"Six trump cards"
Dear readers, let's try to understand in a first approximation what we heard in the Address from the President and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief about new types of weapons. Yes, of course, we are talking about the very "magnificent six" systems
Vladimir Putin consistently spoke about: the Sarmat 5th generation liquid heavy intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), an unnamed cruise missile (CR) with a nuclear power plant (NPP) and an unlimited radius, an ocean-going multipurpose submarine system with unmanned underwater vehicles with NPP, aviation missile complex "Dagger" with a hypersonic guided missile, an unnamed laser complex.
First of all, what does it mean to show them? According to "Sarmat" - the fact that he began flight design tests (LKI), a throw-in start was shown with checking the exit from the silo launcher (silo) with checking the operation of silo equipment, control system (CS), powder pressure accumulator (PAD) with the subsequent start-up of the first stage engines (DU-1). PAD is what pushes the ICBM out of the silo at a "cold", "mortar" start. The video shows how, after the missile exited the silo, a pallet was taken to the side with a solid-fuel engine - this is an element that protects the rocket from the gases generated by the PAD.
By the way, the launch of the DU-1 on the first "throw" launch already means that the designers are confident in the design of the rocket already enough so that instead of a pure "throw" launch there was a "throw with stage launch" (of course, with a minimum fuel supply). And this is a somewhat higher stage of testing, and they went to it immediately.
For the rest of the systems, we see that the "Dagger" is already in experimental military operation, the design and development work, in fact, is being completed, and serial production is being prepared. According to "Avangard" - the completion of the ROC and the series is being developed. By the way - the final stages of R&D, except, perhaps, a cruise missile with a nuclear reactor. That is, all these systems are either already close or entering the series, or not very far from it (except for "Sarmat" and the nameless CD).
Heavy "Sarmat"
Of these 6 systems, the RS-28 (as it is called in open sources) "Sarmat" was known earlier, and not so little. The appearance was known, photos of individual components of the rocket were lit up on the Web, from the appearance of which people who were versed in the issue could already draw a number of conclusions. There was, however, confusion with the take-off weight of the "product", with the light hand of one of our generals, who probably deliberately launched a bike in the media about a weight of 100 tons and a payload (PN), at the same time, 10 tons. This, in principle, should have alerted many, because miracles do not happen, and it is impossible for a missile weighing more than half that of the current heavy ICBM of the 4th generation R-36M2 (15A18M) Voevoda to force the output of even a little more weight, than hers (8.8t). Moreover, with constant hints that the new product has a global flight range - the ability to bring light and heat to the United States for free not only during the flight "Chkalov's way" through the Pole and similar relatively short routes, but also through Antarctica and in general whatever you like. … Which, by the way, was confirmed by the President.
There were also other estimates of weight and payload - 120, 160 and even 180 tons, and PN of 5-5.5 tons, including those with a weight of 100 tons. Probably 100 tons - this arose in the early stages of design, when the appearance of the system was being determined, an "economical" proposal could arise to make a missile based on the dimensions of the 3rd generation ICBM UR-100NUTTH (15A35), but on new technological solutions. But then it was rejected in favor of a more serious option. But the most reasonable people assumed that a missile of similar mass and dimensions would replace the Voevoda. And the appeared photos of a number of system elements confirmed this.
Well, now, after Putin's statement about "more than 200 tons", the global range and "payload and the number of charges is greater" than that of its predecessor - the question is completely cleared up. Suppose, therefore, that the weight is, say, from 200 to 210 tons, and the PN is in the region of 10 tons. The dimension corresponds approximately to "Voevoda". There are three steps, judging by the image below.
By the way, the Americans have these data, to whom data on the size, mass, PN, appearance of the rocket and the transport-launch container were provided after the start of the tests, according to the Treaty, but they will not disclose this data, as well as the detailed "disarray" by type and the number of carriers and charges on them from the START-3 exchange data. The parties have an agreement on what to divulge about each other and what not. And one more thing that can be noted from the video clips shown and previously published information about new transport-loading and transport-installation units for the "Sarmat" - it looks like the service equipment of the old and new DBKs are at least partially unified, which, of course, will facilitate the rearmament and retraining of personnel assigned to the "Sarmat" missile divisions of the Strategic Missile Forces. However, this is still a long way off - there are several years ahead of flight design and state tests of the complex, and only then its deployment. And how things will go - it is not known, in general, not a single DBK walked easily and without problems, especially a complex and milestone one. Let us recall the epic of testing and fine-tuning the 3M30 Bulava SLBM, or, say, a large pit that 15A18M Voevoda arranged in the place of the silo in the first launch in the first launch, in March 1986, and the two subsequent launches were equally unsuccessful, yes and all of its more than 30 test launches of accidents were still enough.
