Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829 Constantinople-Constantinople was at the feet of the Russian army. The Turks had no more troops. Diebitsch scattered the Turks in Bulgaria, Paskevich - in the Caucasus. The Russian fleet could land troops in the Bosphorus. The Sultan pleaded for peace. Another 2-3 transitions, and Constantinople could become Russian. But this was not destined to happen (as later, in 1878). The Russian government did not dare to go against its "Western partners". Liberate Bulgaria and hang Oleg's shield on the gates of Constantinople.
The brilliant march of the Russian army in the Balkans and the victories in the Caucasus did not lead to the same political and diplomatic victory. Russia has shown extreme moderation in the negotiations. Petersburg did not use the extremely advantageous position created by the efforts of the Russian army and navy.
Battle of Slivno
After the capture of Yambol, Diebitsch's army was located on the southern slope of the Balkans, on the front from Yambol to Burgas. The left Russian flank was secured by the domination of the fleet at sea. The Russian fleet strengthened the position of the Russian army on the coast. On July 21 and 23, the Russian troops landed from the ships under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Burko captured the cities of Vasilik and Agatopol. Most of coastal Bulgaria came under the control of the Russian armed forces.
To protect the rear of the army in the center and on the right flank from the Shumla side and to communicate with the Danube Bulgaria, Russian troops occupied three passes through the Balkan Mountains. At the end of July 1829, the Russian army received reinforcements. However, the new units, before arriving at the front, suffered such heavy losses from the epidemic that they slightly strengthened the Trans-Balkan army. At the end of July, Diebitsch had about 25 thousand soldiers in Aydos. The rest of the forces were connected with the protection of the rear, the occupied fortresses and the observation of Shumla.
Diebitsch, despite the small size of the Russian army for such an operation, decided to develop an offensive against Adrianople, the second capital of the Ottoman Empire. It was the last strong fortress of the Ottomans on the way to Constantinople. The movement to Adrianople was a natural continuation of the Trans-Balkan campaign. However, before the throw to Adrianople, it was necessary to defeat the Turks at Slivno.
The Turkish command still hoped to stop the Russians at Slivno. The city was well fortified, the Khalil Pasha corps was located here, reinforced by local troops. He was awaiting the arrival of the Grand Vizier with reinforcements. The Russian army could not advance on Adrianople while significant enemy forces were on the flank. Diebitsch decided to forestall the enemy and destroy Khalil Pasha's corps. He united the troops of the 6th and 7th corps, reinforced them with the 5th infantry division from the 2nd corps, and hurried to Sliven. The battle took place on July 31, 1829. According to our intelligence, the main forces of Khalil Pasha were located in a marching camp in front of the city on the Yambol road. Diebitsch sent part of his forces to bypass the main forces of the enemy in order to capture the city itself and cut off the enemy's escape routes. The other part of the army quickly advanced along the road, with the help of artillery and cavalry, sweeping away the advance detachments of the enemy. In such a situation, Khalil Pasha had to flee or fight surrounded.
Russian troops on the right flank bypassed the enemy and reached the city. Here they met with opposition from enemy artillery. The Russian commander-in-chief threw the 19th artillery brigade into battle. The Russian artillerymen greatly outnumbered the enemy in accuracy of fire, so the Turks quickly abandoned their positions and took their guns to the city. In pursuit of the enemy, battalions of the 18th Infantry Division broke into Sliven. Khalil Pasha, as expected, abandoned the Yambol fortifications. Turkish troops fled along still clear roads. 6 banners and 9 cannons became Russian trophies.
Thus, the attempts of the Turkish command to stop the movement of the Russian army towards Adrianople failed. At Aidos, Yambol and Slivno, the Turkish corps were successively defeated and scattered. The Grand Vizier, while in Shumla, weakened his army by the detachment of separate detachments, having lost the opportunity for active actions and communication with Constantinople. The Russian commander-in-chief Diebitsch, having secured his rear and right flank, could now safely go to Adrianople. Although he still had few troops.
Adrianople is ours
Diebitsch could wait and replenish the army with reserves going to Bulgaria. But, given the fact that the Turkish troops were pulling together to Adrianople, and the rapid construction of new fortifications, our commander-in-chief preferred speed and onslaught, according to the precepts of Suvorov. After giving the troops one day of rest, on August 2, 1829, Diebitsch continued the offensive.
