There is a myth that Khrushchev freed millions of innocent prisoners, rehabilitated victims of political repression under Stalin. In fact, this myth has nothing to do with reality. Beria held a large-scale amnesty, and Khrushchev freed mainly Bandera.
General situation
The victims of political repression are considered to be people convicted under Article 58 (paragraphs 2-14) of the Criminal Code of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Criminal Code of the RSFSR). The Criminal Code of other republics of the Soviet Union had a similar article. In reality, most of the points in this article were not related to politics. These included: organizing uprisings, espionage, sabotage (for example, printing counterfeit money), terrorism, sabotage (criminal negligence). Similar articles were and are in the Criminal Code of any states, including in the modern Russian Federation. Only article 58-10 was purely political: propaganda or agitation, containing a call to overthrow, undermine or weaken Soviet power or to commit certain counter-revolutionary crimes, as well as the distribution or production or storage of literature of the same content. That entailed imprisonment for a term of at least 6 months. Usually, in peacetime, the term under this article did not exceed 3 years. A distinctive feature of Article 58 was that after serving a sentence under this article, citizens were sent into exile and had no right to return to their homeland.
In 1953, there were 467, 9 thousand prisoners in the gulag camps, convicted under Article 58. Of these, 221, 4 thousand were especially dangerous state criminals (spies, saboteurs, terrorists, Trotskyists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, nationalists, etc.). They were in special camps of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. There were also 62, 4 thousand more exiles. As a result, the total number of "political" was 530, 4 thousand people. In total, in 1953 the camps and prisons of the USSR contained 2 million 526 thousand people.
Amnesty for Beria
On March 26, 1953, the head of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Lavrenty Beria submitted a memorandum with a draft decree on amnesty to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. The project provided for the release of all prisoners who were sentenced to a term of up to 5 years. It was also supposed to release women with children under 10 years old, pregnant women, minors under the age of 18 years, the elderly and seriously ill people. Beria noted that out of 2.5 million prisoners, only 220 thousand people are especially dangerous state criminals. The amnesty did not apply to dangerous criminals (bandits, murderers), counter-revolutionaries and those convicted of stealing socialist property on an especially large scale. Also, the Minister of Internal Affairs proposed to halve the sentence for convicted persons for a term of more than 5 years and to cancel the link for persons who were serving sentences under Article 58. Beria noted that more than 1.5 million people are convicted annually, and the majority for crimes that do not pose a particular danger to Soviet statehood. If the laws are not improved, then after the amnesty, after 1-2 years, the total number of prisoners will again reach the previous figure.
Therefore, the minister proposed to immediately change the Criminal Code, mitigate criminal liability for minor crimes, and punish administrative measures for economic, domestic and official crimes. Also addressed to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Malenkov, Beria sent a separate submission on the amnesty of all convicts by extrajudicial bodies (including the "troikas" of the NKVD and the Special Meeting of the OGPU-NKVD-MGB-MVD) with the complete removal of a criminal record. Basically, it was about those who were convicted during the repressions of 1937-1938.
The next day after receiving Beria's note, on March 27, 1953, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a decree "On amnesty" for all prisoners whose term did not exceed 5 years, as well as halving the terms of other prisoners, except those sentenced to 10-25 years for banditry, premeditated murder, for counter-revolutionary crimes and for the theft of socialist property on an especially large scale. First of all, pregnant women and those with young children, minors, old people and disabled people were released from places of detention. The amnesty was applied to foreigners on a general basis.
As a result, 1 million 200 thousand people were released under the amnesty, and investigative cases for 400 thousand people were terminated. Among those released were almost 100 thousand people who were convicted under Article 58 ("political"), but were not included in the category of especially dangerous criminals. Also, according to the decree on amnesty, all those deported, that is, those who were forbidden to live in certain areas and cities, were released ahead of schedule. The very category of the deported was eliminated. Some of the exiles were also released - those who were supposed to live in a certain settlement. Beria's proposals on amnesty for persons convicted by extrajudicial bodies under Article 58 were not reflected in this decree. Thus, the first large-scale liberation of the "political", almost a third of the total, was carried out by the "bloody ghoul" Beria (Black myth of the "bloody executioner" Beria; Black myth of the "bloody executioner" Beria. Part 2; Why they hate Beria), not Khrushchev.
