I came to the need to write an article on such a topic after reading a number of other articles proposing the modernization of the modern organizational structure. Basically, these articles propose to return the old Soviet states of motorized rifle and tank divisions. Most propose to base the structure on a battalion tactical group - a reinforced tank or motorized rifle battalion with full-time artillery, air defense, engineering, chemical and other types of troops, combat, technical and logistical support units. Moreover, it is proposed, copying NATO principles, to introduce artillery battalions, reconnaissance companies and many other subunits that are often not needed at all by the battalion as structural units in the staff of the combined-arms battalion.
At the same time, the battalion turns out to be overly bloated and clumsy, and there can be no talk of any of its mobility. I think this approach is fundamentally wrong. How to get out of this situation without reducing the combat capabilities of subunits and at the same time increasing mobility and controllability?
First of all, I want to say that the beautiful expression "battalion tactical group" (BTGr) as a whole is nothing more than a beautiful phrase. It is, by far, theoretically the most flexible and minimal system involving disparate divisions. But the battalion does not have a full-fledged headquarters and command and control system sufficient to manage motley units. Everything is based only on good principles and relations between the battalion commander and the commanders of the attached subunits.
Yes, according to the Combat Regulations of the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation, the commanders of the attached units are obliged to obey and follow the orders of the battalion commander to whom they are assigned. However, it seems incomprehensible who and how should plan the actions of attached units before the battle, organize their interaction in battle, provide them with ammunition, fuel, materiel, organize maintenance of weapons and military equipment, evacuate damaged equipment, etc. in the general BTG system. The battalion commander and chief of staff, even if they are seven spans in the forehead, during the battle will not be able to fully manage such a "hodgepodge" of heterogeneous units, they will not have enough time to analyze the situation, make a quality decision, draw up a combat order, bring it to the subunits, operational command of the battle and fire control of regular and attached subunits, and the commanders of the attached subunits will not be able to provide them in full assistance, proceeding from the employment of preparing for battle and direct leadership of their subunits.
Such a gap in the staff structure of motorized riflemen is being filled by the so-called "commander's will", fraught with nervous and physical overstrain and early fatigue of the battalion command. This is far from a positive phenomenon that entails losses in people and equipment in battle.
At the same time, I am far from thinking that this gap will be filled by the command and control bodies of a motorized rifle or tank brigade, which in turn are overloaded with the solution of a number of operational and tactical tasks. Combat operations are not exercises, where everyone knows his memorized maneuver at a familiar training ground without commands and orders, these are somewhat different conditions, you cannot take an operational pause and you cannot agree with an intermediary.
Under such circumstances, I consider it necessary to have one more additional stage of command and control of subunits - the regimental one. Unlike the Soviet regimental structure, which is similar to the regular structure of a motorized rifle or tank brigade, for the greatest controllability and mobility, I believe it is necessary to have a smaller number of regular units that make up its composition. I propose to add 2-3 mechanized regiments to the brigade, consisting of one tank and one motorized rifle battalion of four companies each, artillery and anti-aircraft battalions, anti-tank, rocket batteries, engineer-sapper, reconnaissance, company communications, chemical flamethrower platoon, repair and material support mouth. The brigade will also need to include an artillery regiment (BrAG) of two divisions, a rocket battalion, an anti-aircraft missile regiment, a reconnaissance battalion and other subunits that are similarly part of today's brigade.
The specified state will have a smaller number of units than the state of the Soviet motorized rifle division, twice, when equipped with modern control systems, it will provide greater mobility and controllability. At its core, such a mechanized regiment will be a semblance of a modern BTGr, but at a higher quality level, having a regular, well-functioning control system for both motorized rifle and tank units, as well as units of the combat arms. So, for example, the commander of an artillery battalion during a battle will receive command commands not from the headquarters of a motorized rifle battalion, which is often poorly versed in the use of artillery, but directly from the chief of artillery of a regiment, who has artillery reconnaissance and command facilities under his command. Whatever one may say, a regiment is an organism, a military unit with its own services and rear.
Next, let us dwell on the need to have a four-company structure of the regiment's tank and motorized rifle battalions. This is not a tribute to NATO fashion. Such a composition will make it possible to organize two BTGs inside the regiment - a tank and a motorized rifle, transferring from a tank battalion one tank company to a motorized rifle battalion, and one motorized rifle company of a motorized rifle battalion to a tank battalion. If necessary, you can have a balanced composition of battalions - two tank and two motorized rifle companies in each.
In general, on the basis of the regiment's subunits, it will be possible to form up to 6 company tactical groups during the period of hostilities, 3 in each battalion. Depending on the actions in the direction of the main attack or in the secondary direction, the formation of the combat formation of the mechanized regiment will be one- or two-echelon, which will maximize the fulfillment of the combat mission.
I believe that such changes in the organizational and staff structure of the motorized rifle (tank) brigade will solve the age-old issues of controllability and mobility of formations.