Despite the lack of enemy resistance, the campaign was difficult. It was hot. Our troops, unaccustomed to such conditions, suffered greatly. Retreating Turkish troops spoiled wells on the way, threw them with animal corpses. The streams encountered were dry from the heat. Disease mowed down the soldiers. As a result, each transition was like a battle - the size of the army was constantly decreasing. For six days the troops passed 120 versts and on August 7 they reached Adrianople. Diebitsch has only 17 thousand soldiers left. Diebitsch and Chief of Staff Tolm went out on reconnaissance, planning to storm the city the next day. It was a great day. Since the time of Prince Svyatoslav, Russian squads have not stood at the walls of Adrianople.
Meanwhile, the Turks gathered significant forces in Adrianople: 10 thousand regular infantry, 1 thousand cavalry, 2 thousand militias. In addition, the walls of the city could be protected by 15 thousand armed citizens. The terrain near the city was rugged, which worsened the possibility of an attack, there were old fortifications. The city had many large stone buildings suitable for defense. The Russian army did not have the strength for a full-fledged blockade, and a decisive assault with powerful enemy resistance could end in failure. It was dangerous to prolong the siege of Adrianople. Russian troops were mowed down by an epidemic. Sultan Mahmud II called for troops from Macedonia and Albania to protect Constantinople. It was impossible to be careful in this situation, it showed the weakness of the army. Only decisiveness and speed could lead to victory. Assessing the situation, Diebitsch did everything right. Russian troops prepared for the offensive. The 2nd corps was in the first line, the 6th corps was in the second, and the 7th was in reserve. The Cossacks of the vanguard detachment of General Zhirov occupied the heights around the city with patrols. The Don Cossack regiment of Colonel Ilyin took the road to Constantinople.
The breakthrough of the Russians through the Balkans, the defeat of the Turkish troops at Aydos and Livny paralyzed the will of the Ottomans to resist. They were stunned and confused. Diebitsch, without a pause, starting the movement of a small army to Adrianople, frightened the Ottomans even more. They were confident in the strength of the Russians. The Ottomans have never known such a threat in the history of the wars they fought in Europe. Turkish commanders and chiefs were confused, gave conflicting orders, and could not prepare for defense. The troops were paralyzed by apathy, and panic broke out among the townspeople. In the evening of August 7, the Turkish commanders Halil Pasha and Ibrahim Pasha proposed to discuss the terms of surrender.
Diebitsch, under the threat of a quick and decisive assault, proposed to lay down arms, surrender all the banners, guns, all army property. On these conditions, the Turks were allowed to leave Adrianople, but not to go to Constantinople (there they could strengthen the garrison there), but in the other direction. The Russian commander-in-chief gave the Ottomans 14 hours to think. On the morning of August 8, Russian troops began to move towards Adrianople in two assault columns. The first was led by Dibich, the second by Tol, the reserve was headed by Ridiger. But there was no assault. Turkish commanders agreed to surrender the city on condition of free passage of troops without weapons. They left in a westerly direction.
Thus, on August 8, 1829, the Russian army occupied Adrianople. The Russians got rich trophies - 58 cannons, 25 banners and 8 bunchuks, several thousand rifles. Our army got a large number of various supplies and property - Adrianople was one of the rear bases of the Turkish army. The fall of Adrianople made a huge impression not only on Constantinople, but also on Western Europe. There was shock and panic in the Turkish capital. There was a direct road from Adrianople to Constantinople, and the Russians could quickly reach the heart of the Ottoman Empire.
Constantinople at the feet of the Russian army
On August 9, 1829, Russian troops resumed their movement. The vanguard forces advanced towards Kirkliss and Lula Burgas, already threatening Constantinople. The headquarters of the Russian commander-in-chief is located from Eski-Saraye - the country residence of the Turkish sultans.
The Russian Emperor Nicholas I subordinated the Mediterranean squadron operating in the Eastern Mediterranean to Diebitsch. Diebitsch instructed the commander of the Russian squadron (it consisted of ships of the Baltic Fleet) in the Mediterranean Sea, Heyden, to begin a blockade of the Dardanelles and act against the Turkish coast. Thus, the supply of food to Constantinople from the southern regions of the Ottoman Empire, primarily Egypt, was blocked. At the same time, the Black Sea Fleet under the command of Admiral Greig blocked the Bosphorus. Russian ships intercepted Turkish ships off the coast of Anatolia and Bulgaria. On August 8, the Black Sea sailors captured Iniada, and on August 28, Media on the Bulgarian coast. In Istanbul, they were very afraid that the Russians would land a landing force to capture the fortifications of the Bosphorus. In this case, strong detachments of Black Sea sailors could support the offensive of Diebitsch's army to Constantinople.
