Winter War. The Finnish government underestimated the enemy. It was concluded that the USSR is a colossus with feet of clay. That even Finland alone can fight the USSR and win. In addition, there was confidence that the Finns would be supported by the world community.
The cure for stupidity
Soviet-Finnish war 1939-1940 looks like the stupidity of the Finnish elite. And the victory of the USSR is a cure for stupidity. The reasonableness of Moscow's demands on Helsinki was obvious to everyone, even the Finns themselves. On the eve of and with the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet government could no longer delay solving the problem of the defense of Leningrad, the second most important vital center of the country, with the issue of freedom of exit and actions of the Baltic Fleet (then the most powerful fleet of Russia). And with the loss of the Leningrad ports, the enemy turned the Leningrad Region into a strategic springboard for an invasion deep into Russia.
That is why the Russian tsars attached such great importance to the defense of St. Petersburg and the approaches to it. But then it was easier. Russia owned the Baltics and the Grand Duchy of Finland. Our batteries were stationed along the southern and northern shores of the Gulf of Finland; the Baltic Fleet had several strong bases. The collapse of the Russian Empire led to the complete loss of these positions. The southern coast remained for Estonia, the northern one for Finland. The Baltic Fleet was, in fact, blocked in Kronstadt. Finnish long-range artillery could hit Kronstadt, our ships and the city.
Moscow in good faith and with all its might tried to negotiate with Helsinki. As soon as Hitler took Austria, the USSR began persistently to persuade Finland to be a good neighbor. Already in April 1938, Moscow secretly offered Helsinki a local military alliance that the Finns would resist the Germans in the event of their invasion of Finland, and the Soviet side promised assistance with troops, navy, aircraft and weapons. The Finns refused.
Moscow began to look for options. She offered to protect the Finnish coast with the support of the Baltic Fleet if Germany attacked Finland. The Finns refused. Meanwhile, the situation in Europe continued to deteriorate. England and France surrendered the Czechoslovak Sudetenland to the Germans. Prague itself refused to defend itself. It became obvious that all agreements in the West are nothing more than paper if there are no "big battalions" behind them. The Soviet government is stepping up pressure on the Finns. In October 1938, the USSR offered Finland assistance in building a military base on the Finnish island of Gogland in the Gulf of Finland and right, if the Finns cannot cope with the defense of this island, defend it together. Helsinki refused. Moscow asks to lease several islands in the Gulf of Finland for 30 years. Helsinki is denied.
Then, in the spring of 1939, Moscow offered a cession of much larger Soviet territory in exchange for islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Finns themselves understood that these were quite reasonable requirements, a matter of vital necessity for Russia-USSR. The commander-in-chief of the Finnish army, Marshal Mannerheim, having learned about these negotiations, suggests that the government cede to Moscow, exchange not only the requested islands, but also the territory of the Karelian Isthmus. However, the Finnish government continued to stand its ground.
It is interesting that if Helsinki accepted Moscow's proposals, then Finland and the entire people would only benefit from this. After all, it was not without reason that Mannerheim offered himself as the person responsible for the exchange of territories. His position as a hero of Finland would only be strengthened by this, since the territory of the country was increasing at the suggestion of Moscow. In addition, the Union was ready for numerous economic advantages for a friendly neighboring state. However, the Finnish government carefully concealed the essence of the Soviet government's requests not only from the Finnish people, but also from the legislature. That is, the arguments of the Finnish government were so weak that they could not be discussed not only in the press and society, but also in parliamentary commissions. Moscow's demands were quite reasonable and just, and even moderate.
At first, Moscow did not even stutter about the transfer of the Karelian Isthmus to the USSR, although this step was also quite logical and fair. But after Helsinki refused to concede even in the smallest, Moscow tightened its demands. It became completely obvious that in a future war Finland would side with Russia's enemies. Then Moscow formulated new conditions: to lease to the Union for 30 years a plot of land on the Hanko Peninsula (at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland) in order to create a Soviet military base there and move the border on the Karelian Isthmus to the Mannerheim Line in exchange for a much larger Soviet territory. Moreover, it was Cape Hanko that remained the main request. On the issue of moving the border from Leningrad, Moscow was ready to make concessions (move less than 70 km).
