On August 22, 1939, just a day before the signing of the notorious Soviet-German non-aggression pact, Romania opened its border with Poland (330 km). The Polish Embassy in Bucharest was informed at the same time by the Romanian Foreign Ministry about "the high likelihood of a military invasion by Germany into Poland, whose borders with Germany occupy the predominant part of the Polish external borders."
The German Foreign Ministry's protest against Romania remained unanswered. But after three weeks, it was this border corridor that actually saved many tens of thousands of Polish military and civilians from death and captivity.
Moreover: not only Romania, but even pro-German Hungary and even Lithuania, which did not recognize the Polish seizure of Vilnius in 1920 and barely escaped the Polish occupation in 1938 thanks to the USSR, provided Poland with indirect military and political assistance during the Nazi invasion. Moreover, Romania and Hungary advised Poland not to neglect Soviet military assistance. But in vain …
The Polish-Romanian non-aggression pact of 1921, signed in Bucharest, proclaimed, among other things, the inviolability of the eastern borders of Poland and Romania. That is, their borders with the USSR and military mutual assistance during Soviet aggression against these countries. This is despite the fact that Romania has occupied Russian Bessarabia since 1918, which was not recognized by either Soviet Russia or the USSR.
And on March 27, 1926, a Polish-Romanian military convention was signed in Warsaw, which did not have a specific duration. Among its provisions was the obligation of Romania to send 19 divisions to help the ally in the event of a Polish-Soviet war, if Germany participates in it on the side of the USSR.
If Germany remains neutral, Romania promised only 9 divisions to help the Poles. Poland, in response, pledged to send at least 10 divisions in the event of a war between Romania and the USSR, Bulgaria or Hungary. It is characteristic that the scenario of the Polish-German war was not considered in the treaty at all.
But fearing that Hungary, allied with Germany, would invade Romania to restore the Hungarian status of Northern Transylvania (which became Romanian since 1921) and due to the aggravation of the Romanian-Bulgarian conflicts over northern Dobrudja (Romanian since 1920), Bucharest refrained from direct military assistance Poland in 1939.
Gheorghe Hafencu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania in February 1939 - June 1940, in a conversation with his Polish colleague Jozef Beck in July 1939 in Bucharest, advised him "not to reject from the doorway the option of allowing Soviet troops to pass to the borders of Poland with Germany and Bohemia. and pro-German Slovakia. Geographic factors are such that your country is unlikely to be able to repel a German invasion on its own."
In addition, according to G. Hafenku, the military geography of Poland is such that even the introduction of Romanian troops into the country will not change the military situation in almost all of Poland. But it can also provoke Soviet aggression in Bessarabia.
Here is such a loyal Bucharest
The Polish side did not listen to the Romanian arguments either. On the other hand, the supply of Romanian oil and petroleum products to Germany has been increasing since the spring of 1939. And by the end of August 1939, they accounted for almost 40% of the volume of German consumption of oil and oil products against 25% in the mid-30s, and the Romanian side did not raise oil prices for Germany since 1938. These supplies increased in the future.
Thus, Bucharest demonstrated its loyalty to Berlin on the eve of the German invasion of Poland. And many Romanian media at that time noted that Berlin agreed to "keep" Moscow, Budapest and Sofia from active actions against Bucharest against a number of Romanian neighboring regions. If Romania does not provide assistance to Poland in the event of its military conflict with Germany. At the same time, all such reports and comments in the press have not been officially refuted by the Romanian authorities.
And on August 27, 1939, the Romanian government, in its not advertised diplomatic note to Berlin, assured that "… it seeks to go hand in hand with Germany in the Russian question." And it will remain "neutral in any conflict between Germany and Poland, even if Britain and France intervene in it."
But on August 28, Romania gave consent to England and France for the transit of military materials to Poland, although these deliveries were only 40 percent of the previously agreed volumes and schedule. Plus, they seem hopelessly late. By mid-September, they, having begun on August 31, completely stopped due to the occupation of Poland.
Meanwhile, the Polish commander-in-chief Marshal E. Rydz-Smigly announced on September 17 the order “… The Soviets also invaded. I order to carry out the withdrawal to Romania and Hungary by the shortest routes. Do not fight with the Soviets, only if they attempt to disarm our units. The task for Warsaw and Modlin (the citadel north of Warsaw. - Ed.), Which should defend against the Germans, - no changes. Units which the Soviets have approached must negotiate with them with a view to the withdrawal of units and garrisons to Romania or Hungary. The units covering the Romanian suburb (southeastern borderland of Poland. - Ed. Note) - to continue resistance."
On September 16-21, 1939, in spite of German protests, no less than 85 thousand Poles, including the government and military officials, crossed the Romanian border. The Polish state gold reserve of 80 tons was also evacuated. Already on September 19, 77 tons were delivered to the Romanian port of Constanta and from there transported to southern France (Angers).
