November 9, 1969 was the beginning of the battles that forever changed both the situation in central Laos and the course of the war in Vietnamese communications.
The beginning of the battle
The course of the Vietnamese offensive was slow - it was necessary to advance along the roads, but not along them, which reduced the speed of maneuvering of troops on highly rugged terrain to a few kilometers, and sometimes hundreds of meters per day. In addition, some of the heights that were held by the royalists were truly impregnable, and aviation was working against the advancing.
Faced with the loss of Xianghuang (now Phonsavan airport, it was with his attack and capture that a new series of battles in the Valley began), Wang Pao organized the transfer of a battalion to the Valley from another province - the 26th Volunteer Battalion. The latter was armed with captured PT-76 tanks and 155-mm howitzers. It took two weeks for the battalion to reach the outskirts of Phonsavan and Xianghuang, but then, as a result of a counterattack, this battalion was able to knock the Vietnamese out of Xianghuang. By November 27, the village was returned. This did not change much - route number 7, on which this settlement stood, was controlled by the Vietnamese, along the arcuate route 72 north of route 7, they also slowly advanced their attack.
The Fau Nok Kok mountains (south of route 7) and Fau Fiung (north-east of the previous one) were defended by local tribal militias, reinforced by royalist battalions. Fau Fiung was the first to fall. On November 29, a battalion of the 141st Infantry Regiment of the 312th Infantry Division drove the 21st Volunteer Battalion and local militias off the mountain. Next came the turn of Fau Nok Kok, but then difficulties arose. The mountain, firstly, had very difficult slopes, and secondly, it was of much greater importance, so, for example, the defenders included American aircraft controllers from the CIA. The mountain was fortified with various types of anti-personnel barriers. Moving around the mountain and carrying heavy weapons onto it were both challenging.
The assault on the mountain was entrusted to units of the "Dak Kong" - Vietnamese special forces. The detachment that stormed the mountain managed to concentrate everything it needed only by December 2. Before nightfall, the mortarmen of the mortar unit attached to the special forces detachment opened heavy fire on the positions of the troops defending the mountain. Before nightfall, they brought down about 300 mines on the defenders. Under cover of fire, special forces approached the front line of the defense at the top of the mountain. With the onset of darkness, the special forces immediately attacked. In order to quickly overcome the massively equipped obstacles on the way, the Dak Kong fighters used the so-called "Bangalore torpedoes" - elongated explosive charges (US) in long pipes.
Throwing such a charge in front of themselves on the fence, and undermining it, the soldiers made their own corridors for the offensive. Excellent preparation, superiority in weapons, and darkness favored the attacker, and as soon as dawn approached, the defenders fled. However, it was too early for the Vietnamese to rejoice. The CIA gunner requested a series of massive airstrikes against the mountain top. The blows were inflicted and the Vietnamese, unable to withstand the heavy bombardment, went down below, leaving the summit in a draw.
Soon the Royalists launched a massive counterattack. Fau Nok Kok was occupied by a detachment of Hmongs, and all the forces that Wang Pao could throw into battle here and now fell on the entire leading edge of the Vietnamese - the 21st Volunteer Battalion, 19th Infantry Battalion and tribal militias.
The attackers were able to return back another mountain - Fau Fiung, after which they continued their slow advance to the east. It soon stopped, however. By the nature of the intelligence information collected during the counteroffensive, it became clear to the royalists that the Vietnamese had not brought their main forces into battle, and that an even stronger blow from their side was not far off.
At first, the royalist command had an idea to retreat slowly with battles, but Wang Pao "corrected" it. He did not want to surrender to the enemy the Valley of the Kuvshinov, which he conquered with such difficulty, and he refused to retreat.
