Discussions on the topic of "shell versus armor" often pass by a number of important points, and as a result, the conclusions of the participants are misinterpreted. A new round of discussion aims to dispel some of the existing myths about the security of ships and find a connection between an amusing theory and a miserable reality.
As you know, modern ships sink (lose combat capability and need outside help) after one or two hits ABOVE the waterline. The usual 500 lb. bombs, small anti-ship missiles or suicide bombers on a boat with a bag of improvised explosives - the result will be the same: any modern cruiser or destroyer will be in the balance of death.
The current situation is in clear contradiction with the results of the battles of past years. During the Second World War, armored cruisers of similar size withstood much stronger blows without serious consequences. During the battle in Leyte Gulf, Takeo Kurita's squadron marched for three hours under continuous attacks, in which up to 500 American aircraft took part. Despite the leaden rain from heaven, all of Kurita's ships returned to Japan (except three, but they died for another reason). The secret of the trick is simple - at that time the Yankees had only ordinary "fugasks" and did not have torpedoes.
In January 1945, the Australian cruiser HMAS Australia withstood three kamikaze rams in four days + a bomb hit the waterline! Despite extensive damage and death of 39 sailors, "Australia" stubbornly held in position, shelling the Japanese fortifications in Lingaen Bay. Upon returning home to Australia, the wounded cruiser did not manage to receive qualified assistance, and the somehow patched ship went around the world to Great Britain - where it safely reached on its own.
HMAS Australia is a British-built County-class cruiser, victim of Washington restrictions with deliberately weakened armor. Other ships, who are stronger, demonstrated even more impressive survivability. Despite the mockery of the heroes, none of the dead battleships could be destroyed with conventional bombs.
The Arizona, an ancient battleship (1915), was caught off guard with his pants down at Pearl Harbor. Death came from an 800-kg special bomb made from an armor-piercing projectile of 410 mm caliber.
"Marat" - its sinking was postponed until armor-piercing bombs weighing 1.5 tons were brought from Germany.
Italian "Roma" - killed by two radio-controlled armor-piercing bombs "Fritz-X" dropped from a height of 6 kilometers. Imagine the kinetic energy of such a pig! And multiply it by the mechanical strength of the ammunition, which was a solid 1300 kg array of high-strength steel. I would not be surprised if such a "baby" can pierce through a 16-storey building. None of the modern anti-ship munitions has and cannot have a similar trajectory.
To say that the gloomy Teutonic knight "Tirpitz" died "only" from a couple of bombs is to insult common sense. The bombs were called "Tallboy" and weighed 5 tons. Only in this way were the British able to deal with the "lonely queen of the North." The previous three years of hunting and 700 sorties were unsuccessful.
Nine direct hits by bombs of caliber 227 and 726 kg did not add beauty to the Tirpitz, but even taking into account the damage from all previous attacks, the battleship remained afloat and retained the lion's share of its combat effectiveness. The explosions severely beat the servants of anti-aircraft guns (in those days, ships were not highly automated, and there were hundreds of people on the upper deck). Operation Wolfram, April 1944
The Tirpitz is an extreme case of demonstrating the highest survivability of a large, well-protected ship. Much more revealing is the episode with the little "Australia". Or damage to the cruiser "Columbia" - two kamikaze planes disabled both aft towers and 37 servants of anti-aircraft guns, but the cruiser continued to fire along the coast from the forward turrets of the main battery. The Japanese cruiser "Kumano", the American "Louisville", the British "York" … The survivability of the ships of the previous years is amazing.
Destroyer "Cole", blown up by terrorists in the port of Aden, 2000. An IED surface explosion with a capacity of 200-300 kg of TNT next to the side - the crew lost 17 people killed, the ship lost the ability to move independently.
