The winter offensive of the Red Army in the North Caucasus ended in complete disaster. The 11th Army was defeated, fell apart, and Denikin's army was able to end the campaign in the region in its favor.
Preparation and plan of the operation
In the first half of December 1918, the 11th Army was unable to fulfill the task set by the high command and launch a decisive offensive with the aim of defeating the whites in the North Caucasus and the Kuban. The offensive movement of the 11th Army ended in a fierce oncoming battle, as Denikin's army also launched an offensive. The Whites captured a number of villages, but on the whole were unable to defeat the Red Army and suffered heavy losses. Both sides were preparing to continue the battle.
On December 18, 1918, the main command of the Reds repeated the directive on a decisive offensive in the North Caucasus with an offensive on Yekaterinodar and Novorossiysk, and Petrovsk and Derbent. However, the army's combat stock was almost completely depleted, so the offensive could only be started after it was replenished - at the end of December 1918 - January 1919.
In general, the 11th Army was not ready for this offensive. The main command did not have data on the forces and groupings of the enemy; the troops did not have enough ammunition and equipment for winter battles; the new reorganization and reorganization were not completed, that is, the army was not prepared organizationally; numerous cavalry was dispersed between the rifle divisions, was not united into shock groups capable of breaking through to the enemy's rear, disrupting his communications; there was not a strong army reserve capable of responding to an unexpected counterattack of the enemy; in the rear, the Reds were restless. The Stavropol peasantry was tired of the hardships of the war, was dissatisfied with the invasion of food detachments and expropriations. At the same time, the 11th Army, cut off from central Russia, could in no way compensate the losses of local peasants. The peasants mobilized into the army did not want to fight, had low motivation and political education. That is, the reinforcements in the army had low combat effectiveness, they did not have time to prepare and educate, plus problems with the supply of troops in winter conditions. Hence the low resilience of many units and mass desertion at the first signs of defeat. The Terek Cossacks, after the suppression of the uprising, hid, but were ready to rise again. The highlanders, who had previously supported the Bolsheviks, increasingly showed independence.
At the same time, the leadership of the Red troops was strengthened. In mid-December, the North Caucasus Defense Council was created under the chairmanship of the Extraordinary Commissioner for the South of Russia Ordzhonikidze. The council was supposed to strengthen the work of the rear of the 11th Army. At the end of December, the Central Executive Committee of the North Caucasian republic was liquidated, its functions were transferred to the regional executive committee headed by Podvoisky. Political training improved, almost all regiments received commissars. The army headquarters created in December established work, proper order in the army, and intelligence. However, in general, these events were late.
The total number of the army reached 90 thousand people with 159 guns and 847 machine guns. The Red Army held a front 250 km from Divnoe to Kislovodsk and Nalchik. For the convenience of troop control, by order of December 25, the front was divided into two combat sectors. The right combat area included the 3rd Taman and 4th rifle divisions, the headquarters was located in Sotnikovsky. Rigelman was appointed commander, Gudkov chief of staff. The left combat area included the 1st and 2nd rifle divisions, commanded by Mironenko. The headquarters was in Mineralnye Vody.
The army was supposed to go on the offensive on January 4, 1919. The 4th Infantry Division (8,100 bayonets, 15 guns and 58 machine guns) and the 1st Stavropol Cavalry Division (more than 1,800 sabers) struck from the Vozdvizhenskoye, Voznesenskoye, Mitrofanovskoye area on Bezopasnoye. The 3rd Taman Rifle Division (24, 4 thousand bayonets, 2, 3 thousand sabers, 66 guns and 338 machine guns) advanced from the Sukhaya Buffola - Kalinovskoye area to Stavropol. Kochergin's cavalry corps as part of the 1st cavalry division (1, 2 thousand sabers with 36 machine guns) and the 2nd cavalry division (1, 2 thousand sabers with 34 machine guns), was subordinated to the commander of the 3rd Taman division, and should was to go to Temnoleskaya. The 1st Infantry Division (11 thousand bayonets and sabers with 130 machine guns and 35 guns received the task to go to Temnolesskaya. with a cavalry brigade of Kochubei (consisting of 10, 5 thousand bayonets, 3, 8 thousand sabers, 230 machine guns, 43 guns) struck from the area of Kursavka, Suvorovskaya, Kislovodsk to Batalpashinsk and further along the Kuban river to Nevinnomysskaya.
