12 failures of Napoleon Bonaparte. Napoleon's stay in the capital clearly dragged on. This is not disputed by any historian. As no one disputes the erroneous calculation of the French emperor to conclude peace with Alexander I. You can say as much as you like that the circumstances this time turned out to be stronger than Napoleon. But, in spite of the fact that Napoleon's troops left the old Russian capital almost by necessity, it was still an army of victors.
95 thousand experienced warriors, well rested and fairly profitable in Moscow, who received not only awards, but also solid reinforcements, marched in the direction of Kaluga for more victories. Napoleon also managed to strongly provoke his soldiers, who learned about the defeat that Marshal Murat suffered on the Chernishna River.
The king of Naples, to whom Napoleon himself constantly insisted that peace was about to be concluded, clearly overestimated the friendliness of the Cossacks, who more than once entered into negotiations with the French patrols, rather than into battle. The old sly Bennigsen, not paying attention to all the prohibitions of Kutuzov, set up a real trap for Murat, and if he received support from the main forces, everything could end in the defeat of the French avant-garde.
Napoleon set out from Moscow on the morning of October 19, with the guards and headquarters, after five weeks of voluntary imprisonment in the city that was almost burned to the ground. A city that in other conditions could contain more than 100 thousandth mass of invaders until next spring. Together with Napoleon's soldiers and officers, many wounded and thousands of civilians left Moscow; General Marbeau counted more than 40 thousand carts in the train.
Most of them were filled not with provisions and ammunition, but with plundered goods. It is terrible to imagine if each of Napoleon's soldiers managed to take advantage of the emperor's permission to take two carts with him from Russia. The army tried to advance in several columns, but even so it sometimes stretched out, according to French eyewitnesses, for a dozen leagues - more than fifty kilometers.
Yet Napoleon is advancing again. And he begins to act as in an offensive - he conceals his retreat along the old Kaluga highway, tries to misinform Kutuzov, knowing his unwillingness to fight again. Napoleon spreads rumors that he wants to attack the left flank of the Russian positions near Tarutino, hoping that Kutuzov will immediately "move" to the east. The Russians stand still, but Napoleon has already decided to turn onto the new Kaluga road near the village of Troitskoye.
Crossroads of Fate
The circumstances of the radical turning point in the course of the Patriotic War of 1812 have been studied in great detail, including on the web pages of Voenniy Obozreniye (The radical turning point in the course of the Patriotic War: the battle of Maloyaroslavets on October 12 (24), 1812). Here we will try to figure out why a tactical victory turned out to be such a serious strategic defeat for the French.
Mid-October 1812, south of Moscow - warm and sunny. Ahead of the French emperor is Maloyaroslavets, from where you can continue to Kaluga, or immediately turn to Medyn. In any case, the ultimate goal of the campaign is Smolensk, where huge reserves of food, fodder and ammunition are concentrated, with which it is quite possible to spend the winter. While continuing to consider yourself a winner.
Napoleon puts Marshal Mortier in the rear, who either failed or was lucky enough not to blow up the Kremlin, and on the old Smolensk road he still holds the eighth corps of Junot, Duke d'Abrantes, whose wife is a famous memoirist, understands that he in vain awaits from the emperor a marshal's baton for Borodino. The responsibilities of the rearguard are assumed by Marshal Ney's third corps, which will then repulse all Russian attacks on the French rear until it is completely exterminated.
And the Russians are already withdrawing from the excellently fortified camp near Tarutino, since not only the commander-in-chief Kutuzov, but everyone understands that just letting the French out is worse than defeat in open battle. In addition, and this was attested by many contemporaries, His Serene Highness Prince, who had recently received the rank of field marshal, was quite obviously jealous of Bennigsen for his success on the Chernishna River. His Serene Highness Prince Kutuzov was now by no means averse to fighting Napoleon, who no longer had practically any advantages over the Russian army.
General Dokhturov, whose sixth corps had this time the role of either the vanguard or the flank cover, cleverly followed literally in the footsteps of Napoleon's main forces, then managing to bypass them imperceptibly and occupy the Maloyaroslavets crossroads on October 23. A day later, Kutuzov withdrew the main forces of the army to positions approximately one passage to the south - in the vicinity of Afanasyev and Polotnyanoy Zavod, which belonged to the notorious Goncharov family, future relatives of Pushkin.
In Maloyaroslavets itself, Dokhturov left only a Cossack patrol, which on the evening of the same 23rd was used by the French infantrymen from the Delzon division, who immediately captured the city. However, at night the Russians, having learned that the French had decided not to stay in the city, but withdrew to the banks of the Luga, with a decisive attack knocked them out over the bridge over the river. Dokhturov immediately placed artillery batteries along the ridges of the hills to cover the approaches to the important crossing.
