12 failures of Napoleon Bonaparte. It would seem that modern historians have come to terms with the fact that the Battle of Borodino ended in victory for Napoleon's Great Army, although it would be more accurate to call it almost a victory. The Russian army did not leave its positions, even if every time and new ones, until the order of the commander-in-chief followed.
On the position and strength of the parties
Napoleon himself admitted that Borodino did not become for him the same victory as Austerlitz or Jena, Wagram or Friedland. No matter how his famous words are translated from French, for the Russians they can only sound like this: "Of the fifty battles I have given, in the battle of Moscow, the most valor is shown and the least success is won."
In the same way, none other, but the great commander himself, admitted that under Borodino "the Russians acquired the right to be invincible …"
So, the position chosen by Kutuzov under Borodin was criticized by everyone up to Leo Tolstoy. However, as a military officer, he had every right to do so. Meanwhile, the fact that the left Russian flank is practically open for a direct blow does not in itself say anything.
After all, the left flank initially covered, among other things, the Shevardinsky redoubt - an advanced position for which the French had to pay a considerable price. Then time did not allow to build something more significant than flushes. However, in order to break through the Russian front here, the French in any case had to overcome several successive lines, including a deep ravine, the height and the burning village of Semyonovskoye.
Another thing is that Kutuzov was actually much more worried about the right flank, and the Russian commander-in-chief considered the entire power of the corps put up by Napoleon against the positions of the 2nd Western Army to be something of a bluff. Perhaps Kutuzov was really mistaken, counting on the fact that Napoleon would operate bypassing precisely his right wing in order to cut off the Russian army's path of retreat to Moscow.
But if Napoleon undertakes a similar maneuver already on the left, he can, for a start, hit the flank with Tuchkov's corps. For some reason, Bennigsen, the chief of staff of the Kutuzov army, returned to the line from an ambush, literally parading the Polish voltigeurs of Ponyatovsky's corps.
Kutuzov hoped to counterattack just from behind the Kolocha River - to the flank of the French columns bypassing it on the right. This would be quite in the spirit of the art of war at that time. And in case the French attacked from the left, the three Russian corps were actually not so difficult to move to the south, as it happened during the battle.
The beginning of the battle fully confirmed the expectations of the Russian commander-in-chief - the French stormed Borodino and took the bridge across the Kolocha. However, there was no serious development of operations here. Apparently, only when it finally became clear where Napoleon was delivering the main blow, and it was decided to march Uvarov's cavalry and Platov's Cossacks to the flank of Napoleon's army.
However, it was not the position, but the Russian army that occupied it, which managed to withstand at Borodino. She was opposed by about 130 thousand selected French and Allied troops with 587 guns. Only in the very first years after the war did data appear that Napoleon had much larger forces, almost up to 180 thousand, as under Wagram, but they were not confirmed.
The size of the Great Army is practically not questioned by anyone, but disputes about how many Russian soldiers were on the battlefield of Borodino do not stop today. Experts appeared, claiming that there were at least 160 thousand Russians at the expense of unrecorded militias and Cossacks.
We will not say much about what role such extra tens of thousands could have played in the battle, we will only note that the number of regular Russian regiments is almost not disputed. So, in the infantry, regular cavalry and artillery on the day of the Battle of Borodino there were no more than 115 thousand people.
At the same time, the Russians had even more guns than the French - 640, and the superiority in large-caliber guns was especially significant. However, unlike the French, they almost could not move freely around the battlefield. Almost one and a half hundred reserve guns and howitzers remained in reserve until the end of the day, while suffering losses in the servants, who were constantly recruited to replace the fallen comrades.
As you can see, there is no need to talk about any decisive superiority in the forces of one side or the other, although the Russians still could not put the same number of experienced soldiers in the battle lines.
At what price did they get Moscow
So, following the results of a 12-hour battle, the French troops still managed to capture the positions of the Russian army in the center and on the left wing. However, this fact in itself did not mean victory, especially since after the cessation of hostilities, the French army retreated to its original positions.