The 11th Army delivered the main blow with the left flank (1st and 2nd divisions, three cavalry brigades). The red command planned, having occupied Batalpashinsk, Nevinnomysskaya and Temnolesskaya, cut the Stavropol-Armavir railway, cut the front of Denikin's army in order to encircle and destroy the enemy grouping in the Stavropol region.
Denikin's army
The Soviet troops were opposed by 100 thousand. Denikin's army. Directly against the 11th Army there were about 25 thousand bayonets and sabers with 75 guns, in the immediate rear in the garrisons there were another 12-14 thousand people. On the left flank, in front of the front of the 4th Infantry Division, Stankevich's detachment was located, to the south, at the junction of the 4th and 3rd Taman divisions - Wrangel's cavalry corps. The 1st Army Corps of General Kazanovich, together with the 1st Kuban Cossack Division of Pokrovsky, was located in the center against the 3rd Taman Division. General Lyakhov's 3rd Army Corps together with the 1st Caucasian Cossack Divisions Shkuro on the right flank on the Vladikavkaz Railway against the 2nd Infantry Division.
The Denikinites were better equipped with weapons and ammunition than the Reds. Their combat effectiveness, despite heavy losses in previous battles, was also significantly higher. The white command made better use of the cavalry, forming agile strike groups. The numerical strength of the White Army was now supported by the mobilization of peasants, Cossacks, officers (formerly neutral). Prisoners of the Red Army were driven into the army. The volunteer principle had to be abandoned. This affected the combat capability of the army, for the worse. But in general, Denikin's army was stronger than the 11th Red Army in terms of basic parameters. The high-quality composition and better management, organization and motivation compensated for the numerical superiority of the 11th Army in the Stavropol direction.
Departure of the 1st Officer General Markov Regiment (1919)
11th Army offensive
The 11th Army's offensive was planned for January 4, 1919. However, the battle began earlier than planned. The December battle was generally over, but isolated clashes took place. Thus, Casanovich continued pressure on Medvedskoe in the second half of December. By December 22, the Whites captured Aleksandrovskoye, Crimea-Gireyevskoye, Borgustanskaya, on December 28 - Medvedskoye.
On December 28, 1918, the Reds counterattacked and recaptured the previously lost villages. Under the blow of the 1st and 2nd rifle divisions, the Denikinites were forced to retreat along the entire front line. On the same day, the 3rd Taman Rifle Division, with the Derevyanchenko cavalry division attached to it from Kochergin's cavalry corps, in order to support the success of the left flank, launched an offensive on Grushevskoye, Medvedskoye and, having occupied these villages, threw the enemy back to the west. The next day, December 29, the Reds continued their successful forward movement.
On the right flank, the Reds also went on the offensive and began to cover Petrovskoe from the north. On December 29, the 2nd Kuban Cossack Division Ulagaya with two Plastun battalions struck on the left flank of the 4th Infantry Division. The Whites defeated the 4th division, throwing it back to Voznesensky - Mitrofanovsky, and captured the Winery. In this battle, the commander of the 7th regiment P. M. Ipatov, one of the talented red commanders in the Stavropol Territory, died a death of the brave. Having recovered and regrouping the forces, the Reds again went forward. Within a few days Ulagay again defeated the Reds in the area of Winery and Derbetovka, throwing them back to Divnoye.
The detachment of P. M. Ipatov in the village of Petrovskoye. In the center is P. M. Ipatov and I. R. Apanasenko. 1918 year
On December 30 - 31, 1918, the 3rd Taman Rifle Division continued its successful offensive. The Tamans defeated Casanovich's corps and threw the Whites back to the Kalaus River. On January 2, 1919, the Red Army captured Vysotskoye, Kalinovskoye, and took many trophies. Kazanovich informed the high command that in the event of a further offensive by the Red Army, the front would be broken through and there would be a threat of the fall of Stavropol. The volunteers had no reserves in the immediate rear, only the Kornilov shock regiment in Yekaterinodar.
Meanwhile, the Soviet command started another reorganization of the troops: the former three Taman corps were transformed into three rifle brigades; from the cavalry regiments of the 3rd Taman Rifle Division, the North Kuban Cavalry Division was created under the command of Litunenko. This cavalry division included the newly reorganized three cavalry regiments: Kuban, Caucasian and Taman. All artillery units were divided into three artillery brigades, one for each rifle brigade. It is obvious that all these events in the midst of the offensive and fierce battles with the whites caused only confusion and negatively affected the fighting qualities of the Tamans.