"Cardboard" board of the destroyer "Porter" after a collision with a tanker in the Strait of Hormuz, 2012. No wonder these clowns die from one bag of homemade explosives
Even the most modest armor can radically increase the combat durability and protection of a ship, saving the lives of many of its crew members. But why, in our days, when safety and human life are valued above all else, warships are completely devoid of any serious constructive protection? Layers of Kevlar, local armoring of battle posts and fire bulkheads - all these comedic measures of "security enhancement" play no role in a real encounter with an anti-ship missile or boat guided by a suicide bomber.
May be, it's all about the terrible destructive impact of the RCCthat no armor can save from? No, this is not at all true. And that's why.
Horror stories about multi-ton supersonic missiles "Granit", sweeping away everything in their path, have little to do with reality. The Soviet rocket school, in pursuit of the speed / range / power of the warhead of anti-ship missiles, exceeded a reasonable limit: the resulting missiles (in fact, disposable aircraft) were so gigantic that they required ships and submarines of special construction to accommodate them. Hence the extremely limited number of carriers and the lack of opportunities for their real use. "Granites" are excessively expensive for local wars. They cannot be exported, since they require a specialized carrier and special over-the-horizon target designation equipment, without which super missiles lose their significance.
Heavy anti-ship missiles "Granit", "Mosquito", "Volcano" are terrible, but extremely rare, exotic weapons. It is possible to meet with such an anti-ship missile only in the event of a direct armed conflict between the United States or China and the Russian Navy - the situation is almost unrealistic. As a result, during its 30-year career, Granites have never been used in combat conditions and have not sunk a single enemy ship.
P-700 "Granite". The size and weight of this missile is close to the MiG-21 fighter.
The story of the P-15 "Termit" stands apart - the firstborn of anti-ship missile weapons, not yet a very perfect missile with a launch weight of 2 tons and a flight range of 40 km. But even in this form, "Termit" proved to be much more effective than "Granites", quickly gained popularity among the countries of the "third world" and distinguished itself in many local wars.
Unlike the Russian Navy, all other fleets of the world are armed with predominantly light anti-ship missiles - the French Exocet, the American Harpoon, the Chinese C-802, the Norwegian NSM, the Japanese Type 90 - all of them are small missiles with a starting weight of 600 -700 kg. With a subsonic flight speed and a warhead of 150-250 kg, of which less than half is explosive. The "semi-armor-piercing warhead" itself does not have any constructive measures to overcome the armor, and its "armor-piercing" is determined only by the deceleration of the fuse.
A positive feature of small anti-ship missiles is their low weight, size and cost. As a consequence, such missiles are numerous and ubiquitous. The Yankees and their allies have adapted the "Harpoon" for dozens of different carriers. Almost any ship in the range from a boat to a battleship, any aircraft - from fighters to strategic B-52s, ground-based launchers on truck chassis … as far as the developers had imagination.
It is the small-sized Exocets, Harpoons and S-802 that are most intensively used in local conflicts and have sunk a dozen ships. They are so cheap and practical that any terrorist group and third world country can acquire them. In 2006, Hezbollah militants shot down a corvette of the Israeli naval forces and a ship sailing under the Egyptian flag with the help of the Chinese Yingji anti-ship missiles.
An accidental Exocet launched from a Mirage that flew past or an unexpected Yingji launched from a camouflaged launcher on the shore - these are the cases that pose the main threat in modern hot spots and local wars at sea. And from them one should seek adequate protection.
It is in principle incorrect to compare the kinetic energy of an anti-ship missile system with a duralumin body and a nose cone made of radio-transparent plastic with the energy of armor-piercing shells, due to the cardinal differences in the strength of these bodies. At meeting angles close to the normal, the missile warhead can simply collapse when it hits the armor. When hitting on a tangent, the "soft" anti-ship missile is guaranteed to ricochet. The sources cite figures from 40 mm (realistic) to 90 mm (which is unlikely) - such a layer of steel is able to confidently protect the crew and the insides of the ship's compartments from anti-ship missiles like the Exoset.
