The Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Vietnamese People's Army were officially formed on May 1, 1959. However, the actual formation of anti-aircraft units began in the late 40s during the anti-colonial uprising, which soon turned into a full-scale national liberation war.
Vietnamese partisan formations conducted successful offensive operations on the ground, but their actions were strongly constrained by French aviation. At first, the Vietnamese detachments did not have specialized anti-aircraft weapons, and the Vietnamese could only oppose bomb and assault attacks from small arms and the art of camouflage in the jungle. In order to avoid losses from air raids, Vietnamese guerrillas often attacked strong points occupied by French troops at night, ambushes in the jungle, arranged along the supply routes of the French garrisons, gave very good results. As a result, the French were forced to use transport aircraft for the supply and transfer of troops and spend considerable forces on the protection and defense of air bases.
In 1948, the French command tried to turn the tide in Indochina in their favor. In order to encircle the partisans, capture or physically eliminate the Viet Minh leadership, several large airborne assault forces were landed. The paratroopers were supported by Spitfire Mk. IX fighters and SBD-5 Dauntless carrier-based dive bombers operating from the aircraft carrier Arromanches and ground airfields. During the operation, which took place from November 29, 1948 to January 4, 1949, the Dontless made the same number of bombing missions as the entire aviation of the expeditionary force for the whole of 1948. However, despite the involvement of large forces and significant costs, the operation did not achieve its goal, and the partisan detachments avoided the encirclement, evading a direct collision with the paratroopers and disappeared into the jungle. At the same time, the pilots of the Dontless and Spitfires noted the increased intensity of anti-aircraft countermeasures. Now, in addition to small arms, 25-mm Type 96 anti-aircraft machine guns, inherited from the Japanese army and captured from the French, 12, 7-mm Browning M2 machine guns and 40-mm Bofors L / 60 anti-aircraft machine guns were now fired at the planes. Although due to the lack of experience of the Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners, the accuracy of the fire was low, French aircraft regularly returned from combat missions with holes. In total, by the end of 1949, the partisans had shot down three and damaged more than two dozen aircraft. Several aircraft, which received combat damage, crashed during the landing approach.
I must say that the French aviation group was quite motley. In addition to the Spitfire Mk. IX and SBD-5 Dauntless, captured Japanese Ki-21, Ki-46, Ki-51 and Ki-54 were involved in bombing and assault attacks on rebel positions. The former German transport aircraft J-52 and C-47 Skytrain, received from the Americans, were used as bombers. In the second half of 1949, worn-out Japanese and British-made aircraft were replaced by American P-63C Kingkobra fighters. Due to the presence on board a 37-mm cannon, four large-caliber machine guns and the ability to carry a bomb load weighing 454 kg, the R-63S were capable of delivering powerful bomb and assault strikes. However, the partisans did not sit idly by either; in 1949, after Mao Zedong came to power in China, the Vietnamese communists began to receive military assistance. In addition to small arms and mortars, 12.7-mm DShK anti-aircraft machine guns and 37-mm 61-K anti-aircraft machine guns appeared at their disposal. Already in January 1950, near the border with the PRC, the first Kingcobra was shot down by dense 37-mm anti-aircraft guns. As the guerrillas gained experience, the effectiveness of anti-aircraft fire from small arms increased. In small detachments, where there were no specialized anti-aircraft guns, heavy and light machine guns were used to repel air raids, and they also practiced concentrated salvo firing at one aircraft. Often this led to the fact that the French pilots, having come under heavy fire, preferred not to risk it and got rid of the combat load, dropping it from a great height.
The small arms of the partisans were very diverse. At first, the Viet Minh detachments were armed mainly with Japanese and French-made rifles and machine guns. After the establishment of diplomatic relations in January 1950, the Soviet Union began to provide military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. At the same time, a significant amount of German small arms captured by Soviet troops as trophies during the Great Patriotic War were transferred to the Vietnamese in the 50s. Cartridges for rifles and machine guns produced in Germany came from the PRC, where weapons of caliber 7, 92 × 57 mm were officially in service.
