On the border of two environments
Based on the premises stated in the article “On the border of two environments. Diving Ships: History and Prospects , consider a variant of a diving surface ship (NOC), the hull of which is under water, in the near-surface layer, and above the water there is only a superstructure-mast with radar stations (radar), with active phased antenna arrays (AFAR), optical reconnaissance means and communication antennas. In other words, the waterline of such a ship should pass just above the base of the superstructure-mast.
Design
The design of the NOC should be based to a greater extent on the design of submarines (SS) than surface ships (NK), but taking into account the influence of near-surface factors: wave drag, near-surface rolling, etc. Taking into account the Russian specifics, the optimal basis for a ship of this type will most likely be one of the projects, existing or prospective nuclear submarines, for example, the project of the strategic missile submarine cruiser (SSBN) 955A, with contours optimized for movement in the near-surface layer. It is possible that the NOC should be supplemented with installed high-speed low-inertia thrusters and control surfaces, as well as pumps for ballast tanks with increased capacity.
Previously, the SSBN of project 955A was already considered by the author and as the basis for a nuclear submarine with cruise missiles (SSGN) of the conditional project 955K, and the implementation of SSGNs based on project 955A is being considered by the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, and as the basis for a nuclear multifunctional submarine designed for raider actions against enemy surface forces and aviation. The reason for such attention to the 955A project is that it is quite modern, well-developed and is being built in a large series, which will simplify the development and reduce the cost of solutions based on it.
As the name implies, the NOC should be able to dive to a shallow depth, no more than 20-50 meters, which will reduce the requirements for the hull structures of the original submarine project.
Intelligence tools
An unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) should be located in the upper part of the mast superstructure, most likely a quadrocopter (octacopter, hexacopter) type with reconnaissance equipment on board, powered by a flexible cable from the NOC. Depending on the permissible dimensions of the UAV, it can be equipped with both optical, thermal imaging and radar reconnaissance equipment. The possibility of automatic tracking of NOC UAVs flying at an altitude of 50-100 meters, and possibly more, will allow the detection of surface and low-flying targets at a much greater distance than is possible with the help of the NOC mast.
If a radar stationed on a mast at a height of 5-15 meters can see an anti-ship missile (ASM) flying at an altitude of 20 meters, at a range of about 25-30 kilometers, then a radar stationed on a UAV at an altitude of 50-100 meters can see the same anti-ship missile at a distance of 40-55 kilometers.
The NOC submarines will inherit a powerful hydroacoustic station (GAS).
It will not be possible to place classic manned anti-submarine defense (ASW) helicopters on the NOC. Their functions can be divided between UAVs, unmanned boats (BEC) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) accompanying the NOC and recharging batteries from it (refueling). To release and receive UAVs or unmanned boats, the NOC must make a short ascent with the hull rising above the waterline.
Anti-submarine UAVs can be implemented on the basis of helicopter or quadrocopter (octacopter, hexacopter) UAVs.
Speaking of UAVs for a diving surface ship, one cannot but recall the UAV projects launched from under water. One of the most interesting projects can be considered the UAV "Cormorant", designed to launch from the mines of nuclear submarines, ballistic missile carriers (SSBNs) from a depth of 46 meters. For NOCs, such difficulties are not required, the start can well be carried out from the surface position. Such a UAV can be used to perform reconnaissance missions at a relative distance from the ship.
Unmanned surface and underwater vehicles can be used both for performing the functions of an ASW and for solving mine defense tasks.
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Armament
Since the main task of the NOC is air defense (air defense), like the British destroyer type 45, its main weapon should be a powerful anti-aircraft missile system (SAM). Presumably, this could be a modernized air defense system, implemented on the basis of the Polyment-Redut air defense system. It is possible that a more promising option would be a shipborne air defense system based on the promising S-500 land-based complex, but given that its composition and capabilities are still unknown, it would be more logical to focus on more elaborate solutions. The basis of the ammunition should be medium-range anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAM) 9M96E, 9M96E2 with an active radar homing head (ARLGSN) and short-range missiles 9M100 with an infrared homing head (IKGSN), capable of engaging targets without continuous targeting or target illumination.
To engage air targets at a long range, the SAM ammunition must be supplemented with long / ultra-long-range missiles. There may be few of them, but their very presence will force the enemy to plan their actions taking into account this fact, to keep high-altitude UAVs and early warning radar aircraft (AWACS) away.
