Troubles. 1920 year. 100 years ago, in June 1920, the Red Army defeated the Polish Army near Kiev. On June 5, Budyonny's 1st Cavalry Army broke through the Polish front and defeated the enemy's rear in Zhitomir and Berdichev. Under the threat of complete encirclement and death, the Polish troops left Kiev on the night of June 11.
To fight the pans
The invasion of the Polish army in the western direction triggered a wave of new mobilization in Soviet Russia. The Soviet propaganda was armed with concepts that until recently the internationalist revolutionaries were throwing mud at: Russia, the Russian people, patriotism. Former tsarist generals and officers were actively involved in the Red Army. For example, the former commander of the Southwestern Front and the supreme commander of the Provisional Government, Alexei Brusilov, chaired a special meeting with the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the Soviet Republic, which worked out recommendations for strengthening the Red Army. Brusilov, together with other well-known generals, appealed to the officers: they were asked to forget the strife and protect "Mother Russia."
Thousands of officers, who had previously held "neutrality", evaded the war, went to recruiting stations. Some responded to the call of well-known military leaders, others out of a sense of patriotism, and others - tired of uncertainty, and finding a reason: the fight against the traditional enemy, Poland. Also, part of the former White Guards from among the prisoners was attracted to the Soviet troops. Simultaneously, Trotsky was mobilizing among the workers and peasants.
In the rear of the Soviet South-Western Front, units of the VOKhR (Internal Security Troops of the Republic) operated under the command of F. Dzerzhinsky. The People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the RSFSR was the head of the rear of the South-Western Front and led the fight against the insurrectionary and bandit movement in Ukraine. One of the main reasons for the success of the Polish army in April - May 1920 was the presence of numerous rebel detachments and bandit formations in the rear of the Reds. Among them were Ukrainian nationalists, Socialist-Revolutionaries, anarchists, monarchists, etc. Most of the atamans and fathers were simple bandits. Dzerzhinsky declared a number of territories under martial law, and emergency commissions received the rights of revolutionary military tribunals. Bandits and persons suspected of banditry were allowed into the expense without further ado. It is clear that many innocent people have suffered as well.
At the same time, Iron Felix launched an ideological and educational work. In the rear headquarters, political and propaganda cells were formed. Educational conversations, lectures, meetings, the so-called. village weeks. Leaflets, posters, newspapers were distributed. The local population was brought up, carried out explanatory work and won over to their side. As a result, Dzerzhinsky for the first time managed to turn the tide in Little Russia-Ukraine. The rear of the Southwestern Front as a whole was "cleaned out" and fortified. They fought against banditry for more than two years, but on the whole the situation stabilized.
Forces of the parties. Offensive plan
A pause in active hostilities allowed the Soviet command to restore the front in the southwestern direction. The previously broken parts were put in order and replenished. Divisions from the Urals, Siberia, and the North Caucasus were hastily transferred to the western direction. Tens of thousands of soldiers arrived on the Western and Southwestern Fronts. The most selective formations and units of the Red Army were thrown against the Poles. From the Caucasus was the 1st Cavalry Army of Budyonny, which was replenished with Cossacks. The shock equestrian connection made the transition along the route Maykop - Rostov - Yekaterinoslav - Uman. On the way, the Budennovites defeated many bands and detachments of Makhno in Gulyaypole. The army consisted of four cavalry divisions (4th, 6th, 11th and 14th) and a special purpose regiment. In total, over 16, 5 thousand sabers, 48 guns, over 300 machine guns, 22 armored vehicles, and 12 aircraft. The army was given a group of armored trains.
The 8th Cavalry Division, formed from the Red Cossacks, was removed from the Crimean direction. The powerful 25th Chapaevskaya rifle division of Kutyakov (13 thousand bayonets and sabers, 52 guns and over 500 machine guns) was transferred to the 12th Army. It was one of the most powerful divisions in the Red Army. Also, the 45th Infantry Division of Yakir, the Kotovsky Cavalry Brigade, the Bashkir Cavalry Brigade of Murtazin were transferred to the Kiev direction. Additional artillery and aviation forces were deployed to the south. The front received over 23 thousand rifles, over 500 machine guns, over 110 thousand sets of uniforms, a large amount of ammunition.
