Thousands of tanks, dozens of battleships. In the previous article, we focused on the fourth shipbuilding program of the USSR, adopted in 1936 and designed for the period 1937-1943. It was distinguished by two characteristic features: it was the first Soviet program for the construction of the "Big Fleet" and … the last program for the creation of the "Big Fleet", approved in the pre-war USSR.
Where did it begin
As mentioned earlier, the reasons that prompted the leadership of the Country of Soviets to start creating a powerful navy are quite understandable and logical. The country was in political isolation, and naval power was a powerful diplomatic argument, because no one could afford to ignore the political views of a first-class maritime power. In addition, the military industry by 1936 seemed to have reached an acceptable level and did not require multiple growth, and the second five-year plan ended much more successfully than the first. In general, “at the top” there was an impression that we were quite capable of a large shipbuilding program, and, at the same time, the country's leadership felt a real need for a powerful fleet.
Alas, as we now know, the capabilities of the domestic industry turned out to be extremely overestimated, and the construction of 533 warships with a total displacement of more than 1.3 million tons for some 10 years was completely beyond its strength. Thus, the execution of the resolution of the Council of People's Commissars (STO) of the USSR No. OK-95ss "On the marine shipbuilding program for 1936" Literally "stalled" from the very beginning of its adoption.
This program itself was a common document, and provided for the construction of 8 battleships of the "A" type, 16 battleships of the "B" type, 20 light cruisers, 17 leaders, 128 destroyers, 90 large, 164 medium and 90 small submarines. Its implementation was to be clarified by the relevant resolutions of the Council of Labor and Defense (STO) under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, which set specific tasks for the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry and other structures involved in the process of creating the fleet for one or two years in advance. And so, the first such resolution was the document "On the program of large sea shipbuilding" adopted on July 16, 1936, which specified the procedure for creating the "Big Fleet" for the next 2 years. According to him, in 1937-38. the shipbuilding industry was to lay 4 battleships of type "A", four - type "B", 8 light cruisers and leaders, 114 destroyers and 123 submarines. Moreover, all 8 battleships were supposed to enter service in 1941!
It is interesting, although this does not apply to the topic of the article, that the SRT attached great importance to the unification of ships under construction. The battleships of the projects "A" and "B" had yet to be developed, and later on the "B" was abandoned in favor of the ship of the "A" type, the light cruisers were to be built according to the project "Kirov", the leaders - according to the project 20I (the famous "blue cruiser "Tashkent"), destroyers - project 7, submarines - type "K" of the XIV series, type "C" of the IX series, and "M" of the XII series as large, medium and small submarines, respectively.
It was smooth on paper …
Alas, the reality turned out to be extremely far from the expectations of the Soviet leadership, because problems arose literally at every step. So, for example, of the 8 battleships planned for construction, 7 were supposed to be laid in 1937.and one more - in the next 1938, However, in fact, in the specified period, it was possible to start building only two ships of this class: "Soviet Union" was laid down on July 15, and "Soviet Ukraine" - on October 31, 1938. Light cruisers were laid down half as much as planned, even if we “count” the “Maxim Gorky” laid down on December 20, 1936. Leaders were not laid down for a single one: but as for the destroyers, the laying in 1936 of as many as 47 "sevens" deliberately surpassed and oversaturated the capabilities of our industry. A number of these ships were commissioned already during the war, and some were dismantled altogether on the stocks. In general, in 1937 not a single destroyer was laid down at all, and in 1938 only 14 ships of this class could be counted, re-laid from project 7 according to the improved project 7U.
On the one hand, of course, I would like to be surprised at the incompetence of the persons responsible for the development of the shipbuilding program, and its "linkage" with the domestic industry. Literally everything was lacking, from metal and armor to artillery and turbines. But on the other hand, it should be understood that in addition to the incorrect assessment of the prospects for the growth of our industry, other factors also played a role, which were rather difficult to foresee from the beginning.
So, for example, according to the program, it was supposed to build type "A" battleships with a standard displacement of 35,000 tons. contracts and did not have any obligations under them. At the same time, for a long time, large warships were not created or even designed in the USSR. But, obviously, it was assumed that if the leading world powers have limited the displacement of battleships to 35 thousand tons, then they know what they are doing, and the creation of balanced ships in such dimensions is quite possible.
However, very quickly it became clear that a battleship with 406-mm cannons, somewhat effectively protected from the effects of artillery of its caliber, and at the same time developing a more or less acceptable speed, categorically did not want to "ram" in 35,000 tons. So the initial project of the battleship type "A" in the middle of 1937 was sent for revision (as, in fact, the battleship of type "B") after which, as the requirements of the RKKF were satisfied, the ship's displacement sharply "crawled" upward, quickly reaching first 45, and then and 55-57 thousand tons. But what did this mean for the shipbuilding industry?
