What hardships the creators of the last oxygenated intercontinental rocket of the Soviet Union had to go through
Rocket R-9 on a pedestal at the Central Museum of the Armed Forces in Moscow. Photo from the site
As far as the technology of using the central drive in the rocket movement control system turned out to be a breakthrough, the hardware intrigues and problems of relations between the chief designers, which almost led to the failure of the R-9 project, looked just as backward against this background. The reason for this was, first of all, fundamental differences and noticeable personal contradictions between Sergei Korolev and Valentin Glushko, who was responsible for the engines of the first stage of the "nine". Moreover, they began to appear long before the R-9 project entered the draft stage.
Nozzles of the first stage engine of the R-9A rocket, developed at OKB-456 by Academician Valentin Glushko. Photo from the site
He cannot and does not know
The reason for this was the same liquid oxygen: Valentin Glushko, who managed to build oxygen engines for the R-7 rocket, categorically objected to repeating this work for the R-9. According to one version, the reason for this attitude lay in the pressure that Sergei Korolev put on the leadership of the USSR and the Ministry of Defense, seeking to include the Glushkovsky design bureau in the cooperation of subcontractors in the "nine", while Glushko himself sought to cooperate with the Mikhail Yangel design bureau and work on the components. According to another version, the reason for this was the failures that followed Glushko during the period of work on the engine for the R-9. Academician Boris Chertok recalls:
“In August 1960, fire tests of the R-16 rocket began in Zagorsk. Glushko's engines powered by asymmetric dimethylhydrazine and nitrogen tetraxide worked stably. At the same time, the new oxygen engines on the stands in OKB-456 for the R-9 began to shake and destroy the "high frequency".
The troubles that accompanied the initial period of development of oxygen engines for the R-9, Glushko's supporters explained by the fundamental impossibility at this stage of creating a powerful oxygen engine with a stable regime. Even Isaev, who did not want to openly engage in disputes, said something like this in a private conversation with me: “It's not that Glushko doesn't want to. He simply cannot and does not yet know how to make the oxygen process stable in such large chambers. And I don’t know. And, in my opinion, no one yet understands the true reasons for the emergence of high frequency."
Korolev and Glushko could not agree on the choice of fuel components. When information was received that the Americans were using liquid oxygen in Titan-1, Korolev both at the Council of Chiefs and in the negotiations on the Kremlin said that this confirms the correctness of our line when creating the R-9. He believed that we were not mistaken in choosing R-9A for oxygen, and not R-9B for high-boiling components, which Glushko insisted on.
However, at the end of 1961, information appeared that the same Martin company had created a Titan-2 missile designed to destroy the most important strategic targets. The autonomous control system of "Titan-2" ensured an accuracy of 1.5 km at a range of 16,000 km! Depending on the range, the warhead was equipped with a charge with a capacity of 10 to 15 megatons.
Scheme of filling the R-9 rocket with liquid propellant components in the Desna V-type silo launcher. Photo from the site
Rockets "Titan-2" were placed in single silo launchers in a fueled state and could be launched a minute after receiving the command. The Americans gave up oxygen and used high-boiling components. At the same time, information was received about the removal of the "Titan-1" from service due to the impossibility of reducing the readiness time due to the use of liquid oxygen. Now Glushko gloated.
Relations between Korolev and Glushko have never been friendly. The conflict over the choice of engines for the R-9, which began in 1958, subsequently led to an exacerbation of both personal and official relations, from which both both of them and the common cause suffered."
As a result, Valentin Glushko's design bureau nevertheless brought the engines for the first stage R-9 on liquid oxygen to a series, although this process took more time and required more effort than expected. Moreover, it would be completely unfair to blame only the engine specialists for this. Suffice it to say that by the time it was time to test the 8D716 engine, aka R-111, it turned out that for some reason the terms of reference for its development did not indicate that he would have to work on supercooled oxygen - and the engine was prepared for work with ordinary liquid oxygen, the temperature of which was at least a dozen degrees higher. As a result, another hardware scandal broke out on this basis, which did not improve the already tense atmosphere in which the rocket was created.
