Squadron battleships of the "Peresvet" class occupy a special place in the history of the Russian navy. These high-breasted beauties with a recognizable silhouette took an active part in the Russian-Japanese war, but their fate turned out to be sad. All three ships of this type were lost: "Oslyabya" rested at the bottom of the Tsushima Strait, and "Peresvet" and "Pobeda" went to the Japanese when they occupied Port Arthur. And yet, "Peresvet" was destined to return to the Russian Imperial Navy, it was redeemed to participate in joint Allied operations in the Mediterranean during the First World War. It seemed that fate gave the ship a second chance. But this did not happen, and his combat career ended before he could begin: "Peresvet" was killed by being blown up by German mines near Port Said even before it could begin to perform combat missions.
It is believed that the "Peresvets" turned out to be an unsuccessful type of armored ships: occupying an intermediate position between squadron battleships and cruisers, these ships did not become either one or the other. In this series of articles, we will not question this opinion, but we will try to figure out how it came about that the country, which had just built a series of very successful for its time (and at the time of the laying - and one of the best in the world) battleships of the type " Poltava "suddenly stumbled and created" not a mouse, not a frog, but an unknown animal. " It is known that the "Peresvet" project was greatly influenced by the British 2nd class battleships of the "Centurion" class and the later laid down "Rhinaun". But how did it happen that the leadership of the Naval Ministry took as a model for their squadron battleship, i.e. potentially the most powerful ship in the fleet, lightweight and obviously inferior to modern British battleships of the 1st class?
In order to understand the history of the "Peresvet" class battleships, it is necessary to link their design characteristics with those ideas about the role and tasks of the fleet that existed at the time of their design. It is interesting that the monographs of such respected authors as R. M. Melnikov, V. Ya. Krestyaninov, S. V. Molodtsov, in general, give all the necessary information on this issue, and an attentive reader, familiar with the history of both domestic and foreign navies, will be able to draw all the necessary conclusions for himself. But nevertheless, the respected masters did not focus the readers' attention on this aspect, but we will try to reveal it as fully as possible (as far as possible for the article format, of course).
To do this, we will have to go back to 1881, when a special meeting was created under the chairmanship of Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich (the same "Seven pounds of the most august meat", although in fairness it must be admitted that in those years he had not yet gained the proper weight) a special meeting was created. In addition to the future admiral-general (Alexey Alexandrovich will receive this position after 2 years), this meeting included the Minister of War and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as the manager of the Naval Ministry. The task of this most respectable assembly was one: to determine the development of the navy, in accordance with the military and political requirements of the Russian Empire.
The Black Sea Fleet was recognized as the primary concern; the rest of the fleets should have been started only secondarily. But the Black Sea was a closed basin and the fleet was assigned specific tasks peculiar only to this theater: it should be much stronger than the Turkish naval forces and be able to ensure not only dominance at sea, but also escort and support the landing of 30,000 people, which should will capture the mouth of the Bosphorus and gain a foothold on its shores. The leadership of the Russian Empire assumed that the day of the collapse of Turkey was close and wanted to get the Straits - this became the leitmotif of the construction of the Black Sea Fleet.
With the Baltic Fleet, everything seemed to be clear as well:
"The main task for the Baltic Fleet is to bring it to a priority value in comparison with the fleets of other powers washed by the same sea, providing it with reliable bases in the least freezing parts of the Gulf of Finland."
The tasks of the Pacific Fleet were very interesting. On the one hand, it was recognized that the defense of the "most important points of the coast" did not need a navy at all, and this could be achieved
"… with only engineering and artillery means and minefields, and only to ensure communication between these points, as well as for the intelligence service, it seems necessary to have a small military flotilla of quite reliable ships."
To this end, it was supposed to create and expand the Siberian flotilla, without trying, however, to make it a force capable of independently fighting the naval forces of other powers. However, from the above it does not at all follow that the special meeting refused to use sea power in the Far East, however, these forces had to fundamentally differ in their composition, depending on who they were to fight, with a European or Asian power:
“… In the event of separate clashes with China or Japan in case of peaceful relations with the European powers, a squadron from the Baltic and Black Sea fleets will be dispatched to the waters of the Pacific Ocean. To protect common interests, political and commercial, Russia needs to have a sufficient number of cruisers in the waters of the Pacific Ocean, which could, in the event of a collision with European powers, seriously threaten trade by attacking their commercial ships, warehouses and colonies."