The Soviet-Finnish negotiations were conducted in the autumn of 1939, already under the conditions of the outbreak of a major war in Europe. The importance of negotiations for Moscow is evidenced by the fact that Stalin personally spoke with the Finns. So Molotov negotiated with the Germans, although they also had strategic importance for the USSR. What Stalin didn’t offer the Finns: land in Karelia (the Finns tried to seize them in 1918–1922), monetary compensation for property on the Karelian Isthmus, economic benefits, concessions in mutual trade. When the Finnish side declared that it could not tolerate a foreign base on its territory, Stalin suggested digging a canal across the Hanko Peninsula and making the base an island, offered to buy a piece of land on the cape and thus make the territory Soviet. Then the Finns were offered to buy from them several small uninhabited islands near Cape Hanko, which the members of the Finnish delegation did not even know about. All in vain!
Why the Finns believed in victory
The negotiations show that the Finnish government had an ironclad confidence in victory in a possible war with the USSR. Therefore, the Finnish side did not make any concessions, and obviously was looking for war. Only the war went according to a different scenario, not according to the plan of Helsinki.
The Finnish elite made two major mistakes. First, she underestimated the enemy. It must be remembered that the victorious Soviet Union of 1945 and Soviet Russia of the 1920s in the first half of the 1930s are two different countries. The Finns remembered Russia in the 1920s. A country that narrowly escaped death during the Russian turmoil and intervention, which lost the war to Poland and lost vast Western Russian regions. A country that gave up the entire Baltic region without a fight. The Soviet government, which turned a blind eye to the genocide of Russians in Finland, to the destruction of the Red Finns, to the robbery of Russian property, to the two aggressive wars that the Finns unleashed against Russia.
Hitler's definition of the USSR as a "colossus with feet of clay" was then dominant in the West. It is worth remembering that the Third Reich will make the same strategic mistake, like Finland in the fall of 1939, in the summer of 1941. The Hitlerite elite was confident that they would crush Russia before winter. During the lightning war. That the Russian colossus will collapse under the blows of the "invincible" Wehrmacht, that Russia will collapse under the yoke of problems, because of the actions of the "fifth column", military conspirators and separatists. The entire West slept through the huge changes that took place in Russia-USSR in just a few years. The Stalinist USSR was already a qualitatively different power: with a powerful, albeit raw army, which still had to be tempered in the flames of a terrible war; with a developed industry and military-industrial complex, high scientific, technical and educational potential. The people became different, the nucleus of the society of the future emerged in the country. Real patriots, smart, healthy, ready for self-sacrifice.
All Finnish intelligence at that time was conducted through Soviet dissidents, and they hated the Union, were interested in a corresponding distortion of reality. On the eve of the war, the Finnish secret police reported to the government that the majority of the population of the USSR (75%) hated the authorities. That is, the conclusion was drawn that one had only to enter the Soviet lands, as the population would meet the "liberators" with bread and salt. The Finnish General Staff, analyzing Blucher's vague actions in the conflict on Khasan, concluded that the Red Army could not only attack, but defend competently. As a result, the Finnish government concluded that even Finland alone can fight the USSR and win. But most likely the West will come to Finland's aid.
Secondly, in Helsinki they were confident that they would be supported by Western democracies. These calculations had real grounds. France and England at this time were waging a "strange" war with Germany. That is, there was no real war. The Allies were still waiting for Hitler to turn his bayonets to the East, against the USSR. London not only did not hold back Helsinki from the war with the USSR, on the contrary, it incited the Finns against the Russians. The British wanted to take the Kola Peninsula from the Russians. They themselves did not want to fight, but as usual they used "cannon fodder" - Finnish.
In January 1940, the Chief of the General Staff of England, General E. Ironside, presented to the War Cabinet a memorandum entitled "The Main Strategy of the War." In it, he noted that the allies can provide Finland with effective assistance "only if we attack Russia from as many directions as possible and, which is especially important, we strike at Baku, the oil production region, in order to cause a serious state crisis in Russia." … That is, London was ready for a war with Russia. France adhered to similar positions. At the end of January 1940, the French commander-in-chief, General M. G. Gamelin, expressed confidence that during the 1940 campaign, Germany would not attack the allies, so an Anglo-French expeditionary force could be landed in Pechenga (Petsamo) and, together with the Finnish army, to deploy active hostilities against the USSR.