True, the number of warheads of the new heavy "queen of ICBMs" needs to be clarified. As you know, the "Voevoda" had 2 types of combat equipment (BO) - or 10 warheads of the "megaton class" (it is believed that 800kt, but officially the data on the capacities in the USSR and the Russian Federation were not disclosed), or the so-called. "lightweight" monoblock of "multi-megaton" capacity (estimates vary - from 8-9Mt to 20-25Mt). Other BO options were also planned, incl. with a "heavy" monoblock, with controlled BB and a combination of controlled and uncontrolled. It is clear that with a solid complex of means of overcoming missile defense (KSP ABM). Options for combat equipment with more than 10, the number of BBs were worked out, but were not implemented for contractual reasons.
Vanguard
Obviously, for the "Sarmat" there will be variants of BO both with a large number of unguided BB, and, as it is now clear, with a hypersonic maneuvering and gliding vehicle, or 2-3 vehicles capable of delivery, capable of delivering one or more charges of various capacities, from medium to high. That is, with what is already known as "apparatus U71", as well as the designations 15U71 or "object 4202" or "theme 42-02" and a number of others. And now it is also known as the Avangard complex, which has passed and successfully completed flight design and state tests on the basis of the UR-100NUTTH (15A35) ICBM with the same apparatus. Probably, the same device will be used, in different dimensions and, say, with a smaller battery, and on versions of light-class ICBMs.
About this hypersonic gliding and maneuvering apparatus, the following should be said. Even before 2004, declared the first successful test of a prototype of this weapon (and not the fact that it was not a device at all, shall we say, of a different generation than the current final product), the topic of controlled and maneuvering BB (UBB / MBB) in the USSR and the Russian Federation were engaged. You can recall the aforementioned controlled BB 15F173 for Voevoda, the development and testing of which was stopped at the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau. But even after it, UBB / MBB were engaged - one can recall the undeveloped, even before the initial tests, the Yuzhmash R-36M3 "Ikar" ICBM, where something like this was also considered, as well as the 15P170 "Albatross" project. This one was developed by NPO Mashinostroeniya from Reutov, and contained, as equipment, maneuvering and gliding BBs of the first generation, already capable of maneuvering both in height and in course. Able in theory. The NPOM complex itself was offered as a universal one for basing both in a mine and in a mobile version. But this provoked tough opposition from both the Yuzhny Design Bureau and MIT - the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering. As a result, instead of the Albatross, they began to develop the Universal, the future Topol-M, but the planning BB itself was not abandoned even in the 90s. There were even flight tests of this very device, based on the K-65MR special carrier. But then, on the luggage of this project, they began a new project of hypersonic aeroballistic hypersonic combat equipment (or, if you prefer, planning, and which was brought to the primary "flying iron" by 2004, the tests of which had been going on with varying success for more than 10 years on the platform of the modified ICBM 15A35 Well, in the end, we now have a workable system, the production of which has begun. Now the next step is, obviously, different versions of this apparatus of different dimensions and for different missiles.), a certain number of such systems can be deployed, fortunately, "Sarmat" will not be very soon, but this missile is available.
The new device passes most of the trajectory either along the standard trajectory of the ICBM, or along a gentle flat trajectory, which is much faster, but much more energy-intensive. Therefore, not all ICBMs and not at all targets can shoot at it with a normal launch vehicle, the range may not be enough, more often such a trajectory is available for SLBMs, and even then - not from the "indestructible bastions of NSNF" off their shores, but it is necessary to come closer. But in this case, our apparatus then passes to the stage of its active flight, still descending and entering the relatively dense layers of the ionosphere and stratosphere, maneuvering several thousand kilometers along the course and tens of kilometers in height. Well, then, in the target area, depending on the version, either attacks the target itself, or drops a homing striking element (warhead). Of course, no existing missile defense system, in principle, will help here, as well as air defense. Of course, this is just an assumption, and time will tell what specific performances this type of combat equipment will have.
Although we can immediately say that both the US missile defense system with the GBI PR, which so far has not even intercepted an ordinary target of an intercontinental radius, limiting itself to much simpler targets (and this is after 15 years of deployment and "successful" tests), and the naval missile defense system with the PR SM -3 Block 2A and even more so, will be unable to resist this weapon. By and large, and promising unguided combat equipment of this missile defense has nothing to fear. Let's remember how it should have been (and is about the same now), according to statements from more than ten years ago an article by Major General Vladimir Vasilenko, the then head of the 4th Central Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense (in the original source is no longer available, but it is widespread on the Internet, I will allow myself to quote from there piece, with some cuts).