It is also worth remembering that Beria began his activity as People's Commissar of the NKVD in the fall of 1938 with a review of all cases against people convicted in 1937-1938. During 1939 alone, he released more than 200 thousand people from prison, including those who did not have time to carry out the execution sentence. Note that in the same 1939, 8 thousand people were convicted under Article 58 of the Criminal Code, that is, three times more were released under Beria than were convicted.
In the late summer and autumn of 1953, Beria planned to carry out a large-scale return to their homeland of peoples deported during the war. In the spring of 1953, the Soviet Ministry of Internal Affairs developed drafts of relevant decrees, which in August were planned to be submitted for approval to the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers of the USSR. It was planned by the end of 1953 to return about 1.7 million people to their places of former residence. But in connection with the arrest (or murder) of L. P. Beria on June 26, 1953, these decrees never materialized. These plans were returned only in 1957. In 1957-1957. the national autonomies of Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Karachais and Balkars were restored. These peoples returned to their small homelands. In 1964, restrictions on deported Germans were lifted. But the decree that completely removed the restrictions on freedom of movement and confirmed the right of the Germans to return to the places from which they were deported, was adopted only in 1972 (that is, after Khrushchev). The turn of the Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, Greeks, Koreans and some others came only during the period of Gorbachev's "perestroika". That is, the role of Khrushchev in the liberation of the deported peoples is exaggerated. This was Beria's plan, which was implemented in a truncated form.
Amnesty for Khrushchev
On May 4, 1954, the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU made a decision to review all cases against people convicted of "counter-revolutionary crimes". For this, special commissions were formed, which included senior officials of the Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the KGB and the Ministry of Justice of the USSR. The Central Commission was headed by the Prosecutor General of the USSR R. A. Rudenko, local - prosecutors of republics, territories and regions. By the beginning of 1956, the commissions considered cases against 337,100 people. As a result, 153.5 thousand people were freed, but only 14.3 thousand of them were officially rehabilitated. The rest were applied the decree “On amnesty”.
In addition, in September 1955, a decree was issued "On amnesty for Soviet citizens who collaborated with the occupiers during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." A significant part of political prisoners fell under this amnesty. By the beginning of January 1956, the number of persons convicted under Article 58 of the Criminal Code was 113, 7 thousand people. These were mainly people who fought with weapons in their hands against the Soviet regime, either on the side of the Germans during the Great Patriotic War, or in the ranks of nationalists in Ukraine, the Baltic States and other republics of the USSR.
In addition, after Khrushchev's report at the XX Congress (February 1956), it was decided to hold an exemplary release and rehabilitation of political prisoners. Immediately after the congress, special visiting commissions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were created. They worked directly in places of detention and received the right to make decisions on release or reduction of the sentence. A total of 97 such commissions were formed. By July 1, 1956, the commissions had considered over 97 thousand cases. Over 46 thousand people were released with the removal of their criminal record. But only 1487 people were rehabilitated as convicted on falsified materials. Thus, 90% of political prisoners were released even before the famous XX Congress. That is, the role of Khrushchev in the release of political prisoners from camps and exile is greatly exaggerated.
Why Khrushchev decided to free Bandera, Vlasov and other traitors
For a start, it is worth remembering that the Soviet government was not as "bloodthirsty" as all sorts of "perestroika" and "democratizers" tried to inspire the people. Amnesties to Bandera and other "forest brothers" were regularly carried out under Stalin. The Soviet government skillfully combined the "carrot and stick" policy, trying not only to suppress the Nazis by force, but also to return many ordinary bandits to a peaceful life. In Ukraine, Khrushchev personally initiated many amnesties. In addition, in May 1947, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the abolition of the death penalty" was issued. As a result, since 1947, Bandera and other Nazis were no longer threatened with a "tower", even for the most terrible war crimes and acts of genocide during the Great Patriotic War and later. That is, the "bloody Stalinist regime" tried with all its might to return even this, the most "frostbitten" part of society to a peaceful life.
In September 1955, a decree was issued "On amnesty for Soviet citizens who collaborated with the occupiers during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945." Persons sentenced to up to 10 years of imprisonment and accomplices of the Nazis were released from places of confinement and other measures of punishment; convicted of service in the German army, police and special German formations. Sentences for those sentenced to more than 10 years were cut by half. Interestingly, such citizens were not only pardoned, that is, pardoned, but also removed their convictions and deprivation of rights. As a result, many former Ukrainian Nazis, Banderaites and members of their families were able to quickly “change their colors” and later enter the Soviet and party bodies. By the 80s, "perestroika", they, according to various sources, accounted for from a third to a half of the Ukrainian state, party and economic elite.
