Explanatory note to the article about heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers, project 1143, published on VO a week ago. The story of the "Ships of Armageddon" severely criticized my point of view on the adequacy of the construction of these monsters. And if so, you will have to keep an answer to the readers.
Having appeared as a kind of "hybrid" of a missile cruiser and an aircraft carrier, the Soviet aircraft carrier proved to be ineffective as a cruiser and completely untenable as an aircraft carrier. With a length of 273 meters and a displacement of 40 thousand tons, in terms of the composition of its armament, the “supercruiser” corresponded to a large anti-submarine ship (which was six times smaller than the “supercruiser”).
In parallel with the TAKRs, real Slava-class cruisers were built (project 1164). With long-range S-300 air defense systems and twice as many strike weapons. Moreover, "Glory" was three times smaller than the aircraft-carrying monster of Admiral Gorshkov.
As for the air wing, absolutely amazing things were happening there. For example, the "vertical" Yak-38. With a subsonic flight speed, without a radar and with a fuel supply for 10 minutes of flight. "He took off, scared, sat down." The pilots of the American Tomkats did not care that the Yak was classified as an attack aircraft. They will not hit on the passport, but on the face. However, even in the role of a strike aircraft, the Yak, to put it mildly, looks suspicious. Funny combat load and range, minimal survivability, lack of sighting and navigation equipment for work in adverse weather conditions.
Anti-submarine helicopter squadron? To base it, a 273-meter monster was certainly needed.
Anyway, what is this dispute about? The aircraft carrier Clemenceau was built in France 20 years before the Soviet aircraft-carrying cruisers. With smaller dimensions than the aircraft carrier, it carried a full-fledged air wing, incl. aircraft with horizontal takeoff and landing. In the 1990s, the powerful supersonic Super Etandars were based on it. And this is a completely different level. And for much less money.
The construction of TAVKRs was a mistake and a waste of money. At the same time, it was repeated four times in a row.
My dear opponent Andrey Kolobov suggests looking at the situation from a different angle. It is alarming that the author, who usually deliberately carefully checks the information, so freely interprets the facts and misuses very strange conclusions.
It is also possible that S. G. Gorshkov also considered such a "Machiavellian" idea: based on the results of the operation of the aircraft carrier of the project 1143, substantiate the discrepancy between the tasks of the aircraft-carrying cruiser and the capabilities of its air wing. In any case, it should be taken into account that the tasks that were formulated in 1968 for the aircraft carrier of project 1143 could not be solved by the air group with VTOL and S. G. Gorshkov could not have been unaware of this
Since the top management and even the commander-in-chief himself were involved in the case, then, indeed, it is better to refrain from searching for the guilty.
A couple more of these "Machiavellian designs" and natural experiments with the 273-meter "wunderwolf", and the budget will disperse at the seams.
But why did the USSR Navy need this "ideal" helicopter carrier?
The aircraft carrier was not a helicopter carrier. In the course of combat services "Kiev" and its sisterships were engaged in what they were created for: the operation of useless VTOL aircraft.
And the heavy aircraft-carrying cruisers of Project 1143 could well become the backbone of the defense of such areas - operating in the near sea zone, they perfectly complemented the actions of ground anti-submarine aviation
Their pride did not allow them to operate in the near sea zone.
Brief chronology of the service of the aircraft-carrying cruiser "Minsk":
In the summer of 1980, a military campaign to Vietnam, the port of Cam Ranh. During military campaigns in December 1982, "Minsk" visited Bombay, in July 1986 - Wonsan
TAKRs spent all their time on long voyages, pretending that they were real aircraft carriers. And to cover the "protected combat areas" in the near sea zone is a job for the gray mass of the "third rank": numerous patrol and small anti-submarine ships. Of which there were 530 units in the USSR Navy.
The value of the aircraft carrier project 1143 in a full-scale nuclear missile conflict could be very high
Is it really higher than that of nuclear submarine missile carriers and their “colleagues” from the squadron “41 on guard of Freedom”?
Whatever one may say, a helicopter is a terrible enemy of a submariner
At that time (as well as now) the most terrible enemy is a subkeeping sonar in conjunction with a towed low-frequency antenna, supplemented by a dozen rocket torpedoes (“Trumpet”, “Waterfall”, foreign ASROK) on board the ship. No RSL can match the detection capabilities of a ship's SAC, which consists of thousands of hydrophones. Ship complexes are less dependent on weather conditions and, in the presence of contact, are capable of destroying a submarine in a matter of minutes.
In this sense, 32 patrol ships pr. 1135 "Burevestnik", as well as two dozen modern APCs pr. 1134A, 1134B and pr. 1155 "Udaloy" were of particular value.
Interestingly, for the tasks of escorting the AUG in the Mediterranean, our TAKRs of Project 1143, perhaps, were even better suited than classic aircraft carriers
There is no mission that a TAVKR could handle better than a classic aircraft carrier.
But the very concept of 5 OPESK, which was supposed to die, simultaneously mutilating the enemy … What can you say? Only that the valor of our crews, who took up combat duty, being doomed to death in the event of a conflict, is worthy of all respect and memory of grateful descendants
Those who die immediately may be happier than the survivors of the global nuclear apocalypse.
If any survived at all.
So there is no need for cheap melodramas, every citizen of the Union had the risk of being burned up in a nuclear fire.
After increasing the range of US sea-based ballistic missiles, their "city killers" no longer had a reason to deploy in the USSR's near sea zone
No sooner had the head "Kiev" entered service, "Francis Kay" (1979) went on combat patrols. The first SSBN armed with the Trident-I complex. The creepy combat vehicle was capable of throwing 8 warheads at a range of 7400 km. American boats were able to shell from the Philippine Sea all of Siberia - up to the Ural ridge. As well as to shoot at the territory of the USSR directly from the shores of the United States.
And who here called the TAVKRs "ships of Armageddon"?
Many unflattering words were said about the presence of heavy missile weapons on our TAKRs - Basalt anti-ship missiles
Yes, everything looks strange there.
For some reason, a quarter-kilometer long ship dragged 10 torpedo tubes and paired 76-mm artillery mounts of unclear purpose (too weak a caliber for firing at any ships and ground targets; in terms of air defense, it is difficult to come up with more useless AK-726).
But there is a nuance - in the USSR, neither in the 70s, nor later there was an abundance of heavy ships capable of carrying long-range anti-ship missiles "Basalt" / "Granit"
And were anti-ship missiles needed at all on the ships? The Soviet Navy had 60 nuclear submarines with cruise missiles. Such a “squadron” could scatter everything in its path!
SSGN pr. 670 "Skat" - a series of 17 missile submarines armed with anti-ship missiles "Amethyst" and "Malachite"
However, it was imperative to load anti-ship missiles on the first domestic “aircraft carrier”.
The assertion that the Kiev air defense systems quickly became obsolete due to the appearance of the S-300, in my opinion, is not entirely true
SAM "Kiev" became obsolete with the emergence of new threats, primarily with the massive appearance of anti-ship missiles. The ubiquitous "Harpoons", "Exocets" and "Tomahawks" (TASM), capable of launching from any ship and aircraft.
Still, the TAKRs of Project 1143 did not become useless ships
Yes, at least there was where to play football.
Combat service in the Mediterranean. That is why the Yankees were afraid of slippery black fish from the depths of the sea, and aircraft-carrying cruisers were not even considered by them as a real threat.
The fleet finally got some kind of carrier-based aircraft and began to master new weapons for itself, thereby gaining invaluable experience
We always get experience when we don't get what we want.