At the beginning of the 50s, the French transferred the F6F-5 Hellcat carrier-based fighters received from the United States to Indochina. In general, this machine was well suited for counterinsurgency operations. In front of the anti-aircraft fire, the pilot was covered by a powerful and reliable radial air-cooled engine. And the built-in armament of six large-caliber machine guns made it possible to mow real clearings in the jungle. The external combat load weighing up to 908 kg included 227 kg of aerial bombs and 127-mm rockets. Also, four dozen American-made B-26 Invader twin-engined bombers operated against the partisans in Vietnam. This highly successful bomber proved to be a very effective anti-insurgency aircraft. It could carry 1,800 kg of bombs, and in the front hemisphere there were up to eight 12.7 mm machine guns. Simultaneously with military vehicles, the French received military transport C-119 Flying Boxcar from the United States in the form of military assistance. Which were used to drop napalm tanks, supply isolated garrisons and parachute landing. However, after several C-47 and C-119 were shot down by the fire of 37-mm anti-aircraft guns, Vietnamese anti-aircraft gunners weaned pilots of military transport aircraft from flying at an altitude of less than 3000 m.
In the first half of 1951, F8F Bearcat fighters began to take part in airstrikes. It was at this time that the Birkats began to be removed from service by the US Navy and were donated to the French. F8F carrier-based fighters of the later series were armed with four 20-mm cannons and could carry 908 kg of bombs and NAR.
In the role of "strategic" bombers, the French used six PB4Y-2 Privateer heavy anti-submarine aircraft. This machine, created on the basis of the B-24 Liberator long-range bomber, could carry a bomb load weighing 5800 kg. Taking into account the carrier-based aircraft based on French aircraft carriers, more than 300 fighters and bombers operated against the Vietnamese. But, despite the high intensity of the air strikes, the French expeditionary contingent failed to turn the tide of hostilities in Indochina.
In the spring of 1953, Vietnamese communist detachments began operating in neighboring Laos. In response, the French command decided to cut the supply routes of the partisans, and near the border with Laos, in the area of the village of Dien Bien Phu, created a large military base with an airfield, where six reconnaissance aircraft and six fighters were based. The total number of the garrison was 15 thousand. In March 1954, the battle for Dien Bien Phu began, which became the decisive battle in this war. For anti-aircraft cover of the advancing Vietnamese troops with a total number of about 50 thousand, more than 250 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and 12, 7-mm machine guns were used.
Simultaneously with the start of the offensive operation, Vietnamese saboteurs destroyed 78 combat and transport aircraft at the Gia Lam and Cat Bi airbases, which significantly worsened the capabilities of the French contingent. Attempts to supply the Dien Bien Phu garrison from the air were suppressed by strong anti-aircraft fire. After how many planes were shot down and damaged during the landing approach, the goods began to be dropped by parachute, but the drop accuracy was low and about half of the supplies went to the besiegers. Despite the efforts of the French pilots, they were unable to stop the Vietnamese offensive rush. During the siege of Dien Bien Phu, 62 combat and transport aircraft were shot down by anti-aircraft guns and another 167 were damaged.
On May 7, 1954, the Dien Bien Phu garrison surrendered. 10 863 French soldiers and Asians who fought on their side surrendered. All equipment located in Dien Bien Phu was either destroyed or captured. The grouping of French troops in Indochina suffered serious losses in manpower, equipment and weapons. In addition, the surrender of a large garrison caused great damage to the prestige and influence of France at the international level. The result of the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, which in Vietnam is considered to be its Stalingrad, was the beginning of peace negotiations and the withdrawal of French troops from Indochina. After the official cessation of hostilities, according to the agreement concluded in Geneva, Vietnam was divided into two parts along the 17th parallel, with the regrouping of the Vietnamese People's Army to the north and the forces of the French Union to the south. In 1956, free elections and the unification of the country were envisaged. In October 1955, as a result of the proclamation in the southern part of the Republic of Vietnam and the refusal to hold free elections, the implementation of the Geneva Agreements was thwarted.
Realizing that while the country will not be divided into two parts of the world in the region, the DRV leadership used the respite to strengthen its defenses. In the late 1950s, the construction of a centralized air defense system for North Vietnam began. Batteries of 85 and 100 mm anti-aircraft guns with radar guidance and searchlight installations appeared around Hanoi. The total number of 37-100-mm anti-aircraft guns available in the DRV in 1959 exceeded 1000 units. The regular units of the Vietnamese army were saturated with Soviet-made equipment and weapons. Taking into account the experience of fighting French aviation, special attention was paid to the skills of firing at air targets from small arms. In the late 50s, several groups of Vietnamese cadets were sent to study in the USSR and the PRC. At the same time, the construction of runways, aircraft shelters, repair shops, fuel depots and aviation weapons was underway. At the beginning of the 60s, several radar posts were already functioning in the DRV, equipped with P-12 and P-30 radars. In 1964, two training centers were formed in the vicinity of Hanoi, in which Soviet specialists trained Vietnamese air defense calculations.
