Below are, in my translations, extracts from the military operations logs of the GA Sever from late August to early November 1941, concerning plans for Leningrad.
Microfilms with these KTBs are in NARA (T311 Roll 51, Roll 53, Roll 54), I used scanned materials posted on the site maparchive.ru (which I thank). If someone, for some conspiracy reasons, is not satisfied with the copies on this site, he, of course, has the right to order his own from NARA.
It should be noted that the main content of the KTB is the planning and implementation of military operations, therefore, political issues rarely fall on its pages and, of course, are considered through, so to speak, a military monocle. A fairly active discussion of the fate of Leningrad in the KTB data should probably be associated with the personality of the commander-in-chief of GA Sever, Field Marshal Leeb. The documents show some opposition regarding the instructions of the OKW and Hitler, however, the choice against the direct physical extermination of the civilian population of Leningrad, but in favor of his death by starvation, is unlikely to put the Field Marshal General in the ranks of major humanists. A few months later, Leeb was removed from the post of commander-in-chief.
original 28.08
translation
OKH regarding the operational plans of GA North
2) The complete encirclement of the city of Leningrad as the ultimate goal must be achieved by means of a ring that shrinks as closely as possible around the city and thereby saves power. To avoid its own large losses, the city itself must not be attacked by infantry; after the destruction of air defense and enemy fighters, the city should be deprived of any vitality and defensive capability through the destruction of hydraulic structures, warehouses, sources of light and electricity; enemy military installations and defense forces must be destroyed by fire and shelling.
OKH will agree with the Finnish army, which should take over the encirclement from the north and northeast, and act on the same principles.
02.09 original
translation
Order of the Army Group to the Command of the 16th Army
In order to cut off all supply routes to Leningrad from the outside, and in the end, by starvation, force the city to surrender, it is necessary that Schmidt's group break through the Mga station to Lake Ladoga.
03.09 original
translation
Keitel's message to the chief of staff
The Fuehrer and OKW see no obstacles to artillery shelling and bombardment of Leningrad.
05.09 original
translation
Assessment of the situation by the commander-in-chief of the army group
With regard to the treatment of the city of Leningrad, it is envisaged that Leningrad should not be taken, but only surrounded. I expressed the opinion that if Leningrad, perhaps prompted by hunger, surrenders, then at least [should] be deprived of the opportunity to defend itself again, that is, all soldiers and conscripts must be taken prisoner, and all weapons must be surrendered. Then at Leningrad it will be possible to leave only a small part of the forces, the rest of the forces will be freed.
15.09 original
translation
Commander-in-Chief of Army Group - OKH
Asks for instructions on what should be done in the event of a proposal to surrender Leningrad. In his opinion, it is necessary at least to deprive the city of all its means of protection. The best situation will be provided by the military occupation of the city (1 army corps of two divisions, one SS police division, until further orders an external military cordon around the city), it is also urgently needed for military-economic reasons: most of the 18th army will be freed.
17.09 original
translation
Assessment of the situation by the commander-in-chief of the army group
Allegedly, Leningrad is overcrowded with refugees from Krasnogvardeysk, Krasnoe Selo and Kolpino. It seems that the bread dispensing rates are already decreasing. I cannot rule out that after regrouping, when the front line will be formed anew, we will quickly move in the direction of Leningrad. What to do with the city itself, whether to accept its surrender, whether to destroy it with fire or starve it - the decision of the Fuehrer on this score, unfortunately, has not yet been made.
18.09 original
translation
Chief of Staff to Chief of Staff of Army Group
He, like the High Command of the Ground Forces, is aware of the difficulties facing Army Group North. They believe that it will be possible to clean up Leningrad only by means of hunger, and not by force of arms.
18.09 original
translation
Assessment of the situation by the commander-in-chief of the army group
During the visit of Field Marshal Keitel, it was discussed: the Finns will make significant progress only when we attack the other bank of the Neva. What should happen to Leningrad in case of surrender, the Fuehrer keeps to himself, he will inform about it only when the surrender occurs.
18.09 original
translation
From the conversation of the OKH liaison officer with the chief of general staff
The encirclement of Leningrad and possible surrender.
Colonel-General Halder recommends using all means to protect the ring around the city from attempts to break through (mines, barriers), since undoubtedly one should reckon with the most serious attempts to break through.
The capitulation of Leningrad should in no case be accepted without the knowledge of the OKH. If you receive an offer to surrender, you just need to find out: who is offering, what is he offering, what are his powers?
Based on these materials, the OKH should make a decision as soon as possible.
In addition to encircling Leningrad, the destruction of the remnants of the 8th Russian army in the area west of Leningrad is also urgent.
