. At the same time, this will reduce the now growing threat of "space debris".
The elimination of old satellites, if they pose a threat of a fall, should take place under the supervision of the other side (s) and with the provision of sufficient information so as not to raise suspicions about the conduct of covert MSS tests, like the American intercept of the spacecraft in 2008.
The original contract could have a limited duration (say 10-15 years renewable). The format of the agreement could at the first stage include the United States, Russia and, preferably, the PRC, and envisage in the future the possibility of joining other powers.
After 30 years of negotiations, there is hardly any reason to hope for a single, comprehensive treaty on outer space following the model of the 1967 Treaty, BTWC or CWC. In all respects, the subject of space non-armament is rather similar to the limitation and reduction of strategic arms. Therefore, the version of the original agreement proposed above is, of necessity, partial and selective. The same was, by the way, with the SALT-1 Temporary Agreement of 1972 and the SALT-2 Treaty of 1979. Without going through those natural stages, the parties would never have reached such unprecedented agreements on disarmament and transparency as the INF-RMD Treaty of 1987, START I of 1991 and the Prague START Treaty of 2010.
Having entered the era of globalization, the world is faced with ever new security problems, the solution of which is impossible on a unilateral basis, let alone a military force. To solve these problems, interaction of the leading powers and all responsible states of the world is urgently required, including cooperation in the use of outer space to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, suppression of international terrorism, multilateral peacekeeping operations, control over disarmament, effective measures in relation to climate and environmental problems in general., energy and food security.
This presupposes the imperative to start practical negotiations without delay in order to reach realistic international agreements that prevent outer space from becoming a theater of armed rivalry, incidents and conflicts.
