We will begin the second article on the Russian naval aviation by working on the mistakes of the previous one.
So, first, the author assumed that in 2011-13. tactical fighter and strike aircraft were completely withdrawn from the Navy, with the exception of the TAVKR air group "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" and the Black Sea assault aviation regiment. However, thanks to respected readers, it turned out that the 865th Separate Fighter Aviation Regiment, based in Yelizovo (Pacific Fleet), also remained in the Navy. More precisely, not so that it survived, the regiment, as you can understand, was disbanded, however, there were two MiG-31 squadrons in the fleet, which today have been completely or partially replaced by the MiG-31BM. In addition, according to the bmpd blog, the 4th separate guards naval assault aviation regiment as part of the Baltic Fleet was also not transferred to the Air Force, but was disbanded - only one Su-24M and Su-24MR squadron remained in the fleet. Apparently, the situation was that, despite the decision to transfer tactical aviation, in a number of cases the Air Force simply refused to accept formations with almost no materiel, which is why such air regiments were simply disbanded and reduced to the size of a squadron.
The second mistake is that the number of IL-38 today is almost half as much as the author assumed. The publications usually indicate "about 50", but this figure seems to include those planes that will never be able to take off. Most likely, the program of modernization of the Il-38 to the state of the Il-38N covers all aircraft capable of fighting today, that is, if it is planned to modernize 28 Il-38s, then we have exactly the same number of aircraft left.
And, finally, the third - the qualification “pilot-ace” does not exist, after the pilot of the 1st class follows the pilot-sniper.
Many thanks to everyone who pointed out to the author his mistakes.
Taking into account the above amendments, the estimated number of naval aviation of the Russian Navy today, and in the near future (approximately until 2020) will be:
Tactical aviation
Strictly speaking, 119 tactical aircraft seem to represent a rather formidable force, but exactly until we take a closer look at these aircraft.
MiG-31 and MiG-31BM - these aircraft, with all their undoubted advantages (supersonic cruising speed, two crew members, which is important for a "naval" aircraft), still do not fully meet the tasks of the naval aviation of the Russian Navy. The problem lies in the fact that the MiG-31 was created as a fighter-interceptor, that is, an aircraft focused on combating missile bombers with high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft, as well as enemy cruise missiles. But the MiG-31 was by no means an air superiority fighter, the creators did not put such capabilities into it.
Although the MiG-31 can carry short-range air-to-air missiles (hereinafter - UR VV), the aircraft is not designed for close air combat - for this, the MiG-31's maneuverability is completely insufficient.
At the same time, the long-range missile missiles R-33 and R-37 do not cope very well with the destruction of tactical aviation - after all, the main target for such missiles is strategic bombers and cruise missiles. But an attempt to attack enemy fighters with them from a long range with a high degree of probability will be doomed to failure, since with the timely detection of such missiles, modern electronic warfare systems in combination with an energetic anti-missile maneuver reduce the probability of hitting a target to very insignificant values.
All of the above, of course, does not mean that the MiG-31 is incapable of fighting against enemy tactical and carrier-based aircraft. In the end, with all the advantages that the multinational air force in Iraq had, during Desert Storm, the deck-based F / A-18 Hornet was shot down by an Iraqi MiG-25 using a short-range missile defense missile. In another combat episode, two MiG-25s entered into battle with four F-15s, and, despite the fact that the latter fired several missiles at them, they did not suffer losses, although they themselves could not harm the enemy.
Of course, the modernized MiG-31BM have much greater capabilities than the Iraqi MiG-25, but their real vocation is the destruction of strategic bombers and cruise missiles flying towards us through the North Pole, as well as the Tomahawk missile launcher and the like. Thanks to the modernization of the MiG-31BM, they were able to carry various air-to-surface missiles of the Kh-25, Kh-29, Kh-31 and Kh-59 families, which makes it possible to use interceptors as strike aircraft, including against enemy ships. But, due to the low maneuverability and the lack of modern electronic warfare systems (information that the MiG-31BM are equipped with the latter is not at the disposal of the author), their use is still quite limited, and, despite equipping with all modern nomenclature of the UR VV (including RVV-BD, SD and BD) in air combat, one should not expect much from them.
