Today, even professional historians prefer not to recall that in September 1939, even the most stubborn anti-communist Winston Churchill did not protest against the Red Army's Liberation campaign in ex-eastern Poland. Moreover, the Soviet and Polish troops actually jointly defended Lviv from the German units!
Such precedents of a joint struggle against the Nazis were, of course, rare, although a common enemy, as you know, unites. Now no one remembers that Poland and the USSR, even before the start of not only the Liberation Campaign, but also the German invasion, nevertheless discussed the issue of how the Red Army could enter the war, if it comes to it.
It was planned that Poland would have to provide corridors for the passage of the Red troops to the front line, including through the territory of the Vilno district and in the vicinity of Lvov. It is clear that after the pact, which the USSR had managed to conclude with Germany, the issue of the "pass" was removed by itself. It is also clear that no one would have given any orders from the very top to fight against the Germans either to the Poles or to the Soviet troops.
However, at the walls of Lvov, the failed allies successfully carried out the largest joint military operation, about which a little below. The Russians fought side by side with the Poles, already knowing that the authorities of Pan Poland not only emigrated to Romania, but themselves had already “written off” Lviv and the surrounding area to the zone of Soviet military-political responsibility.
Nevertheless, already in September 1939, the leadership of the German Reich planned to create a number of puppet "states" in the former eastern Poland. It was about independent Galicia and Volhynia, and even some Transcarpathian Slavic autonomy. At the same time, the calculation in the traditionally disputed region was clearly made on their expansion in the course of a future war with the USSR.
It seems that one can rightfully agree with the assessment of the Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko of the events of eighty years ago. He expressed it ten years ago, on September 17, 2009:
“On September 17, 1939, the Red Army's liberation campaign began, the purpose of which was to protect the Belarusian and Ukrainian population left to their own devices in Poland in the face of the German invasion and the outbreak of World War II. This not only strengthened the security of the USSR, but also became an important contribution to the struggle against fascist aggression”.
Since then, the position of Belarus, despite all the somersaults of the current political situation, has not changed at all. But it must be recalled that the point of view of British Prime Minister Churchill, expressed back in early December 1939, was much more specific:
“Russia is pursuing a cold policy of defending its own interests. Therefore, in order to protect Russia from the Nazi threat, it was clearly necessary that the Russian armies stood on the line that had arisen."
Regarding specific real British actions in September 1939, Churchill noted:
“… On September 4, the British Air Force (10 bombers), having made a raid on Kiel, in which half of our aircraft were lost, had no results. … Then they limited themselves to throwing leaflets appealing to the morality of the Germans. The Poles' repeated requests for specific military assistance remained unanswered, and in some cases they were simply misinformed."
Tracing boundaries
The active actions taken by the USSR on September 17 were also due to the fact that, as it became known, on September 12, 1939, at a meeting on Hitler's train, issues of the near and medium term with respect to Poland were discussed. It was also about the fate of the Ukrainian population and, in general, about the new line of German-Soviet contact.
At the same time, it was noted that on the border with the USSR, with the expectation of an inevitable future conflict with this power, it is necessary to create "gasket states" loyal to the Reich: first Ukraine (at the beginning on the territory of the ex-Polish Galicia and Volyn), and then the "Polish »Quasi-state. Simultaneously with the implementation of these projects, Germany planned by all means to strengthen the dependence on Germany not only of Lithuania, but also of the two neighboring Baltic states - Latvia and Estonia.
At the same time, it was unambiguously recognized that Lviv would be a political stronghold in the phased implementation of these plans through, first of all, the OUN (see, for example, "Martin Broszat's Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik 1939-1945", Stuttgart, 1961). Obviously, because of geography, such projects directly related to the security and integrity of the USSR.
Regarding Lviv, the situation, according to Soviet and Polish documents of that period, developed as follows: at about 6:30 am on September 19, Colonel P. Fomchenkov, the commander of the 24th brigade (his headquarters near the eastern outskirts of Lvov), arrived the chief of staff of the Polish garrison in Lvov, Colonel of the General Staff B. Rakovsky, with him two colonels and three majors.
The brigade commander proposed to surrender the city of Lvov to Soviet troops. The chief of staff of the garrison asked to postpone, as he must receive instructions from above. All this was given 2 hours. The commander of the 24th brigade (ltbr) also demanded that the tanks in the city and on the outskirts continue to remain in their places. But, in view of the data of Soviet military intelligence, he allowed the Poles to occupy points in the city to observe the German positions, which adjoined the city in a half-ring.
This decision of Fomchenkov was one hundred percent justified. For already at 8:30. On the same day, the Germans, who had reached Lvov on September 16, unexpectedly launched an attack on areas of the city occupied not only by Polish, but also by Soviet troops. By that time, it was the latter who already controlled up to 70% of its territory. Polish troops accepted the battle, and Soviet tanks and armored vehicles of the 24th LtBR reconnaissance battalion first found themselves between the opposing sides.
By order of the brigade command, coordinated with Moscow, Soviet tankers opened fire on the Germans, joining the Poles. By the evening of September 19, the German attack was repulsed. The losses of the 24th brigade amounted to two armored vehicles and one tank, three people were killed and four were wounded. In addition, two German tanks knocked out by the Poles remained in the brigade's position on the battlefield.
Similar excesses of a smaller scale took place in the Grodno region, near the town of Kolomyia in southern Galicia, west of Lutsk. After that, the local Polish troops, which repelled German attacks along with Soviet units, were captured by the Red Army (south of Kolomyia, neighboring Romania - and by the Romanians). Although the German military insisted on their transfer to German captivity.
It is possible that the events mentioned, especially in Lvov, were a deliberate German provocation in order to capture the whole of Galicia and, possibly, even then unleash a war with the USSR. It is obvious that Berlin no longer feared a stab in the back from France and England.
It is noteworthy that it was in its Lviv region that large oil reserves were located, on the basis of which the local oil refining worked, which clearly attracted the Germans. But to prevent the German invasion, which, by the way, contradicted the notorious Ribbentrop-Molotov pact, the Soviet and Polish troops acting together were able to act together.