Thus, according to the conclusions of a special meeting, the needs of the Russian Imperial Navy looked like this: on the Black Sea - an armored fleet for dominance in Turkey and the capture of the Straits, in the Pacific Ocean - cruising forces for action in the ocean against the communications of European powers, in the Baltic it was necessary to build a naval force so that it was able to outnumber the combined forces of the German and Swedish navies, which guaranteed an advantage at sea in the event of a conflict with one of these countries. And besides, the Baltic Fleet should have been able at any time to allocate an expeditionary corps of armored ships to send the latter to the Pacific Ocean or to any other place where the emperor liked:
"The Baltic fleet should consist of battleships, without dividing them into ranks and categories, quite suitable for sending, if necessary, to distant waters."
This formulation of the question was a definite innovation in the use of the fleet. The fact is that the battleships of those years, for the most part, were not at all intended for service in the ocean, although they had sufficient seaworthiness so as not to drown on the ocean wave. The same Britain did not at all envisage the use of its battleships in the Indian or Pacific Ocean - it needed them for domination in the seas washing Europe, and the protection of communications was entrusted to numerous cruisers. Therefore, the decision to build battleships that were supposed to go to the Far East and serve there looked like something new.
And besides, a special meeting actually predetermined the opponents for the Baltic ships. In the Baltic they were supposed to be the fleets of Germany and Sweden, in the Far East - the ships of China and Japan. Of course, the cruising fleet, which was supposed to be based in Vladivostok and threaten the sea communications of England (or other European countries) from there, should also be built in the Baltic.
After the tasks of the fleet were determined, the specialists of the Naval Ministry calculated the forces required to solve these tasks. The total need for ships of the Baltic Fleet (taking into account cruisers for the Pacific Ocean), according to these calculations, was:
Battleships - 18 pcs.
Cruisers of the 1st rank - 9 pcs.
Cruisers of the 2nd rank - 21 pcs.
Gunboats - 20 pcs.
Destroyers - 100 pcs.
In addition, it was necessary to build 8 gunboats and 12 destroyers for the Siberian flotilla.
This program of military shipbuilding was approved by the then reigning Alexander III and submitted to a special commission, which included representatives of various ministries. The Commission concluded that:
"Although the real expense is very heavy for the state, however, it is recognized as necessary,"
but
"To carry out the program within a 20-year period, since a shorter period is unbearable for the funds of the state treasury."
What can you say about the Russian shipbuilding program of 1881? We will not analyze the Black Sea theater in detail, since it does not relate to the topic of this article, but the Baltic and Pacific ones … Of course, the very organization of fleet planning looks very sensible - the naval and military ministers together with the minister of internal affairs determine a potential enemy, the naval ministry formulates the need for ships, and then the commission, with the involvement of other ministries, is already deciding how much the country can do.
At the same time, attention is drawn to the fact that the Russian Empire did not claim dominance in the oceans, clearly realizing that at that stage of development such a task was beyond its strength. However, Russia did not want to completely abandon the ocean-going fleet - she needed it, first of all, as a political instrument of influence on technically advanced countries. Militarily, the Russian Empire needed to protect its coast in the Baltic Sea, and besides, it wanted domination in the Baltic and in Asia: but this, of course, only on condition of non-intervention of the fleets of the first-class naval powers - England or France.
And these requirements lead to a dangerous dualism: not hoping to build a fleet capable of competing in a general battle with the French or English, but wanting to carry out a "projection of power" in the oceans, Russia only had to build numerous cruising squadrons. However, cruisers are incapable of ensuring domination in the Baltic - for this, battleships are needed. Accordingly, the Russian Empire was supposed to build, in fact, two fleets of completely different purposes - an armored one for the defense of the coast and a cruising ocean one. But could a country that is not a world industrial leader create such fleets of sufficient size to solve the tasks assigned to them?
Subsequent events clearly showed that the shipbuilding program of 1881 turned out to be too ambitious and did not correspond to the capabilities of the Russian Empire. Therefore, already in 1885, the 1881 program was almost halved - now it was supposed to build only:
Battleships - 9 pcs.
Cruisers of the 1st rank - 4 pcs.
Rank 2 cruisers - 9 pcs.
Gunboats - 11 pcs.