Su-33 - sadly to admit it, but this aircraft is outdated. Its combat capabilities are not too superior to those of the classic Su-27. Modernization, of course, made it better, expanding the range of ammunition used and giving the ability to destroy ground targets, but this is not enough to talk about the Su-33 as a modern fighter that fully meets its tasks.
Su-24M / M2 - it was a fairly good aircraft for its time, but its time has passed. The Su-24s have been withdrawn from the Russian Aerospace Forces today, and the modernized version of the M / M2 was supposed to be "sent on a well-deserved rest" by 2020 or a little later. It is possible that the Black Sea Su will be able to stay in service longer, but of course, this aircraft is no longer suitable for modern combat against a high-tech enemy. Of course, the rating of the Su-24 increased immeasurably after it was "blinded" by the use of the Khibiny electronic warfare system of the radars of the American destroyer Donald Cook, but, firstly, the source of this news does not deserve the slightest trust, and secondly, the complex “Khibiny "was never installed on the Su-24.
In fact, the only modern (although not the latest) tactical aircraft in service with the Russian Navy are 19 MiG-29KR, 3 MiG-29KUBR and approximately 22 Su-30SM, and there are 44 aircraft in total. And, of course, this is absolutely not enough for 4 fleets.
We have already examined the MiG-29KR / KUBR in some detail in a series of articles devoted to the TAVKR "Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Kuznetsov" version of "Super Hornet". It entered service due to its complete lack of alternatives, since it is the only carrier-based multifunctional fighter of the Russian Federation today. These planes complete the Kuznetsov air group, no additional deliveries are planned.
Another matter is the Su-30SM.
This plane, about which the head of the naval aviation of the Navy, Major General Igor Kozhin said:
"In the future, we will change almost the entire fleet of operational-tactical aviation for the Su-30SM - it will become our base aircraft."
Let's see what the future base aircraft of the Navy is like.
The Su-30SM today is one of the heaviest multifunctional fighters: the empty weight is 18,800 kg (Su-35 - 19,000 kg, F-22A - 19,700 kg), normal take-off - 24,900 kg (Su-35 - 25 300 kg, F-22A - 29,200 kg), maximum takeoff - 38,800, 34,500 and 38,000 kg, respectively. At the same time, the Su-30SM is equipped with the weakest engines among all the above aircraft: its AL-31FP has a maximum thrust without afterburner of 7 770 kgf, with the afterburner - 12,500 kgf, while the Su-35 engine has 8,800 and 14,500 kgf, and F-22A - 10,500 and 15,876 kgf, respectively. Therefore, one should not be surprised that the speed of the Su-30SM is lower than modern heavy fighters - while the Su-35 and F-22A are capable of accelerating to 2.25M, the limit of the Su-30SM is only 1.96M. However, it is unlikely that the Su-30SM loses much from this as a fighter - that the French Rafale is an extremely dangerous air fighter, no one doubts, but its speed is even lower - up to 1, 8M.
However, relatively weak engines negatively affect such an important indicator of the aircraft as the thrust-to-weight ratio - for the Su-30SM with a normal take-off weight, it is only one unit, while for the Su-35 - 1, 1, for the Raptor - 1, 15. Area wing of the Su-30SM (as on all Sukhoi aircraft) is relatively small, 62 sq.m. In the Raptor it is more than 25.8% more (78.04 m), but due to its structural scheme, the fuselage of the domestic aircraft also participates in the creation of lift, the load on the wing of these two aircraft with a comparable load does not differ so much …
In general, in terms of maneuverability, the Su-30SM, apparently, loses to the Su-35 and F-22A, although in the case of the latter, everything is not so simple: firstly, in addition to the thrust-to-weight ratio and wing loading, it would not hurt to know the aerodynamic quality of the aircraft, and also the capabilities that the PGO provides to the aircraft, and secondly, the Su-30SM engines are capable of changing both the vertical and horizontal thrust vector, while the F-22A engines are only vertical.