20.09 original
translation
Chief of General Staff's message
With regard to the city of Leningrad, the same principle remains: we do not enter the city and cannot feed the city. But Field Marshal Keitel thinks that he has found a way to expel women and children to the east. No final decisions have been made yet.
25.09 original
translation
Commander-in-Chief of Army Group - OKH
Army Group North with its remaining forces is no longer able to fully continue the offensive against Leningrad. This eliminates the systematic shelling of the city. All that remains to force the city to surrender is bombardment and starvation.
The experience of other big cities shows that the bombing should not be expected to have a significant impact, besides the forces of the Luftwaffe after the announced withdrawal [of units to another front] are very weak, and their tasks remain multifaceted.
Izmor is called into question, since there is a steamship service on Lake Ladoga, in addition, outside the city to the north of the Neva to the former Russian-Finnish border, there are land areas up to 75 km in depth, suitable for harvesting potatoes and grain.
If attrition is to bring results, it is necessary to seize these areas and harbors on Lake Ladoga. Due to a lack of forces, Army Group North is not capable of this. Only the advance of the Finns against the now weakened enemy will allow the Russians to take the land areas outside the city and the shore of Lake Ladoga from the Russians.
12.10 original
translation
OKV order (3)
The Fuehrer decided that the surrender of Leningrad, even if offered by the enemy, would not be accepted. The moral grounds for such a measure are clear to the whole world. In Kiev, the explosions of time bombs posed a tremendous danger to the troops; in Leningrad, this should be reckoned with on a much larger scale. That Leningrad was mined and would defend itself to the last man, Soviet-Russian radio reported itself. Major epidemics are to be expected.
No German soldier should enter the city. Anyone who wants to leave the city through our front line, drive back with fire. Small open holes [in the cordon] that will allow the flow of the population to get out into the interior of Russia, on the contrary, should only be welcomed. And for all other cities there is a rule that before being taken, they must be destroyed by artillery fire and air attacks, and the population must be forced to flee. It is irresponsible to stake the lives of German soldiers to save Russian cities from the danger of fires or to feed their population at the expense of the German homeland. The chaos in Russia will become the more, our management and exploitation of the occupied territories will be easier, the larger the population of Soviet-Russian cities will flee into the interior of Russia. This will of the Fuehrer should be communicated to all commanders.
OKH Addendum: To make it easier for the troops to carry out these measures, the current encirclement of Leningrad should be narrowed down in places where it is absolutely necessary for tactical reasons.
24.10 original
translation
Memorandum on the trip of the first officer of the General Staff (Ia) to the location of the 18th Army
2) In all the units visited, the question was asked how to behave if the city of Leningrad offered its surrender and how to behave in relation to the flow of the hungry population that would pour out of the city. The impression was that the troops were very concerned about this issue. The commander of the 58th Infantry Division emphasized that he had passed on to his division an order he received from above, which is in line with existing instructions that such attempts should be opened to fire in order to nip them in the bud. From his point of view, the division will carry out this order. But he doubts whether she will manage not to lose her composure when, with repeated breakthroughs, she will have to shoot women, children and defenseless old people. It should be noted that his remark that the general situation on the front sector, which is just on his flank in Uritsk, is becoming more and more aggravated, he fears less than the situation with the civilian population. Such is the mood not only of him, but also of his subordinates. The troops are fully aware that we cannot provide food for the millions of people surrounded in Leningrad without aggravating the food situation in our own country. For this reason, the German soldier must prevent such breakthroughs, including with the use of weapons. Well, this can easily lead to the fact that the German soldier will lose his stability, i.e. and after the war, such acts of violence will not frighten him.
The command and the troops are trying in every possible way to find another solution to the issue, but a suitable option has not yet been found.
3) The civilian population still living there is evacuated from the areas of combat both on the ring around Leningrad and on the coast south of Kronstadt. This is necessary, since it is impossible to provide the population there with food. The conclusion is that the civilian population moves in groups to the rear area and there is distributed among the villages. Despite this, most of the civilian population went south on their own to find new homes and livelihood opportunities. Along the highway from Krasnogvardeisk to Pskov, there is a stream of thousands of refugees, mainly women, children and the elderly. Where they move, what they eat, it is impossible to establish. One gets the impression that sooner or later these people must die of hunger. And this picture makes a depressing impression on the German soldiers carrying out construction work on this road.