If technically feasible, it would be a good help to deploy on the NOC a laser weapon (LO) with a capacity of 100-500 kW, capable of engaging small targets: UAVs, light boats and boats, destroying sensitive optical elements of anti-ship missiles and enemy aircraft, and in the future, provide their physical destruction. Despite the fact that many are skeptical of laser weapons, they will not become less effective from this. The leading powers of the world (USA, Great Britain, Germany, Israel, China) are investing huge amounts of money in the development of laser weapons. For example, the Germans are planning to install LW on corvettes, the British are planning to install laser weapons on almost all types of ships (promising frigates, destroyers, landing ships and even on multipurpose nuclear submarines). And don't think that it will take up half of the ship. A laser module with a 100 kW cooling system can be comparable in size to one or two refrigerators.
Torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber will remain from the original submarine project. The NOC will lack artillery weapons, as well as short-range air defense missile systems / ZRAK (anti-aircraft missile and artillery systems).
Accommodation
The question arises: where to place all of the above and how can you save space? The answer is simple: the NNP should become precisely the air defense ship of the combat area, that is, its strike functions will be reduced to a minimum. The same goes for anti-submarine functions.
If we are talking about the fact that the project 955A SSBN is taken as a basis, then it has space to accommodate 16 missile silos (with a diameter of about 2.2 meters), 6 (8?) Torpedo tubes of 533 mm caliber with an ammunition load of about 40 torpedoes, and also six disposable non-rechargeable 533-mm launchers for launching hydroacoustic countermeasures, which are located in the superstructure.
Based on this, the NOC ammunition load can be:
- 10 standard torpedoes of 533 mm caliber of the current model;
- 40 anti-torpedoes with dimensions half the size of a standard 533 mm torpedo;
- 10 unmanned underwater vehicles, made in the dimensions of a standard 533 mm torpedo;
- 2 (4) anti-submarine UAVs with a release-receive-refueling device, occupying the space of two conventional missile silos;
- 2 unmanned boats in containers on the hull, by analogy with external docking cameras implemented on SSBN "Ohio";
- 12 ultra-long-range missiles 40N6E in four conventional missile silos, taking into account the diameter of one missile in a transport and launch container (TPK) 1 meter;
- 192 medium-range missiles 9M96E2 in four conventional missile silos, taking into account the diameter of one missile defense system 240 mm;
- 264 short-range missiles 9М100 in four conventional missile silos, taking into account the diameter of one missile defense system 200 mm (according to some reports, 125 mm, that is, the number of short-range missiles can be increased to 584 units);
- 24 missiles (anti-ship, cruise missiles, missile-torpedoes) of the "Caliber" complex, with a complete set depending on the task set by the NOC, in two conventional missile silos, taking into account the diameter of the missile in the TPK 533 mm.
Of course, the actual ammunition load will be 20-30-50 percent less due to the need for cabling, installation of power structures, and so on. Nevertheless, a general idea of the potential NOC ammunition load based on Project 955A SSBNs can be obtained, and even if the ammunition load is halved, NOC will be equivalent to several air defense divisions
In addition, it must be borne in mind that the dimensions of the missile silos on SSBNs are much higher in height than the missiles and anti-ship missiles placed in them, that is, there will be a reserve of volumes to accommodate the necessary additional equipment.
Advantages of NOCs over classic surface ships
First of all, the appearance of NOCs will significantly devalue the reserves of anti-ship missiles available to potential adversaries, including the latest AGM-158C LRASM. NOC defense against a massive anti-ship missile strike may look something like this:
After the enemy detects a group of NOCs, the latter carries out a strike with a large number of anti-ship missiles. Radars operating in active mode will detect incoming anti-ship missiles from a distance of at least 20 kilometers. After that, the NOC carries out an urgent dive, having previously ejected protective curtains. In principle, the creation of false targets, which are inflatable, rapidly deployable imitators of the surface of the NOC mast, ejected from torpedo tubes or UVP and inflated with compressed air, can also be considered.
Even the RCC's retargeting capabilities will prevent them from "circling forever", waiting for the NOCs to reappear on the surface. In order to provide anti-ship missiles with the possibility of loitering in the air, for additional target search and retargeting, their launch must be carried out not at the maximum range, but closer to the target, which puts the carriers at risk. And still, not being able to track the NOCs under water, the anti-ship missiles will quickly move away from them, run out of fuel or hit false targets.
