Battle for the North Caucasus. Part 2. December battle

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Battle for the North Caucasus. Part 2. December battle
Battle for the North Caucasus. Part 2. December battle

Video: Battle for the North Caucasus. Part 2. December battle

Video: Battle for the North Caucasus. Part 2. December battle
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The suppression of the anti-Soviet Terek uprising strengthened the position of the Red Army in the North Caucasus. However, in general, the strategic initiative remained with the White Army. In addition, the Soviet troops had a serious logistical problem. After Stavropol was lost and the Reds were pushed back to the eastern part of the Stavropol province, the supply situation worsened even more. Astrakhan was far away and communication with it was unreliable. So, in October 1918, a small amount of ammunition was delivered from Astrakhan along a 500-kilometer deserted path through Yashkul to the Holy Cross and then by rail to Georgievsk - Pyatigorsk (100 thousand cartridges per week). New regiments arrived in Astrakhan and formed significant reserves, but they could not be transferred further than Astrakhan and Kizlyar.

In the case of the Whites, the situation improved with the capture of the vast and rich regions of the Kuban, the Black Sea coast and part of the Stavropol Territory. In addition, in November - December 1918, the Entente fleet appeared in the Black Sea. Denikin's army was supported by the Anglo-French imperialist predators, who fomented the fratricidal Civil War in Russia in order to dismember and plunder the Russian lands.

New reorganization of the Red Army

After the defeat at Petrovsky, the commander of the 11th Army Fedko was replaced by V. Kruse. In December 1918, an independent Caspian-Caucasian front was separated from the Southern Front, consisting of the 11th, 12th armies and the Caspian flotilla. The front was headed by M. Svechnikov. At the same time, the 11th Army was reorganized again: the previously formed 4 infantry and 1 cavalry corps were transformed into 4 rifle and 2 cavalry divisions, 1 reserve and 2 cavalry brigades. The total composition of the 11th Army in mid-December 1918 was about 90 thousand people, of which two-thirds are active soldiers.

The new reorganization failed to strengthen the Red Army in the North Caucasus. The main part of the troops was on the front line, in battles, that is, the units could not fully replenish, arm, give them a rest. The supply problem has not been resolved. In addition, the red command was unable to make full use of its significant cavalry formations. The cavalry remained an appendage of the rifle units. The cavalry was dispersed along the front, it was subordinated to the commanders of the rifle divisions, who used them to reinforce the infantry. As a result, the Reds were unable to organize massive attacks by cavalry units in the main directions.

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Parties' plans

On November 28, 1918, the Revolutionary Military Council of the Caspian-Caucasian Department of the Southern Front ordered the offensive of the main forces of the 11th Army along the Vladikavkaz railway in the direction of Armavir - Kavkazskaya station in order to divert part of the White forces from Tsaritsyn. This was already the fourth order of the 11th Army to provide assistance to the 10th Army in the Tsaritsyn area, which repulsed the onslaught of the Don Army (Krasnov White Cossacks). In August 1918, the entire Red Army of the North Caucasus was ordered to be withdrawn to Tsaritsyn; in September 1918, the most combat-ready "iron" division of the Redneck was withdrawn from the army of the North Caucasus and transferred to Tsaritsyn; On September 24, the RVS of the Southern Front demanded to organize an offensive against Stavropol and Rostov-on-Don, which led to a severe defeat in the Stavropol battle.

It is obvious that the RVS of the Southern Front, when ordering the 11th Army, which had just survived the hardest defeat at Armavir, Stavropol and Petrovsky, again went on the offensive in order to save Tsaritsyn, imagined the situation of the Red troops in the North Caucasus badly. The 11th Army could not immediately organize a new offensive, and even during the next reorganization. However, following the order of the high command, units of the 11th Army in December launched an offensive from the Kursavka area to Nevinnomysskaya. The 2nd rifle division and the cavalry brigade of Kochubei (formerly parts of the 9th column and the troops of the Nevinnomyssk combat area) operated in this sector. And the main blow in the direction of Batalpashiisk - Nevinnomysskaya was to be inflicted by the 1st Infantry Division of Mironenko (before the reorganization - the 1st Shock Shariah Column), which showed high combat effectiveness during the defeat of the Terek uprising.

On December 1, 1918, the RVS of the Southern Front ordered the troops of the 11th and 12th armies to seize the ports of Novorossiysk on the Black Sea and Petrovsk on the Caspian Sea, the entire Vladikavkaz railway, the Tikhoretsk-Novorossiysk railway line, creating a base for a further offensive to the north and southeast … After the capture of Novorossiysk and Petrovsky, it was ordered to develop an offensive against Yeisk, Rostov, Novocherkassk and Baku. The troops of the 12th Army were to occupy the Gudermes - Petrovsk, Kizlyar - Chervlennaya railway, creating conditions for an offensive on Baku.

