If in our time, in some youth company, you tell that during the Great Patriotic War, Leningrad was also defended by a German cruiser, which was included in the Baltic Fleet only a year before the war; that only during the breakthrough of the blockade of Leningrad in January 1944, his 203-mm guns fired 1,036 shells - this is unlikely to be immediately believed.
Belonging to the class of the most modern heavy cruisers of that time, the ship was initially called "Luttsov" and in 1940 was sold to the Soviet Union for 106.5 million gold marks. On May 31, German tugs brought him to the wall of the Leningrad plant No. 189. Next, the Germans sent the equipment necessary for the completion and re-equipment of the cruiser, as well as the many years of ammunition put in it. In the same 1940 he was named "Petropavlovsk". However, the cruiser was not the only ship that, during that war, "fired at friendly" from the Soviet side. Italy built two dozen warships, including destroyers, torpedo boats, submarines, torpedo boats, patrol boats. Under the guise of Italian, they were driven by the Italians themselves to Soviet ports, became the basis of the reviving Black Sea Fleet and then defended Odessa and Sevastopol from the Nazis, among whom, in addition to the Germans, there were Romanians and soldiers of the Roman Duce.
Unfortunately, now this is known only to professional historians. “The broad masses” have long been told that it was the Soviet Union that fed the Hitlerite Reich, and therefore together with it, is responsible for unleashing the Second World War. The closer on August 23, when the USSR signed a non-aggression pact with Germany, the louder the chorus of those who are strenuously trying to prove that that day opened the barrier for planetary conflict.
It doesn't matter that Poland was the first to sign the same pact, followed by France, Great Britain, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia. It is important for Stalin to be on the same board with Hitler, with all the ensuing consequences.
Among the responses to the recently published article in the newspaper Stoletie.ru "Though with the devil, but against the Russians …", dedicated to the close allied relations between Poland and Nazi Germany, there is one in which it is argued that Poland is just a speck in the European eye, but at the behest of the dictator Stalin, many thousands of tons of "rare metals, fuel, grain and other goods were sent to Germany." True, the author of the response did not cite a single fact. And they are very interesting and, of course, stubborn.
Although there are many publications in the modern press claiming that the Soviet Union fed Hitler and his army, allowing him to build up military muscles, that trains with grain, oil, and other raw materials went to Germany immediately after the signing of the non-aggression pact, the real picture was different. First, on August 19, 1939, a loan agreement was signed, according to which Germany provided the USSR with 200 million marks of credit and undertook to supply to the USSR not only machine tools and other industrial equipment, but also military equipment. Secondly, the conclusion of an economic agreement between the USSR and Germany, according to which supplies began, took place only on February 11, 1940. For almost half a year, negotiations were going on, which were not even very simple. Thirdly, Germany really really needed the import of Soviet raw materials and food, moreover, such a need became very aggravated with the outbreak of World War II and the Anglo-French actions on the economic blockade of the Reich, and the USSR had all this at its disposal. Moreover, no blocking measures could interfere with Soviet supplies to the Reich, since with the fall of Poland a common border appeared.
The economic agreement with the Soviet Union acquired not only an economic but also a political character for Germany, since by concluding it, the Reich could demonstrate to the same Great Britain that its efforts to organize a trade blockade were simply naive. But there was also a very painful nuance: Germany found itself in the role of a supplicant. The USSR understood this and did not miss the opportunity to dictate their terms. Moscow immediately stressed that they were ready to agree to the supply of goods Germany needed only if they could buy factory equipment in exchange, moreover, samples of the latest military equipment should make up a significant part of the purchases.
Post-war German historians D. Eichholz and H. Perrey, after analyzing the situation of those years, even came to the conclusion that "Stalin … intended to gain even more benefits … and make the military economy of Germany largely work for the USSR", which he also led the case to a forced build-up of armaments with the help of "purposeful development of German technology."
It seems that having lost hope for a collective security treaty in Europe, realizing the inevitability of war, the Soviet leadership decided to act without regard to others, and by signing the pact, which still did not add international authority, tried to squeeze out of it the maximum possible for itself. Military equipment and technology became the main stumbling block in the negotiations.