Can the anti-ship missile system carry out the defeat of the target under water? In its current form, no. And equipping the anti-ship missile with a depth-charge-type warhead will also do little, since the NOC is a mobile target capable of changing course and speed, and the anti-ship missile cannot predict the movement of the NOC under water. The weight of the warhead (warhead) of most modern anti-ship missiles does not exceed 500 kg. Any complication of the warhead, giving it the function of hitting underwater targets, will weaken it even more.
There remains the option of equipping the anti-ship missile system with a small-sized torpedo, that is, in fact, turning it into a rocket-torpedo (RT). But in this case, we will expect a complex drop in the characteristics of the RT in comparison with the RCC. For example, the firing range of the RPK-6 "Waterfall" missile-torpedo is only 50 (according to some sources, 90) kilometers, plus the range of the UMGT-1 torpedo is another 8 kilometers.
The American RUM-139 VLA rocket-torpedo has an even shorter range - 28 kilometers, and the Mark 46 or Mark 54 torpedoes installed on it have a range of 7, 3 or 2.4 kilometers, respectively.
Thus, RT will have a shorter range, speed, maneuverability, warhead mass and, at the same time, greater visibility and cost compared to anti-ship missiles. If the enemy wants to increase the firing range of RTs, then their dimensions and weight will increase significantly, which will not allow them to be placed on those aircraft carriers that can carry anti-ship missiles. And those aircraft carriers that can carry RT with an increased range will take less of them than they could take anti-ship missiles.
It is possible to practically exclude the possibility of a "firefight" between surface ships of the classical design and the surface ships consisting of diving surface ships, since the latter will have time to reach the launch line of anti-ship missiles, shoot back and change course long before the enemy's CAG can approach the launch range of the RT.
In terms of the probability of hitting the target, the missile + torpedo combination will most likely also be inferior to the probability of hitting the target of the anti-ship missile system, although here we are partly comparing the incomparable, but, in the end, we are after all interested in the final result - hitting the target, be it NK or NNK.
As a result, RTs with a short flight range will force aircraft carriers to enter the NNK air defense zone, there will be fewer RTs launched than could be anti-ship missiles, the RTs themselves will be easier to hit the NNK air defense systems. And the likelihood of hitting NOCs with small-sized torpedoes, which nevertheless managed to reach the drop zone, will not be so high due to their obviously worse characteristics in comparison with full-size torpedoes, as well as because of NOC counteraction with the help of false targets and counter-torpedoes.
In other words, it is good to shoot with missile torpedoes at submarines, but not at diving surface ships capable of actively countering them. The enemy will have to organize a complex strike of anti-ship missiles, RT, false targets such as ADM-160A MALD, knowing that anti-ship missiles will most likely be wasted if such a strike has a chance of success at all.
If, when the NOC dives above the surface, the UAV remains on the power and control cable, the situation for the enemy will become even more complicated, since the NOC will be able to engage air targets even after the dive, albeit with less efficiency.
Thus, diving surface ships will have the following advantages:
- the ability to ensure continuous monitoring of airspace and destruction of air targets, as in the classic NK design;
- a significant ammunition load of missiles, which allows to ensure the isolation of the combat area and level the strike potential of the enemy aircraft carrier strike groups (AUG);
- increased secrecy, since only the superstructure-mast with reconnaissance and communications equipment will remain on the surface;
- the possibility of an additional increase in stealth due to the transition to a completely submerged position, and misleading the enemy with false inflatable superstructure-masts;
- the ability to evade anti-ship missiles, due to the submersion of the NOC under water;
- a highly effective GAS, inherited by the NOC from the submarine, capable of ensuring the detection of enemy submarines and submarines.
The high protection of the NNP from anti-ship missiles can lead to the fact that in fact, the only serious threat to such a ship will be the most modern low-noise enemy submarines.
Of course, diving surface ships should not act alone, but as part of a naval strike group (KUG). However, its composition should differ significantly from the KUG based on ships of the classical design.
Iceberg-class ship strike group
The presence of surface ships of the classical design as part of the KUG negates all the advantages of the NOC, since in the event of an attack by anti-ship missiles, the NOCs will disappear under water, and surface ships of the classical design will take the entire impact of the anti-ship missiles on themselves. This leads to the following conclusions:
1. CBG based on the NOC, in addition to the NOC itself, may include only submarines.
2. A KUG based on the NOC cannot include surface ships that require security - transport and landing ships, aircraft carriers, etc.