It is noteworthy that time eventually confirmed the correctness of Sergei Korolev - but after his death. After Valentin Glushko in 1974 headed TsKBEM, into which OKB-1 was transformed, only liquid oxygen engines were used on the super-heavy rocket Energia created within the walls of this bureau. However, it was still a space rocket, not an intercontinental rocket …
Installation of the R-9 rocket on the launch pad of the ground site at the Tyura-Tam training ground. Photo from the site
Magic takes for the first run
The most interesting thing is that despite all these hardware contradictions and technical difficulties, the R-9 rocket was ready for the first flight tests on time. The first launch of the Nine was scheduled for April 9, 1961 from the Baikonur test site, and the target was the Kura test site in Kamchatka, which has been targeted for several years by all newly created and already in service missiles during test and control launches. From the memoirs of Boris Chertok:
“In March 1961, the P-9 was first installed on the launch pad for fitting, and we got the opportunity to admire it. The strict and perfect forms of the still mysterious "nine" differed sharply from the "seven", which had known all the hardships of polygon life, entangled in multi-storey steel service trusses, filling and cable masts. The P-9 really did win over its older sister in starting weight. With a range equal to or even greater than that of the R-7A, a charge with a capacity of 1.65 megatons could fit in its warhead. Let me remind you that the "seven" carried 3.5 megatons. But is it really that much of a difference - the city turns to ash from being hit by 80 or 175 Hiroshima bombs?
The beauty and severity of the forms of the "nine" were not given for nothing. The fight against extra pounds of dry mass was carried out relentlessly. We fought for kilometers of range with a tough weight policy and improving the parameters of all systems. Glushko, despite the fear of self-excitation of "high frequency" oscillations, increased the pressure in the chambers in comparison with the "seven" and designed the RD-111 engine for the "nine" very compact."
Alas, the first launch turned out to be unsuccessful: the rocket left the launch pad as expected, but then at 153 seconds of flight there was a sharp decline in the engine operating mode of the "B" block, and after another one and a half minutes the engine was switched off. As it turned out on the same day, the reason for the failure was a single valve, which was responsible for the flow of gas into the common turbopump unit, which distributed it between the four combustion chambers. This malfunction led to the operation of the pressure switch, which determines the end of the fuel components, and the engine, figuratively speaking, was deprived of power.
But this might not be the only malfunction that could cause an unsuccessful start. Another one was eliminated by one of the main specialists in the P-9, who was present at the launch, and in a very non-trivial way. By Boris Chertok:
“Preparations for the first launch of the rocket took place with a long delay. In the ground automation of the refueling control, errors were found that interfered with a set of readiness. With a five-hour delay, we finally reached a fifteen-minute readiness. Voskresensky (Leonid Voskresensky, rocket test engineer, one of the closest associates of Sergei Korolev. - Author's note), who was standing at the periscope, suddenly announced:
- Give all services a fifteen minute delay. Turning to us, he said there was a noticeable leak of oxygen from the flange connection at the launch pad.
- I'll go out and look. Ostashev (Arkady Ostashev, a leading tester of missiles and space-rocket complexes of OKB-1. - Author's note) with me, the rest of the bunker does not leave!
R-9 on the launch pad of the ground site at the Tyura-Tam training ground (Baikonur). Photo from the site
Mishin and I watched through the periscope. Two, slowly, walked to the starting table, shrouded in white fumes. Voskresensky, as always, in his traditional beret.
- Lenya flaunts his gait here too, - Mishin could not resist.
Voskresensky was in no hurry in emergency situations, he walked erect, without looking at his feet, with a peculiar gait that was only characteristic of him. He was in no hurry because, in a duel with another unexpected defect, he was concentrating and pondering the upcoming decision.