The first North Vietnamese combat aircraft to achieve aerial victory was the T-28 Trojan piston trainer, which was actively used as a light counter-guerrilla aircraft during the Vietnam War. The two-seater Troyan developed a speed of 460 km / h and could carry a combat load of up to 908 kg, including heavy machine guns in suspended gondolas.
In September 1963, a pilot of the Royal Lao Air Force hijacked the Trojan into the DRV. After the Vietnamese pilots mastered this machine, in January 1964, the T-28 began to be raised to intercept American aircraft, which regularly flew over North Vietnam. Of course, the piston Troyan could not keep up with the jet reconnaissance aircraft, but at night the Americans often flew over the FER on transport aircraft adapted for reconnaissance and special missions. Fortune smiled at the Vietnamese on the night of February 16, 1964, the crew of the T-28, having received target designation from a ground-based radar in the area bordering Laos, in the light of the moon discovered and shot a military transport aircraft C-123 Provider in the air.
In February 1964, the first jet fighters appeared in the DRV, a batch of 36 single-seat MiG-17F and two-seat training MiG-15UTI arrived in Hanoi from the USSR. All aircraft entered the 921st Fighter Aviation Regiment. By the mid-60s, the MiG-17F was no longer the last achievement of the Soviet aviation industry, but with proper use, this fighter could pose a serious danger to more modern combat aircraft.
The advantages of the MiG-17F were ease of control, good maneuverability, simple and reliable design. The fighter's flight speed was close to the sound barrier, and its powerful armament included one 37 and two 23 mm cannons.
Almost simultaneously with the delivery of jet MiGs to North Vietnam, the SA-75M "Dvina" air defense system was sent. It was a simplified export modification of the complex with an anti-aircraft missile guidance station operating in a 10-centimeter range. In the early 60s, the USSR Air Defense Forces already had the S-75M Volkhov anti-aircraft missile systems with a guidance station operating in the 6-cm frequency range. However, in the 60s, the Soviet Union, fearing that more advanced air defense systems could get to China, did not deliver them to Vietnam. Operation of all modifications of "seventy-fives" was hampered by the need to refuel rockets with liquid fuel and an oxidizer.
Nevertheless, the SA-75M air defense system was a valuable acquisition for the air defense of the DRV. The range of destruction of air targets reached 34 km, and the maximum reach in height was 25 km. As part of the anti-aircraft missile division, there were six launchers with ready-to-launch B-750V missiles, another 18 missiles were supposed to be on transport-loading vehicles and in storage facilities. During the combat operation of a division as part of a regiment or brigade, target designations issued from the unit's command post were used to search for air targets. In addition, a separate SA-75M air defense missile system could conduct hostilities independently using the P-12 radar and the PRV-10 radio altimeter attached to it.
At the beginning of the 60s, the object and army air defense of North Vietnam was reinforced with 57-mm S-60 anti-aircraft machine guns with radar guidance and 14, 5-mm single, twin and quad anti-aircraft machine gun mounts.
The fire of ZU-2, ZPU-2 and ZPU-4 was especially disastrous for attack aircraft and combat helicopters operating at low altitudes. 14, 5-mm machine gun mounts are capable of effectively fighting airborne targets covered with armor at ranges up to 1000-1500 m.
Part 14, 5-mm twin anti-aircraft guns in the ZPTU-2 modification were installed on the BTR-40A armored personnel carriers. In addition to Soviet technology, the North Vietnamese army had a number of makeshift SPAAGs in the form of former French 40-mm Bofors L / 60 assault rifles mounted on the chassis of GMC trucks. Also widely used were 12.7 mm ZPU mounted on various vehicles.
At this time, the partisan movement was gaining strength in South Vietnam. Most of the peasants living in the south of the country were dissatisfied with the policies pursued by President Ngo Dinh Diem and supported the Popular Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, whose leaders promised to transfer the land to those who cultivate it. The North Vietnamese communists, seeing no peaceful ways to reunite the country, made a choice in favor of supporting the South Vietnamese partisans. In mid-1959, supplies of weapons and ammunition to the south began. Also, military specialists who grew up in these places and who ended up in the north after the partition of the country went there. At the first stage, the illegal transfer of people and weapons took place through the demilitarized zone, but after the military successes of the communist rebels in Laos, the delivery began to be carried out through Lao territory. This is how the Ho Chi Minh Trail appeared, which ran through Laos and further south, entering Cambodia. In 1960, many rural areas of South Vietnam were under the control of the Viet Cong. Wishing to prevent the expansion of communist influence in Southeast Asia, the Americans intervened in the Vietnamese conflict. The matter was no longer limited to the supply of weapons and financial support, and at the end of 1961, the first two helicopter squadrons were deployed to South Vietnam. However, US aid did not help stop the communist advance. In 1964, the Popular Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam, supported by the DRV, by 1964 controlled over 60% of the country's territory. Against the backdrop of the military successes of the guerrillas and internal political instability in South Vietnam, the Americans began to build up their military presence in Southeast Asia. Already in 1964, almost 8 thousand American troops were stationed in Indochina.
