In the "Fleet" section, a number of articles have been published that inspire certain fears for the immature minds of the younger generation. It is clear that spring is in the yard, and the Unified State Exam will soon come, but no one forbids learning to think logically before rushing to multiply the first numbers that come across.
Don't count where you need to, and count where you can't. To carry out rigorous calculations, no less rigorous initial data are required. And the more complex the system, the more various factors influencing the result. It is impossible to make scientific calculations without accurate information about the layout of the warship, the distribution of loads on its decks and platforms, without specific values of the load items, without taking into account the elongation of the hull and the shape of the contours of its underwater part.
At the amateur level, the calculation of the exact parameters is not possible. This should be done by those whose professional duties include such calculations.
We can only draw general conclusions and find potential solutions to problems, focusing on known facts about similar designs. Not knowing all the coefficients and initial data, publishing the results accurate to the third decimal place is a sure sign of falsification of facts and pseudoscience.
The simplest example: the calculation of the reliability of the ship's weapons systems according to the scheme GEM - MSA - UVP. The author of the calculation hardly guessed that when firing from the Mk.41 installation, air at a pressure of 225 psi was required. inch (15 atm.) and continuous seawater cooling - 1050 gpm. Burk's armament will immediately fail if the pump and main compressor of the HFC-134a are damaged.
But this was not taken into account in the presented calculations.
The reliability of the system is reduced for all modern ships. No wonder. To disable the long-range air defense of the Cleveland cruiser, you must either destroy all 6 127-mm AUs, or 2 KDPs, or the power industry (supplying electricity to the KDP and AU drives). The destruction of one control room or several AU does not lead to a complete system failure.
Damage to the main switchboard or fuse compartment immediately brought a WWII cruiser to the brink of death. So you don't need to wishful thinking. Critical systems exist on any ship - now or 70 years ago. And they have a stronger relationship than it might seem from the outside.
The role of electricity in the combat capability of WWII ships is incomparably less, because even if the power supply is disconnected, the fire may continue with manual supply of shells and rough guidance by means of optics …
There were no volunteers to rotate the 300-ton tower by hand. However, if they wanted to, they would not have deployed even the universal AU of the Cleveland cruiser.
… armored ancestors could only fire cannons within sight. And modern ships are versatile and capable of destroying targets hundreds of kilometers away. Such a qualitative leap is accompanied by certain losses, including the complication of weapons and as a consequence, reduced reliability, increased vulnerability, and increased sensitivity to failures.
Gyro speakers and multi-ton analog computers of WWII ships broke down from the slightest shock.
Anyone who undertook to compare the reliability of weapons of ships of different eras, somehow took into account the difference between the sensitive mechanics of gyroscopic KDP devices and modern microcircuits, extremely resistant to strong shocks and vibrations? No? Then what kind of “scientificness” can such a “calculation” claim?
Today, knocking out a ship from active combat can be just turning off its radar.
In the old days, when the ship was de-energized, sailors could manually fire from 20-mm anti-aircraft guns. Modern destroyers also have autonomous short-range air defense systems. Instead of primitive "Erlikons" - automatic "Falanx" with its own fire control radar, mounted on a single gun carriage.
He will not leave the battle soon. A modern destroyer is ready to fight to the last living sailor. On board 70 sets of "Stingers" (if someone thinks that this is ridiculous, compare the capabilities of MANPADS with the characteristics of the RIM-116 or "Dagger").
Autonomous "Phalanxes". Automatic "Bushmasters" with manual guidance. Finally, the damaged destroyer can separate "independent combat modules" - two helicopters capable of searching for submarines and shooting at surface targets with "Hellfires" and "Penguins".
A touching moment was the acquaintance with the "rational" booking scheme proposed by a regular participant in the discussion with the nickname Alex_59. He was not taken aback and calculated the local protection for a modern destroyer of the "Berk" class. Based on the calculation - 10% of the standard displacement, 788 tons of armor steel.
