A swift blow from Wrangel's cavalry corps cut through the positions of the 11th Army. The northern group of the Reds retreated beyond the river. Manych and formed the Special Army. The southern group with battles retreated to Mozdok and Vladikavkaz. The remnants of the 3rd Taman Rifle Division fled to the Caspian Sea. The 11th Army ceased to exist, only a few fragments remained.
The defeat of the 11th army
The counterstrike of Wrangel's cavalry caused the threat of cutting the 11th Army in two. The 3rd Taman Rifle Division suffered a heavy defeat, thousands of Red Army men were captured, others fled, dozens of guns were lost. Division control was lost. At the same time, the Whites continued to advance on the Holy Cross (Budennovsk), entering the flank and rear of the left-flank group of the Reds in the Mineralnye Vody area.
The command of the 11th Army tried to rectify the situation. On January 8, 1919, Commander Kruse ordered the 3rd Taman Rifle Division from the Novoselitsky area to launch a counteroffensive on Blagodarnoye, Alexandria, Vysotskoye, Grushevskoye. The 4th Infantry Division on the left flank of the 11th Army was to separate a cavalry group and strike at Vegetables and Blagodarnoye, on the flank and rear of Wrangel's grouping. It was also supposed to strengthen the defense of the Holy Cross.
On January 8, the 4th Infantry Division delivered a flank attack on Wrangel's grouping. In the course of a stubborn battle, the Reds pushed Denikin's forces into Petrovsky. Denikin reinforced Wrangel with the Kornilov shock regiments and the 3rd Consolidated Kuban Cossack regiments located in Stavropol. On January 9, the left flank of Wrangel's grouping under the command of Babiev stopped the offensive of the 4th rifle division a few kilometers from Petrovsky. On January 10, having received reinforcements from the Kornilovites and the Kubanites, the Whites counterattacked.
On January 9, the Tamans counterattacked, but to no avail. Under pressure from volunteers, the Reds retreated to the Sotnikovsky area. Communication with the 3rd and 4th Infantry Divisions was cut off. As a result, the 3rd Taman Rifle Division was defeated and cut, suffered heavy losses. Its left flank remained to operate in the south with units of the 1st Infantry Division, and its right flank in the north with the troops of the 4th Division. Only scattered, demoralized groups remained in the center, unable to maintain the unity of the army. The defeat greatly demoralized the Red Army soldiers, especially the recruits, and many deserters appeared.
In addition, the command of the 11th Army is not up to par. Commander Kruse, without warning from the headquarters, left the army in a difficult situation, whose position he considered hopeless, and flew by plane to Astrakhan. The army was led by the head of the operational and reconnaissance department of the army, Mikhail Lewandovsky, a talented organizer and an experienced combat commander. However, this replacement could no longer rectify the situation, the 11th Army, in fact, had already been defeated, and there were no resources or reserves to rectify the situation.
In the course of these battles, the absence of strong cavalry groups in the 11th Army, including in the reserve, affected. The strong and numerous Red cavalry was scattered along the front, subordinated to the command of the rifle divisions. That is, the command of the 11th Army did not use the chance to repeat the success of the counterstrike of Wrangel's cavalry corps - to the flank and rear of the enemy. The command of the red army tried to hold on to the entire front to the last, although it could, at the cost of losing territory and withdrawing troops to the rear, create a shock fist from several cavalry divisions and brigades, and deliver a counterattack on the enemy who had broken through from the area of Gergievsk and the Holy Cross. Such a blow could well bring victory. Wrangel's group was small, stretched out along a large front, the flanks were open. To attack, after each blow, White had to take a break and regroup, gather fighters for a new blow. But the red command did not take advantage of this, preferring to try to hold the common front and close all new gaps with small subunits and detachments.
In the center, on January 11, the whites occupied the Novoselitsky area, the remnants of the Tamans fled to the Holy Cross. On January 15, the headquarters of the Taman Division moved to the Holy Cross. The Reds feverishly tried to strengthen the defenses of the settlement. For the defense of the Holy Cross and the railway, horse detachments from Vladikavkaz, consisting of mountaineers, were brought to Georgievsk. The partisan detachment of A. I. Avtonomov was also transferred here from there. However, the efforts of the remnants of the Taman division and the arriving small units could not hold back the offensive of the 2nd Kuban Cossack Division of Ulagai. On January 20, the volunteers took the Holy Cross, capturing large supplies from the 11th Army's rear base. At the same time, Toporkov's column took Preobrazhenskoye to the south of the city, cutting off the Holy Cross - Georgievskaya railway.
