Comparing the capabilities of the artillery and armor of the Russian, German and British battleships, we come to the conclusion that the fighting qualities of the "battleships-cruisers" of the "Peresvet" type at the time of their laying fully corresponded to the concept of fighting German battleships in the Baltic Sea and the British 2nd class - in Asia. But, in addition to combat, from ships of the "Peresvet" type, purely cruising qualities were required, and here everything turned out to be much more complicated.
As a matter of fact, information about the speed and range of the "battleship-cruisers" is very contradictory. The most common source, perhaps, should be considered the monographs of V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsov "Battleships of the type" Peresvet ", as well as the works of R. M. Melnikov, but they, oddly enough, do not give unambiguous answers about the speed and range of the "battleship-cruisers". So, V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsov write:
“Power of mechanisms with natural draft 11,500 hp. was supposed to provide a speed of 16, 5 knots, and with a forced 14,500 hp. - 18 knots."
It seems to be short and clear, and besides, it is confirmed by the results achieved by ships of this type on the measured mile. The fact is that all further descriptions of the tests of battleships report that they achieved 13 775 - 15 578 hp, and this power was usually developed during six hours of continuous runs, while the planned speed of 18 knots was surpassed in almost all cases. It would seem that everything is correct and understandable - such a result corresponds to the planned indicators of machine power and speed at afterburner.
But the problem is that Russian ships, as a rule, were tested without forcing mechanisms, with natural thrust. At the same time, in the description of tests of battleships of the "Peresvet" type, nowhere is it indicated whether natural or forced thrust was used. It is only known that the battleships-cruisers showed an average speed on tests:
"Peresvet" - 18.64 knots (during the first run, for 4 hours it showed 19.08 knots, but then one boiler had to be removed) with an average power of 13,775 hp.
"Oslyabya" - 18, 33 knots (15 051 hp)
"Pobeda" - 18.5 knots (15 578 hp)
But was this average speed the limit for the ships, or could they (when forcing) give more? The author of this article believes that the "battleships-cruisers" were tested with forced blast. Interestingly, from September 30 to October 2, 1902, "Peresvet" participated in the battleship races at full speed, while, according to R. M. Melnikov, the race was held:
"Without harming machines and boilers"
which clearly implies a refusal to force boilers. The route Nagasaki-Port Arthur (566 miles) was covered by "Peresvet" in 36 hours, at an average speed of 15.7 knots - and this is close enough to the planned 16.5 knots, which the ship was supposed to show on a natural thrust.
You should also pay attention to this - "Peresvet" entered trials underloaded, having a displacement of only 12,224 tons, while its normal displacement actually tended to 13,868 tons. Accordingly, the speed in normal displacement should have been lower, than shown on tests, nevertheless, a recalculation by the method of admiralty coefficients, corrected for an increase in displacement, shows that even at 13 868 tons, the ship would have exceeded the 18-knot threshold (the speed should have been 18, 18 knots). Therefore, it can be stated that the planned speed of "Peresveta" was developed and even slightly exceeded.
"Rhinaun" turned out to be somewhat faster than the Russian "battleships-cruisers" - it developed 17.9 knots on natural thrust (8-hour run, power 10 708 hp) and 19.75 knots with forced blast (6-hour run, power 12 901 hp), but here you need to make a small reservation - it is not known at what displacement these results were shown (the ship could have been greatly lightened) and, in addition, it is not known whether the above speeds were average for the run or maximum. Of course, comparing the 18.64 knots of the Peresvet with the 19.75 knots of the British battleship, it becomes a little sad, but if the maximum speed is indicated for the Rhinaun, then the differences in speed are not at all as great as it seems - remember that at four o'clock During the run, the average speed of "Peresvet" reached 19.08 knots, which means that the maximum speed was even higher - and it will not differ too much from the one shown by "Rinaun".
The German "Kaiser Frederick III" developed the maximum power on the shafts of 13 053 hp, giving a speed of 17.3 knots, which was 0.2 knots less than the contractual one - again it is unclear whether this was the rated power of the machines or forced. Nevertheless, and most likely, in its speed qualities "Peresvet" occupied an intermediate position between "Rhinaun" and "Kaiser Friedrich III".
