At the stage of the formation of the T-64 tank, due to the difficulties in its development, both technical and organizational confrontation began. There were fewer supporters, and a serious opposition began to mature. Despite the adoption of a decree on the production of the T-64 at all factories, at UVZ, under the guise of a mobilization tank, they tried to create their own version as opposed to the T-64.
By that time, the documentation for the reserve version of the tank (object 435), which was developed and tested at the KMDB, was transferred to UVZ. It was carefully analyzed, the comments received during the tests were assessed and ways to eliminate them were worked out.
The main emphasis was placed on a simplified version of the tank and the use of existing or used components and systems to the maximum during a failed attempt to modernize the T-62. This was reminiscent of the work of aircraft designers Tupolev and Myasishchev. The first created aircraft, relying on his own groundwork and the experience of competitors, and the second created everything from scratch and did not always achieve success.
Taking into account the problems of the T-64 in terms of the engine, engine protection and chassis, a waste B-45 engine with a capacity of 730 hp was installed. with a fan cooling system, an automatic loader with a conveyor ammunition rack and a more powerful chassis. The comments on the T-64 were taken into account, the design was simplified to the limit, often with a decrease in the tank performance characteristics, and a higher reliability was ensured.
The first samples were created by reworking the T-64, then they began to make their own prototypes and prototypes. It was forbidden to make changes to the T-64 documentation. I had a case in the early 70s, then a letter came from UVZ with a request to eliminate the detected error in the drawing. My boss forbade me to do this with the words: "We will solve this issue ourselves."
The military supported this work, up to two dozen tanks were manufactured, factory and military tests were carried out. This is how the object 172 appeared not as a new tank, but as a mobilization version of the T-64.
As a result, two disunified tanks appeared, developed according to TTT for the T-64 tank. In accordance with the directive documents, the serial production of the T-64 should be organized at three factories, and the T-72 did not fit into this in any way. On this issue, two groups have formed in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense Industry, the Central Committee and the military-industrial complex.
The highest party and state leadership and ministers supported the T-64, while the lower leaders in the GBTU, the military-industrial complex and the Central Committee were guided by the T-72. Basically, the undercover struggle of these two groups was resolved in the most unexpected way, creating problems for many decades.
In pursuance of the decree on the serial production of the T-64, a decree was prepared on the creation of production facilities for this. This decree was prepared by an employee of the military-industrial complex Kostenko.
I had to meet with him several times behind the Kremlin wall during the development of the "Boxer" tank, and he always tried to delve deeply into the issue under consideration.
Kostenko was part of a group of people who advocated the idea of putting the T-72 tank into mass production. In his book Tanki (Memories and Reflections), he describes this episode in detail.
This group set a goal in the document being prepared, distorting its essence, to indirectly carry out a decision on the serial production of the T-72. Let's give the floor to Kostenko:
“And nevertheless, supporters of" object 172 "appeared in the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Defense Industry, and the State Planning Committee (in the military-industrial complex and the Central Committee - too). There were not many of them, in each "office" they could be counted on the fingers on one hand.
This is how a group of like-minded people was gradually formed, in which everyone acted within the limits of their personal capabilities and official powers, without advertising "object 172"."
They also chose the time of signing it, when their opponents went on vacation: Ustinov (secretary of the CPSU Central Committee), Zverev (minister of the defense industry). Dmitriev (Deputy Head of the Department of Defense Industry of the Central Committee of the CPSU) and Kuzmin (Head of the Department of Armament of the Ground Forces of the Military Industrial Complex). As noted by Kostenko, "the absence of top officials was of particular importance in the situation with the draft resolution."
They forged a government document in such a way that:
“Reading this, anyone not devoted to the intricacies of the essence of the matter could not (even after reading the full text of the resolution) imagine that the purpose of this resolution was to ensure, in 1969-1971, the creation of production facilities at UVZ and ChTZ, which would allow from January 1, 1972 start serial production of new tanks "object 172".
He especially admires how beautifully they did everything:
“The first, second, third page - but now I got to the point where there was a point about the mobilization of the tank. This paragraph has disappeared from the text! Instead, a new one appeared, which formally changed the essence of the resolution. The new clause stated that the Ministry of Defense Industry was released from the task of organizing the serial production of T-64 at UVZ”.
So in May 1970, a decree appeared "On measures to create capacities for the production of T-64A tanks", and in fact on the preparation of serial production of the T-72 tank. Through the efforts of a number of high-ranking officials and the military, a decision was made that contradicted the general line in tank construction approved by the government to create a single T-64 tank. This document, contrary to the interests of the state, allowed two almost identical tanks to be put into mass production.
In 1972, an installation batch of T-72 tanks was produced, factory and military tests were carried out, and in August 1973 the tank was put into service. This was the first not entirely clean blow to Morozov, which did not allow him to realize the idea of creating a single tank.
In parallel with the work on equipping the T-64 tank with the V-45 engine, the LKZ carried out work to install a GTD-3L 800 hp on this tank. GTEs were installed on the converted T-64s. Tests have shown that the chassis does not withstand a significant change in dynamic loads, and LKZ began to develop and test its own version of the chassis.
As a result of the cycle of tests, the fundamental possibility of creating a tank with a gas turbine engine was proved. Based on the results of these works, in June 1969, a decree was issued by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers on the creation of a gas turbine power plant for the T-64 tank. The organization of serial production of the T-64 tank with a gas turbine engine was envisaged at the LKZ.
In 1972, comparative military tests of three T-64, T-72 and T-80 tanks were carried out. Tests showed approximately equal characteristics of the tanks, but a decision on their further fate was not made.