Of course, it must be admitted that after Borodin there could be no question of retreat in the ranks of Napoleon's troops. However, the emperor was in no hurry to attack immediately, surprisingly. The losses of his army, perhaps, were still less than those of the Russians, about which a little below, but they also significantly undermined the combat effectiveness of entire formations. It is believed that the very next morning Napoleon wanted to continue the battle and complete the rout of Kutuzov's army.
It was the losses, taking into account the possibilities of receiving reinforcements, that predetermined how the company of 1812 subsequently continued. The numerous skeptics who believe that Kutuzov fought only to please public opinion and the mood of the army are hardly credible. And there is no doubt that initially he did not plan to surrender Moscow after a single battle, albeit such a bloody one.
Another thing is that Kutuzov did not expect to sit in the old capital, as in an impregnable fortress, realizing that Moscow was completely unprepared for this. Contrary to the optimism and fighting fervor of its governor Rostopchin.
In the documents and memoirs of contemporaries there are many facts confirming that Kutuzov seriously hoped to distract Napoleon from the capital, immediately moving either towards St. Petersburg, or to the south or southeast. It is unlikely that the Russian commander-in-chief was playing his next performance for the audience. But he needed a very short analysis of such prospects in order to come to terms with the fact that he would have to withdraw the army through Moscow.
Speaking about losses, let's start with the French, whom Russian historians initially "prescribed" more than 50 thousand killed and wounded. And this seemed quite possible given the fact that Napoleon's army lost many more generals and officers in comparison with the Russian. 49, including 8 killed, against 28, of which six were killed.
It should be noted that the calculation of the generals inevitably leads to an erroneous estimate of the total losses. The fact is that only 73 generals were involved in the entire Russian army in the battle of Borodino, while the French only had 70 generals in the cavalry. At the same time, in each of the armies, only one general was captured at Borodino - Bonami from the French, and Likhachev from the Russians, both with numerous wounds.
It quickly became clear that all references to documents with high numbers of French losses were so dubious that it was decided to refer to the combat schedules of units and formations of the Great Army. Before and after the battle at the walls of Moscow. They gave quite reasonable data on French losses - a little more than 30 thousand people. There were no more than 1000 prisoners, and the Russians managed to take only 13. Against 15 guns captured by the French, and this is actually quite a good indicator, given that ours were constantly on the defensive.
The amount within the limits of 30 thousandth losses does not fully correspond to the numerous and completely truthful information that historians have at their disposal about the composition of the French army that entered Moscow. Its number only slightly exceeded 100 thousand people, which means that those same marching battalions did not seem to come to Napoleon at all.
But they actually came, albeit with a delay of several days. Also pulled up and the untouched division of Pino from the Italian army of Prince Eugene de Beauharnais, and several regiments from the flank guard, which, it seemed, could be somewhat weakened. Yes, Napoleon had to allocate several thousand people to protect communications, reconnaissance and monitor Kutuzov's army.
But even in this case, Napoleon had too little strength left to simply admit his losses at Borodino were less than 30 thousand. However, this, like the losses of the Russian army, is a topic for a series of much deeper historical studies.
Our task is somewhat more ambitious, but somewhat more modest - to try to argue our thesis that the Russian army did not suffer defeat at Borodino. Here, we just note - after a real defeat, even with such losses, so calmly, but at the same time covertly, promptly and in an organized manner, few others retreated.
About Russian losses and … prospects
It is much more difficult to judge Russian losses. Although, it would seem, a lot is known for sure. But by no means everything.
For the Russian army, no one has ever named the number of casualties below 38.5 thousand people. This is already more than the French minimum. And it hardly makes sense at all to prove that our losses were less. Paradox, but under Borodino the well-known principle - the attacker suffers more losses than the defender, almost did not work. More precisely, it worked, but the Russians counterattacked too often.
In addition, on the day of Borodin, a single spirit reigned throughout the army - to stand to death. And they stood, not moving from their place under the crossfire of the French artillery, under the blows of the iron men from Murat's cavalry corps. In dense columns, and not always at heights or in shelters.
The French in this respect were much more cunning and enterprising - they were not at all shy about leaving from under fire. In addition, this fire from the side of Napoleonic artillery, generally less numerous than the Russian one, was much more intense. There is documented information that our opponents spent almost three times more charges at Borodino than the Russians.