At the same time, stubborn oncoming battles continued on the left flank of the 11th Army. Here the 1st and 2nd rifle divisions and Kochergin's cavalry corps fought dressed-up battles with Lyakhov's corps. On the Vladikavkaz railway, the blow of the red troops with the support of armored trains was repelled by the Shkuro Cossacks and the mountaineers of the 2nd brigade of the Circassian cavalry division (also called the "Wild Division") Klych Sultan-Giray. On December 31, the whites attacked Krym-Gireyevskaya, but were driven back beyond Surkul. On the southerly direction, on January 2 - 3, 1919, the red cavalry defeated another part of the Circassian division, captured Vorovskoleskaya and broke through to Batalpashinsk. The threat of the fall of Batalpashinsk and the withdrawal of the Reds to the rear of the main forces forced the corps commander Lyakhov to remove two cavalry regiments led by Shkuro from the Surkul-Kursavka sector and throw them to the aid of the garrison of Batalpashinsk. Shkuro mobilized all the available Cossacks there, strengthened his units and repelled the attack.
Commander of the Circassian Cavalry Division ("Wild Division") Sultan-Girey Klych
Thus, on January 4, 1919, the position of the whites became critical. The Reds' success on the left flank was especially noticeable. The 11th Army occupied the Bekeshevskaya - Suvorovskaya - Vorovskoleskaya - Batalpashinskaya, led an offensive on Nevinnomysskaya. In the event of the fall of Batalpashinsk and the withdrawal of the whites to the left bank of the Kuban, the Red Army went to the rear of the corps of Kazanovich and Wrangel. At the same time, the body of Casanovich in the center itself barely held on. On January 5, 1919, the Revolutionary Military Council of the 11th Army sent a joyful telegram to the Revolutionary Military Council of the front in Astrakhan about the successes achieved. It was noted that, subject to the full supply of ammunition, the 11th Army will take Stavropol and Armavir. The problem was that the enemy had already launched their counteroffensive.
Wrangel's counterstrike
The white command decided to bypass from the rear and attack a group of red troops (3rd Taman Rifle Division) advancing in the Medvedskoe-Shishkino region. The main forces of Wrangel's cavalry corps (about 10 regiments under the general command of Toporkov) were transferred to the Petrovskoe-Donskaya Balka area by two heavy night marches. On the morning of January 3, 1919, the Wrangelites (about 4 thousand sabers with 10 - 15 guns) delivered a sudden blow, bypassing the right flank of the Tamans. The blow was sudden, since the Reds believed that Wrangel's corps was scattered over a large area up to Manych.
By the evening of January 3, the Wrangel cavalry occupied Alexandria, deeply wedging into the enemy's position. At the same time, the headquarters of the Taman division was located in the village. Thankful, and the troops were still advancing in a westerly direction to the Kalaus River. The headquarters of the 11th Army initially did not attach importance to the message of the commander of the Taman division about the breakthrough of the enemy and the exit to the rear of the Taman units. As a result, it turned out that Wrangel's corps had nothing to oppose. The 3rd Taman Division was taken by surprise, its cavalry exhausted by previous battles. At the same time, the Tamans were in the process of another reorganization, which weakened the division. The general reserve of the 11th Army's right combat area, which consisted of the 3rd Kuban Rifle Brigade, took it and at this critical moment held a meeting. And in the army reserve there were no large units and horse formations capable of responding with blow to blow, parrying a successful maneuver of the enemy. In the reserve of the 11th Army there were 4 reserve regiments, but these units, formed from soldiers recovering from wounds and illnesses, were not capable of a quick counterattack. The command instructed Kochergin's cavalry corps to concentrate in the village of Blagodarny by the morning of January 4.
By order of Commander-in-Chief Denikin, Kazanovich's 1st Army Corps, Wrangel's 1st Cavalry Corps and General Stankevich's detachment were united into a separate army group under the general command of Wrangel. The army group was supposed to build on the first success, take the main base of the Tamans - the Holy Cross, and then put pressure on the rear of the Red group, which in the Mineralnye Vody area acted against the Lyakhov corps.
On January 4, the red front collapsed, the Tamans left Sukhaya Buffalo and Medvedskoye, and retreated to Blagodarnoye, Elizavetinskoye and Novoselytskoye. Casanovich's corps also went on the offensive and occupied Orekhovka and Vysotskoye. White attacked Blagodarnoe and Elizavetinskoe. The headquarters of the Taman division moved from Blagodarny to Elizavetinskoe. Some Taman units tried to counterattack unsuccessfully, fought well, others at the same time fled, deserted or surrendered (mainly yesterday's Stavropol peasants). On January 6, the White Guards captured Blagodarnoye and threatened to dismember the 11th Army into two parts.
