An assessment of the combat qualities and results of the operation of US armored vehicles in the war against Iraq is set out according to foreign sources.
Shortly after the end of Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the US leadership instructed the General Financial Control Department to analyze the effectiveness of the actions of American weapons and military equipment during this operation in order to determine ways to improve them. With regard to armored vehicles, the actions of the Abrams tanks (M-1 and M-1A1) and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicle (BMP) (M-2A1 and M-2A2) were considered.
By the beginning of hostilities in the Persian Gulf zone there were:
- 3113 Abrams tanks, of which 2024 were deployed in units (M-1A1 - 1,904 units and M-1 - 120 units), 1089 units are in reserve;
- 2200 BMP "Bradley", including deployed in 1730 units (834 - M-2A2 vehicles with increased survivability), in the reserve - 470 pcs.
The department specialists conducted a questionnaire survey of direct participants in the operation (from division commanders to tank crew members). The respondents were asked three questions:
-how combat vehicles have shown themselves in the operation;
- what are the detected deficiencies and proposals for their elimination;
- how the actions of the support and support machines were evaluated.
The army reports on the technical condition and combat readiness of the vehicles were also studied. After a preliminary analysis of the materials received, the department acquainted the relevant services and bodies of the US Department of the Army and the US Department of Defense with them, with which measures were discussed to eliminate the identified deficiencies.
The effectiveness of the combat use of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles was assessed according to five criteria:
- by combat readiness, characterized by the performance of vehicles in a combat situation (the ability to move, fire and maintain communication) and its maintenance;
-by firepower capable of hitting enemy targets;
- by survivability, which is determined by the ability to resist or avoid being hit by enemy fire through passive protection and maneuverability;
-by mobility, realized by the ability to move around terrain with different terrain at maximum speeds and maneuverability;
- according to the power reserve (the maximum distance that the car can travel without refueling in the given road conditions).
The combat readiness factor was determined by the relative number of vehicles in a subunit, ready to perform a combat mission on a given day, expressed as a percentage. Malfunctions that did not affect the ability to move, fire and maintain communications were not taken into account when assessing the combat readiness ratio in a combat situation.
1. Evaluation of the fighting qualities of tanks "Abrams"
Tanks "Abrams" in the combat operations of Operation "Desert Storm" showed high combat readiness. The number of Abrams tanks, which were indicated in the army reports as ready for combat missions, exceeded 90% during the entire period of hostilities. This level is confirmed by the reviews of tank commanders, crew members and repair personnel. Some crews in reports indicated that the Abrams tanks were the best combat vehicles on the battlefield, while others believed that the tanks were capable of covering long distances with minor maintenance difficulties.
The Abrams tank armament system provides good firing accuracy and has a strong destructive effect. According to tank commanders and gunners, the shells of the 120-mm cannon inflicted catastrophic damage to Iraqi tanks. The ability of a tank thermal imaging sight to detect a target in the dark, through smoke and fog, as well as the effectiveness of an armor-piercing sub-caliber projectile, which often led to the defeat of Iraqi tanks from the first shot, was noted. However, the magnification and resolution of the devices should be matched to the range of the 120-mm gun. The firing accuracy of the 120-mm cannon in combat exceeded the predicted one, based on the results of evaluative firings conducted on the eve of the events in the Persian Gulf zone, and is due to: the high performance of the sight, which allowed US tanks to fire at Iraqi tanks at long distances in poor visibility conditions (sandstorms, smoke, thick fog); the short duration of hostilities and hence the insignificant fatigue of personnel and slight wear and tear of equipment; high level of tank readiness and crew training.
Army officials indicated the need to install independent thermal imaging devices for the driver and commander, which will allow the commander to observe the battlefield and search for targets simultaneously with the gunner firing at other targets. The Ministry of the Army has included the installation of a commander's independent thermal imaging device in the list of improvements being implemented on the M-1A2.
Tanks "Abrams" showed high survivability in the course of hostilities. Not a single Abrams tank was destroyed by enemy tanks. In total, 23 Abrams tanks were disabled and damaged during the operation. Of the nine destroyed, seven were fired upon by "friendly" troops, and two tanks were blown up by coalition forces to prevent their capture by the enemy after they lost mobility. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce a system of identification "friend or foe". The commanders and crew members also indicated in the reports about the advisability of installing an indicator of the position of the tower relative to the hull.