In other words, the NOC-based BMG is designed for attack, not defense. Is this a disadvantage? More likely no than yes. As mentioned earlier, in the foreseeable future, Russia is unable to build a fleet capable of "symmetrically" opposing the fleet of the United States and its allies. Those. We are still unlikely to be able to ensure the safety of, for example, landing ships: no matter how many Project 22350 frigates we build, they will be "overwhelmed" by anti-ship missiles with a bomber and / or aircraft from aircraft carriers. We can ensure their safety only when the enemy understands that in the event of a conflict his losses in combat and support ships will be incomparably higher, which is exactly what the NOC-based CMGs are needed for.
The proposed spatially distributed attack surface-submarine KUG of the "iceberg" type should include the following types of ships and submarines:
- 2 NOCs based on Project 955A SSBNs;
- 2 SSGNs of the conditional project 955K;
- 4 multipurpose submarines.
Additionally, the "iceberg" KUG are attached to 2-4 UAVs of a long flight duration.
The distance between NOCs, SSGNs and multipurpose submarines KUG of the "iceberg" type will be determined by the possibility of organizing communications and, accordingly, interaction between the NOCs and submarines. An increase in the communication range can be organized at the expense of ULA-repeaters of acoustic communication, in an organizational way - by the surfacing of submarines for radio communication with the NOC at certain points in time or in other ways. Currently, methods of long-distance communication between submarines are being developed, one of which, for example, is described in patent RU2666904C1 "Method of two-way long-range resonant EHF / microwave radio communication with an underwater object."
Also, the maximum distance between diving surface ships and submarines as part of an iceberg-class CGS is determined by the NOC's ability to protect "its" submarines from enemy anti-submarine aircraft and the ability of "own" multipurpose nuclear submarines to protect NOCs and SSGNs from enemy submarines. It can be assumed that the distance between the ships and submarines of the KUG of the "iceberg" type will vary in the range from five to forty kilometers
Functions within the KUG are distributed as follows:
NOCs provide air defense of the area, not allowing the enemy's anti-submarine aviation to work, destroy all types of enemy aircraft and helicopters. When reaching the line of attack of the enemy's AUG, they destroy AWACS aircraft capable of over-the-horizon guidance of enemy missiles at attacking anti-ship missiles.
SSGNs are designed to deliver massive strikes, depending on the task at hand, with cruise missiles at ground targets or anti-ship missiles at enemy ships.
Multipurpose nuclear submarines provide protection for NOCs and SSGNs from enemy multipurpose nuclear submarines.
The reconnaissance data of the iceberg-type KUG should be received from reconnaissance satellites, UAVs of long duration of flight, as well as with the help of UAVs deployed from the NOC, unmanned boats and unmanned underwater vehicles.
conclusions
Is there a future for diving surface ships? The question is complex. There is no doubt that the development and construction of NOCs will be challenging, like any other new technology. Accordingly, the list of countries that can implement such a project is very limited.
The United States already dominates the oceans, and only the threat from China's rapidly growing fleet can prevent it from experimenting. But the parity of the Chinese and US fleets is unlikely to be achieved before 2050. The US allies in NATO solve local problems as part of the US fleet, they do not need ships capable of withstanding a powerful enemy.
China could be interested in upsetting the balance in its direction, but it seems that while the engineers of the PRC can only combine and modify the successes of the design schools of other countries: most of the armaments of the PRC resemble a "vinaigrette" from the modified solutions of the USA, Russia, and European countries. Moreover, in the field of submarines, without which it is impossible to create an ICG on the basis of the NOC, the PRC's successes are small: obviously, it has not yet been possible to obtain critical data in this direction. On the other hand, the PRC can replicate on a huge scale what has already been developed, so an extensive development path for China looks more natural.
In the last century, during the Cold War era, original projects often appeared in the USSR: ekranoplanes, deep-sea high-speed submarines and highly automated submarines with a liquid metal reactor, Spiral spaceplanes and much more. By the way, the United States also experimented quite actively during the Cold War. But the USSR no longer exists, and the conventional forces of the Russian Federation pose a minimal threat to the United States, rather even useful from the point of view of an excuse to use the budget.
As for Russia, the Russian Navy is hardly able to maintain the size of the fleet at a minimum level, although recently there has been progress in the serial construction of Project 22350 frigates, albeit not quickly, but strategic and multipurpose nuclear submarines are being built. On the other hand, the Russian Navy allocates resources for specific projects such as the Poseidon strategic torpedo and special submarines for it. Maybe in the shipbuilding program of the Russian Navy there is a place for diving surface ships? At least, carrying out research work in this direction will be inexpensive and looks quite real, and carrying out work at the level of a preliminary design will not take up a lot of resources.