As a result, if we consider only the numbers of speed / thrust-weight ratio / wing load, then the Su-30SM looks like a very mediocre fighter, however, taking into account the above (and also other, unaccounted for by us) factors, it is at least as good as modern American and European in close maneuvering combat. aircraft (including - Eurofighter Typhoon - speed 2, 3M, thrust-to-weight ratio 1, 18, wing load - 311 kg per square meter), which was shown by training battles in which the Su-30 of various modifications of the Air Force of India and other countries participated …
So, the maneuverability of the Su-30SM today is, if not the best, then one of the best among multi-role fighters, both heavy and light. However, unlike most modern aircraft in this class, it is a two-seater, and as such is much more versatile than a single-seater.
We have already said that it is possible to create a single-seat multifunctional aircraft that can work equally well against air and ground targets, but it is not easy to train an equally multifunctional pilot. The situation is greatly simplified when there are two people in the crew - they divide the functionality in half, and due to such specialization, the two together are able to solve more problems with the same efficiency with which one pilot does it. The author of this article does not know whether one trained Su-30SM crew can solve strike missions as effectively as, for example, ground attack pilots, and at the same time fight in the air, being in no way inferior to fighter pilots, but if not, then they are still capable of approaching such an ideal closer than the pilot of a single-seat aircraft.
It must be said that in terms of time spent in the air, the Su-30SM has an advantage over most other aircraft of its class - its maximum flight range at an altitude of 3,000 km, while the same Raptor reaches 2,960 km only when two PTBs are suspended (F-35A, by the way - 2,000 km without PTB). And only the Su-35 has it higher, reaching 3,600 km. The long range of the Su-30SM gives the aircraft great advantages, as it increases its combat radius, or, when flying at an equal distance, it saves more fuel for afterburner and air combat. The time spent in the air for the Su-30SM is about 3.5 hours, which is higher than that of most fighters (usually 2.5 hours). Here a crew of 2 also gives an advantage, since it leads to less fatigue of the pilots, in addition, a flight in the absence of landmarks (a common thing at sea) is psychologically tolerated by such a crew more easily than by a single pilot.
Both the Su-35 and the Su-30SM have the ability to "work" on land and sea targets, but the payload (the difference between the empty weight and the maximum takeoff weight) of the Su-30SM is 20 tons, and it is higher than that of the Su-35 (15, 5 t) and at the "Raptor" (18, 3 t).
As for the SU-30SM avionics, it must be said that this is the first domestic fighter with an open architecture. What does this mean? The traditional architecture of aircraft meant that communication between their equipment was carried out through specific communication lines, information exchange protocols, etc. As a result, if there was a desire to modernize the aircraft by changing any equipment or adding new ones, this necessitated redesigning the rest of the avionics that were in contact with it, and often it was necessary to change the design of the aircraft, lay new communications, etc. It was a very lengthy and costly process.
But in an open architecture, none of this is needed - the interaction of various equipment is carried out through a standard data bus. At the same time, the Su-30 became the first domestic digital aircraft, since all information flows "converged" in a central computer. As a result, the installation of any new equipment almost never requires revision of the rest - all issues of their interaction are resolved by means of appropriate "additions" of software. Vladimir Mikheev, Advisor to the First Deputy General Director of the Radioelectronic Technologies Concern, described it this way: “A fundamentally new approach has been developed for this aircraft - the so-called open architecture, when we could connect any number of systems to the central computer - weapon control, flight navigation, and protective systems. And all the systems on this plane were made digital for the first time."