The official beginning of the armed confrontation between the DRV and the United States is considered to be the clash that occurred between the American destroyer USS Maddox (DD-731), the F-8 Crusader fighters called to help him and the North Vietnamese torpedo boats, which took place on August 2, 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin. After the radars of American destroyers allegedly recorded the approach of unidentified ships and opened fire on the night of August 4 during a tropical storm, President Lyndon Johnson ordered air strikes on the bases of North Vietnamese torpedo boats and fuel depots. An A-1H Skyraider piston attack aircraft and an A-4C Skyhawk jet were shot down by anti-aircraft artillery fire.
After the first bombing raids, the flywheel of the war began to unwind, and American reconnaissance and attack aircraft began to appear regularly in the airspace of the DRV. In response to the activity of South Vietnamese partisans in February 1965, two air raids were carried out as part of Operation Flaming Dart. On March 2, 1965, the United States began regular bombing raids on North Vietnam - the Rolling Thunder air operation, the longest US aviation bombing campaign since World War II. In response to this, in July 1965, the DRV and the USSR signed an agreement on helping the USSR in the development of the national economy and strengthening the defense capability of the DRV. After the conclusion of this agreement, military and economic assistance from the Soviet Union increased many times over. China also made a significant contribution to ensuring the defense capability of the DRV during the Vietnam War. By the beginning of 1965, there were 11 regiments in the combat strength of the air defense forces, of which three were attached to radar units. Radar stations were equipped with 18 separate radar companies. The Air Force command had ten operating airfields.
After the start of the massive bombing raids, the main burden of countering American aviation fell on anti-aircraft artillery. Due to the small number and lack of experienced pilots, the North Vietnamese fighter aircraft could not have a noticeable impact on the course of hostilities. Nevertheless, flying on not the most modern fighters, the Vietnamese managed to achieve some success. The main tactic of the MiG-17F pilots was a surprise attack by American strike vehicles at low altitude. Due to the numerical superiority of American combat aircraft, the Vietnamese pilots tried to withdraw from the battle after the attack. The main task was not even to shoot down American fighter-bombers, but to make them get rid of the bomb load and thus protect the covered objects from destruction.
The first air battle of the pilots of the 921st Fighter Aviation Regiment took place on April 3, 1965, when a pair of MiG-17Fs intercepted two Crusaders. According to Vietnamese data, two F-8s were shot down in the Ham Rong area that day. However, the Americans admit that only one carrier-based fighter was damaged in the air battle. The next day, four MiG-17Fs attacked a group of eight F-105D Thunderchief fighter-bombers and shot down two Thunderchiefs. After that, the Americans drew the appropriate conclusions and now the strike group was necessarily accompanied by cover fighters, which flew light without a bomb load and carried only air combat missiles. American pilots of the "air clearing" group, operating in conditions of overwhelming numerical superiority, had good flight training, and not too experienced MiG pilots began to suffer losses. The actions of Vietnamese fighters were also constrained by the fact that ground radar posts, having detected approaching enemy aircraft, notified the anti-aircraft gunners and the Air Force command about this, after which, to minimize losses, they most often turned off their stations. Thus, Vietnamese fighters, which did not have on-board radars, were deprived of information about the air situation and, often being detected by Phantom radars, were subjected to surprise attacks. Having received a warning about the presence of enemy aircraft in the air, its own anti-aircraft artillery often fired at Vietnamese fighters. Soon after the start of the air battles, the Americans deployed EC-121 Warning Star early warning and control aircraft in South Vietnam. Flying radar posts patrolled at a safe distance and could warn American pilots of the appearance of MiGs.
However, the Phantoms were not the main enemy of the air defense forces in the skies of Vietnam. F-105 fighter-bombers carried out approximately 70% of combat missions to bomb targets located in North Vietnam. These aircraft were the priority targets for the MiG-17 pilots.