Since the Germans considered the contracts of August 23 and September 28 more beneficial for the USSR than for Germany, they insisted that the Soviet Union begin deliveries immediately. At the same time, they formulated an extensive procurement plan, calculated for 1 billion 300 million marks per year. However, the People's Commissar for Foreign Trade A. I. Mikoyan immediately stated that Soviet deliveries would not exceed the maximum volume of previous years, i.e. 470 million marks. As one of the researchers of this problem emphasizes, the historian V. Ya. Sipols, the named figure had political significance, because it did not give rise to reproaches from England, France and the United States against the Soviet Union. The world practice of those years did not consider it reprehensible to maintain trade relations with the belligerent country at the same level. The same Washington did exactly that in relation to Italy and Japan, which fought against Ethiopia and China. But the increase in turnover was strongly condemned. An important moment for the USSR was the fact that Britain and France, having entered the war with Germany, essentially stopped fulfilling Soviet orders. The United States has taken a similar position. In this regard, V. Ya. Sipols emphasizes that the named countries "actually pushed the Soviet government themselves to expand trade with Germany."
The first round of negotiations, however, ended in vain. At the end of October 1939, a Soviet delegation headed by the People's Commissar for Shipbuilding I. F. Tevosyan and his deputy, General G. K. Savchenko, whose competence included precisely procurement for the Soviet armed forces. The main interest is military innovations and sophisticated machine tools for the production of military materials. I. F. Tevosyan, in conversations with the Germans, who insisted on speeding up Soviet deliveries, did not hide: “Our task is to get from Germany the latest and improved models of weapons and equipment. We will not buy old types of weapons. The German government must show us all that is new in the field of armaments, and until we are convinced of this, we cannot agree to these deliveries."
Hitler had to decide the question. He allowed to show the new equipment that had already entered the troops, but not to admit to the samples that were in the testing stage. Tevosyan was not satisfied with this. The signing of the trade agreement was slowed down. Then the leadership of the Reich again made concessions, but the Germans began to call deliberately high prices in order to at least in this way discourage interest in new products. In some cases, prices went up 15 times. In response, A. I. Mikoyan on December 15, 1939, declared to the German ambassador F. Schulenburg that attempts to strip three skins from the Russians would be unsuccessful. The question was posed bluntly: the agreement mainly depends on whether the German side is ready or not ready to supply military materials of interest to the Soviet side; everything else is secondary.
As a result, writes D. Eichholz, Hitler "was forced to give in to the ultimatum demands of Moscow" and agree "even to such supplies of military equipment, which meant limiting the German arms buildup program."
Only after Ribbentrop's letter was received in Moscow in early February 1940, informing that Germany was ready to supply military materials, as well as provide technical experience in the military field, did the Soviet side name its specific proposals regarding the content of the agreement. The Germans immediately accepted them. The agreement was signed on February 11. The USSR undertook to supply goods worth 430 million marks in 12 months, Germany - military materials and industrial equipment for the same amount - in 15 months. The breakdown in three months was explained by the fact that the Germans needed time to produce what we ordered, and we could send a lot from state reserves - after all, it was about natural and agricultural resources. However, we have reserved the right to stop deliveries if the German backlog exceeds 20 percent. The first delay in deliveries of oil and grain to Germany was made on April 1, 1940, and immediately took effect. Already in the same April, German exports to the USSR in comparison with March increased threefold, in May the April volume also doubled, and in June - the May one.
As of the end of May 1941, in the preceding year and a half, Germany imported from the USSR 1 million tons of oil products, 1.6 million tons of grain - mainly feed, 111 thousand tons of cotton, 36 thousand tons of cake, 10 thousand tons of flax, 1, 8 thousand tons of nickel, 185 thousand tons of manganese ore, 23 thousand tons of chrome ore, 214 thousand tons of phosphates, a certain amount of wood, and other goods totaling 310 million marks. The amount specified in the business agreement was not reached.