What happened is shown in the illustration:
It would seem that everything is obvious: 788 tons were spent in the void. "Protection" turned out in the form of small "patches", unable to cover even a quarter of the side area. However, the following became clear: in 3D space, each of the rectangles is a parallelepiped. Simply - a box without a bottom, with a sidewall thickness of 62 mm.
As a result, there were as many as SEVEN separate strongholds. Are you seriously?
For example, why separate two engine rooms (each with its own internal traverse bulkhead), if you can simply combine them into a single protected compartment. And the weight of the internal traverse bulkheads should be spent on protecting the gap between the compartments (so that nothing gets in there).
The same applies to the protection of UVP, art. cellar and combat information center. I am not even talking about booking the Falanxes' beds, which does not make any sense at all.
Why fence numerous 60-mm traverses and citadels, if the specified 800 tons can be spent on continuous 60-mm side protection (citadel length 100 m, belt height 8 m) and two traverses washing the citadel.
Otherwise, we come to a paradoxical conclusion. Only 700-800 tons (10% of the standard displacement of a modern destroyer) is enough to ensure complete protection of both sides, from the design air line to the upper deck. With a thickness of armor plates of 60 mm, which is quite enough to prevent the penetration of any anti-ship missiles of NATO countries (Otomat, Harpoon, Exocet) into the hull and to protect the ship from the wreckage of the downed Brahmos.
And how does all this agree with the conclusions of the same author?
Any attempt to stretch the armor over these volumes leads to such a thinning of the armor that it turns into foil.
Try nibbling on 60mm Krupp hardened steel “foil”. With a Brinell hardness over 250 units. To make it clearer: on the same scale, wood has a hardness of 1-2 units, a copper coin - 35. Their ultimate strengths have approximately the same ratio.
What is the citadel for? The sailors have something to protect, except for the CIC, the UVP and two military units. Offhand:
- sailors 'quarters and officers' cabins of personnel;
- pumps and compressors;
- posts of struggle for survivability;
- a cellar of aircraft weapons (40 small-sized torpedoes, aircraft anti-ship missiles "Penguin" and UR "Hellfire", blocks of NURS and other aircraft weapons);
- mentioned UVP, mechanisms and turbines of power plant;
- three power plants with switchboards and transformers;
- air ducts, electrical cables and data exchange lines between the destroyer posts …
There is one more unaccounted point. In addition to 130 tons of Kevlar anti-splinter protection, starting with the destroyer Mahan, the Yankees are installing five additional 1-inch (25 mm) thick armor bulkheads in the hull. Covers of UVP launch cells also have protection from 25 mm plates.
Now look what an interesting trick. How many hundreds of tons can be saved if the armor plates are included in the hull power set?
As for the eternal questions about horizontal protection and the possibility of performing a "slide" followed by a blow to the deck, did anyone say that the deck always has worse protection than the sides?
To do this, it is enough to provide a blockage of the sides, which will automatically reduce the deck area. And just redesign the ship. By the way, the "slide" maneuver itself is also not sugar, its implementation is possible only at subsonic speeds.
The Atlanta and Arleigh Burke examples are initially flawed. The creators of these ships did not expect to install constructive protection, and all attempts to calculate the armor make no sense. For this, I repeat, a new ship is needed. With a different layout (similar to the one in the picture), a different hull lengthening and a completely rebuilt superstructure.
As for the dispute about the percentage of armor protection in the articles of the ship's load, it is also not worth the candle. All examples with “Tashkent”, “Yubari”, etc. are incorrect. Because load items are a variable function. And it depends on the priorities of the designers.
The French cruisers "Dupuis de Lom" and "Admiral Charnay" with a displacement of 4700 and 6700 tons each carried 1.5 thousand tons of armor (21% and 25%, respectively). As for the volumes for placing the electronics - show a modern frigate with three steam engines, armored control tower, turrets (with 200-mm protection) and a crew of 500+ people.