After examining the hovering compound, Voskresensky and Ostashev, without haste, disappeared behind the nearest wall of the launch facility. About two minutes later, Voskresensky again appeared in sight, but without a beret. Now he walked with determination and speed. He was carrying something on his outstretched hand and, going up to the table, he applied this “something” to the floating flange. Ostashev also approached, and judging by the gestures, both were pleased with the decision. After standing at the table, they turned and walked towards the bunker. When the walking figures moved away from the rocket, it became clear that the flow had stopped: there were no more swirling white vapors. Returning to the bunker without a beret, Voskresensky took his place at the periscope and, without explaining anything, re-announced the fifteen-minute readiness.
At 12 hours 15 minutes, the rocket was enveloped in flame, scattering the starting debris, and, roaring, went abruptly towards the sun. The first stage has completed its assigned 100 seconds. The telemetrists reported over the speakerphone: "Separation has passed, the transition compartment has been dropped."
At the 155th second, a report followed: "Failures, failures!.. In failures, the loss of stabilization is visible!"
For the first launch, and it was not bad. The first stage, its engine, control system, central drive, second stage engine start, hot separation, discharge of the second stage tail section were checked. Then came the usual report that the films were urgently taken to the MIC for development.
"I'll go and look for a take," Voskresensky said somehow vaguely, heading for the "zero" mark.
Some of the soldiers who joined the search found a beret about twenty meters from the launch pad, but Voskresensky did not put it on, but carried it in his hand, without even trying to put it in his pocket. To my dumb question, he answered:
“I ought to wash it.”
From Ostashev, we learned the details of the impromptu repair of the oxygen line. Hiding behind the nearest wall from oxygen vapors, Voskresensky took off his beret, threw it on the ground and … urinated. Ostashev joined in and also added moisture. Then Voskresensky quickly carried the wet beret to the leaking flange and, with the virtuosity of an experienced surgeon, precisely applied it to the place of the leak. In a few seconds, a strong ice crust patch "darned" the oxygen feed of the rocket."
Layout of the Dolina-type ground launch pad. Photo from the site
From the ground and from the ground
Of the 41 R-9 launches that were part of the first stage of the rocket's flight design tests, 19 turned out to be emergency - that is, slightly less than half. For new technology, and even such a complex one as an intercontinental ballistic missile, this was a very good indicator. By the way, already the second test launch, which was carried out on April 24, 1961, shortly after the world-famous launch of Yuri Gagarin, was successful. The rocket launched strictly according to the schedule, all the engines worked as they should, the stages separated on time, and the warhead flew safely to Kamchatka, where it fell on the Kura range. At the same time, the undershoot to the target was only 300 meters, and the deviation was just over 600.
But it was not enough to modify and make the "nine" itself fly. It was also necessary to provide it with starting positions. But with this, certain difficulties arose. The first version of the ground launch, called "Desna-N", according to the results of the tests, was recognized as not corresponding to the tactical and technical requirements of the customer and was not recommended for adoption. In particular, the transition frame, which was created as a means of accelerating prelaunch preparation and was part of the rocket itself, turned out to be too heavy and inconvenient in operation. It was to this frame that all the ground-to-side transitional connections were docked at the technical position, and on the launch pad it was necessary to connect only the adapters from the frame to the table equipment. Alas, even with the use of such an innovation, the technological cycle of rocket preparation was two hours - and it was already about minutes!
General view of a silo launcher for R-9 missiles of the Desna-V type. Photo from the site
Much more successful was the mine launching position for the R-9, which bore the code name "Desna-V". The first rocket launch from such a silo took place on September 27, 1963, and was quite successful. Both the launch and the entire flight of the rocket went in full accordance with the program, and the warhead hit the target on the Kura with a flight of 630 meters and a deflection of 190 meters. By the way, it was in the mine launch version that another innovative idea of Vasily Mishin was implemented, who proposed to create a rocket on supercooled oxygen - continuous feeding of the R-9 on alert with this component. As a result, the loss of liquid oxygen was reduced to 2-3% per year - an incredible figure for this type of missile! And most importantly, due to this, it was possible to present for adoption a system that ensured the rocket's stay in readiness state number one (that is, not filled with all fuel components) for one year, provided that it was on it - without taking it off the launch pad! - the scheduled maintenance work was periodically carried out. If a start command was received, then according to the standards, it took 20 minutes for a complete technological preparation, and most of the time was spent on spinning up the guidance system gyroscopes.
