100 years ago, the Red Army carried out the July operation. Soviet troops inflicted a heavy defeat on the Polish North-Eastern Front and liberated a significant part of Belarus and part of Lithuania, including Minsk and Vilno.
Preparing an offensive in Belarus
Simultaneously with the offensive in Ukraine, the Red Army was preparing for an offensive operation in Belarus. The Western Front under the command of Tukhachevsky only in June 1920 received 58 thousand people as reinforcements. During the preparation of a decisive offensive in White Russia, 8 rifle divisions, 4 rifle and 1 cavalry brigades were transferred here. The size of the front (taking into account the rear units and institutions) increased from more than 270 thousand people in May 1920 to more than 340 thousand people in June and more than 440 thousand people in July. Also, the front was replenished with guns, small arms and melee weapons, ammunition, ammunition, etc.
At the beginning of July 1920, the front included the 4th (including the 3rd cavalry corps - the 10th and 15th cavalry divisions), the 15th, 3rd and 16th armies, the Mozyr group. Directly at the front, there were about 120 thousand (as the operation developed, up to 150 thousand people). In total, there are about 20 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions, over 720 guns and 2,900 machine guns, 14 armored trains, 30 armored vehicles, 73 aircraft.
The troops of the Soviet 4th, 15th and 3rd armies (13 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions, a rifle brigade of about 105 thousand soldiers) were opposed by the 1st Polish army of General Zygadlovich. The 1st Polish Army included 5 infantry divisions and 1 brigade, over 35 thousand bayonets and sabers in total. Against the red 16th army of Sollogub and the Mozyr group of Khvesin (over 47 thousand people), the 4th Polish army of General Sheptytsky and the Polesie group of General Sikorsky acted. In this direction, the Polish army had 6 infantry divisions and 1 brigade, more than 37 thousand people in total. There was one division in the Polish reserve.
Thus, the Red Army had a great superiority in strength. On the entire front, there were twice as many Soviet troops, on the direction of the main attack - 3 times. In the zone of the 16th Army and the Mozyr group, the Reds had a slight advantage in strength. The Polish command planned to withdraw troops to a new line of defense: Baranovichi - Lida - Vilno. However, the commander of the Polish North-Eastern Front, Shcheptytsky, believed that it was impossible to surrender the existing front line without a fight. Therefore, the Poles were preparing to stop the Reds on the existing line. The capabilities of the Polish army in White Russia were weakened by the transfer of reserves and part of the forces on the front to the Ukraine, where the offensive of the Soviet Southwestern Front was successfully developing.
The Soviet offensive plan as a whole repeated the idea of the May operation ("Battle for Belarus. May operation of the Red Army"). Resting on Lithuania with its right wing, the Soviet strike group in the Vilna direction was supposed to defeat and encircle the 1st Polish army, then push the enemy troops back to the swampy region of Polesie. Guy's 3rd Cavalry Corps received the task of breaking through to the rear of the enemy, in the direction of Sventsiany. The 16th Army was advancing on Minsk. If the operation was successful, the Red Army inflicted a heavy defeat on the Polish army, liberated most of Belarus and opened the road to Warsaw.
Breakthrough of enemy defense and liberation of Minsk
On July 4, 1920, Tukhachevsky's armies launched a decisive offensive. As part of the 33rd Kuban Rifle Division of the 15th Army, Cork for the first time used three trophy Renault tanks repaired at the Putilov plant. The offensive developed successfully. On the very first day of the operation, Soviet troops advanced 15-20 km. In the battles of July 4-7, the northern flank of the Western Front crushed the 1st Polish army. Polish troops suffered serious losses. The northern flank of the Polish front, the Dvina group, was defeated and retreated to Latvian territory, where the Poles were interned. Another group of the Polish army, the troops of General Zheligovsky (10th Division), retreated to the line of the old German front, to the line Dvinsk - Lake Naroch - west of Molodechno - Baranovichi - Pinsk. The third group of the 1st army was also defeated - the detachment of General Endzheevsky (the brigade of the 5th division and the reserve brigade). The Polish command, having no serious reserves, on July 5 issued an order for the withdrawal of troops in the general direction of Lida.