Generally speaking, this was done in order to meet the diverse requirements of foreign buyers of the Su-30. The aircraft was conceived for export, had to be delivered to various countries that had their own specific requirements for the composition of its avionics: to implement them on the basis of an aircraft of classical architecture would be prohibitively long and costly, which would hardly suit customers. Well, thanks to the open architecture, almost any equipment could be integrated into the Su-30, including foreign-made ones.
However, this approach not only "presented" the Su-30 with a huge export potential, but also provided unprecedented opportunities for aircraft modernization - after all, it turned out that almost any equipment of size acceptable for the design could be installed on the aircraft. The Su-30SM is most of all similar to a modern computer of the IBM architecture, which, in fact, is a "assemble it yourself" constructor. Began to slow down? Let's add some RAM. Can't handle the calculations? Let's install a new processor. Didn't have enough money when buying a good sound card? Nothing, we'll save up and buy later, etc. In other words, for its time, aircraft of the Su-30 family (perhaps in the Su-30MKI version) came close to the ideal combination of tactical, technical and operational qualities for a multifunctional fighter, while possessing a very reasonable price, which predetermined the great success of these aircraft in world market (in comparison with other heavy fighters). And everything would be fine, if not for one "but" - the keywords in the last sentence are "for their time."
The fact is that the first flight of the Su-30MKI prototype (from which the Su-30SM later "grew") took place back in 1997. And, I must say frankly that the optimal combination of price and technical characteristics of the aircraft ensured a balance between the novelty of equipment, cost and manufacturability: translated into Russian, this means that not the best equipment that we could have created at that time was used, but the most acceptable in terms of price / quality ratio. And here is one of the results: today the Su-30SM is equipped with the N011M "Bars" radar control system, which has not been at the peak of progress for a long time.
With all this … the language will not turn to call "Bars" a bad radar control system. Let's try to understand this in a little more detail.
Many people interested in modern weapons define the quality of an airborne radar station as follows. AFAR? Oh, great, great complex. Not AFAR? Fi, yesterday is completely uncompetitive. Such an approach, to put it mildly, is oversimplified and does not at all reflect the real state of affairs in the radar control system. So where did it all start? Once upon a time, airborne radars of aircraft were a flat antenna, behind which were a receiver and a signal transmitter. Such radars could track only one target, while in order to accompany it (after all, both the plane and the target change their position in space), it was required to mechanically turn the antenna towards the target. Subsequently, the radar was taught to see and conduct several air targets, but at the same time they retained a completely mechanical scan (for example, the AN / APG-63 radar, installed on early versions of the F-15).
Then came passive phased array radars (PFAR). The fundamental difference from the previous types of radars was that their antenna consisted of many cells, each of which has its own phase shifter, which is capable of changing the phase of an electromagnetic wave at different angles. In other words, such an antenna is, as it were, a set of antennas, each of which can send electromagnetic waves at different angles both in the horizontal and in the vertical plane without mechanical rotation. Thus, mechanical scanning was replaced by electronic scanning, and it became a huge advantage of PFAR over previous generations of radars. Strictly speaking, there were radars, so to speak, of a transitional period, for example H001K "Sword", which used mechanical scanning in the horizontal plane and electronic - in the vertical one, but we will not complicate the explanations beyond what was necessary.
So, with the advent of electronic scanning, changing the direction of the radio wave became almost instantaneous, thus, it was possible to achieve a fundamental increase in the accuracy of predicting the position of the target in the tracking mode on the pass. And it also became possible to simultaneously shoot at several targets, since the PFAR provided them with continuous-discrete illumination. In addition, PFAR was able to operate simultaneously at several different frequencies: the fact is that different types of frequencies are optimal for "work" on air and ground (sea) targets in different conditions. So, at a short distance, you can get high resolution using the Ka-band (26, 5-40 GHz, wavelength from 1.3 to 0.75 cm), but for long distances, the X-band is better suited (8-12 GHz, wavelength is 3.75 to 2.5 cm).