Some crews noted in reports that further, with direct hits from Iraqi T-72 tanks, M-1A1 tanks received minimal damage. There is one case when the T-72 tank fired twice at the Abrams tank from a distance of 2,000 meters. As a result, one shell ricocheted, the other got stuck in the armor. On anti-tank mines, two Abrams tanks were blown up and received minor damage, and the crews survived.
Anti-radiation, biological and chemical protection, a system of fire-fighting equipment, additional armor, high speed qualities, maneuverability and firepower - all this, according to the crews, increases their own confidence in safety.
The commanders and crew members of the Abrams tanks, as well as the commanders of the subunits, pointed to the speed, mobility of the tank and its ability to effectively maneuver on any terrain. Tanks "Abrams" performed combat missions in a wide range of changing terrain conditions, including soft sand and rocky areas. Although the speed of the tank changed depending on the tasks being solved and the terrain, the pace of movement was high. At times the tanks were forced to slow down to allow other vehicles, with the exception of the Bradley BMP, to follow them.
Despite the advantages noted above, the disadvantages of the Abrams tank were also named, among them a limited power reserve.
The high fuel consumption of the gas turbine engine limited the tank's range, so refueling tanks was a constant concern of the support service. Tanks were refueled at every opportunity. Before the outbreak of hostilities, the units trained in refueling on the move and in organized columns. Directly in the combat zone, it was required to refuel every 3 … 5 hours. High fuel consumption was of concern to crew members and army personnel. They believe that fuel efficiency can be improved by installing an auxiliary power unit.
The Abrams tank has a capacity of 500 gallons (1,900 liters). The fuel is stored in four fuel compartments: 2 compartments in the front, 2 compartments in the back. According to military estimates, the fuel consumption of the Abrams tanks was 7 gallons per mile (16.5 liters per km), including idling, in which the engine was operated mainly to support the operation of tank electrical equipment.
In the course of hostilities, the crews tried to ensure the development of the rear tanks in the first place due to the less time spent on refueling them. Access to the filler neck of the front fuel tanks is difficult as the turret must be rotated. As a result, the front fuel tanks served as a kind of reserve tanks, and the crews used every opportunity to refill the rear fuel tanks.
Reducing fuel consumption is carried out in two directions:
-reduction of the idling of the main engine due to the installation of an auxiliary power unit, which must supply power to the tank electrical equipment when the engine is not running;
-development of an electronic control unit, which will increase fuel efficiency by 18….20%, thanks to the automatic adjustment of the fuel supply when the engine is idling.
Frequent refueling of the Abrams tanks, due to failures of the fuel-priming pumps, also limited the length of the marches. Fuel is supplied from the rear fuel tanks to the engine by two fuel priming pumps built into the fuel tanks. The two rear tanks are connected so that in the event of a failure, the other serves as a backup. When the fuel in the rear tanks falls below 1/8 of the level, it is pumped from the front tanks to the rear ones. If the transfer pump fails, power to the engine is cut in half as fuel in the front tanks becomes unavailable. All divisions reported unreliable in-line and transfer pumps in their reports. Inline fuel pumps have a high failure rate. According to the crews and mechanics of the units, tanks often worked with only one serviceable built-in pump. If only one pump fails, the tank can perform a combat mission. If both built-in pumps fail, the engine can still receive fuel by gravity, but the engine power, and therefore, the speed of the tank is reduced. To replace the right built-in pump requires more than 4 … 5 and more than 2 … 3 hours to replace the left one. If it was impossible to obtain new pumps to replace those that had failed, some units were forced to repair them themselves. Transfer pumps also frequently failed. So, in the 1st Infantry Division in one of the companies, three tanks out of fourteen could not get into position due to pump failures. The crews explain these failures by the accumulation of precipitation at the bottom of the front tanks: before deploying into battle formations, the tanks did not have long-distance runs, and fuel was not produced from the front tanks for a long time, therefore precipitation clogs the pumps and leads to their breakdowns. The army plans to purchase new fuel pumps with a service life of 3,000 hours instead of 1,000 from serial ones and test them.