The Southwestern Front was commanded by Alexander Yegorov. During the world war he commanded a battalion and a regiment, was a lieutenant colonel in the imperial army. The front consisted of: Mezheninov's 12th army (opposite Kiev), consisting of 5 rifle, cavalry divisions and a cavalry brigade, Uborevich's 14th army (southern sector) - three rifle divisions and the 1st Cavalry Army. The front troops numbered over 46 thousand bayonets and sabers, 245 guns and over 1400 machine guns. The 13th Army, which was part of the Southwestern Front, was in the Crimean direction.
The command of the Southwestern Front planned to deliver powerful converging strikes and defeat the enemy's Kiev grouping (3rd and 6th armies). The shock group of the 12th Soviet Army was supposed to cross the Dnieper north of Kiev and occupy Korosten, preventing the Polish troops from fleeing to the northwest. On the left flank of the army, Yakir's group (two rifle divisions, Kotovsky's cavalry brigade) struck at Belaya Tserkov and Fastov. The Yakir group was supposed to tie up and distract the enemy from the direction of the main attack. The decisive blow was to be delivered by Budyonny's cavalry. The 1st Cavalry Army struck at Kazatin, Berdichev, and went into the rear of the enemy's Kiev grouping. At the same time, Uborevich's 14th Army was to capture the Vinnitsa-Zhmerynka region.
The Polish Ukrainian Front was headed by General Anthony Listovsky (at the same time the commander of the 2nd Army). On the left flank, in the direction of Kiev, was the 3rd Army of General Rydz-Smigly; on the right flank, Vinnitsa direction, the 6th Army of General Ivashkevich-Rudoshansky. Polish troops numbered over 48 thousand people, 335 guns and about 1,100 machine guns.
Thus, the forces of the opponents were approximately equal. However, the Soviet troops had an advantage in cavalry (1: 2, 7), aviation and superiority of forces in the direction of the main attack (1, 5 times). In addition, the Red Army struck at the junction of the enemy's 3rd and 6th armies. Here the Polish army had a weak point, due to the disbandment of the 2nd army.
Unsuccessful start of the Kiev operation
On May 26, 1920, the Red Army launched an offensive. Mezheninov's 12th Army unsuccessfully tried to force the Dnieper north of Kiev. After six days of fighting, having met strong resistance from the enemy, the Reds stopped their attacks. Soviet troops were able to occupy only a small foothold. At the same time, the Yakir group (Fastov group) and Uborevich's 14th army tried to break through the enemy's defenses. However, they also did not succeed. Against the Fastov group, Polish troops launched a counterattack and pushed the Reds back to their original positions.
The 1st Cavalry Army, starting the offensive on May 27, initially also could not find a weak spot in the enemy's defense. First, the Budyonnovites entered into battle with the Kurovsky rebels, then on the 28th they advanced significantly and occupied Lipovets. Red armored trains broke into the station, shot at the Polish positions. The Polish armored train was damaged and barely left. But then the Poles counterattacked, on May 30 they recaptured Lipovets and threw the Budennovites back. Thus, the first attempt at an offensive by the Red Army failed. After unsuccessful May battles, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the front, Stalin, sent a telegram to Budyonny. In it, the army commander was asked to abandon frontal attacks on enemy strongholds, to bypass them.
Budennovtsy break through the enemy's defenses
Regrouping forces, pulling up reserves and finding a weak spot in the enemy's defenses, the 1st Cavalry Army on June 5, 1920, suddenly broke through the Polish front in the Samgorodok area and entered the operational space. The weather (thick fog and rain) facilitated the maneuver of the red cavalry. The Poles tried to set up a screen from the 13th Infantry Division, gathered reserves with several tanks. But the Budennovites did not get involved in the battle and simply bypassed the enemy. The march was swift, 10 hours after the start of the campaign, the Budennovites reached Kazatin, intercepting the railway, vital for the Poles, which connected the Kiev grouping with the rear. On June 6, the Budennovites began to destroy the railway and eliminate small Polish garrisons at the stations.
Red cavalry wreaked havoc and destruction in the rear of the Polish army. On the first day of the raid, the cavalry covered 40 km, on the next - another 60 km. The 1st Cavalry Army broke through to Zhitomir and Berdichev, on June 7, the 4th and 11th divisions occupied the cities. The headquarters of the Polish front was located in Zhitomir. It was defeated, disrupting communication and control of the Polish troops. In Berdichev, the Polish garrison put up stubborn resistance, but was defeated. In Berdichev, a railway station was destroyed, and front-line ammunition depots were blown up. The Polish artillery was left without ammunition. Also, the troops of Budyonny freed 7 thousand prisoners of the Red Army, thereby replenishing their ranks. The Poles tried to counterattack with their cavalry, but there were few of them. The Reds defeated Savitsky's Polish equestrian group. On June 9, the Budennovites moved east, to Fastov, where Kotovsky's brigade was breaking through.