Toledo is the 12th in a series of 14 Baltimore-class cruisers. Launched in 1945. Full w / and 17 thousand tons. Reservation (in short): armor belt - 152 mm, deck - 65 mm, conning tower - 165 mm. Main building towers - max. armor thickness 203 mm. The barbets of the GK towers are 152 … 160 mm. Cellar protection 51 … 76 mm. The total weight of the armor is 1790 tons or 12, 9% of the standard in / and cruiser
If we take the Baltimore cruiser as a standard, its armored belt and armored deck are capable of withstanding any modern small-size anti-ship missile system or a near detonation of a boat with terrorists. The rocket will never penetrate a layer of metal of such a thickness, and in an external explosion, the design of the plastic "Harpoon" excludes the appearance of heavy fragments - such fragments simply have nothing to form. Even if the shock wave bends the frames and stringers, ripping out several armor plates, the presence of the armor will minimize damage and prevent the death of a large number of sailors. Doubters, I ask you to look at examples of the Second World War.
Where did the armor disappear?
It is not known for certain in whose bright head the idea of the uselessness of ship armor was first born. One way or another, from the end of the 1950s, the massive construction of warships began, in the design of which no attention was paid to security.
The only reason for such a dubious situation is the emergence of nuclear weapons. The first sea test of nuclear weapons on Bikini Atoll gave the exact opposite effect - armored ships, located more than 1000 yards from the epicenter, easily survived the explosion. However, the further evolution of nuclear weapons, whose power exceeded the megaton line with the advent of thermonuclear bombs, turned out to be fatal. Preparations began for a worldwide nuclear apocalypse, after which nothing mattered. Warships quickly turned into "disposable" pelvis.
Time passed, there was still no atomic war. But they had to get involved in a bunch of local wars, where ships became victims of the most common means of destruction - artillery fire, anti-ship missiles, boats with suicide bombers on board or free-fall bombs.
The first alarm signal sounded during the Falklands War (1982) - one of the British ships (Sheffield) burned down and sank from one unexploded anti-ship missile stuck in its hull. Strictly speaking, the Falklands cannot serve as a standard example of modern warfare - Her Majesty's unarmed frigates drowned like puppies under the blows of decrepit subsonic attack aircraft of the Argentine Air Force.
However, the only maritime conflict of the modern era has clearly shown what happens to an unprotected ship when hit by a small 500-pounder or Exocet. If some cruiser Belknap or Spruance had been in the place of the little Sheffield or Coventry, nothing would have changed fundamentally. Belknap, due to its large size and buoyancy reserve, could not sink - but it would have burned out completely. Numerous human casualties + damage of hundreds of millions of dollars. The ship would have to be rebuilt. Subsequent events only confirm this thesis (a striking example is "Cole").
On June 12, 1982, the destroyer Glamorgan was 20 miles off the coast of the Falkland Islands when a gift from the coast flew in - the ASM Exocet. The story of this missile is unusual: the Argentines removed it from one of their destroyers, delivered it by transport plane to the island - and launched it from a homemade launcher into the first British ship that caught my eye. The rocket slid across the deck (its trail is visible in the photo) and exploded, destroying the Glamorgan aft. The air defense missile system fell off, a helicopter flared up and burned in the hangar. 14 sailors were killed. In general, Glamorgan was lucky, which cannot be said about the other ships of the British squadron.
If a major naval conflict occurs today (the Chinese copies of the Orly Berks fight the Japanese Atagoes), the result will be dire. Armorless ships will turn into flaming colanders with monstrous losses among their crews.
The facts simply scream about the need to improve the security of ships. But no country in the world builds battleships. What is the reason for the paradox?
Armor is expensive.
The adherents of this theory are not at all embarrassed by the fact that a $ 300 boat completely disables a $ 1,500,000,000 destroyer. combat capabilities of the ship.
Finally, it is worth remembering that even half a century ago, armored ships were built in large series (Soviet 68 bis - 14 units!), And no one complained about the high cost and difficulty of installing armor. Despite the fact that machining technologies were at a very primitive level compared to the current ones.