In 1936, the USSR had the same 7 stocks on which tsarist Russia created its battleships. At the same time, on 4 Baltic stocks, on which, before the First World War, battle cruisers of the "Izmail" type of 32,500 tons were built (although this is normal, not standard displacement), laying down battleships of 35,000 tons was not particularly difficult. The same, apparently, applied to the Black Sea slipways. But the increase in the displacement of battleships led to the fact that they all turned out to be completely insufficient and began to require volumetric upgrades. Moreover, the increase in displacement naturally entailed an increase in the mass and draft of the ship during launching, and it turned out that there is simply not enough water area for new battleships - it was necessary to carry out expensive dredging works … Thus, even in those cases when the problem was solved (in this case - permission to increase the displacement) it could be that this only entailed a whole "heap" of new difficulties.
More ships! More
It would seem that, faced with an obvious failure, the leadership of the USSR would have to moderate their appetites and return their shipbuilding programs to the limits of what is actually achievable. However, nothing of the kind happened: starting from 1936, the planning of military shipbuilding proceeded in two parallel ways. Sailors, under the patronage of the People's Commissar of Defense K. E. Voroshilov formed more and more ambitious programs: for example, the "Plan for the construction of warships of the Red Army Naval Forces", submitted for consideration by I. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, who at that time was the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars on September 7, 1937, assumed the construction of 599 ships with a total displacement of 1.99 million tons! The corresponding indicators of the previous program were surpassed by 12.3% and 52.2%, respectively. According to this document, it was planned to build 6 battleships of type "A", 14 - type "B", 2 aircraft carriers, 10 heavy and 22 light cruisers, 20 leaders and 144 destroyers, 375 submarines! The next iteration, proposed in 1938, was significantly reduced in terms of ships (424 units), but their total displacement remained at the same level - 1.9 million tons. Finally, on June 14, 1939, People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov submits to the Council of People's Commissars the monstrous "10-year plan for the construction of ships of the RKKF", according to which it was required until 1948 inclusive, the country should have built 696 ships of the main classes and 903 small ships (torpedo boats, minesweepers, hunters for submarines, etc.) with a total displacement of over 3 million tons!
At the same time, such plans were approved by the country's leadership, but … were not approved. Unfortunately, many lovers of naval history are misled by the phrase wandering from source to source that the "10-year plan for the construction of RKKF ships" was approved by the People's Commissar of the Navy N. G. Kuznetsov. Nikolai Gerasimovich really endorsed this document, but you need to understand that his signature only means that the People's Commissar of the Navy agrees with this plan and recommends it for approval by higher authorities. But to approve it "for execution" by N. G. Kuznetsov, of course, could not in any way, because it was far beyond the limits of his powers. Only the STO, or, later, the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, or the Council of People's Commissars itself, could approve documents of this kind. As for I. V. Stalin, he approved these programs, but also did nothing to turn them into a guide to action.
But then, on what basis were the warships laid at all? In essence, this was the case. All the above plans were, so to speak, a kind of super-goal, which, of course, it would be great to achieve, someday, in the bright socialist future. And the actual construction of warships was carried out (and controlled) on the basis of annual plans drawn up by the People's Commissariat of the Navy, coordinated by it with the shipbuilding industry and approved by higher authorities. And these plans were much more realistic than the "program" hundreds of ships and millions of tons of displacement.
And what in practice?
Let us explain this with a simple example, namely: we will quote the Decree of the Defense Committee under the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR No. 21ss "On the approval of the plan for the order of the NKVMF for shipbuilding, ship repair, spare parts and equipment for 1940". In 1940, it was planned to transfer to the fleet:
Cruisers - 3 units, including one project 26 and two - 26 bis;
Destroyer leaders - 1 unit. project 38 "Leningrad";
Destroyers - 19 units, including 1 experimental, 4 projects 7 and 14 - 7U;
Submarines - 39 units, including 4 large type "K" series XIV, one underwater minelayer "L" series XIII bis, 14 medium type "C" series IX bis, 5 medium type "Sh" series X, and finally, 15 small "M" type XII series - 15;
Minesweepers - 10 units, including 2 projects 59, 2 projects 58 and 6 projects 53.