The command of the 18th Army draws attention to the fact that leaflets are still being dropped on Leningrad, including those calling for desertion. This is not consistent with the indication that defectors should no longer be accepted. So far, defector soldiers (this is 100-120 people a day) are still accepted. But the content of the leaflets should be changed
27.10 original
translation
Commander-in-Chief of Army Group to Commander of 18th Army
The question of Leningrad, and especially of the civilian population there, strongly preoccupies the commander-in-chief. The main command of the ground forces proposed to arrange minefields in front of their own positions in order to save the troops from conducting direct battles with the civilian population. If the Red troops at Leningrad and Kronstadt surrender, surrender their weapons and are taken prisoner, the commander-in-chief sees no further need to support the encirclement of the city. Troops will be withdrawn to the quartering areas. And in this case, most of the population will die, but at least not right before our eyes. The possibility of taking part of the population to the road to Volkhovstroy must be considered.
09.11 original
translation
Assessment of the situation by the commander-in-chief of the army group
After the capture of Tikhvin, the waterway across Lake Ladoga was cut for Leningrad. The enemy has the ability to communicate with the outside world only through aviation and radio. In any case, further supply of supplies in large volumes is impossible, since the only area through which it can still pass - the area between Tikhvin and Svir - does not have major highways and railways. Tikhvin was taken two months after Shlisselburg, thus, after the then cutting of the supply routes by land, the supply routes across Lake Ladoga are now cut.
There were no changes in the operational plans.
1 - Cf.
Memorandum Leningrad.
Possibilities:
1. to occupy the city, i.e. behave as with other large Russian cities.
Reject, since we will then be held responsible for the nutrition [of the population]
2. To surround the city with a tight ring, preferably with a fence, through which electricity was launched, and which will be guarded by machine gunners.
Disadvantages: out of two million people, the weak will die of hunger in the foreseeable future, while the strong, on the contrary, will take possession of food and remain alive. The danger of epidemics that will spread to our front. In addition, it is questionable whether our soldiers can be required to shoot women and children trying to escape.
3. Women, children, old people, lead out through the gate in a ring of encirclement, leave the rest to die of hunger.
a) The transfer across the Volkhov behind the enemy front line is theoretically a good solution, but practically hardly feasible. Who should hold and guide hundreds of thousands? Where is the Russian front then?
b) If we refuse to withdraw to the Russian front, then those released will be distributed over the [occupied] territory.
In any case, there remains the disadvantage that the starving population of Leningrad is a hotbed of epidemics and that the strongest will live in the city for a long time to come.
4. After the advance of the Finns and the complete encirclement of the city, again withdraw beyond the Neva and transfer the area to the north of this section to the Finns.
The Finns unofficially stated that they would like to have the Neva as a state border, but Leningrad should disappear. Good as a political decision. But the question of the population of Leningrad cannot be solved by the Finns. We must do this.
Outcome and suggestion:
There is no satisfactory solution. Army Group North must, however, in due time receive an order that is really executable.
Offered
a) We state before the whole world that Stalin defends Leningrad as a fortress. Thus, we are forced to treat the city and its entire population as a military target. Nevertheless, we are taking a step forward: after the surrender of Leningrad, we allow the friend of the people Roosevelt to supply the residents who were not captured with food by means of neutral ships under the supervision of the Red Cross and we allow these ships to sail freely (the proposal, of course, cannot be accepted, assessed only from a propaganda point of view)
b) We are hermetically cordoning off Leningrad and destroying the city as much as possible with the help of artillery and aviation (the initially available aviation is weak!)
c) when the city ripens thanks to terror and the beginning of hunger, separate gates will open and unarmed people will be released. As far as possible, pushing deep into Russia. The remainder will be forcedly distributed over the [occupied] territory.
d) the remainder of the "fortress garrison" is left to himself for the whole winter. In the spring we then enter the city (if the Finns enter earlier, there are no objections), we withdraw everything that is, deep into Russia or into captivity, level Leningrad with the ground with explosives and transfer the territory north of the Neva to the Finns.
(Memorandum L OKW / WFSt 21.09., Quoted from W. Wette / G. Ueberschär "Unternehmen Barbarossa")
2 - The message corresponds to paragraph 3 of the order of the chief of staff of the naval forces.
3 - In the original order of Jodl from 07.10. (Nuremberg document 123-C) says about "the surrender of Leningrad, and later Moscow"
Several comments.
1. Obviously, the explosions in Kiev are used by Hitler as a pretext, but not as a reason. He repeatedly expressed his intention to raze Leningrad to the ground, even when Kiev was in the deep Soviet rear (see, for example, the entry in KTB OKW of 1941-08-07)
2. With all the hesitation in tactical issues (what to do with the prisoners of war and the population and the disagreement associated with this), the three main points of the program remain virtually unchanged
a) Seal off Leningrad hermetically, but do not enter the city
b) there is no interest in preserving the city
c) the civilian population will not be supplied with food
3. The technical implementation of plans to push the civilian population out of the city to the east and even "deep into Russia" is being questioned by the very authors of the idea. In any case, it is clear that in late autumn / winter for hundreds of thousands of hungry people it would be a death march.