The remnants of the Tamans retreated in the direction of the village. Stepnoe, Achikulak and Velichaevskoe. A group of Tamans led by division chief Baturin, military commissar Podvoisky and division headquarters, not pursued by the enemy, reached the coast of the Caspian Sea on February 6, where they united with other troops of the 11th Army retreating from Kizlyar to Astrakhan. Another group of the Taman Rifle Division, which consisted of the remnants of the 1st brigade under the command of Kislov, fought back to the State village. Here the Tamans tried to gain a foothold, but the whites bypassed the village from the rear, the Red Army men fled to Mozdok.
Thus, the 11th Army's right combat area (3rd Taman and 4th divisions) was completely destroyed. With the loss of the Holy Cross, the Red Army in the North Caucasus lost its rear base and important communications to Astrakhan. Having deployed on the Aleksandrovskoe - Novoseltsy - Preobrazhenskoe line, Wrangel's army group (13 thousand bayonets and sabers with 41 guns) launched an offensive to the south: Kazanovich's 1st Army Corps from Aleksandrovskoe to Sablinskoe and further to the Alexandrovskaya stanitsa; 1st Kuban Division from Novoseltsy to Obilnoe; parts of Toporkov from Preobrazhenskaya along the railway line to Georgievsk.
Wrangel at the headquarters train. 1919 year
Situation on the right flank
Having received the first alarming information about the enemy breaking through the front in the sector of the 3rd Taman Rifle Division and the exit of the white cavalry to the rear of the Taman troops, the command of the 4th Rifle Division issued an order to go over to the defensive. Communication with the headquarters of the 3rd Taman Division and the 11th Army was interrupted. The group of troops of the 4th rifle division (3 rifle brigades, an artillery brigade and the 1st Stavropol cavalry division) was isolated from the rest of the army.
To help the Tamans on January 7, the 1st Stavropol Cavalry Division was tasked with striking the rear of the Whites in the Blagodarnoye - Vegetables area. The rifle brigades remained in place, strengthened the defenses and repulsed the attacks of the white detachments of Generals Stankevich and Babiev. The troops were confident that the cavalry division with a blow to Blagodarnoye would establish contact with the Kochergin cavalry corps and thereby create conditions for the defeat of the enemy that had broken through. The Stavropolites occupied Vegetables, and on the 10th Kochergin's cavalry struck a sudden blow from the south and occupied Blagodarnoye. Thus, favorable conditions were created for the attack of the Taman division, which broke into the rear, to the Wrangelites. Until the connection of the two Soviet cavalry formations remained 20 - 30 km. The appearance of red horse groups in the village of Ovoschi and Blagodarnom forced the White Guards to somewhat delay their movement in the direction of the Holy Cross and Georgievsk.
However, the red command lost control and was unable to use this favorable moment in order to restore the situation on the front of the 11th Army. The 3rd Taman Division had actually already been defeated and could not deliver a strong blow towards the red cavalry. Kochergin's corps did not receive a task for a joint strike with the Stavropol Cavalry Division at the rear of the enemy. As a result, Kochergin's cavalry was soon forced to retreat to the east under the onslaught of the whites. And the command of the Stavropol cavalry division acted indecisively and by January 20 withdrew the troops back to the 4th division. By January 17, the white troops finally cut off the northern and southern parts of the 11th Army from each other.
Meanwhile, under the command of Stankevich and Babiev, the Whites, having regrouped, defeated the 4th rifle division in a stubborn battle, and took Vegetables. Hundreds of Red Army men, just mobilized, surrendered and joined the ranks of the White Army. The troops of the 4th division withdrew to the area of Divnoe, Derbetovka and Bol. Dzhalga, where they continued to fight with Stankevich's detachment and the cavalry brigade of General Babiev from Wrangel's cavalry corps.
In a situation where communication with the 1st and 2nd divisions and the command of the army was lost, and the left flank and rear of the 4th divisions were open for a strike by the enemy cavalry from the side of the Holy Cross, the commanders decided to leave Stavropol and retreat beyond the river. Manych, covered by the river. On January 26 - 27, the 4th Infantry and 1st Stavropol Cavalry Divisions withdrew beyond Manych. Battles with whites continued on the outskirts of Priyutnoye, then
Behind Manych, the troops of the 11th Army met with units of the 10th Army, which had been sent from Tsaritsyn in the fall to communicate with the Stavropol group. Among them were the Elista infantry division (up to 2 thousand bayonets) and the Chernoyarsk brigade (up to 800 bayonets and sabers). Thus, units of two armies - the 10th and 11th, which were part of different fronts - the South and the Caspian-Caucasian ones, ended up in the same area. There was no contact with the headquarters of the armies and fronts, but it was necessary to decide: either to retreat to Tsaritsyn or to Astrakhan, or to remain in place and continue fighting with the White Guards, trying to draw off as many forces of Denikin's army as possible. As a result, at the end of January 1919, it was decided to create a Special United Army of the Steppe Front. The troops of the Special United remained in the areas they occupied and fought defensive battles with the Whites, who were developing an offensive from the Priyutnoye area to Kormovoye, Kresty and Remontnoye. At the end of February 1919, the troops of the United Special Army were reorganized into the Stavropol combat area, and remained behind Manych.
The commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade as part of the Wrangel Cavalry Division, then the commander of the 1st Cavalry Division of the Cavalry Corps of General Wrangel, General S. M. Toporkov at the parade of the Volunteer Army in Kharkov. 1919 year
Commander of the 2nd Kuban Cavalry Brigade in the 1st Kuban Cossack Division, then the commander of the 3rd Kuban Cossack Division Nikolai Gavriilovich Babiev
Fighting on the left flank of the 11th Army
At the same time, fierce battles continued on the left flank of the 11th Army. The troops of the 1st and 2nd rifle divisions, having used up most of the ammunition they had, were unable to overcome the resistance of the Whites in the Nevinnomyssk direction and fought fierce battles with varying success in the area of the Kursavka station, the villages of Borgustanskaya and Suvorovskaya and Kislovodsk. First, the Reds pushed the Circassian division of Sultan-Girey at Batalpashinsk. However, Shkuro mobilized all the White forces on the southern flank, repelled the attack and launched a counteroffensive himself. He managed to organize a Cossack uprising in the red rear and at the same time attacked from the rear. On January 9, the Reds retreated from Vorovskaya, Borgustanskaya and Suvorovskaya and retreated to Essentuki, Kislovodsk and Kursavka, where fierce battles continued with renewed vigor. Both sides acted extremely brutally. The villages that passed from hand to hand were badly destroyed, the red and white terror flourished. The Bolsheviks destroyed the Cossacks, and the returning Cossacks massacred nonresident (peasants and other social groups that did not belong to the Cossack estate) who supported the Soviet power.
On January 10, the White Cossacks approached almost close to Kislovodsk, and raided Essentuki, but they were thrown back. On January 11, Lyakhov's 3rd Army Corps launched an offensive on Kursavka, Essentuki and Kislovodsk. Shkuro with horse and foot militia and the Circassian division attacked Essentuki, but met strong resistance, suffered heavy losses and retreated. On January 12, Shkuro repeated the attack and took Essentuki. On the morning of the 13th, the Reds, with the support of an armored train, recaptured the city.
However, in the conditions of the defeat of the Taman division, the enemy offensive on the Holy Cross and Georgievsk, the operational situation for the left flank of the 11th Army was unfavorable. The 1st and 2nd rifle divisions were threatened with encirclement. On January 12, Army Commander Lewandovsky ordered the 1st and 2nd divisions to withdraw to Kislovodsk. On January 13, the RVS of the 11th Army assigned the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions with the help of cavalry to detain the enemy and, after retreating, hold the Kislovodsk, Essentuki and Pyatigorsk areas with all their might.
On January 13, 1919, the RVS of the 11th Army reported to the headquarters of the Caspian-Caucasian Front in Astrakhan that the situation was critical: due to an epidemic that wiped out up to half of the personnel, lack of ammunition and ammunition, demoralization and mass surrender with a desertion to the side white mobilized units, the army on the brink of death. The size of the army has decreased to 20 thousand people and continues to decline. But even on January 5, the army command reported on the imminence of a decisive victory against white. This message did not quite correspond to reality, the southern group of the Reds was quite combat-ready - the 1st and 2nd rifle divisions retained their combat strength almost completely and by this time numbered at least 17 thousand bayonets, 7 thousand sabers. Kochergin's cavalry retained up to 2 thousand sabers, Kochubei's cavalry brigade was combat-ready.
On January 15-16, the troops of the 1st and 2nd Infantry Divisions retreated, their rearguards repulsed the fierce attacks of the enemy. On January 17-18, Lyakhov's corps took Kursavka (in a month of fighting, the station changed hands seven times). At the same time, the Whites bypassed Essentuki from the Prokhladnaya side. Fearing encirclement, the Reds left the city. The Red troops continued to withdraw and on January 20 they left Pyatigorsk and Mineralnye Vody. The retreat of the rifle divisions was covered by the brigades of Kochubei and Gushchin, the 1st Communist Pyatigorsk Infantry Regiment, which fought rearguard battles with the advancing Shkuro Cossacks.