Thus, the Red Army in the North Caucasus was given a grandiose task to liberate the entire North Caucasus, Stavropol province, Kuban, and the Baku oil region. To do this, it was necessary to defeat Denikin's army, which created conditions for the armies of the Southern Front to dismember and destroy Krasnov's Don army. In reality, the troops of the 11th and 12th armies could not carry out such a strategic operation. Suffice it to note that the command of the new Caspian-Caucasian Front did not even have data on the composition and grouping of Denikin's army in the North Caucasus and very poorly represented the actual position of the 11th Army. The headquarters of the 11th Army - B. Peresvet was appointed its chief, and MK Levandovsky as the head of the operational and reconnaissance department - had just begun to be created at the beginning of December, as were the divisions' reconnaissance departments. And data on the state of the enemy army was collected only by the beginning of 1919, when the situation had already changed dramatically.

Meanwhile, the white command was also planning an offensive. On December 7, 1918, Denikin instructed the Wrangel corps, to which Stankevich's detachment was subordinated, to defeat the Stavropol group of Reds, throw it over the Kalaus River and capture the area of the Holy Cross. Casanovich's corps struck at Blagodarnoye and thereby covered Wrangel's southern flank. Lyakhov's corps was supposed to advance on the Kislovodsk - Mineralnye Vody front. As a result, during December 1918, a counter battle between the 11th Red Army and Denikin's army flared up.

December battle

The whites who went on the offensive faced the units of the 11th Army that had also begun to move: the 2nd rifle division and the cavalry brigade of Kochubei, and the troops of the Georgievsky infantry regiment transferred from the Terek region, at the head of the Svyato-Krestovsky combat area, which also went on the offensive along the Vladikavkaz railway roads from Kursavki station to Nevinnomysskaya and from Vorovskolesskaya to Batalpashinsk (Cherkessk).

As a result, a stubborn oncoming battle broke out. On the railway, Soviet troops supported 5 armored trains with artillery and machine-gun fire. In the battles in the district of Kursavka, the command of the armored train "Kommunist" especially distinguished itself. The village of Vorovskoleskaya, attacked by Kochubei's cavalry, passed from hand to hand several times. The 1st Caucasian Cossack Division Shkuro, which was advancing now from the left or from the right side of the railroad to Kursavka, tried to reach the rear of Kochubei's brigade. But the white cavalry was repeatedly thrown back by the red infantry. Only by December 16, the whites reached the area north of Kursavka, and took it on the 27th with an attack of plastuns with the support of armored trains and with the entry of Shkuro's cavalry into the rear of the red.

Against the Denikinites, who were advancing from Batalpashinsk to the Kislovodsk-Pyatigorsk region, a part of the Kislovodsk combat area headed by Kozlov was defended. On December 14-15, the white cavalry suddenly attacked Kislovodsk, but was repulsed. The enemy retreated to Batalpashinsk. Until December 17, White continued his attacks, but without much success.

In the Stavropol direction, Kazanovich's 1st Army Corps launched an offensive in the Aleksandrovskoye - Donskaya Balka sector. On December 15, the Denikinites captured the villages of Sukhaya Buivola, Vysotskoye, Kalinovskoye. Reds - the 3rd Taman Infantry and Cavalry Divisions, showed stubborn resistance. But they were crowded and on December 22 the volunteers captured the large villages of Aleksandrovskoye and Kruglolesskoye. White could not break through further.

The main blow was delivered by Wrangel's cavalry corps. The main forces of the corps were advancing on Vinodelnoe, Derbetovskoe, and Stankevich's detachment on Divnoe. By December 14, the Wrangelites broke through the defenses of the 4 rifle and 1st cavalry divisions (formerly the Stavropol corps). The Whites captured the Petrovskoye - Vinodelnoe area. Wrangel, confident in the defeat of the Reds and that they did not pose a threat in the near future, surrendered the command to Ulagayu and drove off to Yekaterinodar. However, on December 18, the Reds counterattacked, threw back Stankevich's detachment, captured Derbetovskoe and Vinodelnoe. The 2nd Kuban Division of Ulagai was sent to the aid of Stankevich's detachment. White struck on the enemy's flank and threw the Reds back to Divnoye.

Battle for the North Caucasus. Part 2. December battle
Battle for the North Caucasus. Part 2. December battle

The fighting continued until December 22, 1918, but the White Guards could not break the resistance of the Reds and, having suffered serious losses, went on the defensive. A feature of these battles was their winter nature - in conditions of ice, snowstorm and frost. Both sides tried to occupy large settlements in order to find a warm hearth, shelter for the soldiers, food and fodder. There were no permanent defensive lines. The only exception was the Kursavka area, where the red infantry prepared permanent positions near the Vladikavkaz railway.

On December 18, 1918, the Caspian-Caucasian Front was again ordered to attack Yekaterinodar - Novorossiysk, Petrovsk, Temir-Khan-Shura (now Buinaksk) and Derbent. However, the 11th Army did not have ammunition for the offensive, the reserves were depleted. So, for the active gun there were only 10 shells for the troops and 10 in the arsenals. The units had 10 - 20 rounds per rifle, and the army reserve did not provide even one cartridge for one rifle. And the ammunition coming from Astrakhan could arrive only at the end of December 1918 - early January 1919. Therefore, the offensive of the 11th Army was postponed until the end of December 1918.

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