In terms of range, everything is much more complicated. Usually for "Peresvet" and "Oslyabi" they indicate 5610 miles at a speed of 10 knots, we will find these figures in V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsov, however, in the same book, respected authors indicate:
“… Battleships of this type consume 100-114 tons of coal per day at a speed of 12 knots. For comparison: "Tsesarevich" consumed 76 tons per day at the same speed. This limited the cruising range of 5000 miles instead of 6860 miles according to the project, and even then in good weather."
First, it is in itself strange that we are talking not about 10, but about 12-knot economic movement. And secondly, the above quote already contains a certain contradiction, because even if we take the consumption not "100-114 tons per day", but all 114 tons, then even then the planned full supply of coal (2058 tons) guaranteed the ship more than 18 days full speed, for which the ship (at a speed of 12 knots traveling 288 miles per day) could travel 5199 miles, but not 5000 miles. If we take the average daily consumption of 100 tons, then the cruising range will obviously increase even more (20.5 days and 5927 miles).
It can be assumed that the range of the "Peresvet" was (calculated) 5610 miles at 10 knots and 5000 miles at 12 knots. At a speed of 10 knots, the Russian battleship would travel 240 miles a day and 5610 miles would go in 23 days and 9 hours, while the average daily consumption of coal would be just over 88 tons (if we take the planned total coal supply of 2,058 tons).
At a speed of 12 knots the ship would go 288 miles a day, and 5000 miles would go in 17 days and almost 9 hours, the average daily consumption of coal would already be 118.5 tons. But what about the "100-114 tons" indicated by the authors? It can be assumed that these figures do not include coal consumption for some on-board needs. In addition, the calculation formula that we used implies the obligatory and complete consumption of all 2,058 tons of coal, while when calculating the cruising range of ships of the "Peresvet" type, some losses during storage and transportation of coal or others, similarly affecting to calculate the reason.
Let's assume that the above version is correct. Then we have that the reduction in the economic speed from 12 to 10 knots caused an increase in the range by 610 miles, or 12.2%. This means that if the project provided for a range of 6860 miles at 12 knots, then at 10 knots this very range should have been about 770 miles. Everything would be fine, but in V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsov we read:
“According to the information available in the ITC, for the twin-screw installations of the British battleships Barfleur and Centurion, coal consumption per day at a 10-knot stroke reached 86 tons, taking into account 5 tons for shipboard needs. Driving under one medium machine in an economical mode reduced the consumption to 47 tons."
Let's say that even the planned fuel consumption of 47 tons does not include the very “5 tons for shipboard needs”. Let the Russian "battleship-cruiser" have them not even 5, but 10 tons. But even then, an average daily consumption of 57 tons will provide more than 36 days of travel at a speed of 10 knots, or a range of 8665 miles!
And then - even more interesting: in another chapter of their book V. Krestyaninov and S. Molodtsov write about the first exits to the sea of the battleship "Peresvet":
"At sea, the mode of economic operation was determined: with 10 operating boilers and two on-board machines, the speed is 10-10.5 knots and the consumption of coal is about 100 tons per day."
In other words, if earlier it was said that at a flow rate of 100-114 tons a speed of 12 knots was reached, now it is only 10-10.5 knots at 100 tons / day! Given that 100 tons per day at an average speed of 10 knots and coal reserves of 2058 tons give about 5000 miles of cruising range, but by no means 5610 miles!
Thus, the only thing that can be said for sure is that battleships of the "Peresvet" type, having achieved and even slightly exceeded the planned maximum speed, very much "did not reach" the cruising range. Presumably, their estimated cruising range was no more than 5610 miles per 10 knots (Pobeda's - 6080 miles), while the actual one did not exceed 5000 miles at the same speed, and perhaps it turned out to be even less.