In order to somehow increase the chances of the Vietnamese for timely detection of enemy aircraft and actions in poor visibility conditions, at the end of 1965, a batch of ten MiG-17PF "interceptors" was sent to the DRV. Visually, this aircraft was distinguished by an influx in the upper part of the air intake. The dielectric fairing covered the antennas of the RP-5 Izumrud radar sight, which provides automatic target tracking at a distance of 2 km.
Instead of a 37 mm gun, a third 23 mm gun was mounted on the MiG-17PF. In addition to the radar sight, the MiG-17PF was distinguished by a number of improvements and was equipped with a warning station about radar exposure "Sirena-2" and a navigation indicator NI-50B. However, by the mid-60s, the RP-5 "Izumrud" radar sight no longer met modern requirements and for this reason the MiG-17PF was not widely used in Vietnam.
As the conflict escalated, the military assistance provided to the DRV by the Soviet Union and China increased. The North Vietnamese Air Force, in addition to Soviet MiG-17F / PF fighters, received Chinese J-5s. The fighters supplied from the PRC were the Chinese version of the MiG-17F. In general, these aircraft had the same flight data and similar weapons as the Soviet prototypes. Simultaneously with the receipt of new fighters at the end of 1965, pilots and technicians who were trained there arrived from the Soviet Union and China.
The Vietnamese carefully studied the tactics of American aviation and analyzed the course of air battles. Purposeful interrogations of downed American pilots were carried out. It soon became clear that the US Air Force and Navy fighter pilots were trying to avoid horizontal battles with the more maneuverable MiG-17s, shifting the air combat to a vertical. The Americans entered the battle in highly open combat formations. In the event of a fight with a single "instant", the Americans tried to use their numerical superiority; when faced with several "moments," they parted in pairs, trying to impose a duel situation on the enemy.
In addition to swept-wing fighters, the USSR supplied the MiG-21F-13, which had a delta wing, to Vietnam from the USSR. The nature of air battles changed in many respects after the appearance in Vietnam of the modern MiG-21F-13 fighters at that time.
The MiG-21F-13 developed a speed of up to 2125 km / h at altitude and was armed with one built-in 30-mm HP-30 cannon with an ammunition capacity of 30 rounds. The armament also included two R-3S close-combat guided missiles with a thermal homing head. The R-3S missile, also known as the K-13, was created on the basis of the American AIM-9 Sidewinder air-to-air missile and could be used at a range of 0.9-7.6 km. However, the effectiveness of the use of missile weapons was reduced by the fact that the first mass modification of the MiG-21 did not include an airborne radar in the avionics. And the aiming of weapons at the target was carried out using an optical sight and a radio range finder. The first air battles with the participation of the MiG-21, which took place in April 1966, showed that the Soviet fighter has better horizontal maneuverability, however, due to its own inexperience and better information awareness of the enemy, the Vietnamese fighters suffered losses, and therefore the tactics of conducting air combat were changed …
The most numerous modification of the "twenty-first" in Vietnam was the MiG-21PF, modified for operation in the tropics. The front-line interceptor MiG-21PF was equipped with an RP-21 radar and target guidance equipment based on commands from the ground. The fighter did not have built-in cannon armament and at first carried only two R-3S missiles, which limited its combat capabilities. Air combat missiles had restrictions on overload during launch (only 1.5 G), which made it impossible to use them during active maneuvering. Guided missiles could effectively fire at targets maneuvering with an overload of no more than 3 G. Due to the lack of cannon armament, after the launch of the missiles, the MiG-21PF became unarmed. A significant drawback of the MiG-21PF was a weak and insufficiently jammed airborne radar, which, in terms of its characteristics, was actually a radar sight. This made the fighter dependent on a system of ground stations for target designation and guidance. These shortcomings affected the methods of using front-line missile interceptors.
The standard combat technique was a surprise missile attack by American combat aircraft flying in close formation at a speed of 750-900 km / h from the rear hemisphere. At the same time, the speed of the MiG-21PF itself was 1400-1500 km / h. To increase the probability of hitting a target, in one combat approach, as a rule, two missiles were launched. Quite often, subsonic MiG-17Fs were used as bait, which forced enemy aircraft to gain altitude. An unexpected attack and a timely exit from the battle at high speed ensured the invulnerability of the missile interceptor.