Destroyers and counter-destroyers - 50 pcs.
In addition, it suddenly turned out that in order to achieve not so much domination, but at least parity with the German fleet in the Baltic, much more effort would have to be made than had been previously assumed. The only battleships that joined the Baltic Fleet in the first half of the 1890s were two battering ships: "Emperor Nicholas I" and "Emperor Alexander II" and the extremely unsuccessful "Gangut".
Battleship "Gangut", 1890
At the same time, the German fleet in the period from 1890 to 1895 was replenished with 6 coastal defense battleships of the "Siegfried" type and 4 squadron battleships of the "Brandenburg" type - and the Kaiser was not going to stop there.
The problem was that Germany, which at that time had a powerful industry, suddenly desired to build a navy worthy of itself. She certainly had no less opportunities than the Russian Empire, despite the fact that Germany could keep her entire fleet off her shores and send it to the Baltic if necessary. Russia, on the other hand, was forced to build and maintain the mighty Black Sea Fleet in an isolated maritime theater, and it would hardly have been able to come to the rescue in the event of a war with Germany.
For the sake of fairness, it should be noted that this "sea dash" of land Germany could hardly have been predicted in 1881, when the 20-year shipbuilding program was being created, but now the Russian Empire found itself in a situation where not so much for domination, but at least for parity in the Baltic, it was necessary to make much more effort than previously planned. But the program of 1881 refused to Russia beyond its power!
Nevertheless, the leadership of the Russian Empire saw the provision of a worthy counterbalance in the Baltic as a more important matter than the construction of cruiser squadrons to support foreign policy, so the construction of battleships received a priority. The "Program for the Accelerated Development of the Baltic Fleet" was supposed to build 10 battleships, 3 armored cruisers, 3 gunboats and 50 destroyers in 1890-1895. But it was also a failure: during this period, only 4 battleships were laid down (Sisoy the Great and three ships of the Poltava type), three coastal defense battleships of the Ushakov type (instead of gunboats), the armored cruiser Rurik and 28 destroyers.
Thus, in the period 1881-1894. military and political necessity forced the Russian Empire to build two fleets - an armored one and a cruiser. But this practice only led to the fact that neither battleships nor cruisers could be built in sufficient numbers, and the too different requirements for these classes of ships in the Russian fleet did not allow them to replace each other. So, for example, the armored cruiser "Rurik" was a magnificent ocean raider, perfectly adapted for operations on ocean communications. However, the cost of its construction exceeded that of the battleships of the "Poltava" class, while the "Rurik" was absolutely useless for the battle in the line. Instead of "Rurik" something else could be built, for example, the fourth battleship of the "Poltava" class. Ships of this type would have looked excellent in the line against any German battleship, but the Poltava was completely unsuitable for corsair operations far from their native shores.
As a result, closer to 1894, an extremely unpleasant situation developed: huge funds were spent on the construction of the Baltic Fleet (by the standards of the Russian Empire, of course), but at the same time the fleet was not able to dominate the Baltic Sea (for which there were not enough battleships) or to conduct large-scale operations in the ocean (because there were not enough cruisers), i.e. none of the functions for which the fleet, in fact, was created, was performed. Of course, this situation was intolerable, but what were the options?
There was nowhere to get additional funding, to abandon the defense of the Baltic or cruising operations in the ocean is unthinkable, which means … So it only remained to design a type of ship that would combine the qualities of an armored cruiser-raider, a la "Rurik" and a squadron battleship like "Poltava" …And start building ships that can stand in line against the battleships of the German fleet, but at the same time will be able to disrupt British communications.
Exaggerating: you can, of course, create 5 battleships of the "Poltava" type and 5 cruisers of the "Rurik" type, but the former will not be enough against Germany, and the latter against England. But if instead of this 10 battleships-cruisers are built, capable of fighting both Germany and England, then the matter will be completely different - with the same financial costs. Therefore, it is not at all surprising that in 1894 the head of the Naval Ministry, Admiral N. M. Chikhachev demanded from MTK to create a draft design
"… a strong modern battleship, rather characterized by an armored cruiser."
Thus, we see that the very idea of a "battleship-cruiser" did not appear at all from a floundering bay, it was not at all some kind of admiral's whim. On the contrary, in conditions of limited funding, the creation of this type of ships remained, in essence, the only way to achieve the goals set for the Baltic Fleet.
But still, why was the British 2nd class battleship taken as a reference point? The answer to this question is much simpler than it might seem at first glance, and for this one should recall the features of the shipbuilding programs of Great Britain and Germany.
For the war on sea communications, the Russian Empire created a specific type of armored cruiser, in which the fighting qualities were sacrificed for cruising. But still, they remained formidable enough opponents for most foreign cruisers of the same age. Such were "Vladimir Monomakh" and "Dmitry Donskoy", "Memory of Azov" and "Rurik".
The British also built armored cruisers, but two of their series entered service in the period 1885-1890. (we are talking about "Imperials" and "Orlando") were so unsuccessful that they disappointed the British sailors in this class of ships. In the future, the Royal Navy for a long time abandoned armored cruisers in favor of armored cruisers, which, as the Admiralty believed, could well protect English trade routes from Russian encroachments. But still, the British admirals could not be satisfied with a situation when they could only oppose armored cruisers to enemy armored cruisers, and besides, Britain did not want to compromise its interests in Asia. Not that the British were seriously afraid of the Chinese or Japanese fleet (we are talking about 1890), but still, in order to "educate" the same China, it was necessary to have ships capable of suppressing land forts, and armored cruisers were not very well suited for these purposes. Therefore, the British in 1890 laid down battleships of the 2nd class of the "Centurion" type. Designed for service in Asia, they surpassed in combat power any Russian armored cruiser and any ship of any Asian fleet, while having a draft that allowed them to enter the mouths of large Chinese rivers. Then the British laid down an even more perfect "Rhinaun".
Accordingly, in the waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, it was the Rhinaun that was supposed to represent the maximum combat power that the Russian battleships-cruisers could face. As for the German fleet, its development paths also looked very tortuous and unclear. After the Germans decided to strengthen themselves at sea, they laid down a gigantic series of eight coastal defense battleships of the "Siegfried" type at that time, but in combat terms these were very mediocre ships. And how much can be accommodated in a displacement of 4 100-4300 tons? Three 240-mm and a dozen 88-mm guns would have looked great on a gunboat, but for a battleship, such a composition of weapons was not suitable. Reservation was not bad (up to 240 mm belt) but … in truth, even "one mast, one pipe, one gun - one misunderstanding" "Gangut" looked like a superdreadnought against their background, unless of course you remember that "Gangut" was one, and the Siegfrieds eight. The next series of German battleships seemed to be a significant step forward: four Brandenburg-class ships had a much larger displacement (over 10 thousand tons), a speed of 17 knots and an armor belt of 400 mm.
But it was obvious that the German shipbuilders, ignoring the experience of world armor-building, were following their own national path towards some of their own, only to them, and a visible goal: the armament of German ships was like nothing else. The main caliber consisted of six 280 mm guns of two different types. All of them could shoot on one side, and thus they favorably differed from the artillery of battleships of other powers, most of which could only fire onboard with 3-4 large cannons (which were usually only four), but this was the end of the firepower of the newest German battleships - eight 105mm cannons were practically useless in linear combat. The author of this article does not have data on whether the Naval Ministry knew about the characteristics of the battleships newly designed in Germany, but looking at the general development of the German fleet, it could be assumed that in the future the Germans would build battleships, whose firepower is more likely equivalent to the battleships of the 2nd class, not 1st.
That, in fact, is the answer to why the Rhinaun was taken as a reference point for the Russian "battleships-cruisers". Nobody set the task of the Baltic Fleet to resist the battleship squadrons of the 1st class of England or France. In the event of their appearance in the Baltic Sea, it was supposed to defend behind land fortifications, involving ships only as an auxiliary force, and it was not worth expecting such battleships on ocean communications at all - they were not created for that. Therefore, there was no urgent need to provide the "battleships-cruisers" with a combat power equivalent to the first-class battleships of the world's leading powers. It would be enough to make the newest Russian ships surpass the second-ranked British battleships in their combat qualities and not be too inferior to the newest German ones.
In addition, the Russian "battleship-cruiser" was supposed to be a compromise between combat and cruising capabilities, because its cost should not exceed a conventional battleship, but it would be better if it was even less, since things were not the best for the money of the Russian Empire. …
All of the above reasons look quite logical and as if they should have led to the creation of albeit unusual, but in their own way interesting and very balanced ships. But what went wrong then?