So, the PFAR in general and the N011M "Bars", which the Su-30SM is equipped with, in particular, allows attacking a ground target at the same time using one radiation range, and, at the same time, controlling the airspace (attacking remote air targets) using different range. Thanks to these qualities (better accuracy, the ability to simultaneously operate in several modes and track / fire multiple targets), PFAR radars have become a real revolution in comparison with previous types of radars.
And what about AFAR? As we have already said, the PFAR radar antenna consists of many cells, each of which is a miniature radiator of radio waves, capable, among other things, of directing them at different angles without mechanical turning. But the radar control system with PFAR has only one radio wave receiver - one for all the cells of the phased antenna.
So, the fundamental difference between AFAR and PFAR is that each of its cells is not only a miniature emitter, but also a radiation receiver. This significantly expands the capabilities of AFAR operation in "different frequency" modes of operation, which allows for better quality control of space in comparison with PFAR. In addition, the AFAR, being like the PFAR, capable of simultaneously operating in different frequency modes, can at the same time and at the same time carry out the functions of electronic warfare, suppressing the operation of the enemy's radar: the latter, by the way, does not have the PFAR. Besides, having a large number of receivers, AFAR is more reliable. Thus, AFAR is definitely better than PFAR, and the future of radar control systems, of course, belongs to AFAR. However, APAR does not give any overwhelming superiority over PFAR, moreover, in some aspects PFAR also has advantages. So, radar control systems with PFAR have better efficiency at equal power, and besides, PFAR is banally cheaper.
Summarizing the above, we can say that the appearance of phased arrays has become a real revolution in the radar business - both PFAR and AFAR, in their capabilities, leave far behind the radars of previous generations. But the difference between PFAR and AFAR, created at the same technological level, is far from so great, although, of course, AFAR has certain advantages and is more promising as a direction for the development of radar control systems.
But where did the point of view come from then that domestic PFARs are completely uncompetitive with foreign AFARs? According to the author, the point is this: in most cases, experts compare AFAR radars with mechanical scanning, and, of course, "mechanics" in everything loses to electronic scanning. At the same time, as you know, domestic PFAR (both the N011M "Bars" and the newest N035 "Irbis") have a mixed electromechanical scheme. And therefore, all the disadvantages of radar systems with mechanical scanning are automatically extended to domestic radars of quiet types.
But the fact is that domestic PFARs work completely differently. Both Bars and Irbis use electronic scanning, and nothing else - in this respect, they are no different from AFAR. However, phased arrays (both PFAR and AFAR) have one, let's say, a weak spot. The fact is that in cases where a phased array cell is forced to send a signal at an angle greater than 40 degrees. The efficiency of the system begins to drop sharply and PFAR and AFAR no longer give out the detection range and tracking accuracy that are prescribed for them according to the passport. How to deal with this?
According to some reports, the Americans have modified their cells so that they provide an overview in azimuth and elevation up to + - 60 degrees, while the radar array remains stationary. We also added a hydraulic drive to this - as a result, the Su-35 radar, just like the American AN / APG-77, installed on the Raptor, being stationary, provides electronic scanning at the same plus or minus 60 degrees, but it also has an additional mode. When using a hydraulic booster, that is, when combining electronic scanning with a mechanical rotation of the antenna plane, the Irbis is able to control targets no longer in the + -60 deg sector, but twice as large - + -120 deg!
In other words, the presence of a hydraulic drive on domestic radar systems with PFAR does not at all reduce them to radars of past generations, but on the contrary, gives them new capabilities that a number (if not all) of foreign AFARs do not even have. This is an advantage, not a disadvantage, and meanwhile, very often when comparing domestic PFARs with foreign AFARs, all the disadvantages of mechanical scanning are extended to the former!