Thus, the breakthrough of Budyonny's army led to the collapse of the Polish front. Attempts by the troops of the 3rd Polish Army and the 6th Ukrainian Division to push the enemy away from Zhitomir and restore the front did not lead to success. The Kiev group of Poles was under the threat of a blow from the rear and encirclement. Meanwhile, other troops of the Southwestern Front went on the offensive. The Fastov group (44th and 45th divisions, the Kotovsky cavalry brigade, the VOKH brigade), with the support of the Dnieper flotilla, struck at Bila Tserkva. Yakir's group, covering Budyonny's right flank, occupied Rzhishchev, Tarashcha, Belaya Tserkov, Tripoli and Fastov on June 7-10. Kotovsky's brigade established contact with the Budennovites, captured Skvira and intercepted the Kiev-Zhitomir highway. The Poles were able to stop the breakthrough of the Fastov group only near Vasilkov. The Yakir group was widely scattered and lost its striking power.
At the same time, the shock group of the 12th Army crossed the Dnieper near Chernobyl and went from the north to the rear of the Polish troops in the Kiev region. On June 11, Soviet troops cut the Kiev-Korosten railway in the Borodyanka area. On June 9, the 12th Army began the battle for Kiev. The situation for the Polish group was hopeless. The 7th and 58th Divisions of the 12th Army attacked head-on. The ships of the Dnieper flotilla fired at the city. From the north-west, the Poles were bypassed by the shock group of the 12th army - the 25th division and the Bashkir cavalry brigade. The 1st Cavalry Army advanced from the rear - from the west. The Fastov group attacked from the south. On the night of June 8-9, Polish troops began to clear their left-bank Dnieper bridgehead. By the evening of the 10th, the Poles finally left the bridgehead opposite Kiev and destroyed the constant crossings. On the night of June 11, the Poles left Kiev and began to prepare crossings on the Irpen River. On June 12, the Red Army entered Kiev. Under the threat of complete encirclement and death, the Polish army quickly retreated from the Kiev region.
The Poles retreated to Korosten, and not to Zhitomir, as the Soviet command assumed. As a result of the 10th, the front command sent the red cavalry from the Khodorkov area back to Zhitomir. Already on June 10, the red cavalry again occupied Zhitomir. Then the Soviet command tried to correct the mistake and moved the 1st Cavalry Army to intercept the enemy, to Radomyshl and Korosten, but it was too late. The 3rd Polish Army escaped the "cauldron". From the north, units of two Polish divisions hit the Red screens, providing a breakthrough for the 3rd Army. The Poles shot down the screens of the 12th Army at Borodyanka and Irsha and broke through to Korosten.
On the southern flank, Uborevich's 14th Army defeated the Petliurists, occupied Zhmerinka, Gaisin, Vapnyarka, Tulchin and Nemirov. The Polish 6th Army retreated west. By June 17, the operation was completed. The front stabilized on the Korosten - Berdichev - Kazatin - Vinnitsa line. To the south of this line, in the interfluve of the Southern Bug and the Dniester, the Petliurites retreated to the west. The UPR government and Petliura moved their headquarters from Vinnitsa to Proskurov, then to Kamenets-Podolsk.
Thus, the Polish army suffered a major defeat, the Soviet troops liberated a significant territory of Little Russia. However, the Red Army failed to complete the encirclement and completely destroy the Polish Kiev group. The Polish army retreated successfully - mainly due to the mistakes of the Soviet command.
The Red Army was unable to develop the success in the Kiev operation due to the lack of reserves and the offensive of Wrangel's army in Northern Tavria. Possible reserves were sent to the Crimean front. The failures of the Polish army were caused by the stretching of the front, the lack of reserves, especially mobile ones. Part of the Polish troops from the Ukrainian front was transferred to Belarus. In addition, the Polish command refused from widespread mobilization into the Ukrainian army, which could strengthen the position of the Poles in the Kiev region.