Thus, the Red Army broke into the enemy's defenses on the move. However, as in May 1920, it was not possible to encircle the Polish army. This was due to the mistakes of the front command. The right-flank group (3rd Cavalry Corps and 4th Army of Sergeev), which was supposed to make a swift coverage of the Polish northern wing, turned out to be weaker than the front group, which delivered a frontal strike (15th Army). The central group advanced faster than the right-flank group. This allowed the Poles not only to avoid encirclement, but also to break away from the Red Army.
The defeat and rapid retreat of the 1st Polish Army sharply complicated the position of the 4th Polish Army in the Minsk direction. The 16th Army of Sollogub was supposed to cross the Berezina southeast of the city of Borisov. In the main direction, the blow was delivered by 3 divisions. The most powerful division of the army was the 27th Omsk Infantry Division (commander Putna): 8 thousand bayonets and sabers, 34 guns and 260 machine guns. The fighters of the division had great combat experience - they fought on the Eastern Front with the Kolchak people.
On the night of July 7, 1920, the shock group of the 16th Army went on the offensive and crossed the Berezina in the morning. The Poles stubbornly fought back, but were forced to retreat. On July 9, our troops liberated the city of Igumen and reached the approaches to Minsk. In the eastern direction, the Poles created a strong defense, so units of the 27th division bypassed the city from the north and south. On July 11, the battle for Minsk began. By noon, units of the 27th and 17th divisions had broken the enemy's resistance. Polish troops retreated west.
On July 12, 1920, the second stage of the operation of the Western Front began. Again, the right flank was to play the main role. The right-flank grouping, hiding behind the border with Lithuania, was supposed to create a threat to the northern wing of the Polish front and prevent the enemy from gaining a foothold in new positions. Meanwhile, the Polish command was trying to gather additional forces and means in Belarus to stop the advance of the Red Army and stabilize the front. On July 9, Pilsudski ordered to hold Vilna and the line of the old German front. The Polish troops, entrenched on the old line of the German front, where there were 2-3 rows of trenches, lines of communication, concrete shelters and a large number of firing positions, had to stop, wear out and bleed the Russians. Then, with the approach of reinforcements, launch a counteroffensive and drive back the enemy. A strike group was formed in the Brest region. That is, the Poles planned to repeat the scenario of the May battle.
However, the Polish army did not manage to gain a foothold on the new line of defense, it lacked forces and resources. We did not have time to form shock groups in time. This was largely due to the fact that the Polish front was also falling apart in Ukraine. In mid-July 1920, the Red Army broke through the enemy's positions. July 15 Pilsudski order to withdraw troops to the Pinsk - r. Neman - Grodno. To contain the Russian offensive, to cover the withdrawal of the 1st Army, the 4th Polish Army was ordered to strike to the north on the flank of the advancing enemy strike group. But this plan also failed.
On July 14, Guy's cavalry and the 164th Infantry Division of the 4th Army liberated Vilno. The Lithuanian army opposed the Poles who occupied part of Lithuania. Polish troops from the Vilna region began to withdraw to Lida. The Soviet-Lithuanian negotiations with the aim of coordinating the actions of the two armies failed, which affected the pace of the offensive. As a result, it was agreed that the Soviet divisions would not violate the Novye Troki - Orany - Merech - Avgustov line. On July 17, units of the 15th Army entered Lida, on July 19, the red cavalry unexpectedly for the enemy burst into Grodno. A small Polish garrison fled. On July 19, units of the 16th Army liberated Baranovichi, on July 21-22, Soviet armies crossed the Neman and Shara. On July 23, the Mozyr group entered Pinsk.
Thus, the Soviet armies, due to the concentration of a powerful strike group and the weakening of the enemy in Belarus due to defeats in Ukraine, inflicted a heavy defeat on the Polish North-Eastern Front. The Red Army firmly seized the initiative in the war, liberated a significant part of White Russia and part of Lithuania. Conditions were created for the liberation of the rest of Belarus and the development of an offensive in the Warsaw direction. However, the Western Front was unable to encircle and destroy the main enemy forces. This was caused by the mistakes of the command, weak reconnaissance and the absence of large mobile reserves like the 1st Cavalry Army, which could enter the operational space, to the rear and complete the defeat of the enemy.