By the mid-70s, the epic with the T-72 began to subside, but another, with the gas-turbine T-80, was unfolding. With the appointment of Ustinov as Minister of Defense, the positions of Romanov and Ryabov in the country's political elite are strengthened and, with their support, the pushing of a tank with a gas turbine engine begins.
At this time, the efforts of the KMDB were focused on the creation of a fighting compartment of the T-64B tank with a fundamentally new fire control system "Ob" and a complex of guided weapons "Cobra", which made it possible to get a serious gap from other tanks in terms of firepower.
Considering that the T-80 was seriously lagging behind the T-64B in all respects, it was decided to seriously “strengthen” it in a very original way. When carrying out factory tests of the T-64B (I was a participant in these tests), the turret is removed from one tank and placed on the T-80 hull, and all other tests are already underway two different T-64B and T-80B tanks.
Based on the test results in 1976, two tanks were put into service. So, in addition to the already pressed T-72, the T-80B also gets a start in life, and even with the most advanced weapons complex at that time. This was the second blow to Morozov, after which he retired.
Realizing that with three tanks "it is impossible to live like this," Ustinov organized in 1976 the most powerful military trials of three tanks, as they were called, "cockroach races." According to their results, the T-64 and T-80 were approximately equal, and the T-72 lagged behind them. I have read the test report many times, and I was surprised by Venediktov's unsubstantiated dissenting opinion that the T-72 deserves a better rating.
Based on the test results at the very top, a decision is made to promote the T-80 in the same original way. We decided to make one of two T-64B and T-80B tanks. In December 1976, the military-industrial complex decided to create a single improved T-80U tank. The head of the LKZ tank, is developing a hull with a gas turbine engine with a capacity of 1200 hp, and the KMDB is developing a fighting compartment with a new armament complex. This tank was planned to be launched into mass production in Leningrad, Omsk and Kharkov.
Work on the 6TD engine in Kharkov was practically prohibited, and by a decree of the Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, the construction of a plant in Kharkov for the production of a new GTE for the T-80U was launched. The construction of the plant without elaborated documentation for the gas turbine engine was a gamble. The plant has practically been built, they have already begun to order the most complex equipment, it cost incredible money. As a result, the GTE was never developed, everything was thrown to the wind, and no one answered for the senseless use of funds.
Joint development of LKZ and KMDB of the T-80U tank based on the existing gas turbine engine with a capacity of 1000 hp. and the new sighting complex "Irtysh" with laser-guided weapons "Reflex" was successfully completed, and after tests in December 1984, the tank was put into service.
After Ustinov's death in 1984 and Romanov's departure from the political Olympus, who promoted the idea of a gas turbine tank, priorities began to change dramatically. Everyone suddenly saw the light: there is no point in promoting a tank with a problematic gas turbine engine with a 6TD engine of the same power!
Back in 1976, on the basis of a 6TD with a capacity of 1000 hp. a project for the modernization of the T-64B tank (object 476) was developed, but it was postponed, since it was ordered to deal with the T-80U. The problems that began with the GTE forced in June 1981 to adopt a decree on the development of the T-80U tank with the 6TD engine. This is "Object 476" with "Leningrad" chassis.
The tests of this tank were successfully carried out at Kubinka. In September 1985, the T-80UD tank with a 6TD engine with a capacity of 1000 hp was put into service. (object 478). Almost ten years later, they returned to a tank with a two-stroke engine!
At this, the long-term epic of the advancement of a tank with a gas turbine engine came to an end. It turned out that there are no technical prerequisites for this yet. The T-80UD tank was mass-produced in Kharkov, in total, about 700 tanks were produced. As the head of the GBTU Potapov recalled, a draft decree on the phased transition of all factories to the production of T-80UD was prepared and approved, but the Union collapsed, and the tank ended up abroad.
Tanks T-80UD and T-72 unexpectedly had to prove their advantages in other conditions. In 1996-1999, Ukraine supplied 320 T-80UD tanks to Pakistan, and its main enemy, India, operated T-72 tanks. Reviews in these countries about tanks were far from in favor of the latter.
In conclusion, it should be noted that if in the period 1968-1973. there was a sharp competition between the T-64 and T-72 tanks, then in 1975-1985. - T-64 and T-80. It so happened that after 1973, the T-72 faded into the background. All new developments somehow bypassed UVZ, the modifications of these tanks were mainly implemented that had already been tested on the T-64 and T-80. Why this happened is not entirely clear to me, but it took place.
According to many estimates, the T-64, T-72 and T-80 tanks and their modifications are tanks of the same generation, with approximately equal performance characteristics. They are equipped with the same weapons, but they are not standardized in terms of production and operation conditions. It can take a long time to find out which of them is better, but there is no doubt that their concept was laid by Morozov.
Decades have passed, and controversy about this generation of tanks does not subside. In these disputes, we sometimes cross the line where objectivity ends. Therefore, all of us, especially my colleagues from Nizhny Tagil, need a more balanced, objective approach to the assessments of tanks. I also allowed myself sometimes harsh judgments, not always objective. This does not honor us. We did a common cause, we have something to be proud of!
With all the costs of developing these tanks, of course, they had to be developed, manufactured and tested. Based on the test results, make objective and honest conclusions and leave one in serial production, as it was planned. But the leaders of the state, industry and the military did not have the courage to stop and make decisions in the interests of the state and the army.
The time has long come to create a new generation of tanks, taking into account the experience of creating the previous generation of tanks and the unfinished project to create a promising tank "Boxer". Now the Armata tank project is entering the finish line, and there is something to discuss, but there is little information so far.
The purpose of this article was not to study the characteristics of tanks, it has long been done. The main focus was on the process of creating this generation of tanks and the circumstances affecting the making of fateful decisions. I wanted to show how difficult and ambiguous the formation of tanks was: after all, their advancement was influenced not only by technical characteristics, but also by other considerations that were far from technology.