The case at Maloyaroslavets never came to a real general battle of the two armies. But the entire first half of the day on October 24 was held in fierce battles for the city. The fresh division of Pinault, which had not previously taken part in the battles at all, came to the aid of the French, and then the whole corps of Eugene Beauharnais was involved in the matter. Dokhturov was supported by the seventh corps of Raevsky - the vanguard of Kutuzov's army approaching from the southeast.
The city changed hands several times (it is believed that eight), and in the end the French remained in it. It is and only this fact that allows many researchers to talk about the next "Victoria Bonaparte". But the Russians retained the dominant heights and continued to hold the strategic bridge at gunpoint. The battle, however, did not drag out - everything was decided by noon, and it cost the opposing sides 7 thousand killed and wounded.
The decision to retreat was made by the Russian commander-in-chief much later, when Colonel Tol's subordinates chose a defensive position closer to Kaluga, and, as contemporaries testify, much better than Borodinskaya. However, by that time, Napoleon no longer planned to continue his offensive.
And chance, god is the inventor …
So why did Napoleon not dare to go on the offensive against Kutuzov again? Many in this respect tend to overestimate the episode that happened the very next day after the battle at Maloyaroslavets. On the morning of October 25, the emperor, accompanied by a small retinue and two squadrons of guards rangers, decided to conduct a reconnaissance of the southern bank of the Luga. He was greatly disturbed by the fact that the only crossing could be destroyed in just half an hour by the concentrated fire of Russian cannons.
When Napoleon decided to jump close to one of the copses, trying to make out Kutuzov's batteries, a detachment of Cossacks unexpectedly flew out from there in a characteristic lava, rushing straight to the emperor. General Rapp and the escort managed to repulse the Cossacks, but one of them managed to break through to a distance of no more than twenty or thirty paces from the emperor.
Those around Napoleon (up to the marshals) had to grab their sabers. They managed to kill the Cossack, as well as several others, but there were also killed in the ranks of the convoy. And not only - in the heat of battle, one of the mounted grenadiers mistook one of the staff officers forced to dismount for a Cossack and seriously wounded him with a saber blow. It is known that after this incident, Napoleon constantly carried an amulet with poison with him, for fear of being captured.
However, it is hardly under the influence of this episode that Napoleon decided not to go to Kaluga. By the way, he did not move to Smolensk and through Medyn, obviously not wanting to leave Kutuzov's army hanging over his left flank. Still, in this particular case, it is more important that Napoleon did not understand whether the Russians had left their positions south of Maloyaroslavets or were still waiting for his offensive. Apparently, Kutuzov once again managed to "outwit" Bonaparte.
Although, most likely, the emperor, even before the departure from Moscow, was internally ready to retreat along the Old Smolensk road. This is evidenced, first of all, by the numerous measures taken by Marshal Berthier and the Napoleonic headquarters to prepare a proven route. However, Napoleon did not want to miss the chance to leave as a winner.
This is not even a city, this is Gorodnya
Napoleon gathers in Gorodnya, a small settlement not far from Maloyaroslavets, a military council, somewhat reminiscent of the famous council in Fili. Here, the opinions of those present were similarly divided, the hot-headed Murat was ready to almost storm Kaluga with his cavalry and guards, but the emperor gave the order to retreat. “We've already done enough for the glory. The time has come to think only about saving the remaining army."
With all the inclination of the great commander to pathos, he, as we see, had to admit that he could be left without an army at all. Whatever it was, but after the Berezina Napoleon still had something to revive with - it is no coincidence that we dedicated a number of essays to this ability of his. But the Russians' ability to bring the matter to the end should be no less astonishing. Despite the provinces defeated by the invaders, not taking into account the human losses comparable to the French.
The circumstances of Napoleon's exit from Moscow, and the subsequent turn to the old Smolensk road, were perhaps best summed up by one of the most authoritative researchers of the Napoleonic wars, David Chandler.
“After a slow and careful approach, he won a battle that didn’t decide anything, only to then choose the worst road for the further movement of the army, when an open and better road lay in front of him. The combination of this strange for him slowness, indecision and excessive caution doomed his army to gradual destruction, just like a great defeat on the battlefield."
However, one can argue with Chandler, especially, excuse the repetition, about how "open and better" the road through Medyn was. Not only did the French themselves not think to prepare it for retreat, there they were immediately expected by an extremely harsh pursuit by Kutuzov from the rear, in contrast to the "soft" option, which was then actually chosen by the Russian commander-in-chief.
But there is no doubt that on this path the pursuit would have been accompanied by continuous raids by Cossacks and partisans, as well as by the whole set of problems that the French faced on the way to the Berezina. Many of these problems led to colossal losses in the Russian army as well. However, it is worth recalling that in those days in wars such as in 1812, it was generally considered almost the norm, when combat losses were treated as non-combat (mainly from diseases) as 1 to 2, if not worse.