According to Vietnamese data, in the first four months of 1966, 11 American aircraft and 9 North Vietnamese MiG-17s were shot down in air battles. After the MiG-21s were introduced into battle by the end of the year, the Americans lost 47 aircraft, the losses of the DRV Air Force amounted to 12 aircraft. In connection with the growth of losses, the American command increased the detachment of air cover and organized massive airstrikes against the airfields of the North Vietnamese fighters. However, even in 1967, the ratio of losses in air battles was not in favor of the United States. A total of 124 American aircraft were shot down and 60 MiGs were lost. In three months of 1968, fighter aircraft of the Vietnamese People's Army in air battles were able to shoot down 44 American aircraft. At the same time, the Vietnamese fighters operated in very difficult conditions. American pilots have always been outnumbered and generally better trained. On the other hand, the pilots of the DRV Air Force were better motivated, they were not afraid to engage in battle with an outnumbered enemy, and were ready to sacrifice themselves. The Vietnamese flexibly changed their tactics, due to which they achieved significant success in repelling US air raids. Despite the losses, thanks to Soviet and Chinese aid, the strength of the North Vietnamese Air Force grew. At the beginning of the war, the DRV Air Force had 36 pilots and 36 MiG fighters. In 1968, North Vietnam already had two fighter aviation regiments, the number of trained pilots doubled, and the number of fighters - five times.
Before the start of full-scale bombing, it was no secret for the Americans that there were fighters and anti-aircraft missile systems in the DRV. American radio reconnaissance aircraft RB-66C Destroyer in mid-July 1965 recorded the operation of the air defense missile system guidance stations, and RF-8A photo reconnaissance personnel took pictures of the missile positions.
However, the American command did not attach any importance to this, believing that the SA-75M, created to combat bombers and high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, did not pose a great threat to tactical and carrier-based aircraft. It soon became clear that the B-750V missiles, called "flying telegraph poles" by American pilots, were deadly for all types of combat aircraft participating in air raids on North Vietnam. According to Soviet data, on July 24, two anti-aircraft missile divisions, with a consumption of 4 missiles, shot down 3 American F-4C Phantom II fighter-bomber. The Phantoms sailed in close formation with a bomb load at an altitude of 2,000 meters. The Americans recognized only one F-4C shot down, and the other two - damaged.
At the first stage of hostilities, the control and maintenance of anti-aircraft missile systems was carried out by Soviet calculations. The fire divisions, formed from Soviet specialists, numbered 35-40 people. After the first shock caused by the use of the air defense system passed, the Americans began to develop countermeasures. At the same time, both evasion maneuvers were used, and intensive bombing of the identified firing positions of the air defense missile system was organized. In these conditions, measures to comply with the masking regime and radio silence began to be of particular importance. After combat launches, the anti-aircraft missile division had to immediately leave the area, otherwise it was destroyed by a bomb attack. Until December 1965, according to American data, 8 SA-75M air defense missiles were destroyed and disabled. However, it is not uncommon for American aviation to violently bombard false positions with fake missiles made of bamboo. Soviet and Vietnamese calculations announced the destruction of 31 aircraft, the Americans admitted the loss of 13 aircraft. According to the memoirs of Soviet advisers, before the withdrawal of the anti-aircraft missile battalion, on average, he managed to destroy 5-6 American aircraft.
During 1966, five more anti-aircraft missile regiments were formed in the air defense forces of the DRV. According to Soviet sources, 445 live firings were carried out by March 1967, during which 777 anti-aircraft missiles were used up. At the same time, 223 aircraft were shot down, with an average consumption of 3, 48 missiles. The use of air defense systems in combat forced American pilots to abandon the previously considered safe medium altitudes and switch to low-altitude flights, where the threat of being hit by anti-aircraft missiles was much less, but the effectiveness of anti-aircraft artillery sharply increased. According to Soviet data, by March 1968, 1532 aircraft were shot down in Southeast Asia by anti-aircraft guns.
After the American command realized the threat posed by Soviet-made air defense systems, in addition to the standard means of combat in the form of bombing positions and setting active and passive jamming, the creation of special aircraft designed to combat anti-aircraft systems and surveillance radars began. In 1965, the first six two-seater F-100F Super Sabers were converted to the Wild Weasel variant. This modification was intended to perform the tasks of detecting, identifying and destroying radar and air defense missile guidance stations. The F-100F Wild Weasel was equipped with electronic systems developed for the U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft. The equipment included AN / APR-25 radar sources detection and direction finding equipment, capable of detecting radar signals from air defense missile systems and anti-aircraft artillery guidance stations. The crew of the aircraft consisted of a pilot and an operator of electronic equipment. The modified F-100F was supposed to hit the detected targets with 70-mm unguided missiles, for this, two LAU-3 units with 14 NAR were suspended under the wing. "Wild weasels" usually having found a target, "marked" it by launching an NAR, after which fighter-bombers and attack aircraft of the strike group entered into action.