As well as 39 smaller warships and boats. But this is to convey from the previously begun construction, and for us the most interesting are those that were planned to be laid in 1940. Here is a short list of them:
Battleships - 1 unit, project 23;
Cruisers - 2 units, project 68;
Leaders - 4 units, project 48;
Destroyers - 9 units. project 30;
Submarines - 32 units, including 10 medium type "C" series IX bis, 2 - medium type "Sh" series X, 13 small type "M" series XII and 7 - small type "M" series XV;
Minesweepers - 13 units. project 59;
And also 37 more small warships and boats.
In other words, we see that according to the plan for 1940 there is even a slight decrease in the number of ships in construction. Yes, of course, one more (fourth) battleship of Project 23 is being added, but at the same time it is planned to complete the construction of 3 cruisers, 19 destroyers and 39 submarines, and lay down only 2, 9 and 32 ships, respectively.
In general, we can talk about the following. The program for the construction of the "Big Fleet", approved in 1936, was distinguished by clarity and clarity in the types of ships that should be built, but otherwise consisted of only one drawbacks. She was unbalanced, impossible for the domestic industry, and the types of ships in her composition were not optimal. Already the first steps to implement this program in 1937. faced insurmountable difficulties. Thus, it became clear that the country needed a completely different program, and it was not at all about “playing around” with the numbers in the “battleships” or “cruisers” columns. It was necessary to determine the promising composition of the fleets, the performance characteristics of future ships, to bring them together with the capabilities of the Ministry of Justice Industry, but not those that it currently has, but taking into account the build-up of the latter during the implementation of the shipbuilding program … In general, in short, it turned out that not that execution, but even planning such a program is still too difficult for us. Nevertheless, the country's leadership believed that the ocean-going fleet of the USSR was necessary, which means that it should have begun to be built - at least gradually, and not in the quantity that the naval commanders and the country's leadership would like to see.
Battleship project 23 "Soviet Ukraine"
And that is exactly what was done. I. V. Stalin fully encouraged the creation of "megalomaniac" plans for military shipbuilding of 2-3 million tons of total displacement, because in the course of their creation domestic naval thought developed, the number of ships required by the fleet and their performance characteristics was specified, etc., but these the plans were essentially theoretical. But after the mistakes of 1937, they tried to tie the real shipbuilding to the capabilities of our industry. But at the same time, the leadership of the USSR did not at all try to "stretch out his legs according to his clothes" and set extremely difficult tasks for the domestic shipbuilding industry, which often turned out to be on the verge or even beyond its capabilities.
That is, I. V. Stalin, the Council of People's Commissars, etc. in fact, they did the following - on the one hand, they provided the domestic industry with resources to significantly expand its capabilities, but on the other hand, they set before it the most difficult tasks that had to be dealt with in a short time, and monitored their implementation. I would like to note that the said principle of "carrot and stick" is still an excellent strategy for the development of any single enterprise or industry as a whole, and one can only regret that our modern leadership has abandoned these, in general, simple management principles.
Today there is a lot of talk about the fact that the construction of battleships and heavy cruisers in the pre-war period was a mistake, for a number of reasons, of which two main ones are distinguished. Firstly, this construction was not provided with the capabilities of the industry - for example, there was not enough capacity for armored production, and, for example, the main caliber of the heavy cruisers "Kronstadt" and "Sevastopol" existed exclusively in the form of wooden models even when the ships were already in full swing were built. And secondly, the creation of large surface ships led to the diversion of resources from more important, higher priority programs. Indeed, for example, the planned cost of the battleship of Project 23 exceeded 1, 18 billion rubles. and one can be firmly sure that if the battleships were completed, then in fact it would be significantly higher than the plan.
Let's deal with the first question first. It is known that the battleship in those years was still a complex engineering structure, perhaps the most complex of all that mankind created at that time. In a series of articles devoted to the T-34 tank, the author repeatedly touched upon the technical problems that accompanied the release of these combat vehicles and showed how much work had to be done in order to establish the production of technically reliable tanks. It took years, and we are talking about a product weighing 26.5 tons - what can we say about a steel monster weighing under 60,000 tons? In other words, it was not enough to design a perfect battleship and individual systems of weapons and mechanisms for it: it took a truly titanic effort to organize its creation, because thousands of tons and names of complex mechanisms had to be produced and delivered for its construction on time. It was about integrating the work of hundreds of different factories and industries into a single whole: neither Tsarist Russia nor the USSR built anything like this, after all, the battleships of the Russian Empire were much smaller and simpler in design, and there were also more than 20 -year break in their construction …
In general, there was no point in waiting until everything was ready, and only then begin the construction of heavy ships, it should have started as early as possible. Yes, it will, of course, be that long-term construction, yes, there will be a lot of "bumps", but then, when the technology of such construction of the USSR is mastered, the creation of a powerful ocean-going fleet will not encounter any special obstacles. Therefore, when evaluating the laying of heavy artillery ships in the pre-war USSR, it should be remembered that the number of such ships (battleships of type "A", "B", heavy cruisers) in the programs of 1936-1939. fluctuated at the level of 24 - 31 units, but in fact in 1938-39. only 6 such ships were laid down - four battleships of project 23 and two heavy cruisers of project 69. Therefore, it is still impossible to say that their laying was premature.