It should also be noted that, despite the overwhelming share of the RSFSR both in the population and in the economic contribution to the development of the Union, the communists of the RSFSR did not have their own communist party, unlike other republics. There was the party of the USSR, there were the communist parties of the union republics, including the Communist Party of Ukraine (KPU). Due to the absence of the Russian-RSFSR Communist Party, the KPU had the greatest weight in the CPSU (as the second most populous republic of the USSR). Most of the union leadership was represented by immigrants from the Ukrainian SSR.
As the old Bolsheviks and Stalinists were eliminated, which began with the rise of Khrushchev to power, de-Stalinization, the exposure of the "cult of personality", combined with the cleansing of the party, state and economic apparatus from the Stalinists, Khrushchev needed support in the Soviet elite. He staked on the Ukrainian wing of the Soviet elite. And the Ukrainian society, in fact, is rural, "kulak-petty bourgeois" (industrialized cities, centers in the east of Little Russia). Here the effect of nepotism is very pronounced, similar to the tribal principle, only people are promoted not according to the tribal, clan principle, but according to kinship and comradely ties and relations. That is, Khrushchev relied on local nationalism, which quickly develops into Nazism. A similar situation was in other union republics and national republics and autonomies of the RSFSR.
Thus, the early release of Bandera, Vlasov, policemen and other war criminals fit into the policy of Khrushchev's "perestroika" ("Khrushchev" as the first perestroika; "Khrushchev" as the first perestroika. Part 2) and de-Stalinization. Khrushchev and, obviously, the part of the Soviet elite standing behind him (the remnants of the "fifth column", the Trotskyists) tried to "reform" the Soviet Union "," rebuild "it, find a common language with the West. To curtail Stalin's course of creating a fundamentally different civilization and society of the future, to destroy the alternative to the Western world order. Bandera and Vlasovites were supposed to strengthen the "fifth column". This was one of the preparatory measures for the collapse of Soviet civilization.
Therefore, many of Stalin's undertakings and deeds were curtailed, or they tried to distort, "rebuild." In particular, they did not begin to carry out the planned reform of the Communist Party with the aim of excommunicating the party from power and creating an "order of the sword-bearers" (an elite that sets an example for the whole society). Since the time of Khrushchev, the elite-nomenklatura has gradually turned into a class of social parasites, which ultimately killed Soviet civilization. Stalin's (popular) socialism is gradually being transferred to the rails of state capitalism, where party officials began to turn into a new class of exploiters. The basic principle of socialism - "to each according to his work" was violated, equalization in wages was introduced. The foundations of the normal functioning of industry and agriculture were violated, which, in contrast to the Stalinist decline in prices for essential goods, led to a continuous increase in prices (distortion of socialism). Under the guise of military reform, Khrushchev organized a powerful attack on the Soviet armed forces: the ocean-going fleet, the construction program of which was launched by Stalin, was destroyed; big problems have arisen in military aircraft construction and other areas of military construction; a huge amount of new military equipment and weapons were disposed of; thrown into the street a large number of cadre, military officers, foremen, the backbone of the victorious army.
The Russian ruble was deprived of its gold backing. They dealt a terrible blow to the Russian village, which had just recovered after collectivization. Thousands of small settlements and villages were declared “unpromising” (in fact, the current “optimization” of rural Russia is a continuation of the same terrible business). Sent Russian youth to raise the national outskirts. It was a powerful blow to the state-forming Russian ethnos, the demographic potential of the Russians (whose origins are in the villages of the Russian provinces) suffered great damage. They destroyed the reasonable foundations of Soviet foreign and global policy, fell out with the "second humanity" - China, which under Stalin respected and appreciated the "elder Russian brother", began to help various regimes in Asia and Africa to the detriment of the interests of the Russian state and the Russian people. In general, it was "perestroika-1" aimed at liquidating the "red empire" of the USSR.
They managed to neutralize the first attempt to bring down Soviet civilization. Khrushchev was retired. However, the deed was done. The USSR was still making victories out of inertia, going forward, but its foundation was undermined. Catastrophe 1985-1993 became inevitable.