In principle, such a range against the background of British and German ships was not so bad: for example, the German "Kaiser Frederick III", according to some data, had 2940-3585 miles at 9 knots, although other sources give 5000 miles. As for the "Rhinaun", O. Parks assigns it a completely incredible 8500 miles at 15 (!) Knots, and here we can assume a banal typo, especially since 6000 miles at 10 knots are indicated for the ships of the previous series ("Centurion") … Probably, it would not be a mistake to think that the range of the "Peresvetov" also turned out to be intermediate between the German and British battleships, but the problem was that such a range did not at all correspond to the tasks of the "battleship-cruiser". Still, 5,000 miles or less was not enough range for raiding operations in the ocean. Thus, we are forced to state with regret that one of the most important characteristics that determine the purpose of the ship was not achieved. Why did it happen?
The fact is that on the "battleships-cruisers" a new, very ingenious power plant was used, consisting of three steam engines operating on three shafts and rotating three screws. At the same time, it was assumed that the economic course would be provided by only one medium machine, and the other two, located on the sides, would work only in a combat situation.
The calculation was perfectly sound, but … the material part of the Experiment Pool failed. Much later, in 1898, Captain A. N. Krylov, the future academician, described his work as follows:
“… From this it becomes clear why the five-year activity of the pool remained fruitless; if this activity continues in the same form, without any systematic program, then it can, as already indicated, lead to irreparable mistakes. Testing models without propellers, predicting qualities and drawing up ship drawings for such tests and based not on proven facts, but on the "conviction" that Froude's theory is correct, and that the presence of a propeller will not change the nature of the phenomena, the current activity of the pool seems to be just as dangerous for shipbuilding, how dangerous for navigation would be the activity of such a meteorological station, which would display its warning signs, based not on synoptic charts, but on the "conviction" of the fidelity of the Brusov calendar."
The problem was that when one machine out of three was running, one propeller out of three also rotated. And the other two propellers created such perturbations that movement under one vehicle was almost impossible: all this would have been easily revealed in tests of models of battleships of the "Peresvet" type … if the models were tested with propellers. Well, the result was the following - if one or two machines worked, then they had to overcome the resistance of non-rotating propellers: if all three machines were working, then too much coal was spent on their work, because each of them required relatively little power, upon reaching which the efficiency was low.
If this problem were identified at the design stage of the ship, then it is possible that it could be solved by some kind of transmission, when the work of one central machine would rotate all three screws at once - in this case, perhaps, the planned cruising range would be achieved, or at least the failure would not have been so grandiose.
Sometimes "on the Internet" one has to read that the three-screw scheme of "Peresvetov" is dictated by the fact that in Russia there was nowhere to get machines capable of providing the required power on two shafts. Reading this is at least strange: two years before the "Peresvet" and "Oslyabi", the armored cruiser "Russia" was laid down, which had 2 vehicles of 7250 hp each. each (and the third, less power, for the economic move). Those. if the problem of "braking screws" had been identified in a timely manner, then "Peresvet" could well have become a twin-screw, without losing in power at all. But generally speaking, the three-screw suspension itself was not at all flawed in comparison with the two-or four-screw one adopted much later. It is interesting that the Germans, having equipped their Kaisers (and including, of course, the Kaiser Frederick III) with three steam engines, were so pleased with this scheme that all their subsequent series of battleships and battleships tried to make it with three-screw.
Sometimes we hear complaints about the quality of machines and boilers of "Peresvetov". They, obviously, were not the peak of perfection at the time the ships entered service, but it must be remembered that at the time of the laying, the Russian ships received the most modern boilers in comparison with their peers. Water-tube boilers of Belleville were installed on "Peresvet", while the British "Rhynown" carried outdated fire-tube boilers, and the German "Kaiser Friedrich III" had both fire-tube and water-tube boilers.
Also, sometimes one has to deal with impartial statements "about these crooked Russians" who are unable to effectively operate complex equipment, such as the Belleville boilers at that time. But here you need to understand that all nations faced problems in the transition to a new, more complex technology - just not all of them like to trumpet about their problems and difficulties, which can give the impression from the outside that the development of new boilers among the same Englishmen went completely painless. Meanwhile, this is not so - the same O. Parks, even if it is extremely streamlined, but still writes:
“The new boilers, in comparison with the old ones, required more skillful handling, and since the instructions of the Admiralty, if followed punctually, did not contribute to the achievement of the best results, during the first few years of operation of the water-tube boilers they had to face a variety of problems until they were developed and the skills of proper service have not been instilled, making the state of affairs more bearable."