The British government was, in principle, ready to go to war with the Russians. "Events seem to lead to the fact," Chamberlain said at a January 29 cabinet meeting, "that the allies will openly engage in hostilities against Russia." In early February, the British Prime Minister went to Paris, to the Supreme Military Council. It discussed a specific plan for a joint intervention in Northern Europe. Chamberlain proposed to land expeditionary forces in Norway and Sweden, which would widen the Soviet-Finnish conflict, prevent the defeat of Finland by the Russians, and at the same time block the supply of Swedish ore to Germany. The head of the French government, Daladier, supported this plan. It was planned to send not only French troops to Scandinavia and Finland, but also British divisions, which were formed to be sent to the French front.
Also in Paris and London, they were hatching the idea of organizing an offensive against Russia with "giant pincers": a blow from the north (including the capture of Leningrad) and a blow from the south (from the Caucasus). The Petsam operation provided for the landing of more than 100 thousand Anglo-French troops in Scandinavia. The landing party in Petsamo was supposed to capture the Murmansk railway and Murmansk and thereby obtain sea communications for supplying troops and a railway for the development of the offensive to the south. Also, the allies were preparing the Air Force for strikes from bases in Syria and Iraq on Baku, Batumi and Grozny. Only the victory of the Red Army, unexpected for the West in February - March 1940, forced England and France to postpone the blow to the USSR until better times.
War is so war
Thus, London and Paris were preparing a completely different scenario of a world war - England, France and Finland (possibly other countries) against the USSR. Having great powers behind their backs and underestimating the Russians, the Finns were filled with optimism and even plans for a war with the USSR were preparing exclusively offensive ones. According to these plans, the Mannerheim line was supposed to repel the enemy's onslaught in the south, and the Finnish army attacked in the east, in Karelia. Finland was going to establish a new border with Russia along the Neva, the southern shore of Lake Ladoga, Svir, Lake Onega and further to the White Sea and the Arctic Ocean, with the inclusion of the Kola Peninsula. That is, "peaceful" Finland was preparing to double its territory. Only after the start of the war did they have to forget about the offensive. The very first operations showed that the Red Army grouping in Karelia was too powerful to attack.
So the Finnish elite, dreaming of creating a "Great Finland" at the expense of the Russian lands, made a huge mistake. Later, Hitler will also do it. Reason for Finland and Germany will be the defeat in the war and the victory of the Russians. Vyborg will become Russian again, and then Kaliningrad.
It is also worth paying attention to the fact that Finland in the winter of 1939 was ready for war, but the USSR was not. Since Moscow did not want to fight the Finns, and Helsinki wanted war and prepared for it in earnest. During the autumn negotiations, Finland was preparing for war: it evacuated the population of their border areas, mobilized the army. Mannerheim happily noted in his memoirs:
“… I wanted to shout that the first round was behind us. We were able to transfer both the covering troops and the field army to the front on time and in excellent condition. We got enough time (4-6 weeks) for the combat training of the troops, their acquaintance with the terrain, to continue the construction of field fortifications, to prepare for destructive work, as well as to lay mines and organize minefields."
By the end of November 1939, the Finns had already been ready for war for two months, and Moscow was dragging on and trying to negotiate.
As a result, a provocation occurs, and the Red Army begins to enlighten the obstinate and aggressive Finns. The initial stage was difficult: Finland was ready for war, but the USSR was not. The Soviet command underestimated the enemy, intelligence made major miscalculations, the terrain was difficult, winter time, the enemy's defense was powerful. The Red Army was ill-prepared. The morale of the Finns is high, unlike the Poles, who almost immediately surrendered to the Germans, the northerners fought hard and stubbornly. The Finnish command fought skillfully and decisively. However, Russians are good at drawing conclusions from mistakes. At the second stage of the war, the Finnish army was defeated, the defense was hacked, Finland was on the brink of disaster and asked for peace. Moscow got everything it wanted and even more.