Two ways to improve the reliability of the transfer pump are considered. The first is to change the mode of its operation so that the pump pumps fuel at 3/4 of the tank level, and not at 1/8. This should ensure more frequent pumping of fuel and reduce the likelihood of precipitation accumulation. The second is to make a pump with a higher flow, capable of pumping fuel in the presence of precipitation.
Frequent cleaning of the air cleaners also served as a reason for limiting the length of tank marches. The Abrams tank air purifier was designed for operating conditions in Europe and the United States, including the California desert. In the Persian Gulf area, however, the Abrams tank's air cleaner required more frequent cleaning due to the fine, talcum-like sand.
The army took into account the extreme conditions of the desert when deploying armored units in the Persian Gulf area and was forced to carry out frequent and intensive maintenance of air purifiers. Despite this, cases of dust entering the engine began to manifest themselves immediately during deployment, and engine failure occurred in all divisions. In particular, the 24th Infantry Division had a large number of engine failures. The situation was complicated by the lack of filter elements (filters) in the initial period of deployment.
Despite the attention paid to careful maintenance of the air cleaners, units that arrived after the 24th Division also experienced difficulties due to engine breakdowns for the same reason. So, the 1st armored reconnaissance division lost 16 engines during training maneuvers. Other units also suffered engine losses due to dust leakage. Tank commanders and crews quickly realized the importance of maintaining GTE air cleaners in the harsh desert conditions. Maintenance of the air cleaners included using a jet of compressed air to remove sand from the filters and shaking out the filters or lightly tapping on the tank hull or the ground to remove sand.
Most of the tank crews stated that shaking out the filters was the most common method, as it was the simplest and less time consuming. Crews were instructed to check and clean the filters at each refueling stop, i.e. every 3 … 5 hours. Depending on the weather conditions, they stopped even more often to clean the filters. However, despite all these measures, there have been air cleaner failures. Some crews noted that if at the beginning of the operation the weather had been the same as at the end of the operation, then the failures of the air cleaners would have been more acute. The crews of the 1st Armored Division said that when the troops left Iraq, it was dry and dusty, and they experienced great difficulty due to clogging of filters - the engines were losing power and the tanks were slowing down. Five tanks were captured by a dust storm and stopped due to clogging of filters after 15 minutes. after the start of the movement. Two of them stopped again due to the passage of dust into the engine. The Ministry of the Army is considering two possible solutions to the problem of air cleaning. The first is to install a self-cleaning air cleaner on the tank with a longer operating time before maintenance, the second is to use air intake through a tubular air intake device, which excludes the ingress of highly dusty air into the filter.
2. Evaluation of the fighting qualities of the BMP "Bradley"
BMP "Bradley" in the combat operations of Operation Desert Storm showed high combat readiness. The percentage of vehicles ready for the day's combat mission was close to or exceeded 90% during the entire operation. At the same time, the machine model M-2A2 had a combat readiness ratio in the range of 92 … 96%. and older models M-2 and M-2A1 - 89 … 92%. The crews of the Bradley and the repairmen emphasized the combat readiness of the M-2A2 model, which has increased reliability and better maintainability. At the same time, the crews and mechanics of the units noted a number of recurring defects in the equipment and systems of the vehicle. These defects were insignificant: they did not affect the performance of combat missions and did not affect the values of the combat readiness coefficients (table).
The armament system of the BMP "Bradley" showed high efficiency, the 25-mm automatic cannon was a universal weapon. Crews used the 25mm cannon mainly to "clear" bunkers and fire at light armored vehicles. There were cases when enemy tanks were hit by the fire of a 25-mm automatic cannon. However, in order to knock out a tank with a 25-mm shell, it is necessary to shoot at close range at the most vulnerable spots.
ATGM TOU BMP "Bradley" had a destructive effect at long distances against all types of enemy armored targets, including tanks. The crews of the 1st Armored Division and the 2nd Armored Reconnaissance Regiment used TOU to destroy Iraqi tanks at a distance of 800 to 3,700 m. Some Bradley commanders, crews and army specialists expressed concern that the Bradley BMP since launch TOU before hitting the target must remain motionless. At this time, it is vulnerable to enemy fire, in order for the TOU to reach the target at a distance of 3750 m, it takes 20 s. Wishes are expressed to replace the TOU with homing missiles of the "fire and forget" type.