Translated into Russian, it sounds like this: the British crews received neither training nor competent instructions for handling water-tube boilers, which is why the latter had to be mastered by trial and error, with all the ensuing consequences. Alas, about the same thing happened in the Russian fleet - a very contemptuous attitude and underestimation of the role of the "Beelzebubs" led to insufficient training of machine teams, which, moreover, mastered their naval specialty on the fire-tube boilers of old training ships.
Completing the description of the main technical features of the first "Peresvetov", I would like to note that the ships received a number of extremely useful innovations: for example, they received autonomous drainage systems, when instead of one main pipe, water was pumped out by 9 drainage turbines. For the first time, electric drives of steering gears were used. The ships were distinguished by good seaworthiness, which was ensured by a high forecastle.
Unfortunately, battleships of the "Peresvet" class did not escape the "scourge" of domestic shipbuilding - the overload, which on ships of this type took on very high values. So, "Peresvet" was overloaded by 1136 tons, "Oslyabya" - by 1734 tons, and on the later laid down "Pobeda", in the design of which it was possible to take into account some of the shortcomings of these ships, it was possible to reduce the overload to 646 tons. What was the reason?
Again, we often read "on the Internet" about ugly weight discipline and poor design quality, but this is not entirely true. Figuratively speaking, one of the main problems of domestic shipbuilding was that too often the ship that had been designed was laid down, and the ship that was laid down was not completed.
Take the same "Peresvet" - according to the initial project, it had to have a completely different composition of medium and small-caliber artillery than it actually received. Initially, it was believed that the normal displacement of ships would be 12,674 tons, and in a number of documents the ITC named new ships:
"Three-screw steel armored cruisers of 12,674 tons"
But at the same time, it was planned to install not 11 six-inch guns, but only 8, not 20 anti-mine 75-mm guns, but 5 with a caliber of 120-mm, not 20 small-caliber 47-mm, but 14, and only the number of 37-mm "bunches" was in the final project reduced from 10 to 6 units. At the same time, all six-inch guns were originally supposed to be "crammed" into a single casemate - in the final project, each gun was to receive its own casemate.
All this required additional displacement - and after all, the numerous modifications of the ship during the construction process were not limited only to artillery and armor. Thus, the very first and very significant reason for overloading is the irrepressible striving of admirals and designers in every possible way to improve an already designed ship. In some ways, they could be understood - technical progress in those years marched by leaps and bounds, and the technical solutions of newly modern ships quickly became obsolete, and the long construction time of domestic battleships and ships of other classes led to the fact that at the time of completion of construction, the fleet received far not the most modern combat units. Thus, the desire to improve the ship under construction was understandable, but could not lead to a good result.
In addition, the desire to use modern "stuffing" led to the fact that at the time of the ship's design the exact weight characteristics of the equipment were not yet known, and this also created additional overload. And, besides, in other cases an ugly building really took place.
"Peresvet" and "Oslyabya" were laid down on the same project at the same time, but at different shipyards - the first at the Baltic Shipyard, the second at the New Admiralty. But the total construction time of "Peresvet" was about 50 months, and "Oslyabi" - almost twice as long, 90, 5 months, while the overload of "Oslyabi" exceeded that of "Peresvet" by 598 tons. The construction overload of "Oslyabi" exceeded all conceivable limits, which, of course, could not but affect the combat qualities of this ship.
Thus, it can be stated that the attempt to obtain "battleships-cruisers" equally suitable for combat against the battleships of Germany and battleships of the 2nd class of England, as well as for operations on oceanic communications failed. The fighting qualities of "Peresvetov" allowed them to cope with the first task, but their cruising range, quite acceptable for squadron battleships, was too short for ocean raiding - the reason for this was the miscalculations in the design of the power plant and the large construction overload of these ships.
In comparison with the same British battleships of the 1st class, ships of the "Peresvet" class received weakened armament and armor - this was a reasonable compromise for a "battleship-cruiser" capable of long-term operations in the ocean. But, since the cruisers from "Peresvetov" did not work, we can say that the Russian Imperial Navy received two relatively weak battleships.