However, the "hunters" themselves often became "game". So, on December 20, during the next combat mission, "Wild Weasel" fell into a trap. The F-100F Wild Weasel, accompanying a strike group of four F-105Ds, covered by two F-4C units, tracked the radar operation, which was identified as a CHR-75 missile guidance station. After performing several descent maneuvers aimed at disrupting the escort, the "radar hunter" came under concentrated fire from 37-mm anti-aircraft guns and was shot down.
In fairness, it should be said that the creation of a specialized aircraft to counter air defense radars based on the Super Saber was not entirely justified. This fighter had small internal volumes for the installation of special equipment, carried a relatively limited combat load and had an insufficient combat radius in the strike version. In addition, the F-100 was inferior in speed to the F-105 fighter-bombers. F-100 fighter-bombers were used quite intensively at the initial stage of the Vietnam War for strikes against guerrilla positions in the South, but by the beginning of the 70s they were replaced by more payload combat aircraft.
In 1966, the Wild Weasel II entered the business, created on the basis of the two-seat F-105F Thunderchief trainer. The new generation "Wild Weasels" carried AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missiles, on which high hopes were initially pinned. The Shrike was aiming at the radiation of a working radar. But the rocket had a number of disadvantages, in particular, its launch range was less than the launch range of the V-750V SAM SA-75M. Besides Shrikes, CBU-24 cluster bombs were often suspended under the F-105 F Wild Weasel II. Wild Weasel II were also equipped with active jamming stations and more advanced electronic reconnaissance equipment.
"Two-seat radar hunters" flew accompanied by single-seat F-105Gs, which, after hitting the targeting station with an anti-radar missile, filled the position of the anti-aircraft battalion with high-explosive bombs and fragmentation cassettes.
Often, the detection of the position of the air defense missile system took place after the "Wild Weasel" was taken to be accompanied by the guidance station, or even after the launch of an anti-aircraft missile. Thus, the "radar hunter" actually played the role of bait. Having found the launched missile, the pilot directed the plane towards it in order to perform a sharp maneuver at the last moment and avoid defeat. A few seconds before the arrival of the rocket, the pilot put the plane into a dive under the rocket with a turn, change in altitude and course with the maximum possible overload. With a successful coincidence for the pilot, the limited speed of the missile guidance and control system did not allow compensating for the newly arisen miss, and it flew by. In the event of the slightest inaccuracy in the construction of the maneuver, fragments of the missile warhead hit the cockpit. It took a lot of courage and endurance to carry out this evasive maneuver. According to the recollections of American pilots, a missile attack has always produced a strong psychological effect on them. In a duel situation between the SAM crew and the Wild Weasel pilot, as a rule, the winner was the one who had the best training and greater psychological stability.
In response to the appearance of "radar hunters" in the US Air Force, Soviet experts recommended deploying the air defense system with careful geodetic support. Equip false and reserve positions and cover the air defense missile system with anti-aircraft guns. In order to exclude unmasking of the location of anti-aircraft missile divisions, before the start of combat work, it was forbidden to turn on guidance stations, surveillance radars, radar rangefinders and broadcast radio stations.
The United States Air Force achieved great success on February 13, 1966. On this day, B-750V anti-aircraft missiles unsuccessfully fired on an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft AQM-34Q Firebee, equipped with electronic reconnaissance equipment. As a result, the drone recorded information about the operation of the missile guidance systems and the radio fuse of the missile warhead. This made it possible to develop organizational and technical countermeasures, which significantly reduced the effectiveness of the use of air defense systems.