Crews and army specialists would like to have a built-in laser rangefinder on the Bradley machine to accurately determine the distance to the target, since in some cases the gunners opened fire on targets outside the range of the TOW. As a result, there were undershoots. When some crews used autonomous laser rangefinders, they were exposed to enemy fire. These devices are inconvenient to operate, in a combat situation it is difficult to obtain accurate readings with their help. The Ministry of the Army is investigating the possibility of installing a built-in laser rangefinder on the Bradley BMP.
Defects in the equipment of the BMP "Bradley"
It is also noted that the range of the weapons exceeds the range of target identification, therefore, it is pointed out that it is necessary to increase the magnification and resolution of the sights to prevent the destruction of "friendly" ones.
The survivability of the Bradley BMP could not be fully appreciated due to the limited information. Most of the wrecked vehicles were hit by tank cannon fire. It was found that the Bradley BMP fire fighting equipment system worked effectively.
A total of 20 vehicles were destroyed and 12 were damaged, but four of them were quickly repaired. From the fire of "their" 17 BMP "Bradley" was destroyed and three damaged.
Commanders and crew members spoke positively about the advantages of the M-2A2 model over the M-2 and M-1A1, since the additional booking, anti-fragmentation screens and better mobility give a feeling of greater security.
The placement of ammunition on the M-2A2 was changed in order to increase survivability, but this did not find a positive assessment from the commanders and crew members, who were more concerned with ammunition replenishment than with survivability. The vehicles carried additional ammunition, which were located wherever possible. This could lead to an increase in personnel losses due to their explosion due to collisions when vehicles were moving. The commanders and crews positively assessed the mobility and speed of the Bradley BMP, indicating also good maneuverability in desert conditions and the ability to interact with the Abram tank.
The crews who fought on the Bradley BMP M-2A2 model were satisfied with a more powerful 600-horsepower engine instead of the previous 500-horsepower, as well as improved maneuverability compared to the outdated BMP models.
As a disadvantage, a low reverse speed was noted, which reduced the possibility of interaction of the BMP with the Abrams tank. The M-2A2 has a reverse speed of about seven miles per hour (11 km / h), while the Abrams has a speed of 20 miles per hour (32 km / h). In the course of hostilities, there were cases when the Abrams tanks were forced to quickly move back in reverse. BMP "Bradley" or lagged behind, or turned around, substituting the rear of the vehicle under enemy fire. It is envisaged to increase the reverse speed.
It is also indicated that it is necessary to install a driver's thermal imager, which will allow him to see better in dust, fog and at night. Serial cars "Bradley" are equipped with electro-optical night devices of the driver. The driver's thermal imager should be designed like a thermal sight. A thermal imaging device for the driver is under development, but the decision to install it on the Bradley car has not yet been made.
BMP "Bradley" has a good range and fuel efficiency. The 2nd armored reconnaissance regiment in the process of hostilities made a transition of 120 miles (192 km) in 82 hours. The crew members of this regiment stated that they could do without refueling during the entire operation. Some crews noted that at stops for refueling Abrams tanks, the Bradley infantry fighting vehicles never had fuel less than 1/2 … 3/4 of the tank level.
3. General shortcomings in the operation of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles
Although the supply of spare parts in the theater of operations zone was satisfactory, there were many shortcomings in the system of their distribution to subunits. Some units experienced a significant shortage of spare parts, while others had them in abundance. A significant part of the spare parts did not reach the divisions for which they were intended. Therefore, most of the divisions sent their representatives to the central base in the port of Dhahran, and they were forced to sort through mountains of containers in search of the necessary spare parts. The divisions sometimes exchanged spare parts with each other or took them from vehicles that were out of order.
By the beginning of hostilities, the supply of spare parts from the USA and Germany was ensured in a short time in such quantities that the logistics specialists did not know what spare parts they had and where they were stored. It sometimes took several days to process orders for spare parts, in particular, due to incompatibility of computer systems and formats. Then there were transport problems. The army did not have a sufficient number of vehicles, many of which were unreliable and outdated in design. The combat units were changing their location and it was difficult to find them.
Crew members, commanders and army specialists indicated that improved optics were needed for the sights of the Abrams tanks and the Bradley BMP. Although the gunners were able to see potential targets at a distance of 4,000 m or more, the images were in the form of "hot spots". Target identification, that is, recognition of "friend or foe" was possible only at distances of 1500 … 2,000 m in clear weather and 500 … 600 m or less in rain. The main armament of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles could hit targets outside these ranges: ATGM TOU - at a distance of 3750 m, 120-mm cannon - 3000 m or more, 25-mm Bradley cannon - 2500 m.
The inability to identify targets at distances corresponding to the range of weapons, limited the combat effectiveness of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Crews indicated in reports that they delayed the opening of fire, waiting for the outlines of targets to become clear.
Army specialists simultaneously noted that the characteristics of the sights of the Abrams tanks and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicles were superior to those of Iraqi vehicles, thanks to which American tanks and infantry fighting vehicles had a significant tactical advantage. Crews of Iraqi vehicles often simply did not see US tanks when they fired.
The inability of the crews to identify targets at long distances was one of the reasons for the large number of cases of erroneous shelling of their battle formations. So, there were 28 cases of shelling of their own, and in 10 cases the shells hit the target. Some crews of the Bradley BMP admitted that they were more afraid of being hit by the Abrams tank than they were under enemy fire. They also noted that the Bradley vehicle could easily be mistaken for an enemy BMP over long distances.
In the course of hostilities, various methods of the "friend or foe" identification system were used: applying paint to the car with an inverted "V" sign, attaching orange panels, putting on colored glass caps on the stern headlights, installing bright flashing lights, installing a national flag, etc. However all of these measures had limited effectiveness due to weather conditions, long ranges and the inability of thermal devices to distinguish between individual target details.
In connection with the aforementioned incidents, the US Department of the Army has taken certain steps to solve the problem of identifying "friend or foe". Immediately after the events in the Persian Gulf zone, a special organization was approved to work out the issues of identification "friend or foe". It is tasked with checking and making changes to the army doctrine in the near future and for future years, concerning the creation of an effective system of identification "friend or foe", as well as training, promising developments and material support. With the help of this organization, it is planned to carry out a number of projects.
The US Department of the Army also believes that the use of advanced navigation equipment will help identify "friend or foe". If the commander knows exactly where his vehicle is and where the other units are, then it is easier for him to figure out where “his own” and where “aliens” are. Currently, combat units and support services do not have a sufficient number of effective navigation systems. Combat units have one or two navigation systems per company, or approximately one for every 6 … 12 vehicles. In combat, "Desert Storm" used two types of navigation systems: Loran-C and GPS. Loran-C locates based on beacon signals from ground installations. In Saudi Arabia, a network of radio beacons was installed on the ground. To use the existing infrastructure, the US Department of the Army purchased 6,000 receivers. In the course of hostilities, the Loran-C system made it possible for vehicle commanders to determine their location with an accuracy of 300 m.
The GPS navigation system uses signals from satellites. Small SLGR receivers were installed on the Bradley BMP and Abrams tanks, which received signals from satellites. SLGR receivers allowed commanders to locate vehicles with an accuracy of 16 … 30 m. 8,000 SLGR devices were also purchased, of which 3,500 were delivered to vehicles. The crews knew how to use both systems, but the SLGR was preferred due to the increased accuracy of determining the coordinates. According to commanders, crews and army officials, US Army units would not be able to locate on the ground without navigation systems. Navigation systems enabled US units to quickly cross the weakly defended desert in eastern Iraq and cut off Iraqi forces in Kuwait. A captured Iraqi general pointed to the use of the SLGR as an example of when Iraqis were beaten by high American technology.
Support units such as repair and maintenance services, logistics support also used SLGR to locate. The Engineering Service of the 24th Infantry Division used the SLGR to lay new combat routes.
The personnel of the tank units of the US Army highly appreciated the advantages of GPS navigation systems and spoke in favor of installing them on all tanks and infantry fighting vehicles. Wishes were also expressed to install GPS receivers on the Bradley BMP and Abrams tanks.
The Ministry of the Army is working with other organizations to develop military standards and requirements for a new family of PLGR GPS receivers. Although commercial PLGR receivers worked well, they did not fully meet military standards. The Ministry of the Army plans to purchase commercial receivers and modify them to meet the requirements of the military.