Thus, the 11th Army fell apart. Ordzhonikidze believed that it was necessary to retreat to Vladikavkaz. Most of the commanders were against it, believing that the army, pressed against the mountains and without ammunition, would die. Many separate groups, especially the Taman division, could no longer receive orders and fled on their own. The northern flank of the army, the 4th division and other units (about 20 thousand bayonets and sabers) retreated to the north, beyond the Manych, where they then formed a Special Army there.
On January 20, the army command, in view of the complete lack of ammunition, gave the order to retreat the 1st and 2nd divisions with the remnants of the Taman division to go to the Prokhladnaya, Mozdok and Kizlyar areas, and the 4th division to Manych for connections with the 10th army. On January 21, after a difficult two-day battle, the Whites took Georgievsk, cutting off the Georgievsk group of the Reds. Nevertheless, after a stubborn battle, the retreating troops of the 1st and 2nd rifle divisions and Kochubei's cavalry brigade, which went into the rear of the white, inflicted a local defeat on the advancing enemy and broke through. After that, the Reds continued their retreat to Prokhladnaya. At the same time, the retreat took on a spontaneous, chaotic nature, and all plans for a systematic withdrawal of the command of the 11th Army, attempts to gain a foothold and repel the enemy failed. Ordzhonikidze's personal intervention did not help either. The troops fled, only Kochubei's cavalry brigade in the rearguard retained its combat capability, held back the enemy, covering the infantry and carts.
On the night of January 21, a meeting of the army command was held in Prokhladnaya, at which the question of where to retreat was decided: to Vladikavkaz - Grozny or to Mozdok - Kizlyar. Ordzhonikidze believed that it was necessary to retreat to Vladikavkaz. There, to learn the support of the mountaineers, who were oriented towards the Soviet power, and to organize a defense in an impassable mountainous region, continuing to shackle significant forces of Denikin's army. Most of the commanders were against it, believing that the army, pressed against the mountains and without ammunition, would die. As a result, contrary to the opinion of the main command, the troops spontaneously fled to Mozdok - Kizlyar. On the way, in the abandoned cities, villages and stanitsas, there were thousands of typhus-sick and wounded Red Army soldiers. They could not be evacuated.
For example, among those left was the famous red commander Alexei Avtonomov. He was one of the most prominent Red commanders in the Kuban, led the defense of the harrow of Yekaterinodar during the assault on the city by the Volunteer Army (First Kuban Campaign), then was the commander-in-chief of the North Caucasian Red Army. Due to the conflict with the Central Executive Committee of the Kuban-Black Sea Republic, he was removed from his post, recalled to Moscow. Ordzhonikidze stood up for him and was again sent to the Caucasus as a military inspector and organizer of military units. He commanded a small detachment in the battles on the Terek and under the Holy Cross, and during the retreat of the defeated 11th Army, the Autonomov fell ill with typhus, was left in one of the mountain villages and died on February 2, 1919.
Monument to the Red Commander. A. Kochubei in the village of Beysug
Red commander Alexei Ivanovich Avtonomov in his private carriage. 1919 year. Photo source:
On January 23, 1919, the Whites took Nalchik without much effort, on the 25th - Prokhladny. The command of the 11th Army left for Mozdok. On January 24, Ordzhonikidze from Vladikavkaz sent Lenin the following telegram: “There is no 11th Army. She was completely decomposed. The enemy occupies cities and villages with almost no resistance. At night, the question was to leave the entire Tersk region and go to Astrakhan. We consider this to be political desertion. There are no shells and cartridges. No money. Vladikavkaz and Grozny still have not received any cartridges or a penny of money, we have been waging a war for six months, buying cartridges for five rubles. Ordzhonikidze wrote that "we will all perish in an unequal battle, but we will not disgrace the honor of our party by flight." He noted that the situation could improve the direction of 15-20 thousand fresh troops, as well as the sending of ammunition and money.
However, the command of the Caspian-Caucasian Front and the 12th Army did not expect such a rapid change in the situation and the catastrophe of the 11th Army. Thus, the appropriate measures were not taken or were greatly delayed. Communication between Georgievsk Astrakhan was broken and the front command did not know about the critical situation in the 11th Army until January 14. On January 25, the command of the 12th Army ordered the deployment of one regiment to protect Mozdok and Vladikavkaz, which was clearly not enough. On January 27, Astrakhan reported to the 11th Army that a Redneck detachment was sent to strengthen the right flank of the army in the Yashkul area, which was supposed to gather the troops of the 4th rifle division and organize an offensive on the Holy Cross. That is, the main command at that time actually did not imagine the scale of the catastrophe of the 11th Army and the situation in the North Caucasus after that.