During the fighting in Vietnam, 578 AQM-34 UAVs were lost. But according to the American press, the data collected on the Soviet air defense systems, in their value, paid for the entire program of unmanned reconnaissance. On the aircraft of the US Air Force and Navy, active jamming containers appeared very quickly. At the end of 1967, the Americans began to jam the missile channel. Under their influence, the guidance station did not see the rocket, which was flying on autopilot, until the self-destruction system was triggered. Thus, the effectiveness of the SA-75M air defense system has sharply decreased and the consumption of air defense missiles per hit target was 10-12 missiles. The raid on Hanoi, carried out on December 15, 1967, was especially successful for the Americans. Then, as a result of the use of electronic jamming, about 90 anti-aircraft missiles were "neutralized" and not a single aircraft was shot down during this raid. It was possible to restore the combat effectiveness of anti-aircraft missiles by restructuring the operating frequencies of the transponders and increasing the power of the response signal. In the course of the improvements made, it was possible to reduce the lower boundary of the affected area to 300 m, and to reduce the minimum target destruction range to 5 km. To reduce the vulnerability of AGM-45 Shrike missiles, the SNR-75 equipment was modified, while the reaction time of the complex was reduced to 30 s. Anti-aircraft missiles supplied from the USSR began to be equipped with a new warhead with a wider field of flight of fragments, which made it possible to increase the likelihood of hitting an air target. In November 1967, the method of target tracking without CHP radiation began to be used - according to the mark from the active self-cover interference, when firing at a group of combat aircraft, this method gave good results. Subsequently, the calculations of the SA-75M switched to the use of field commander periscopes for visual tracking of the target, installed on the "P" cockpits and coupled with the control units of the air defense missile system. In a number of cases, the calculations were made "false launch" by switching on the appropriate guidance station mode without actually launching the rocket. As a result, an alarm began to squeal in the cockpit of the fighter-bomber, informing the pilot about the approach of an anti-aircraft missile. After that, the pilot, as a rule, urgently got rid of the bomb load and performed an evasion maneuver, exposing himself to anti-aircraft artillery fire. The greatest benefit from the "false launch" was achieved at the moment of the direct attack of the object - the pilots of the attack aircraft immediately became not up to the ground target.
To prevent the possibility of a breakthrough of American combat aircraft at low altitudes in 1967, the supply of P-15 radar stations, placed on the ZIL-157 chassis, was requested. Simultaneously with the P-15 radar, the air defense forces of North Vietnam received P-35 standby radars and PRV-11 altimeters, which were also used to guide fighters. In total, by 1970, more than a hundred radars were delivered to the DRV.
In addition to increasing the combat effectiveness of the Air Force, Air Defense Forces and the radio-technical units of the Air Force, a significant increase in the number of anti-aircraft artillery took place during this period. A year after the start of large-scale bombing of North Vietnam, more than 2,000 37-100-mm guns could participate in repelling the raids of American aviation, and the number of anti-aircraft guns supplied from the USSR and China increased continuously. If batteries of 85 and 100-mm anti-aircraft guns, which mainly fired defensively, were located around Hanoi and Haiphong, then 37 and 57-mm rapid-fire rifles, which also had better mobility, were used to protect bridges, warehouses, fuel depots, cover airfields, positions SAM and surveillance radars. Also, many anti-aircraft guns were deployed along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. To escort the military and transport convoys of the Vietnamese People's Army, anti-aircraft machine gun mounts of 12, 7-14, 5-mm caliber installed in the back of trucks were widely used. Since the fire of the ZPU at an altitude of more than 700 m was ineffective, the American aviation carried out bombing strikes without entering the zone of destruction of anti-aircraft machine guns.
At the end of the 60s, the Chinese ZSU Type 63 appeared in the North Vietnamese army. These self-propelled anti-aircraft installations were created in the PRC by replacing the turret of the T-34-85 tank with an open-top turret with a paired 37-mm anti-aircraft gun B-47.
The Soviet ZSU-57-2, built on the basis of the T-54 tank, had a greater range and height of destruction of air targets. The anti-aircraft self-propelled gun was armed with a 57-mm S-68 twin. A common disadvantage of the Chinese and Soviet ZSU was the lack of a radar sight, data on the height and speed of the target's flight were entered manually, and therefore the firing accuracy turned out to be low and, in fact, 37 and 57-mm ZSU fired defensive fire. However, these machines played a role in forcing American aircraft to drop bombs from high altitudes, which reduced the effectiveness of bombing.
Although in domestic and foreign literature on the war in Southeast Asia, in the confrontation between the air defense system of the DRV and American aviation, much attention is paid to the combat use of North Vietnamese air defense systems and fighters, the main load was still carried by anti-aircraft artillery. It was anti-aircraft guns that hit 2/3 of the aircraft shot down during the Vietnam War. In more than three years of incessant massive airstrikes, the US Air Force, Navy and ILC have lost a total of 3,495 aircraft and helicopters. Due to the growing losses and the unpopularity of the war in the United States, peace negotiations began in Paris in March 1968, and air raids on the territory of the DRV were temporarily stopped.