Thus, if we take two identical modern fighters, install an AFAR on one of them, and a PFAR of equal power and created at the same technological level on the second, an aircraft with an AFAR will have some important additional capabilities, but a cardinal advantage over He will not receive a "fellow" with the PFAR.
Alas, the key words here are “equal technological level”. The problem of the Su-30SM is that its Н011М "Bars" was created a long time ago, and does not reach the level of modern AFAR and PFAR. For example, above we have given the scanning ranges (electronic and with a hydraulic drive) for the Irbis mounted on the Su-35 - these are 60 and 120 degrees, but for the Bars these ranges are much narrower - 45 and 70 degrees. "Bars" has a significantly lower power in comparison with "Irbis". Yes, the Su-30SM radar is constantly being improved - until recently, the number of detecting an aircraft with an RCS of 3 sq. m in the front hemisphere at a distance of up to 140 km and the ability to attack 4 targets at the same time was declared, but today on the developer's website we see other figures - 150 km and 8 targets. But this cannot be compared with the performance of the Irbis, which has a target detection range with an RCS of 3 sq.m. reaches 400 km. "Bars" was made on the old element base, so its mass is great for its capabilities, and so on.
That is, the problem of the Su-30SM is not that it has a PFAR, and not an AFAR, but that its PFAR is yesterday's radar of this type - later we were able to create much better samples. And the same can probably apply to other systems of this outstanding aircraft. For example, the Su-30SM uses the OLS-30 optical-locating station - this is an excellent system, but the Su-35 has received the more modern OLS-35.
Of course, all of this can be replaced or improved. For example, today they are talking about using more powerful engines from the Su-35 on the Su-30SM, which, of course, will significantly increase its maneuverability, thrust-weight ratio, etc. According to some reports, the head of the Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Engineering. Tikhomirova talked about bringing the power of Barça to the level of the Irbis (alas, we could not find quotes on the Internet). But … how can you not modernize the Bars, you will not be able to reach the Irbis, and even if it were possible - after all, the price of such a radar control system will rise too, and will the military be ready to raise the price of the Su-30SM?
The life cycle of any high-quality military equipment goes through three stages. At first, it is ahead of the rest of the planet, or, at least, is not inferior to the best world specimens. At the second stage, approximately in the middle of the life cycle, it becomes obsolete, but various kinds of improvements increase its capabilities, allowing it to more successfully compete with similar foreign weapons. And then comes the decline, when no economically feasible modernization makes it possible to "pull up" the capabilities to the level of competitors, and the equipment is deprived of the ability to perform its tasks in full.
Yes, we talked about the fact that the Su-30SM is an open architecture plane, and even compared it with a modern computer. But any person who has worked with computer hardware will tell you that in the “life” of any computer there comes a moment when its further modernization loses its meaning, because no “gadgets” will bring it to the level of user requirements, and you need to buy a new one. And besides, you need to understand that everything is not limited to avionics alone: for example, today stealth technologies are very important (and at least in order to make it difficult to capture the aircraft by the homing heads of enemy missiles), but the Su-30SM glider was created without taking into account the requirements of invisibility.
Yes, the Su-30SM today is approximately in the middle of its life cycle. The naval aviation of the Russian Navy in its "face" receives a multifunctional aircraft capable of coping well with all its tasks - and so it will remain for a certain period of time. 10 years, maybe 15. But what will happen then?
After all, a combat aircraft is one of the most complex machines that have been created by mankind. Today, the life of a combat aircraft is measured not in years, but in decades - with proper care, fighters, bombers, attack aircraft, etc. able to remain in service for 30 years or more. And, buying today in large quantities Su-30SM, we in 15, well, even in 20 years will be faced with the fact that we have at our disposal a large fleet of physically not old, but outdated and ineffective aircraft in battle. And this is probably the main question for the Su-30SM, as for the main aircraft of the naval aviation of the Russian Navy. But there are others.