Wrong choice
The rather quick and large-scale success caused "dizziness with success" among the front command and the high command. The Soviet command overestimated the defeat of the enemy and decided to strike Warsaw on the move, without pulling up and arranging the rear, strengthening the strike capabilities of the armies. Without concentrating the efforts of the two fronts, the Western and the South-Western, in the Warsaw direction.
In the conditions of the collapse of the front in Ukraine, the State Defense Council was established in Warsaw, headed by Pilsudski, with members of the government, parliament and military command. On July 5, the Defense Council asked the Entente to mediate in the peace negotiations. During negotiations with representatives of the Entente on July 9-10, it was decided that the Polish army would withdraw to the so-called. Curzon's line, the Poles will renounce their claims to Lithuanian lands and agree to hold a peace conference in London with the participation of Russia. Warsaw pledged to accept a Western decision on Poland's borders with Lithuania, Germany, Czechoslovakia, and the future of Eastern Galicia. In the event the Bolsheviks refused peace, Poland was promised military assistance. At the same time, the Poles hoped to use the negotiations to restore and strengthen the army.
On July 11, 1920, Moscow received a note from Lord Curzon demanding to stop the offensive on the Grodno - Nemirov - Brest - Dorogusk - east of Grubeshov - west of Rava-Russkaya - east of Przemysl. The Russians were to stop 50 kilometers east of this line. Finally, the border issues were to be resolved at a peace conference. If the Red Army's offensive continued, the Entente promised to support Poland "by all means." It was also proposed to conclude a truce with Wrangel's army in the Crimea. Moscow was given 7 days for reflection.
On July 13-16, the Soviet leadership discussed this note. Opinions were divided. The head of the foreign department, Chicherin, took a cautious stance. He offered to accept the proposal of the Entente, to enter the Curzon line and, in this position, to negotiate with Warsaw, tighten up the rear, give the troops time to rest and rebuild, and create a defense line. If negotiations fail, resume the offensive. Warsaw put forward counter conditions: negotiations with Moscow, the reduction of the Polish army. Kamenev agreed to negotiate with Warsaw, but on the terms of its demilitarization and offered to occupy Eastern Galicia. Trotsky believed that a truce with the Poles was possible. The command of the Western Front advocated the continuation of the offensive and the Sovietization of Poland. The most cautious position was expressed by Stalin, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Southwestern Front. He noted the successes of his front, but noted that it was too early to bury the Poles. There are still serious battles ahead, bragging and self-righteousness, shouts of a "march to Warsaw" are unacceptable.
The assessment of the situation by the military command at the front, set out in a note dated July 15, was optimistic. The Soviet leadership at that time was dominated by the course of "world revolution", which was promoted by Trotsky and his supporters. The soul was warmed by bright hopes about the red Warsaw, and then Berlin. Therefore, London's offer was rejected. The Soviet leadership planned with one powerful blow to crush the entire Versailles system, which did not take into account the interests of Soviet Russia. On July 16, it was decided to continue the offensive and free the Polish working people from the oppression of the landlords and capitalists. At the same time, the negotiations were not completely rejected. On July 17, Moscow informed London that it was ready to negotiate with Warsaw without intermediaries. On the same day, the chairman of the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic, Trotsky, ordered the Western and Southwestern Fronts to develop the offensive. On July 20, England announced that in the event of a Russian offensive, it would cancel trade negotiations with Russia.
Thus, the military-political leadership of Soviet Russia overestimated the successes of the Red Army in the west and made a number of miscalculations. On July 19, Smilga, a member of the Revolutionary Military Council of the Western Front, informed the Revolutionary Military Council of the republic that the left wing of the Polish army was completely destroyed. On July 21, the commander-in-chief of the Red Army, Kamenev, urgently arrived in Minsk, at the headquarters of the Western Front. Having studied the optimistic reports of the front command, he ordered on July 22 to start an offensive and to occupy Warsaw by August 12. That is, the Polish army was considered completely defeated and incapable of combat. This assessment was fundamentally flawed. At the same time, the high command abandoned the original sensible idea of a concentric offensive of two Soviet fronts on Warsaw. Now only Tukhachevsky attacked Warsaw. Egorov's armies first had to take Lvov. Kamenev and Tukhachevsky were confident that the Western Front alone would be able to break through the enemy's defenses on the Vistula and capture Warsaw.