The same "Soviet Ukraine", but from a different angle
The second aspect of pre-war fleet building is its cost. But even here, upon closer examination, no catastrophe is visible, because the documents show that the expenditures on the RKKF during the third five-year plan (1938-1942) did not strike the imagination at all.
So how much did it cost?
To begin with, consider the costs of capital construction in the interests of the People's Commissariats and Commissariats of the USSR
As you can see, the costs of shipbuilding did not stand out in a big way among others, and were inferior to both the People's Commissariat of Aviation and the production of ammunition. As for the NKVMF, according to the plan, it really did receive a significant share, if we compare its expenses with the People's Commissariat of Defense - in the total costs of these two commissariats, the fleet accounted for, according to the plan, 31% of all investments, and after all, NPOs are aviation. and ground forces, etc. But, again, on the fact of the disbursement of funds, we see a different picture, the share of the KVMF does not exceed 24%. Thus, the cost of capital construction (factories, enterprises, shipyards, military bases, etc.) of the fleet was not any outstanding, and if we are looking for opportunities for savings, then you should pay attention to the NKVD - its capital construction costs are almost one and a half times higher than the NCO and the NKVMF combined!
Now let's look at the costs of building warships and maintaining the RKKF. In 1939, the country was in full swing creating an ocean-going fleet, which is clearly seen from the table below:
If on January 1, 1939, there were 181 ships under construction, then at the beginning of 1940 there were already 203, including 3 battleships and 2 heavy cruisers, and in 1939, 143 combat ships were laid down (along with submarines). ship with a total displacement of almost 227 thousand tons! This significantly exceeded the bookmarks of the last year, 1938, when 89 ships with a displacement of 159,389 tons stood on the slipway, although these figures are very impressive.
But not a single new construction … RKKF also carried out large-scale programs for the repair and modernization of warships.
And now, of course, the burning question - how much did all this cost the country? In 1939, according to the plan of current military orders for all the USSR People's Commissariats, the total defense expenditures were to amount to almost 22 billion rubles, of which the fleet should have received marketable products from the People's Commissariats in the amount of 4.5 billion rubles. That is, at the peak of the construction of the "Big Fleet", the country had to spend on this very fleet only 20, 35% of all its military spending!
In fact, the plan was not fulfilled, but the NPO failed the plan even more (the People's Commissariat of Ammunition did not supply products by 3 billion rubles, the People's Commissariat of Aviation did not receive enough products for 1 billion rubles, the rest was trivial), but even so the NKVMF received only 23, 57% of the total volume of marketable products. I must say that this ratio is quite typical for the entire period of 1938-40. During these years, the total budgetary allocations for the fleet amounted to 22.5 billion rubles, but this amounted to only 19.7% of the total expenditures on defense of the USSR.
All this taken together suggests that, even during the construction of the "Big Fleet", the costs of the RKKF were not at all excessive for the country, and moreover, in fact, we can say that the fleet still remained the least funded branch of the Red Army! Of course, the rejection of the construction of ocean-going ships and a radical reduction in shipbuilding programs could free up certain funds, but they, in essence, are lost against the background of what the NGO was already consuming. And you need to understand that our armed forces to a certain extent did not have time to master the funds that were allocated for them - it was not for nothing that the plan for the receipt of marketable products exceeding 17 billion rubles. was fulfilled by less than 70%.
Of course, many critics say that the USSR started building the ocean-going fleet at the wrong time. Like, how could battleships be laid in 1938, when, as a result of the "Munich Agreement", Hitler was given over to be torn apart by Czechoslovakia! Well, it's obvious that the war is not far off …
All this is true, but you need to understand that this very war is never far off. As a matter of fact, it was quite obvious that from the moment Hitler came to power, the short era of peace in Europe is coming to an end, then - the aggression of Italy in Abyssinia … In general, the world is constantly shaken by some kind of cataclysms, and to postpone the construction of the fleet for a quieter time, means to postpone it forever. Of course, the moment comes when it becomes clear that the war is about to come, and then it is necessary to stop the "long-playing" programs, redistributing resources in favor of the most urgent - but this was exactly what was done in the USSR.
But we will dwell on this issue in more detail in the next article.