As priority measures in this direction, sufficient to maintain a strategic balance and ensure guaranteed deterrence of foreign countries in the context of the deployment of missile defense for the period until 2020, priority measures are considered based on the completion of the implementation of the achieved technologies in the field of creating maneuvering hypersonic warheads, as well as significant reducing the radio and optical signature of both standard and prospective warheads of ICBMs and SLBMs in all segments of their flight to targets. At the same time, the improvement of these characteristics is planned in combination with the use of qualitatively new small-sized atmospheric decoys.
The achieved technologies and the created domestic radio-absorbing materials make it possible to reduce the radar signature of warheads in the extra-atmospheric section of the trajectory by several orders of magnitude. This is achieved by the implementation of a whole range of measures: optimization of the shape of the warhead body - a sharp elongated cone with a rounding of the bottom; rational direction of separation of the block from the rocket or the stage of breeding - in the direction of the nose to the radar station; the use of lightweight and effective materials for radio-absorbing coatings applied to the block body - their mass is 0.05-0.2 kg per m2 of surface, and the reflection coefficient in the centimeter frequency range of 0.3-10 cm is no more than -23 … -10 dB or better.
There are materials with screen attenuation coefficients in the frequency range from 0.1 to 30 MHz: for the magnetic component - 2… 40 dB; for the electrical component - not less than 80 dB. In this case, the effective reflective surface of the warhead can be less than 10-4 m2, and the detection range is no more than 100 … 200 km, which will not allow the unit to be intercepted by long-range anti-missiles and significantly complicates the operation of medium-range anti-missiles.
Taking into account the fact that in the composition of promising missile defense information systems, a significant proportion will be made up of detection means in the visible and infrared ranges, efforts have been made and are being implemented to significantly reduce and optical visibility of warheads, both in the extra-atmospheric sector and during their descent into the atmosphere. In the first case, a radical solution is to cool the surface of the block to such temperature levels when its thermal radiation is fractions of watts per steradian and such a block will be "invisible" to optical information and reconnaissance equipment of the STSS type. In the atmosphere, the wake luminosity has a decisive influence on the optical signature of a block. The achieved results and implemented developments allow, on the one hand, to optimize the composition of the heat-protective coating of the block, removing from it the materials that are most conducive to the formation of a trace. On the other hand, special liquid products are forcibly injected into the trace area in order to reduce the radiation intensity. The above measures make it possible to ensure the probability of overcoming the extra- and high-atmospheric boundaries of the missile defense system with a probability of 0.99.
However, in the lower layers of the atmosphere, the considered measures to reduce the visibility no longer play a significant role, since, on the one hand, the distances from the warhead to the missile defense information assets are rather small, and on the other, the intensity of the unit's deceleration in the atmosphere is such that it is no longer possible to compensate for it. …
In this regard, another method and the corresponding countermeasures come to the fore - small-sized atmospheric decoys with a working height of 2 … 5 km and a relative mass of 5 … 7% of the mass of the warhead. The implementation of this method becomes possible as a result of solving a two-pronged task - a significant decrease in the visibility of the warhead and the development of qualitatively new atmospheric decoy targets of the "wave-flying" class, with a corresponding decrease in their mass and dimensions. This will make it possible, instead of one warhead from the rocket warhead, to install up to 15 … 20 effective atmospheric decoy targets, which will lead to an increase in the probability of overcoming the atmospheric ABM line to a level of 0.93-0.95.
Thus, the total probability of overcoming the 3 frontiers of a promising missile defense system, according to experts, will be 0.93-0.94.
As you can see, dear readers, even ordinary non-maneuvering BB, covered with a similar PCB missile defense system, may not be afraid of the US missile defense system, even the one that portrayed it in the bright dreams of American generals in those days and in the justifications for the committees of the US Congress. And there is no doubt that it has been implemented and used on the 5th generation DBKs entering service, such as Yars and Yars-S, Bulava, there is no doubt that there have been too many successful tests over the past decade. with launches of the Topol-E special vehicles along the "short route" between Kapustin Yar and Sary-Shagan, where, far from the "partners" reconnaissance means, such means are tested.
So why is the Vanguard needed? The development of missile defense systems at a potential "partner" is, nevertheless, not worth it in place. There is almost no progress now, but what if it appears within 15-20 years? And if not, when drawing up programs for the development and rearmament of strategic nuclear forces, the leadership of the Armed Forces and the country cannot proceed from any likely scenario, except for the worst. Because if you are ready for the worst, you are ready for everything else.