However, with a ground launch, it was also possible to solve the problem, creating a completely successful Dolina launcher. Here they used a completely unprecedented for those years, but later became a classic solution to maximize the automation of the process of preparing and installing the rocket on the launch pad, which now took only half a minute. The corresponding automated system was developed at OKB-1 itself and manufactured at the Krasnaya Zarya plant. The launch process at the Dolina site looked like this: a self-propelled cart with a rocket left the assembly and test building and went to the launching device. Having reached the stops, it was connected to the lifting and installation device, otherwise it lifted it to a vertical position, automatically docked all communications and secured the rocket on the launch pad. After that - and also in automatic mode, without the participation of the calculation! - high-speed refueling with components of rocket propellants, preparation of the control system and aiming was carried out. Notable was the system that ensured the connection of the second stage with the ground: for this, a disposable cable mast, called the onboard communications trough, was installed on the rocket directly from the factory.
Layout of objects included in the underground launch pad for R-9 missiles of the Desna-V type. Photo from the site
Victim of big politics
On July 21, 1965, the R-9A intercontinental ballistic missile (that is, a modification with engines running on liquid oxygen as an oxidizer) was put into service. But the long life of the rocket was not destined: oxygen intercontinental rockets had already left the stage, and the R-9 was the last of them. The last one - and, probably, that is why one of the best.
This is how a person who knows the "sevens" and "nines" thoroughly describes it - the leading designer of the R-7 and R-9, and then the general director and general designer of the Samara state scientific and production rocket and space center "TsSKB-Progress" Dmitry Kozlov:
“Our intercontinental nine was smaller and lighter in weight (80 tons versus 86) than Mikhail Yangel's R-14 single-stage medium-range missile, although it surpassed it by almost four times in terms of the enemy's engagement range!.. It had a powerful, but a compact thermonuclear "head" of 5-10 megatons and a sufficiently high hitting accuracy for those times: a circular probable deviation of no more than 1.6 km. The technical readiness for launch was brought to 5 minutes in the mine version, which was three times better than that of the American Titan.
At the same time, the "nine" had a whole set of unique qualities that made it one of the best in its class. Due to the selected components of the rocket fuel, it was non-toxic, its engines were high-energy, and the fuel itself was quite cheap. “A particular advantage of the R-9A over other missile systems was the relatively short section of the first stage engine,” noted Dmitry Kozlov. - With the advent of the United States' systems for detecting ICBM launches on a powerful engine torch, this has become an undoubted advantage of the Nine. After all, the shorter the torch lifetime, the more difficult it is for anti-missile defense systems to react to such a missile."
Rocket R-9A in the exposition of the museum on the basis of the Training Center of the Strategic Missile Forces Military Academy named after Peter the Great (Balabanovo, Kaluga region). Photo from the site
But even at the peak of the deployment of the R-9A missile grouping, the Strategic Missile Forces did not have more than 29 launchers in service. Regiments armed with "nines" were deployed in Kozelsk (Desna-V silo launchers and Dolina ground launchers), Tyumen (Dolina ground launchers), Omsk (Desna-V silo launchers) and the first of the launching areas for combat missiles - the Angara facility, the future Plesetsk cosmodrome, where the Dolina ground-based launchers were used. Launchers of both types were also located at the Tyura-Tam test site, aka Baikonur.
The first regiment - in Kozelsk - took up combat duty on December 14, 1964, a day later the regiment in Plesetsk joined it, and the last R-9A missiles were decommissioned in 1976. The main competitor - Yangelevskaya R-16 - survived them for only a year, serving until 1977. It is difficult to say what were the real reasons why these well-proven missiles were removed from combat duty. But the formal reason was iron: this was done within the framework of the SALT-1 agreement signed by Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon …
