Even before the first combat use of submarines, methods of dealing with them were born: ramming and artillery fire. This was due to the following factors. Firstly, very old submarines, from those times when it was more of a dangerous attraction than a military vehicle, could not dive deep. The second factor was the periscope - the submarine could not attack or navigate other than with its help.
A little later, the depth factor disappeared. Even before the First World War, submarines "learned" to dive deeper than the draft of the largest vessel or ship. However, the attack was still impossible without the periscope, and he unmasked the boat. Theoretically, artillery fire by diving shells at the detected periscope was considered an effective means and, together with high speed and tack movement (anti-submarine zigzag), was supposed to protect ships. The ram of the boat, discovered by the crew of a warship in the immediate vicinity, was fatal to the sub.
The First World War immediately showed that this was not entirely true, and the fact that the boat's periscope was discovered does not at all make its destruction by artillery fire guaranteed. The boat could at least have time to submerge, and then neither the ram, nor the artillery could help, and the boat would have a chance to re-attack.
The need for a means to "reach" the boat at a depth was obvious, and such a means appeared - they were the first depth charges. Depth charges had a hydrostatic fuse with the ability to set a predetermined explosion depth, and the attack was carried out in the likely direction of its evasion after unmasking (detection of a periscope, a boat on the surface or a torpedo shot).
The emergence of naval underwater weapons on surface ships
The advent of ASDIC sonars made the use of depth charges much more accurate and precise. However, the first sonars, as well as the method of using depth charges by dropping them overboard, made the defeat of the submarine, although possible, but still not an easy thing.
Here is what D. McIntyre, an American anti-submarine ace with a large combat score, recalled about the battles with German submarines in the Atlantic during World War II:
"Keats", having arrived at the place where the submarine was found, began a search … established hydroacoustic contact and rushed to the attack.
Unfortunately, the submarine commander outwitted the frigate commander, possibly through the successful use of dummy cartridges … they seem to have either grabbed onto an underwater bubble target, or lost contact after the depth charges due to water disturbance.
… the ships of the 1st division approached … we did 20 knots each - the highest speed at which hydroacoustic search is still possible. A clear hydroacoustic contact was soon established. This move required quick action. First, the ship had to be turned with its bow on contact, so that it was the smallest target for a possible torpedo attack. At this stage of the attack, it is still difficult to decide who is attacking and who is dodging, and torpedoes can already rush under water counting on hitting the ship if it keeps on the same course.
At this time, the speed should be reduced - to give the hydroacoustics time to understand the situation, to determine the course and speed of the boat, but also in order to reduce the noise of the propellers and not attract any acoustic torpedo that may have already been fired.
"Bickerton" went at low speed in the direction of contact …
“The contact is confident. It is classified as a submarine."
"Distance 1400 meters - inclination increases."
"Target moves to the left."
Bill Ridley, controlling the acoustics, all absorbed in listening to the echo, showed me a thumbs up, which signified the discovery of the real object.
… the place of the boat was marked on the tablet. She walked on a constant course, moving at the smallest speed, and seemed unaware of our approach, then at a distance of 650 meters the echoes died down and soon disappeared altogether.
“It goes deep, sir, I'm sure of that,” he said.
… I decided to use the sneak attack method. … one of the ships usually makes contact, keeping about 1000 meters behind the German boat, and then leads the other ship into the wake of the submarine to approach it at such a low speed that would be enough only to catch up with it. Then, as soon as the attacking ship is above the unsuspecting boat, twenty-six depth charges are dropped on command from the command ship …
Walking at the smallest speed and under my radiotelephone commands, the Bly passed us and entered the wake of the boat. The voltage increased to the limit, when the distance to "Bly", measured by the portable rangefinder, gradually began to approach the distance indicated by the sonar. But now both distances coincided, and I gave Cooper the command "Tovs".
I had to skip the Bly a little further than the target to compensate for the time the depth charges would sink to the designated depth. … At 45 meters the right moment has come. My throat was dry with excitement, and I only managed to wheeze the command "Fire!" … I saw the first depth charge hit the water from the stern of the Bly. The first bomb exploded with terrible force near the boat, plunging it into complete darkness. Cracks appeared in the hull of the boat, through which water was pumping inside … all over the ship explosions were heard inside the hull of the boat, which was at great depths. I realized that it was all over….
Of course, everyone was delighted, especially me, because again, like during my first trip to the Walker, the new group “blew the enemy” at the first exit to the sea.
It is noteworthy how difficult it was to attack the submarine using ASDIC and overboard depth charges. Once again, we look at the diagram of the sonar view area given in the previous material: it can be seen that under the ship itself there is a "blind (although, generally speaking," dull ") zone" in which the submarine is not detected. At the same time, the ship may well be heard from the submarine and the boat can indeed evade the depth charges being dropped. D. McIntyre resolved this issue by spreading the targeting means and means of destruction and dropping depth charges for external target designation from another ship that kept contact with the enemy submarine.
This method, however, was not a panacea. Sometimes the setting did not allow time to be wasted. Sometimes the PLO ship could not count on the help of other ships. New means of using weapons were required. And they appeared.
Bomb Launchers
In fairness, we note that the understanding that simply dropping depth charges behind the stern is not enough appeared during the First World War. Combat experience said that the zone of destruction by depth charges dropped from the stern was not wide enough and gave the submarine a lot of chances for survival. It was logical to expand the affected area, but for this it was necessary not to throw the depth charge overboard, but to launch it, throw it over a long distance. This is how the first bomb launchers appeared.
The very first such device was the Mark I Depth charge projector, also known as the Y-gun, so named because of its design similar to the letter Y. It was first adopted by the Royal Navy in 1918.
The new weapon made tactics more perfect, now the width of the bomb destruction zone from one ship turned out to be at least three times larger than before.
The Y-gun had a drawback - it could only be placed in the center, on the so-called centerline of the ship, in fact, on the bow and stern. Taking into account the fact that there were guns on the bow, it was usually only aft. Later, the "halves" of such a bomb appeared, which received the slang name K-gun. They could be placed on board.
By the beginning of World War II, these bombers became the de facto standard for anti-submarine ships, and were used in conjunction with the release of depth charges from the stern. The use of such weapons significantly increased the chances of destroying a submarine, especially with a sonar.
At the beginning of the Second World War, the "first swallows" of future weapons control systems appeared - the control of the launch of bombs from bomb launchers from the ship's bridge.
But the problem that forced McIntyre to work with several ships did not disappear: it was necessary to get the submarine straight ahead while the sonar "sees" it.
Such means were bomb-throwers firing directly on the course. The first of these was in 1942 Hedgehog ("Hedgehog", in English pronounced "Hedgehog"). It was a 24-round bomb launcher with small RSLs that only detonated when they hit the hull. To increase the probability of hitting a target, a salvo of depth charges was used.
To increase the likelihood of defeat in 1943, the first "heavy" British RBUs of the Squid type appeared, which had powerful RSL with a large explosive charge and with ensuring the guidance of their salvo according to the GAS data (i.e., the integration of the GAS with calculating devices RBU).
Depth charges and bomb throwers were the main weapons of anti-submarine ships of the Western Allies during World War II. After the war, the British created the Mark 10 Limbo bomb based on the Squid base, which featured a control system integrated into the ship's sonar system and automatic reloading. The Limbo embarked on warships in 1955 and served until the late 1980s.
It should be noted that depth charges are still in service, incl. in the US and British navies (as a helicopter ammunition), and on ships of a number of countries (for example, Sweden), classic depth charges are also used, dropped from the stern of the ship.
The reason for this is the ability to effectively hit targets lying on the ground and underwater sabotage means (ultra-small submarines, divers transporters, etc.).
In the USSR, based on the experience of the war, they first reproduced the "Hedgehog" (which became our MBU-200), and later a line of domestic RBUs with high performance characteristics was created. The most massive of them were the long-range RBU-6000 (with the RSL-60) and the RBU-1000 with the powerful RSL-10, which had guidance and stabilization drives, a complex for mechanized supply and reloading of RBUs from the cellar and bomb fire control devices (PUSB) "Tempest" …
PUSB "Tempest" had the means of developing the parameters of the target (submarine) movement according to the GAS data and did it very accurately. From the experience of combat training of the Navy, repeated cases of direct hit of single practical RSL (training, without explosives) into submarines are known.
From the memoirs of Cap. 1 rank Dugints V. V. "Ship's Phanagoria":
- Load RBU with a practical bomb! - gave the command to Zheleznov after instructing the commander of the submarine. - Now the boat will submerge, we will get contact with it, and we will immediately fire.
… the miners fumbled for a long time with muzzle covers, which were covered with ice crust and, having turned into stone, did not want to tear away from the guides of the installation. Muzzles are canvas covers that are put on six barrels at once in front and behind the rails of the installation.
And if there were no covers on the trunks? There would have long been ice plugs or ice hummocks inside them. If you then try to charge the installation with at least one bomb, you would have to blow through the barrels with superheated steam and remove this ice.
- Cut the covers between the 11 and 12 barrels and rip it off only from the 12th guide, - I gave a desperate order and sacrificed my covers just to cram a bomb into one barrel.
The installation squealed in the cold and overturned at a loading angle of -90 °.
… there really was something to consider in the cellar.
The chilled through iron of the freeboards, which limited the space of the bomb storage, dimly silvered with a real snow cover. The lanterns themselves emitted light, as if in some kind of foggy ball because of the fog in the room. The green sides below the waterline were covered with large drops of dew, which glittered gold in the light of the electric lamps and, huddled in continuous streams, dripped with melt water, accumulated in the recesses of the ship's bottom.
Graceful bombs, frozen in a strict square of their mounts, glittered with paint washed by the damp fog and drops of water falling from the ceiling, which at the moment served as an excellent condenser for the formed fog.
- How many is it now? - I looked inquiringly at the miner.
“Plus two and humidity 98%,” Meshkauskas said, glancing at the instruments.
The bomb lift door slammed, and he thundered his rods, carrying the bomb up.
“Meshkauskas, turn on the ventilation,” I demanded, depressed by the abnormal conditions of ammunition storage.
- Dragging lieutenant, it will be even worse. Everything will thaw and there will be even more water,”the experienced miner reasonably contradicted my instructions.
Simplifying to the limit all the subtleties of the attack, adjusted for severe frost, right at the stop of the ship and without choosing an acoustic station on board, we directed the RBU to an invisible enemy.
In the frosty silence, the rumble of a rocket bomb shot, muffled by the cold frosty air, thundered unnaturally quietly and the bomb, glowing with a yellow flame from the nozzle of its engine, flew towards the underwater target.
- In such a cold, even a bomb rattles in a special way, - Zheleznov was surprised. - I also thought - maybe it won't work at all in such a frost.
- But what will happen to her … Gunpowder, he is gunpowder in the cold, - I reassured the commander, who doubted the reliability of our weapons. …
The boat surfaced in the southwestern corner of the test site and immediately got in touch with an alarming message:
“We have some kind of white crap about 2 meters long sticking out in the conning tower. It's yours? What to do with it? " - asked alarmed submariners when they first saw a practical bomb on board. "She's not dangerous, throw her overboard," Zheleznov gave to the submariners via communications.
"Blimey!" We got right into the wheelhouse. It is good that the detonator in this bomb is not a combat one, otherwise the submariners would have cut all 600 grams of their charge into the hull, they would have been there in complete ecstasy.
In the 1980s, a new direction in the development of RBUs emerged in the USSR - equipping their RSL with guided gravitational underwater projectiles (GPS), which had a simple high-frequency homing system (HFSS). Tests have shown their very high efficiency, reaching 11 hits in the submarine's hull from a full 12 RBU-6000 rocket salvo. Moreover, the most valuable thing in GPS in the 80s was their very high (almost absolute) noise immunity. In the USSR Navy, the problem of noise immunity of the SSN torpedoes against the enemy's hydroacoustic countermeasures was very acute. At the same time, the high efficiency of the SGPD against torpedoes was "zeroed" against the GPS because of the different frequency ranges and the "mutually perpendicular" orientations of the directional patterns of their antennas.
However, there were problems with the GPS, for example, low capabilities for hitting targets at shallow depths of their immersion (the GPS simply "slipped" them in the cavitation cavity, or did not have time to work out the guidance "up").
Today, ships of Project 11356 (RPK-8 "West") have RBU with GPS. However, what was good in the 80s today looks like an anachronism, because at the modern technical level, GPS could and should have been equipped with small-sized propulsion units, which dramatically increased their performance characteristics and the capabilities of such weapons.
In addition, the PKK "West" has a completely insufficient range for today.
In the USSR, the main purpose of RBU was to "close" the "dead zone" of torpedoes (which, in turn, closed the "dead zone" of anti-submarine missile systems). However, now the dead zone of anti-submarine missile systems (RPK) has decreased to 1.5 km or less, and is virtually absent.
At the same time, the task of hitting targets at ultra-shallow depths of the place lying on the ground, underwater sabotage means (to which combat AUVs have been added today) remains relevant. And for the solution of such problems, the "classical RBU" with the usual high-explosive RSL (or, in some cases, "light" cumulative) is extremely appropriate.
For this reason, RBUs are still used in a number of fleets (Sweden, Turkey, India, China), incl. on the latest ships. And that makes a lot of sense.
Once RBU was the main weapon against submarines, and today it is a "niche" tool, but in its niche it is difficult to replace it. The fact that modern warships of the Russian Navy do not have any bomb launchers at all is wrong. At the same time, it is optimal that the "new RBU" were universal multipurpose launchers capable of solving a wide range of tasks (for example, not only the defeat of underwater targets, but also effective jamming in the "upper hemisphere").
There is one more possible use of bomb throwers, which few people think about. The possibility of creating an explosive sound source projectile, which, being launched from the RBU, would provide an instant low-frequency "illumination" for the ship's GAS, was theoretically substantiated. For some ships, such an opportunity would be very valuable.
The evolution of anti-submarine torpedoes
The "pushback" of bombers from the position of the main anti-submarine weapon began immediately after the Second World War.
The first anti-submarine torpedoes were used by Allied aircraft in 1943 and had very limited performance characteristics. Given this factor. and the presence of sufficiently effective GAS, which provided target designation for depth charges and RBU, the first experiments on the use of anti-submarine torpedoes from ships did not become any massive during World War II, however, immediately after its end, the prospects for new weapons were fully appreciated in all countries and began its intensive development.
At the same time, two main problems of their application immediately emerged:
- often complex hydrology of the environment (sound propagation conditions);
- means of hydroacoustic counteraction (SGPD) of the enemy.
With the means of the GPA (both their own - the towed Foxer devices, and the enemy - the imitation Bold cartridges), the Allies received their first, but serious experience during the Second World War. This was fully appreciated, and during the 1950s, a series of major exercises took place in the United States with the widespread involvement of anti-submarine ships, submarines, with the massive use of anti-submarine weapons (including torpedoes) and GPA means.
It was found that at the existing technical level it is impossible to provide any reliable protection of autonomous torpedoes from the SGPD, therefore, for torpedoes of submarines, the obligatory presence of telecontrol was established (i.e., the decision - the target or interference was made by the operator), and for ships where it was difficult, - the need for a large ammunition load of torpedoes (ensuring the possibility of performing a large number of attacks).
An interesting moment of the tests of the US Navy in the 50s is that often torpedo firing was carried out "on a direct hit" into the submarine's hull, not counting "accidental" such hits during combat training.
From memoirs of American submariners those years:
In the summer of 1959, the Albakor sailed to Key West to participate in tests of an electric torpedo for destroyers. We had to go to sea every morning and be a target for a torpedo there (for 6-7 torpedoes), and by nightfall we returned back. When the torpedo captured the target, it attacked - usually in the propeller. When hitting the propeller, she bent one of the blades. We had two spare propellers attached to the top of the sub's hull. We were returning from exercises, moored and the divers changed the propeller. The damaged propeller was delivered to the workshop where the blade was adjusted or all three blades were ground. When we first arrived, all of our propellers were 15 feet in diameter, and when we went home they were about 12 feet in diameter.
The low efficiency and reliability of American torpedoes at the beginning of World War II became the subject of a "big torpedo scandal" in the United States with tough conclusions for the future: large statistics of firing, conditions as close as possible to real ones, and widespread use of countermeasures.
The second factor, hydrology (vertical distribution of the speed of sound, VRSV), could not be influenced. All that remained was to accurately measure and take it into account.
As an example of the complexity of this problem, we can cite the calculation of the "illumination" (target detection) zone of a modern torpedo in real conditions of one of the seas adjacent to the Russian Federation: depending on the conditions (the depth of the torpedo and the target submarine), the detection range can differ by more than ten (!) once.
Moreover, with competent actions of the submarine in terms of its camouflage (in the "shadow" zone), the response radius of the CLS does not exceed several hundred meters. And this is for one of the best modern torpedoes (!), And the question here is not in "technology", but in physics, which is the same for everyone. For anyone, incl. the newest western torpedo will be the same.
Taking into account the requirements of a large ammunition load of anti-submarine torpedoes, in the west there was a rejection of the use of 53-cm torpedoes on ships, with an almost complete transition to a small 32-cm caliber. This made it possible to dramatically increase the ammunition load of torpedoes on board (more than 20 - frigates, about 40 - cruisers, and this is not counting the ammunition load of anti-submarine missile systems).
Small torpedoes were developed (electric Mk44 and thermal (with a piston power plant on unitary fuel) Mk46), compact and lightweight pneumatic Mk32 torpedo tubes and ammunition storage facilities (taking into account the unification of ammunition for torpedo tubes and helicopters - in the form of a "universal ship anti-submarine arsenal")
An example of a real combat use of torpedoes is the Falklands War (1982). Detailed data from British ships are still classified, but there are quite detailed descriptions from the Argentine side. From the memoirs of an officer from the submarine "San Luis" frigate Lieutenant Alejandro Maegli:
At half past seven I was about to go to bed, when suddenly the submarine's acoustician said something that made the words in the language freeze: "Lord, I have hydroacoustic contact."
At that moment, he could only suspect what might happen next - twenty-three hours of fear, tension, chase and explosions.
From one side heard the explosions of depth charges and the noise of helicopter propellers. We were approached by three helicopters with lowered sonars and dropping depth charges at random, as soon as the analysis of the sounds showed that all the helicopters flew over and began to carry out the attack (of the ships).
When the target was 9000 yards, I said to the commander, "Sir, data entered." The commander shouted "Start". The torpedo carried a wire through which control was carried out, but after a few minutes the operator said that the wire was cut off. The torpedo began to work independently and rise to the surface. The trouble was that it was discovered. Five minutes later, the noise of absolutely all British ships and torpedoes disappeared from the acoustics.
It was not difficult for the English helicopters to locate the location of the San Luis, and they attacked.
The commander gave the order to give full speed, and at the same moment the acoustician said “a burst of a torpedo into the water,” I heard high-frequency sounds emitted by an approaching English torpedo. The commander ordered to dive and set false targets.
We began to set false targets, large tablets, which, entering with water, gave a large number of bubbles and confused the torpedo. We called them "Alka Seltser". After the release of 2 LC, the acoustician reported that "a torpedo near the stern." I thought, "We are lost." Then the acoustician said: "The torpedo is going aft."
Ten seconds seemed like a year, and the acoustician said in his metallic voice, "The torpedo went over to the other side." A quiet joy and a sense of relief swept the boat. An English torpedo passed by and disappeared into the sea. She walked a close distance from us.
Arrived "Sea King" lowered the antenna and began to look for the boat. He had not yet figured out the exact position, and "San Luis" went deeper and deeper. Helicopters dropped torpedoes and bombs nearby, but could not find the boat.
The submarine lay down on the sandy bottom. Every twenty minutes, the helicopters changed and dropped their depth charges and torpedoes into the water. And so, replacing each other, they searched for the boat hour after hour.
For a submarine lying at a depth, torpedoes and depth charges did not pose a danger, the lack of oxygen was dangerous. The boat could not surface under the RDP and the carbon dioxide increased. The commander ordered the entire crew to leave the combat posts, lie down in bunks and connect to the regeneration in order to spend as little oxygen as possible.
Soviet experience
Unfortunately, the factor of the GSPD in the USSR has not been adequately assessed. The situation with our "torpedo science" back in the mid-60s, the head of the Anti-Submarine Weapons Directorate (UPV) of the Navy, Kostygov, aptly described as follows:
"There are many registered doctors at the institute, but for some reason there are few good torpedoes."
The first anti-submarine torpedo was the 53-cm torpedo SET-53 with a passive SSN (based on the German times of World War II). Its main drawback was absolutely similar to the German T-V (with a similar design of the CCH), - low noise immunity (any source of interference in the CCH range led away the torpedo). However, in general, for its time, the torpedo turned out to be successful, it was very reliable (within the framework of its performance characteristics).
From the memoirs of the deputy. Head of the Department of Anti-Submarine Weapons of the Navy R. Gusev:
Kolya Afonin with Slava Zaporozhenko, dashing gunsmiths, in the early sixties decided to "take a chance" and did not turn off the vertical path of the SET-53 torpedo. It was at the naval base in Poti. They fired a torpedo twice, but there was no guidance. The sailors expressed their "feh" to the specialists who were preparing the torpedo. The lieutenants felt offended, and next time they did not turn off the vertical path as an act of despair. As always in such cases, there were no other errors. Thank goodness the blow to the stern of the boat was glancing. The torpedo surfaced. A boat with a frightened crew also surfaced. Such firing was then rare: the torpedo had just been put into service. A special officer came to Kolya. Kolya got scared, began to broadcast to him about a strong signal, a blown fuse and other things at the level of household electrical appliances. It has passed. The sailors no longer complained.
Taking into account the small response radius of the CLS (and, accordingly, the narrow "search strip" of one torpedo), salvo firing of several torpedoes with their parallel course appeared.
At the same time, the only means of protection against interference (SGPD) was the ability to set the distance of the CLO (ie, "firing through interference").
For SET-53, it was significant that the target evading it by reducing the stroke very effectively hit the RBU, and vice versa, when the target submarine evaded from the RBU attack with large moves, the torpedo efficiency sharply increased. Those. torpedoes and RBUs on our ships mutually effectively complemented each other.
Small ships received 40-cm torpedoes with active-passive SSN, in the early 60s - SET-40, and in the mid-70s - SET-72. Domestic small-sized torpedoes weighed three times more than foreign 32-cm ones, however, they made it possible to significantly increase the ammunition load on ships that had them (project 159A - 10 torpedoes versus 4 torpedoes 53 cm on the project 1124, close in displacement).
The main anti-submarine torpedo of the Navy's ships was the electric SET-65, which was put into service in 1965, and "formally" surpassed the American "peer" Mk37 in performance characteristics. Formally … because the significant mass and dimensions sharply limited the ammunition load of the ships, and the absence of a small-sized torpedo of 32 cm caliber, the negative attitude towards the domestic copy of the Mk46 - MPT "Kolibri" cm).
For example, in the book by Kuzin and Nikolsky "The Soviet Navy 1945-1995." there is a comparison of the ships' weapons with the Asrok and SET-65 in terms of their range (10 and 15 km), on the basis of which a “wild” and absolutely incompetent conclusion is made about the “superiority” of SET-65. Those. "Scientific doctors" from the 1st Central Research Institute of the Navy were not aware of the concept of "effective firing range", "target engagement time", "ammunition load", etc. for which Asrok had a clear and significant advantage.
At the same time, in the course of combat training of the USSR Navy, the fleets learned to use the capabilities of the available weapons to the maximum. Captain of the 1st rank, retired A. E. Soldatenkov recalled:
In the broad concept of anti-submarine defense, hydrofoil torpedo boats were also taken into account. They themselves had hydroacoustic stations, but with a short detection range for underwater targets, so they did not pose an immediate threat to submarines. But there were options. After all, each boat can carry four anti-submarine torpedoes! Such boats were built by one of the Vladivostok shipyards. They were provided with the receiving equipment of the group attack system. Thus, the torpedo boats could, according to the data from the IPC project 1124 group attack system, launch an attack on the submarine! That is, the IPC could be the leader of a very serious tactical anti-submarine group. It is characteristic that when moving on the wing, the boats were not reachable for torpedoes from submarines of a potential enemy.
Only now the problem was not in the torpedo boats, but in the availability of torpedoes (anti-submarine) for them.
A little-known fact, the reliance on electric torpedoes, coupled with significant restrictions on silver (loss in the 60s as a supplier to the PRC, and in 1975 to Chile) did not ensure the creation of the necessary ammunition for anti-submarine torpedoes for the USSR Navy. For this reason, the Navy was forced to maximally "pull" the outdated SET-53 in operation and actually "halve" the already small ammunition load of 53cm anti-submarine torpedoes with anti-ship torpedoes.
Formally, the "half ammunition load" of 53-65K and SET-65 was for solving the tasks of combat service and "direct tracking" of large surface ships of the US Navy and NATO ("hitting them with 53-65K torpedoes").
In fact, the real reason was precisely the lack of anti-submarine "electric torpedoes with silver".
And it is all the more surprising that the practice of "half ammunition" is still present on our ships, for example, in the photo of the Admiral Levchenko BOD in combat service in the "southern seas" in open torpedo tubes one can see two SET-65 and two anti-ship oxygen 53 -65K (which are already dangerous to carry today in an amicable way).
As the main torpedo armament of our modern ships, the "Package" complex with an anti-torpedo and a small-sized torpedo with high performance characteristics was developed. Undoubtedly, the unique characteristic of the "Packet" is the possibility of hitting attacking torpedoes with a high probability. Here, it is necessary to note the high noise immunity of the new small-sized torpedo, both for the conditions of the application environment (for example, shallow depths), and in relation to the enemy's SRS.
However, there are also problematic issues:
- lack of unification between torpedo and anti-torpedo ammunition (anti-torpedo capabilities can and must be incorporated into a single small-sized torpedo of the complex);
- the effective range is much less than the range of weapons of submarines;
- significant restrictions on the possibility of placement on various media;
- the absence of an AGPD in the complex (anti-torpedoes alone cannot solve the PTZ task, similarly it cannot be solved by SGPD alone, for a reliable and effective PTZ, complex and joint use of both AT and SGPD is required);
- the use of TPK (instead of the classic torpedo tubes) sharply limits the ammunition load, makes it difficult to reload and obtain the necessary firing statistics during the combat training of the fleet;
- restrictions on the use at shallow depths of the place (for example, when leaving the base).
However, the "Package" is also in the series. At the same time, the preservation of the 53 cm caliber TA on our ships causes frank bewilderment (Project 11356 frigates, Project 1155 BOD, including the modernized Marshal Shaposhnikov). SET-65 looked very "pale" in the ammunition of our ships back in the 80s of the last century, and even today it is just a museum exhibit (especially considering its "American brains" from 1961). However, the attitude of the fleet to naval submarine weapons today is no longer a secret to anyone.
Special attention should be paid to the problem of shallow depths.
Most of the project 20380 corvettes with the "Package" complex are part of the Baltic Fleet and are based in Baltiysk (we will omit the fact that Baltiysk is within the reach of Polish artillery). Taking into account the restrictions on the depth of the place when firing, before reaching great depths, these corvettes will be virtually defenseless and can be shot with impunity by enemy submarines, without being able to use their torpedoes and anti-torpedoes.
The reason is the "big bag", to reduce which (almost to zero) small parachutes are used on western small-sized torpedoes. With us, such a solution is impossible due to the TPK gas generator firing system.
In fact, most of the problems of the complex would be solved by abandoning the SM-588 launcher with TPK and the transition to normal 324-mm torpedo tubes with pneumatic launch (see article "A light torpedo tube. We need this weapon, but we don't have it."). But this question is not raised by either the Navy or the industry.
Another interesting solution, especially for shallow depths, can be the use of telecontrol.
For the first time on ships, it was implemented on our Project 1124M MPK (TEST-71M torpedoes - a remote-controlled version of the SET-65 torpedo).
In the West, there was also a limited use of 53-cm torpedoes with TU from ships.
Of great interest is the Swedish complex PLO for shallow depths - RBU Elma, remote-controlled small-sized torpedoes optimized for conditions of shallow depths and special high-frequency HAS with high resolution.
The small caliber RBU Elma does not provide reliable destruction of submarines, it is rather a "warning weapon for peacetime", however, specialized small-sized remote-controlled torpedoes of their own design (SAAB concern) ensure defeat, incl. targets lying on the ground.
The theoretical capabilities of small-sized telecontrolled torpedoes are most fully reflected in the presentation of the SAAB lightweight torpedo.
In addition to the technical features of the new weapon (albeit somewhat idealized), the video shows some tactical techniques of ASW by surface ships.
Anti-submarine missiles and their impact on ASW tactics
In the 50s, the development of a fundamentally new weapon began in the United States - the ASROC (Anti-Submarine Rocket) anti-submarine missile. It was a heavy rocket, which, instead of a warhead, had an anti-submarine torpedo and threw it immediately over a long distance. In 1961, this complex with PLUR RUR-5 was adopted by the US Navy. In addition to the usual torpedo, there was also a variant with a nuclear charge.
The range of its use corresponded well to the ranges of the new low-frequency sonars (SQS-23, SQS-26), and exceeded the effective ranges of 53 cm torpedoes from the USSR Navy submarines. Those. in favorable hydrological conditions, launching a torpedo attack, and even before reaching the point of the volley, our submarine received a club "Asrok" in the "face".
She had chances to evade, but the Asrok's ammunition reached 24 anti-submarine missiles (ASMs), respectively, with successive attacks, the enemy was almost guaranteed to shoot our submarine (the main torpedoes of which, 53-65K and SAET-60M, were significantly inferior in effective range to Asrok ).
The first such domestic system was the RPK-1 "Whirlwind" complex, which was installed on heavy ships - Project 1123 anti-submarine cruisers and the first aircraft-carrying cruisers of Project 1143. Alas, the system did not have a non-nuclear version of equipment - they could not put an anti-submarine torpedo on the missile in the USSR at that time, those. in a non-nuclear conflict, the RPK-1 could not be used.
The "main anti-submarine caliber" of our ships was the Metel submarine missile system (in its modernized form - "Bell"), which was put into service in 1973 (BOD projects 1134A, 1134B, 1155, SKR project 1135 and on the head TARKR "Kirov" project 1144) … The problem of the large dimensions and mass of the torpedo was solved by hanging it under a cruise delivery missile. An electric torpedo was used as a warhead (first, in the "Blizzard" 53-cm AT-2U (PLUR 85r), and in the "Trumpet" - 40-cm UMGT-1 (PLUR 85ru)).
Formally, the complex "surpassed all" (in range). In fact, before the appearance of the SJSC Polynom, this range not only could not be realized, but moreover, the real detection ranges of the submarine GAS "Titan-2", ships of the project 1134A (B) and 1135, were often in the dead zone of the complex (ie. That is, chasing the range, they got a large dead zone). For this reason, the project 1135 TFR received the nickname "blind with a club" in the navy, i.e. the weapon “seems to be”, and powerful, but it is difficult to use it.
Attempts to resolve this situation - interaction with helicopters and IPC with OGAS, were made, but it was a palliative.
Obviously, when creating our PLRK, major conceptual mistakes were made, and primarily on the part of the Navy and its weapons institute (28 research institutes, now part of 1 TsNII VK).
An attempt to create a lightweight and compact PLRK with a small "dead zone" was the "Medvedka" PLRK, but again, carried away by the range, they missed the fact that the effectiveness of the unguided missile sharply decreases there. Unfortunately, the need to install an inertial control system on the Medvedka submarine missile missile reached the developers too late, when the question of stopping this development had already arisen.
From the standpoint of today, it was a mistake, the PLRK in the Medvelka-2 version could have been brought (and most likely earlier than the Answer), but weakness (suffice it to say that observing this development about the existence (!) Of the new Asrok VLA PLRK I found out only in 2012, that is, they did not show the slightest interest in someone else's experience), scientific support from the 28 Research Institute (and 1 Central Research Institute) was not allowed to do this.
"Medvedka" was closed, instead of it began the development of another PLRK - modifications of the PLRK "Answer" for surface ships.
According to the latest media reports, as a result of long and difficult work, the "Answer" successfully flew, however, in the process, the possibility of its use from inclined launchers was lost, which left the main new anti-submarine ships of the Navy - Project 20380 corvettes without long-range anti-submarine weapons (with an effective range of comparable with the range of submarine torpedo weapons).
Influence on tactics of PLO GAS with GPBA and further evolution of weapons and tactics of surface ships of PLO. Role of shipborne helicopters
From the late 70s - early 80s, there was a massive supply of flexible extended towed antennas (GPBA) to the western fleets. The detection ranges have increased dramatically, but problems have arisen not only to classify the contact (is this target exactly on the GPBA - submarine?) at the level of tens of kilometers). The problem consisted in large errors in determining the area of possible target position (OVPC) of the GPBA (especially at sharp corners to the antenna).
Accordingly, the problem arose of additional examination of these large HCVF, for which they began to use helicopters. Taking into account the fact that the primary detection of the unit was behind the GPBA, it made sense to integrate the search and aiming system of the helicopter into ship complexes in terms of processing hydroacoustic information (as far as the communications facilities of that time allowed). Since the task of classifying a contact was now often solved by a helicopter, it became logical and to strike a submarine from it.
The Oliver Hazard Perry frigates became a classic ship of this concept (for more details - "Frigate" Perry as a lesson for Russia. Machine-designed, massive and cheap ").
"Perry" had a towed GAS and two helicopters, which made it possible to have a very high search performance of one ship. At the same time, the ship did not have anti-submarine missiles in service, but the use of helicopters as a strike means reduced the importance of this fact. In addition, "Perry" could be used as part of search and strike groups with ships with such missiles.
The scheme had both advantages (a sharp increase in search performance) and disadvantages. The most serious is the sensitivity of the GPBA to extraneous noise, and, accordingly, the need for a separate location of their carriers from the detachments of warships and convoys (ie, a kind of destroyer Sheffield as an “AWACS ship”, with corresponding “potential consequences”).
For surface ships of the USSR Navy, which did not have GPBA, helicopters had a different, but also important value. The most effective are the joint actions of heterogeneous anti-submarine forces. At the same time, enemy submarines, evading detection of ships, often "came across" on the intercepting barriers of the RGAB aviation. However, it was very difficult to direct the ships according to the RGAB data, since when they approached the buoy field, they "lit up" it with their noises. In this situation, helicopters played an important role in receiving and transmitting contact (or ensuring the use of the Blizzard PLRK).
Today western helicopters play a very important role in the search for submarines, especially considering their equipment with low-frequency OGAS, capable of "illuminating" both the buoy field and the GAS (including GPBA) of the ship. It has become a real and probable situation when the ship operates covertly and has a significant lead in detecting to the submarine (unfortunately, this is the practice of the US Navy and NATO, the helicopters of the Russian Navy do not provide this).
Taking into account the operation of helicopters at a considerable distance from the ship, the question of the expediency of the PLRK arises. Here you need to be very clear about the difference between peacetime and wartime conditions: "In baseball, one team does not kill the other" (film "The Pentagon Wars"). Yes, in peacetime, you can "calmly and safely" call a helicopter to carry out "training attacks" on the detected submarine.
However, in a combat situation, a delay in attacking a submarine is fraught not only with the fact that it can escape, but also with the fact that it will have time to strike first (anti-ship missiles or torpedoes, which are most likely already approaching the ships). The ability to inflict an immediate strike on the detected submarine is a decisive advantage of the submarine over the helicopter.
conclusions
A full-fledged complex of anti-submarine weapons of modern ships should include modern RBU (multipurpose guided launchers), torpedoes and anti-torpedoes, anti-submarine missiles and aircraft (ship helicopter).
The presence of any one means (usually torpedoes) dramatically reduces the ship's capabilities against submarines, essentially turning it into a target.
As for tactics, the key to success is close interaction between ships in a group on the one hand and ship helicopters on the other.