On January 9, the fighters of the 27th Dak Kong battalion proceeded to re-assault Mount Fau Nok Kok, attacking it from several directions. Originally SGU1, the 1st Rebel Special Unit, held onto the summit. However, the commandos managed to climb up the northern slope and find themselves near the top. It took them a day. Then the summit was again subjected to powerful mortar fire, under the cover of which the Vietnamese special forces approached the front line of the defenders. Then a new surprise was launched - flamethrowers. This finished the Royalists and they fled, leaving the Vietnamese this bloody height. By the end of January 12, the height was cleared and completely occupied. Three days later, on January 15, a detachment of 183 soldiers of the 26th Volunteer Battalion was landed from the air on a mountain ridge directly at the top of Fau Nok Kok, but the landing attempt failed - the forces were insufficient, and the weather did not allow the use of strike aircraft.
South of Route 7, on Route 72, the Vietnamese subjected another Royalist detachment to heavy mortar and artillery fire - the 23rd Mobile Detachment, which, unable to withstand the fire, retreated and let two Vietnamese regiments pass in the direction of Xianghuang-Phonsavan. The latter immediately began to prepare starting positions for an attack on Xianghuang with the aim of returning it. The Royalists, unable to counterattack immediately, began to fortify at the intersection of Routes 7 and 71, which the Vietnamese could not pass, and which would have been kept under fire by Vietnamese communications if they tried to enter Phonasawan itself.
In general, they concentrated there four battalions and a number of local militias.
On January 23, the American ambassador to Laos again asked the command of the US Armed Forces for strikes with B-52 bombers. Royalist armored columns delivered supplies to the Lima 22 stronghold, half-surrounded by the Vietnamese, near Phonsavan.
Storm
Until early February, the sides brought up the second echelons and delivered supplies over the incredibly difficult terrain. The CIA, Air America forces, as usual, began to take out the civilian population from the battle zone, pursuing this time two-fold goals - firstly, to morally support the Hmong (a significant part of the evacuees belonged to this nation), and secondly to deprive the mobilization resource and manpower Pathet Lao. In total, in about two weeks they airlifted 16,700 people. The Vietnamese did not interfere with these operations in any way.
The bigger problem was that the enemy was continuously building up the concentration of strike aircraft. From the beginning of February, attack aircraft from all over Laos began to gather at the Muang Sui airfield. On February 4, a sharp increase in the number of sorties of these aircraft began. To the Vietnamese, deprived of serious air defense, they caused great problems and considerable losses. The power of the air strikes grew steadily. On January 30, the B-52s again entered into action, although that day they bombed the far rear, without touching the troops on the front line.
On February 7, Wang Pao organized a breakthrough of a small detachment from the 26th Volunteer Battalion into the rear of the Vietnamese troops, supported by 155 mm artillery, near the intersection of routes 7 and 71. The detachment occupied the 1394-meter-high peak, from which it was possible to keep the road in the Vietnamese rear under continuous fire
On February 11, the Duck Kong went into battle again. Two companies attacked Lima 22. The Royalists called in the air force, the Americans sent three AC-47 Gunships, and the attack drowned - 76 Special Forces soldiers were left lying in front of the Royalist front line.
But at the intersection of routes 7 and 71, the special forces were successful - covertly approaching the defenders, they massively used tear gas, completely disorganizing the enemy's resistance. Morally and financially unprepared to resist the gas attack, the enemy wavered. The so-called "Brown" battalion fled, leaving behind its heavy weapons. The rest of the monarchists, seeing the flight of their neighbors, panicked and followed them. Soon the fortified point fell.
Now the gates were open for the Vietnamese to invade the Valley of the Jugs, and, despite the offensive and heavy losses at Lim 22, this day was undoubtedly successful for them.
On February 17, the Vietnamese conducted reconnaissance in force in the direction of the "Lima 22" strongpoint, which annoyed them. The result was the loss of four tanks on mines. On the same day, Dak Kong fighters infiltrated Lon Tieng airfield and disabled two T-28 Troyan light attack aircraft and one O-1 guidance aircraft. The Royalists, however, managed to kill three of them. For the next three days, the Vietnamese pulled up their forces to the "Lima 22" stronghold, through impassable terrain, in order to finally take this object by storm and finally free their hands. The royalists also planned a visit to the same stronghold of the King of Laos, Savang Vatkhan, who was supposed to cheer up the defending troops.
By the evening of February 19, the Vietnamese concentrated a sufficient number of soldiers in front of the Lima 22 stronghold, as well as Grad-P portable missile launchers. On the night of 19-20 February, a mass of missiles hit the positions of the troops defending the "Lima 22", and consisted mainly of detachments of the political faction of Lao neutralists. Immediately after the rocket fire, in the pitch darkness, the Vietnamese infantry rose to attack. But this time, the neutralists, who had previously earned a reputation for being the most unreliable troops in this war, repulsed this attack. The king's visit after this, however, was out of the question.
The next day, the Vietnamese managed to deliver four PT-76 tanks to the initial lines, and on the night of February 21, before dawn, they went on the attack again.
This time they were lucky - parts of the neutralists, who came under the attack with the use of tanks, panicked and fled. The Vietnamese managed to break into the defense of "Lima 22" and when it became light, their success was obvious to other defending units. The latter, including the "brown" battalion already beaten by the Vietnamese, ran after them. By 14:15 on February 21, the last Royalist soldier defending the stronghold had fled, and the Vietnamese were already occupying this position abandoned by the defenders, which they had so dearly inherited.
The gates to the Valley of Jugs were now completely open, and all communications that could be used to invade it were under Vietnamese control.
From the beginning of March, the Vietnamese began their advance into the Valley. The problem was the extremely low traffic capacity of the roads to their rear, for parts of two divisions and one separate infantry regiment, this capacity was critically lacking, the rear services worked at the physical limit, and still the pace of the offensive was very low. In addition to insufficient communications, the actual resistance of the enemy, and extremely difficult to move rocky roadless terrain, covered with dense vegetation, the offensive was hampered by extensive minefields, which massively covered the royalists. Nevertheless, the Vietnamese forces of 4 infantry regiments continued the offensive
On the right (northern) flank, the 866th Independent Infantry Regiment and the 165th Infantry Regiment of the 312th Infantry Division were advancing on Hang Ho, on the left southern flank the 148th Infantry Regiment of the 316th Infantry Division was advancing towards Sam Thong. Between these two strike groups, the 174th Infantry Regiment of the 316th Infantry Division, which was divided into two battle groups, was moving, which did not have a clear target for capture and which was supposed to provide the flanks of the other two strike groups, quickly clearing the area between them.
The advance of the Vietnamese clearly indicated that they had every chance of taking Thong Sam and, what would be a disaster for the royal regime - located just a few kilometers away, Long Tieng - the main base of the Hmong, the CIA, and the largest royalist airfield in the region. in fact, an almost complete (by the standards of Laos, of course) airbase.
It would be a disaster for the royalist regime and the CIA.
In mid-March, Wang Pao was in an almost hopeless position. There were no troops. The resources of other regions of Laos were mostly depleted, their soldiers were out of action. In principle, there was still someone to put under arms, but firstly, for this, the help of the generals from the capital was needed, and they did not want to help the upstart Hmong, who de facto worked for the Americans, and not for the monarchy. It was possible to try to recruit mercenaries from different tribal units and militias and replenish the deserted special rebel units at their expense. But I needed money. None of this happened, and the CIA was playing for time, promising that help was just around the corner.
Wang Pao's day consisted of organizing the evacuation of Hmong civilians from the Long Tieng area further west, planning the evacuation of the entire Hmong people to the border with Thailand, and in between - physical labor at the airfield, where the general personally hung bombs under the aircraft with Hmong pilots - there weren't enough technicians either. However, sometimes the situation required Wang Pao to go into the trenches himself, where he could exercise his skills as a mortar gunner. It would not have been possible to fight like this for a long time, and it seemed that defeat was near. And soon the weather also deteriorated, and the planes were laid up …
On March 15, Vietnamese forward units were already rolling up to Sam Thong. Hang Ho was surrounded by VNA forces, and blocked by them, there were no forces to defend Sam Thong. On March 17, the Royalists began a massive withdrawal from Sam Thong, from which by that time the wounded, civilians and Americans had also been evacuated. A day later, the base was occupied by Vietnamese troops. According to the testimony of the Americans, they immediately burned down half of the infrastructure available there - buildings and the like. Soon it was the turn of the last royalist stronghold in the southwest of the Valley of the Jugs - Lon Tieng.
Battles for Lon Tieng
Fortunately for Wang PAO, the CIA was in time at the last moment. On the day when the Vietnamese infantry, exhausted and embittered by months of heavy fighting and maneuvers, entered Sam Thong, "boards" with reinforcements began to arrive at the Long Tieng airfield. The weather "gave relief" and helicopter and airplane flights became possible. On March 20, Wang Pao watched as salvation descended from the sky to him.
The first CIA to deliver a battalion to Long Tieng Thai mercenaries Special requirement 9, 300-man gunners armed with 155-mm howitzers, which they immediately dug in on the outskirts of the airbase. With them arrived and their ammunition, which is quite sufficient for a difficult battle. On the same day, the CIA was able to deliver another full-fledged royalist battalion, recruited and trained in another battalion in Laos, numbering 500 people. This has already radically changed the matter. In the evening, another 79 fighters were delivered from northern Laos, followed by a couple dozen more from the area adjacent to the Valley of Kuvshinov.
At the end of the day, the CIA evacuated the 2nd Special Rebel Unit (2nd SGU) holding Hang Ho and transferred it to Long Tieng, leaving the village to the surrounding Vietnamese.
Together with deserters gathered in the vicinity, walking wounded and militants who lagged behind their troops, Wang Pao's forces reached approximately 2,000 people by the end of March 20. This was about three times less than the attacking VNA troops had, but that was already something.
Wang Pao concentrated these forces on the defense of Long Tieng, effectively abandoning all the surrounding positions. This was taken advantage of by the Vietnamese, who occupied the ridge near the airbase on March 20 in the afternoon, which was listed in American documents as "Skyline One". Immediately, an artillery reconnaissance group was thrown onto the ridge, and soon a fire strike was struck against Lon Tieng with the help of Grad-P rocket launchers for the first time in the whole war. At night, the Dak Kong saboteurs tried to infiltrate the airfield again, but to no avail.
The Vietnamese did not have enough literally a day to turn the tide of the war in Laos - American helicopters and aircraft made their opponents much more mobile.
The weather, unfortunately for the Vietnamese, was getting better and better. On the morning of March 21, Troyans piloted by Thai mercenary pilots began to strike at them. Soon, the Hmong pilots sharply added momentum, so, on March 22, one of the Hmong pilots flew 31 sorties in one daylight. Another 12 sorties were performed by American instructor pilots, also on the T-28.
The decisive factor in the loss of pace by the Vietnamese was the night of March 22-23. That night, the units preparing to storm Lon Tieng were hit by a BLU-82 heavy bomb dropped from an American "special-purpose aircraft" MC-130. The explosion of a monstrous force completely disorganized the VNA units, inflicted heavy losses on them, and stopped combat operations for the rest of the night.
On March 23, the weather over central Laos finally became flying, and over all of central Laos. This allowed the United States Air Force to engage with all its might. During March 23, they carried out 185 strikes against Vietnamese troops, and this despite the fact that both Lao and Thai aircraft also continued to fly and attack targets. The offensive stalled. The Vietnamese simply could not advance under such a barrage of fire, and no matter how close their goal was, they did not go further. On March 24, VNA scouts discovered a TACAN beacon on the Skyline One ridge, a navigation system used by the US Air Force for its own purposes. The lighthouse was immediately destroyed. The Americans could easily have put a new one in the same place, but first they had to take the height at which the lighthouse stood back. This was the second critical moment - in good weather, the Vietnamese units, exhausted by the continuous months of fighting, could hold their positions only if air strikes were minimized, and the loss of the lighthouse by the Americans gave them such an opportunity.
But now the royalists were already on fire with the idea of throwing back the enemy. By that time, the CIA had finally come to its senses and announced that each participant in the assault on the height would receive a dollar for each day of the fighting. For Southeast Asia in 1970, it was money. On the morning of March 24, CIA operatives and Wang Pao assembled a large assault force. An M-16 rifle was delivered to each soldier. Although the US Air Force could not fully realize its strike potential without a lighthouse, Trojans from nearby air bases could fly without it. On March 26, during a massive attack, the height with the lighthouse was repulsed back.
While the US Air Force was rebuilding its equipment, the offensive continued with massive air support. Encouraged by the success of Wang Pao's supporters and royalist units, with more and more powerful air support, they pressed the Vietnamese, who had no strength, no reserves, or even the ability to get ammunition in off-road terrain. On March 27, the royalists drove out and surrounded Sam Thong. Realizing that they would not be able to stay in the village, the Vietnamese went into the jungle, leaving their positions to the royalists.
They, however, held a number of heights from which it was possible to fire at the now inaccessible for them Lon Tieng, interfering with the work of aviation.
By March 29, the Americans had found another detachment willing to fight, now for three dollars a day - the 3rd Special Rebel Detachment. For its fire support between air strikes, the Americans airlifted a 155-mm howitzer with a squadron and shells. On March 29, this battalion and two battalions of royalists who had been in Lon Tieng earlier, covered by artillery and air strikes, went on the attack. Parts of the 866th and 148th regiments could not hold them and retreated. The risk of getting Lon Tieng under Vietnamese fire was removed.
Skirmishes with the Vietnamese in the jungle and individual clashes continued for another month, but then the lack of roads and the difficult terrain began to work against the royalists, and they could no longer push the Vietnamese back. However, they themselves retreated from the "inconvenient" for defense sectors.
On April 25, Wu Lap, seeing that it was impossible to advance further, stopped the 139 Campaign. The Vietnamese offensive is over. The 312th division was withdrawn, but the 316th and 866th regiments remained in the reinforcement of the Pathet Lao units, which again occupied the Kuvshin Valley.
Outcomes
At first glance, the results of the operation for the Vietnamese look contradictory. They drove the enemy out of the Valley of the Pitchers, and took decisive heights to control the Valley. At the same time, the losses were very large, and it did not work to take the main enemy airbase - Lon Tieng.
But in reality, this offensive was decisive for the war on Vietnamese communications. After Campaign 139, the Royalists will never again be able to drive the Vietnamese out of the Valley and threaten the Tropez from the north. They will never again have the strength to simply inflict a serious defeat on the Vietnamese. Their mobilization reserve was completely depleted in these battles. Next time, the people of Wang Pao will go on the offensive only in the fall, now there will be no question of launching attacks over and over again, as before. Of course, the royalists will create problems for the Vietnamese and Pathet Lao more than once. They will be able to invade the Valley at the end of 1971. They will take Hang Ho. Later, the BNA will take Muang Sui, but will again be knocked out of there, in order to then take this town again. But there will never be such a thing for the royalists to be able to knock the Vietnamese out of the Valley of the Pitchers again. "Campaign 139" for all the inconsistency of its results, led to the removal of the threat of a complete cut of Vietnamese communications in Laos.
It was after these battles that the CIA would switch to a different strategy for working on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Now operations on it will go out of touch with the course of the civil war in Laos itself, in the form of raids and raids - which, due to the very nature of such operations, a priori could not have led to the interruption of the "Path". Raids and raids will become a serious problem for the Vietnamese, but will never become critical.
The war in Laos was just approaching its climax. Ahead were the battles for the western part of the Valley of Jugs, the Vietnamese offensives on Long Tieng, the battle for Skyline Ridge, the first massive use of tanks and mechanized troops by the Vietnamese, the first air battles over Laos between the Vietnamese and the Americans, which put the presumptuous Yankees in place - there was still many events. The war in Laos itself ended in the same year as the Vietnam War, in 1975. But there will never be any risk to Vietnamese communications from central Laos again.
However, the CIA was not going to give up, and the main problem for Vietnamese communications was not maturing in Laos.