In our time, a number of publications have reported that the Russian army could lose up to 60 thousand people. Among other things, such calculations are based on some handwritten lists of militias before and after the battle, unthinkable losses among Platov's Cossacks, and other dubious data. Meanwhile, the overestimation of Russian losses is directly related to the overestimation of the size of Kutuzov's army.
Over and over again attributing tens of thousands of militias and thousands of Cossacks to her, such researchers are mistaken in the main thing - the Russians had not yet forgotten how to win in Suvorov style - not by number, but by skill. But with the skill of the same Cossacks and militias, everything was, frankly, not too good. And in regular battle, they were not as useful as they were from experienced soldiers.
That is why they were taken into the Main Army only in well-coordinated units and formations, like the same Moscow militia, which stood in the second line behind Tuchkov's corps. By the way, engaging in such dubious calculations, it is just right to enroll in the Great Army all the travel agents and waitresses accompanying it. Not to mention the doctors and the chefs.
What's left in reserve?
The French did not compel the Russians not only to flee, as was the case at Austerlitz and Friedland, but even to any significant withdrawal. And certainly there was no trace of persecution from the French.
Russians like to be reminded that Napoleon at Borodino never brought his guard into action, but, contrary to the prevailing legend, the Russian guard also remained almost untouched by the evening of August 26 (September 7). Three regiments of the Life Guards, brilliantly repelling the numerous attacks of the French heavy cavalry - Lithuanian, Izmailovsky and Finlyandsky quite calmly, by no means under the pressure of the enemy, took their positions in the second line, leaving the first behind the corps of Osterman and Dokhturov moved from the right wing.
The losses in the composition of these Russian guards regiments, as documents show, were significant, but there could be no talk of a loss of combat capability. Meanwhile, in the corps of Davout, Ney and Junot, as well as in the Italian army of Prince Eugene, a number of regiments had to be reduced to battalions by the evening of August 26. Otherwise, the shock columns would have been so small in number that they would not have withstood the first attack if the battle resumed.
Well, as for the Preobrazhensky and Semyonovsky guards regiments, they limited their participation in the battle by the fact that, after the loss of the flashes and the Kurgan battery, they supported the line of new positions of the army, which, after retreating a kilometer and a half, no more, was already almost in perfect order. The main thing is that she was ready to continue the battle.
As a result, the Russians could still oppose the 18,000-strong French guard with about 8-9 thousand of their elite troops. In addition, Kutuzov still hoped that the reinforcements promised by the Moscow governor Rostopchin would arrive in time for the Borodino field. In their composition, by the way, according to Rostopchin, not only warriors, but also several thousand soldiers from regular regiments should have been present.
But perhaps the most important advantage that the Russians retained by the end of the battle was the advantage in artillery, especially in terms of ammunition. In addition, almost 150 Russian guns from the reserve retained their servants without significant losses, although several thousand artillerymen still had to go to the front lines to help their comrades.
Napoleon had practically all the artillery, with the exception of the guards unit, already in business, and the issue of the presence of cannonballs, buckshot, bombs and especially gunpowder was extremely acute. It is hardly surprising that the Russians won the evening artillery duel quite unambiguously, in fact, did not allow the French to take their starting positions for an attack the next day.
Talking about the fact that the French did not want to spend the night among the corpses is not the best excuse for their retreat to their original positions. Of course, in this there was a certain certainty that the Russians did not have the strength for an offensive, but the Napoleonic troops themselves were no longer too eager for battle.
Napoleon very much hoped that the next day march battalions would catch up with him, but they were late for a number of reasons. Among them, perhaps the most important, were the actions of the first Russian partisan detachments.
There is ample evidence, especially from the French side, that the French commander-in-chief actually experienced considerable relief when he learned that the Russians had withdrawn from their new positions in the early morning of August 27. It was this fact, and then the abandonment of Moscow, that seemed to convince Napoleon himself that his troops nevertheless won at Borodino, or, in the French manner, in the battle on the Moskva River.
Even if not a defeat, but, as they say, on points. We will remain unconvinced: the Russians did not lose even on points under Borodino. They had to retreat and leave Moscow not because of defeat, but for completely different reasons.