Then, in May 1940, this gold was shipped to London. And three tons of the Polish gold reserves remained in Romania for the costs of supporting the Poles and their "redirection" to other countries. Moreover, Romania returned these three tons to socialist Poland in 1948 without any compensation. Indirect Romanian aid to Poland was expressed in the fall of 1939 in the fact that Romania exchanged Polish zlotys for local lei at a very favorable rate for the Poles.
But already on September 21, the then Romanian Prime Minister A. Kelinescu was destroyed by German intelligence …
Lithuania chooses neutrality
As for the position of Lithuania at that time, it was similar to that of the Romanian. She declared neutrality on September 1, and on August 30, the Lithuanian Ministry of Defense assured Warsaw that Lithuanian troops would not enter the Vilnius region (only about 16 thousand square kilometers), which included, we recall, the Braslav region bordering with Lithuania and Latvia, if there were Polish troops there. redirected to the front with Germany. But Berlin refrained from protest, believing that Lithuania would succumb to the temptation to reclaim Vilnius.
On September 9, the German Ambassador to Lithuania R. Tsekhlin proposed to the commander of the Lithuanian army, General S. Rashtikis, to send troops to Poland to occupy Vilna. In response, Rashtikis said that "… Lithuania has always been interested in the return of Vilna and Vilnius, but having declared its neutrality, it cannot openly put forward this proposal, fearing a negative reaction from both the Western powers and the USSR."
Meanwhile, Polish troops from there were transported to Warsaw and the nearby Modlin citadel in the first week of September. Which extended the Polish resistance in Warsaw and Moldina until the end of September.
It is characteristic, in this connection, that the report of the Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Lithuania N. Pozdnyakov on September 13 to Moscow:. Poland. But the Lithuanian authorities are still refusing."
On the same day, the USSR military attaché in Kaunas, Major I. Korotkikh, reported to Moscow that "… the ruling circles of Lithuania, including the military, are not tempted to annex Vilna, although this could be done easily now." Department of the General Staff of the Lithuanian Army, Colonel Dulksnis, the Lithuanians do not want to get Vilna from the hands of the Germans. It is another matter, according to him, if the Soviet Union was involved here."
This, in fact, happened to Vilenshina in mid-October 1939.
Hungarian Rhapsody was not performed in Warsaw
As for Hungary, its authorities, although pro-German, were not predisposed to the defeat of Poland and, accordingly, to German domination in Eastern Europe. Having received in 1938-39. "from the hands" of Berlin, the former Czechoslovak Transcarpathia and many regions of the Slovak border with Hungary, in Budapest, set out, as they say, to play their game in the region.
In the spring of 1939, thanks to Transcarpathia, Hungary received a 180 km border with Poland. And the Polish authorities in 1938-39 more than once offered Budapest mediation in the settlement of the Transylvanian dispute with Romania.
As Matthias Rakosi, who became the head of Hungary already in 1947, later noted in his memoirs, “Budapest and Bucharest agreed to such mediation shortly after the German occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. But subsequent events in Eastern Europe led to the fact that there were only two round of mediation consultations in Poland. For Berlin increasingly hindered Hungary's independent foreign policy."
The most clear and concise description of Berlin's problems with Budapest is stated in the well-known German plan "Weiss", approved by Hitler on April 11, 1939: "… The German side cannot count on Hungary as an unconditional ally."
As for the then Hungarian assessment of Warsaw's policy towards Berlin and Moscow, “Poland, with her narcissistic recklessness, signed her own verdict much earlier than September 1, 1939. Already geographically, it could not repel the German invasion without help from the USSR,”noted the Prime Minister of Hungary (February 1939 - March 1941) Pal Teleki de Secky.
“But Warsaw,” according to his caustic remark, “preferred suicide, and the USSR could not allow the Wehrmacht to reach large Soviet cities near the Polish-Soviet border. Therefore, the Soviet-German pact was inevitable. It would not have existed if Warsaw had taken into account the real plans, the actions of the Nazis and the neighborhood with the USSR, which is not interested in German aggression near its borders."
In accordance with such a completely understandable political logic, the Hungarian authorities on September 7 refused to allow Berlin to transit two (as a whole) Wehrmacht divisions to the border with Poland and to Slovakia. This fact was taken into account in the aforementioned order of Marshal Rydz-Smigla on September 17 - "… I order to withdraw to Romania and Hungary by the shortest routes."
At the same time, just through Hungary, in spite of all the protests of Berlin, up to 25 thousand Polish military and civilians crossed into Romania and Yugoslavia in mid-September. In other words, a truly manic Polish ambition led, perhaps, only to the "evacuation" of Poland in 1939. Literally and figuratively …