The listing of what the USSR acquired from Germany takes up much more space. The main part of German supplies was made up of equipment for factories, moreover, they were often complete enterprises: nickel, lead, copper smelting, chemical, cement, steel plants. A significant amount of equipment was purchased for the oil refining industry, mines, including drilling rigs, about a hundred excavators, three cargo-and-passenger ships, a tanker with a capacity of 12 thousand tons, iron, steel, steel cable, rope wire, duralumin, coal. Metal-cutting machine tools made up an impressive number - 6430. For comparison, let us say that in 1939 the import of such machine tools from all countries did not exceed 3.5 thousand.
D. Eichholz even came to the conclusion that the supply of such a large number of the latest machine tools to the USSR significantly weakened the German economy, for more than half of its own machines were already outdated.
And the Soviet Union also received from Germany "hundreds of types of the latest models of military equipment", V. Ya. Sipols. The suspension of Soviet deliveries in early April 1940 had such an effect on the Germans that already in May two Dornier-215 aircraft, five Messerschmitt-109 aircraft, five Messerschmitt-110 aircraft, two Junkers- 88”, three Heinkel-100 aircraft, three Bucker-131 and the same number of Bucker-133, in June two more Heinkel-100, a little later - three Focke-Wulf-58. Of course, no one was going to fight on these machines, they were intended for study in the corresponding centers and laboratories.
Also supplied were test benches for motors, propellers, piston rings, altimeters, speed recorders, oxygen supply systems for high-altitude flights, aerial cameras, devices for determining loads when controlling aircraft, aircraft radio stations with intercoms, radio direction finders, devices for blind landing, batteries, automatic riveting machines, bomb sights, sets of high-explosive, high-explosive and fragmentation bombs. The relevant enterprises have purchased 50 types of testing equipment.
At the end of May 1940, the unfinished heavy cruiser Lyuttsov, the one that became the Petropavlovsk, was also transported to Leningrad. For the USSR Navy, there were also propeller shafts, high-pressure compressors, steering gears, motors for boats, marine electrical equipment, fans, lead cable, ship medical equipment, pumps, batteries for submarines, systems to reduce the effect of rolling on ship instruments, drawings of 280 and 408 mm three-gun naval towers, stereo range finders, periscopes, anti-submarine bombers, paravan-trawls, anti-blast knives, magnetic compasses, mine samples, sonar equipment, even ship bakeries, equipment for galleys and much more.
For the Soviet artillerymen, two sets of heavy field howitzers of 211 mm caliber were received, a battery of 105-mm anti-aircraft guns with ammunition, fire control devices, rangefinders, searchlights, two dozen presses for wringing out the sleeves, as well as diesel engines, half-track tractors, a sample of medium tank. Equipment for laboratories, radio communication samples for the ground forces, chemical protection suits, including fire-resistant suits, gas masks, filter-absorbing installations, degassing substances, an oxygen-regenerative installation for a gas shelter, portable devices for determining the presence of toxic substances, fire-resistant and anti-corrosion ship paints, samples of synthetic rubber.
The purely military supplies under the economic agreement accounted for almost a third of their total volume. At the same time V. Ya. Sipols cites German authors who categorically reject claims that Germany has not sent anything to the USSR since January 1941. On the contrary, they emphasize, everything went on "on a record scale." And if the export from the USSR to Germany in April-June 1941 amounted to 130.8 million marks, then the USSR's import from Germany exceeded 151 million. And since payment was made within a month upon delivery, the Soviet Union did not manage to transfer more than 70 million marks to the Reich for goods received in May and June. Moreover, taking into account payments on various credit obligations, the USSR "owed" Germany 100 million marks.
It has been suggested that the Reich leadership scrupulously fulfilled its obligations to deliver to the USSR and in order to lull Stalin's vigilance. And it also believed that it would win a lightning victory and prevent it from using the latest knowledge. But the Soviet Union was determined to fight for a long time and in the end turned out to be the winner.
Oil and food exported to Germany were quickly used up, and German factory equipment worked for the Soviet defense throughout the war. If we consider that for all the pre-war years it was purchased for several billion marks, then it really, according to German historians, "largely helped the USSR to create a defense industry, which was able to produce more weapons during the war years than Germany produced." And the latest models of German weapons served to ensure that Soviet military equipment "in war often even surpassed the quality of the German."