Even before the capture of Adrianople, Count Diebitsch ordered General Kiselev, the commander of our troops in Wallachia, to go from defense to offensive. Our troops were supposed to cross the Danube on the right flank and to march quickly (mainly by cavalry forces) along the Bulgarian land to the Balkans, to begin hostilities in the western part of Bulgaria. Such a campaign would have met with the support of the Bulgarians, as well as the Trans-Balkan campaign of Diebitsch. General Kiselev with the 4th Reserve Cavalry Corps successfully crossed the Danube, occupied the city of Vratsa and reached the Balkan Mountains. The Russian avant-garde was already about to descend from the mountains into the Sofia Valley and liberate Sofia. However, this march was stopped due to the start of negotiations with the Turkish delegation.
Thus, the Russian army could have every opportunity to free Sofia and all of Bulgaria from Turkish rule. General Kiselev wrote: "My Cossacks were two marches from Sofia, and in three days I would have occupied this wonderful and important city for us … the Bulgarians greeted us in a friendly way …". Kiselev's troops cleared a vast area of scattered Turkish detachments. The Russians occupied the cities of central Bulgaria, Lovcha, Plevna and Gabrovo, and the Shipka Pass, important for a possible continuation of the war. The remains of the Turkish army remained only in the valley of the river. Maritsa. After the conclusion of peace, the Russian troops under the command of General Geismar defeated the detachment of Mustafa Pasha (he decided to continue the war on his own) at the Orhaniye pass, nevertheless they occupied Sofia.
The Russian army led by Diebitsch found itself on the threshold of the Ottoman capital, the ancient Constantinople-Constantinople. At the same time, Russian troops under the command of Paskevich-Erivansky defeated the Ottomans in the Caucasus, took Erzurum. The Turks lost two main armies. Istanbul was left unprotected. The Ottoman government could not quickly rebuild the armies in the Balkans and Anatolia. There were no large army reserves to defend the capital. Such a turn of events was not expected in Turkey and Europe. Russian troops were 60 kilometers from Constantinople - one Suvorov daily march.
Panic gripped Istanbul and European courts. Diplomats and ambassadors hurried from Constantinople to Adrianople and back. On the very first day of Diebitsch's stay in Eski Sara, envoys came to him from the British ambassador Gordon, from the French Guillemino, and from the Prussian - Mufling. All European ambassadors were unanimous - to stop the movement of Russians to Constantinople and the Straits at any cost. Obviously, they understood better than the Russian government the main millennial national task of Russia-Russia - to occupy Constantinople and the strait zone, to make the Black Sea a Russian “lake”.
The Ottoman government, emboldened by such strong diplomatic support, was now in no rush to negotiate peace. The Sultan hoped that France and England would bring their fleets into the Sea of Marmara and defend the Turkish capital. Diebitsch, alarmed by the behavior of the Turkish "partners", was already planning to move troops to Constantinople and set up a camp in sight from the walls of the city. As noted by the military historian and General A. I. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, who was then at the headquarters of the commander-in-chief, it was easy to take Constantinople - the vanguard of the left army column was located in Visa, and was close to the water pipes supplying the capital. The flow of water could be stopped, and the city was doomed to surrender as soon as possible. In addition, the army knew that there was no one to defend Constantinople, there would be no resistance. The Russian army was waiting for the order to enter Constantinople - it was reasonable, fair and deflected to the national interests of the Russian people. Mikhailovsky-Danilevsky, the author of the official history of the Patriotic War of 1812, wrote that he had never seen more despondency than in the days of the stationary of exhausted troops, when it became clear that such an order would not be forthcoming.
As a result, Emperor Nicholas I stopped Diebitsch in Adrianople. In St. Petersburg, they feared the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Seriously believing that "the benefits of preserving the Ottoman Empire in Europe outweigh its disadvantages." This was a strategic mistake. At the exit, Russia received the shame of the Crimean War, when the Russians were forbidden to have weapons and a fleet on the Black Sea and the coast, the war of 1877 - 1878. and Turkey's performance against Russia in the First World War. But they could solve all the issues in favor of Russia with one blow in 1829.
The Russian army could simply enter ancient Constantinople, and the Russian squadrons could occupy the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The collective West was not then ready to oppose Russia, following the example of the Crimean campaign. After the victory over the empire of Napoleon, Russia was the "European gendarme", the leading military power in Europe (and therefore the world). However, the erroneous policy of Alexander I with his Holy Alliance, the priority of "stability" and legitimacy in Europe, continued by the government of Nicholas I, the interests of the "Western partners" outweighed Russian national interests. The pro-Western vector of Petersburg bound the movement of the Russian hero with a heavy spell.