Installation of armor is impossible: modern ships are already overloaded with electronics, missile systems and other "high technologies".
Pictured is the cruiser Albany, 1962. Believe it or not, this is a modernized Baltimore. The ship lost all artillery, in exchange it received a new superstructure, a PLUR complex and 4 air defense systems with fire control systems. Despite such a fierce "modernization", the displacement remained the same. And it’s scary to imagine what tube computers and electronics were like in the 60s!
Hiding behind the armor is useless - the ship will still need lengthy and expensive repairs.
Of course, it is much better to burn and sink off the coast of Iran with half of the crew.
Armor will not protect radars and other fragile equipment - and then that's it, kaput.
First, the ship will remain operational. Launching Tomahawks and firing a cannon at 45 km, adjusting the fire according to the UAV data - no radar is needed for this. Be sure that the wounded animal will get even more angry, release its ammunition at the insolent "Papuans" and leave on its own for repairs. The ship's PLO will not suffer - sonar, weapons. The move will be saved. The ship will still remain an active combat unit, but with limited air defense.
Secondly, it is difficult to disable ALL radars due to their number, location and significant size of the ship. For comparison, the Ticonderoga cruiser has four independent antennas for the AN / SPY-1 surveillance radar located on the walls of the front and rear superstructures - one for each direction. Plus an AN / SPS-49 backup radar (on the mainmast). Four radar target illumination. Navigation radar and surface surveillance radar. And also two anti-aircraft machine "Falanx" - each with its own fire control radar.
It will take a series of "successful" hits, but by that time the battleship will already be able to figure out the offender and feed him with lead.
Are the Pentagon and the Russian Defense Ministry wasting their bread in vain? If everything is so obvious, why has not the technical specification for the creation of an armored ship been formed yet?
"Pitt is the greatest fool in the world who encourages a way of waging war that gives nothing to a people who already have supremacy at sea, and who, if successful, could lose that supremacy."
- spoke Admiral Lord Jervis, watching as the Minister of the Navy rejoices at the successful tests of a new invention - a submarine designed by R. Fulton.
Seeing in front of them a new tool that could change the balance of power at sea, the British did not develop promising technology, instead offering Fulton a life pension so that he would forget about his submarine. They did not want to change anything - they were fine with everything: the double superiority of His Majesty's fleet over any of the fleets in the world. Then why give a reason for a new arms race if there is no certainty that they will emerge victorious from it?
Today, America continues to celebrate victory in the Cold War. The Yankees do not see worthy opponents at sea and do not want to change anything. Despite the experience, common sense and regular calls of its own analysts, the Pentagon is not going to speed up work on the creation of the "battleship of the XXI century": after all, if successful, it will instantly age all their "Berks" and "Ticonderogs", of which 80 pieces were riveted.
It sounds amazing, but the Yankees do not prepare for wars at sea at all. Their newest ships are completely devoid of anti-ship weapons. Instead, sailors are becoming more and more interested in the topic of BMD (strategic missile defense) and other equipment that has only a distant connection to the sea.
The States are the only ones who can create a fundamentally new CSW (Capital Surface Warship) ship. But they will never take such a step - until someone else does it. Frankly speaking, the American fleet has not been distinguished by novelty of solutions lately, and in terms of its technical perfection it has fallen behind many European and Asian fleets (which cannot be said about its size).
Do not wait for news from Japan - this 51st state receives most of the technology from the United States and builds its fleet according to the American principle.
China? These guys copy everything - from watches to ships. At the moment, they have accepted a challenge from the Pentagon and are trying to catch up with the US Navy, building their own copies of the Berks.
Russia and the countries of the eurozone - here we are not talking about non-standardout in principle. We and the Europeans have enough strength only to build frigates - modest ships, which do not rely on armor by rank.
The conclusion is simple - something epic must happen for the battleships to return to the sea. And there is no doubt that this will happen sooner or later.