The Ministry of the Army is also considering expanding the use of the global navigation system GPS in all combat and training units. The first step in this direction could be the installation of receivers on most ground combat vehicles. There is a requirement that each combat vehicle be equipped with GPS navigation equipment, and in support groups - every second vehicle. The Arms Acquisition Advisory Board is to decide soon on the full-scale production of NAUSTAR GPS systems. According to experts, the cost of the program for the production of 55 thousand GPS systems will be $ 6 billion.
Attaching great importance to the elimination of friendly firing due to unsatisfactory target identification, the Ministry of the Army has developed a long-term 9-year research and development (R&D) plan, the results of which will be phased in.
At the first stage (1992-1994), combat vehicles in the fleet (infantry fighting vehicles, tanks, helicopters, self-propelled artillery installations, etc.) will be equipped with the available navigation and identification means: built-in receivers of the GPS satellite navigation system, modified to take into account the military standards, thermal beacons.
At the same time, the second stage begins - the development of more modern navigation and identification systems based on the latest technologies. Their introduction can start from 1995-1996.
The third stage, which dates back to 2000, provides for the implementation of fundamental and exploratory research on the creation of built-in multifunctional means of identification, navigation, and integrated information processing. No specific lines of research are available.
The R&D plan envisages coordinating at each stage of work the military equipment and fire control systems supplied to the troops with the automated reconnaissance, communications and command and control systems being put into operation.
The commanders and crew members of infantry fighting vehicles and tanks indicated in their reports that their radio stations were unreliable. Most of the Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and Abrams tanks that participated in the hostilities were equipped with VRC-12 radios of 1960 release. In the units of the 1st reconnaissance division, the radio stations were out of order due to overheating. Crew members had to put wet towels on radios to keep them from overheating. Some crews carried several spare radios. In some cases, armored units communicated using signal flags.
Several years ago, the Ministry of the Army recognized the need to develop a new type of radio station. In 1974, the tactical and technical requirements were approved. In 1983, work began under a contract to develop an improved SINGARS radio station. However, by the beginning of Operation Desert Storm in US combat units, only one battalion of the 1st Reconnaissance Division was equipped with new serial models of SINGARS radios. According to the commanders, the new radio stations provided stable and reliable radio communications within a radius of 50 km. SINGARS radios had an MTBF of 7,000 hours in combat, compared to 250 hours of the outdated VRC-12. The Ministry of the Army plans until 1998 to supply the troops with the SINGARS radio station in a total of 150,000 units, and from 1998 to begin the development and adoption of the next model of the radio station. It has not yet been determined whether this will be a new type of radio or an improved SINGARS.
In conclusion, it should be noted the insufficiently effective operation of support and support vehicles, which in some cases hindered the actions of infantry fighting vehicles and tanks. BREM M-88A1 worked unreliable and often could not evacuate M-1A1 tanks. An insufficient number of transporters for the transfer of tanks and heavy equipment was noted. According to crew reports, the pace of movement of the Abrams tanks and the Bradley BMP slowed down so that the M-109 self-propelled artillery unit and support vehicles based on the M-113 armored personnel carrier could catch up with them. The only exceptions were vehicles based on the upgraded M-113A3. Also noted was the unsatisfactory mobility of wheeled trucks, which made it difficult for them to interact with tanks.
Output. Analysis of defects and shortcomings in the operation of the Abrams tanks and the Bradley infantry fighting vehicles allowed American specialists to take them into account when adjusting the development plan for armored vehicles and their systems. At the same time, according to the timing of the proposed implementation, the activities are divided into two groups: priority ones, based on proven technical solutions, and activities requiring R&D. The first group includes:
-installation on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of more advanced optoelectronic devices (with increased magnification and increased resolution), which improve target recognition at long ranges;
-installation on Abrams tanks during the modernization of an independent commander's thermal imager;
- introduction into the power plant of the Abrams tank of an electronic fuel supply control unit, a self-cleaning air cleaner, fuel-booster pumps of increased reliability;
-installation on the chassis of the tank and BMP temporary means that facilitate the identification of "our" and "foreign" vehicles (thermal beacons, thermal tapes, etc.);
-equipping tanks and infantry fighting vehicles with elements of the navigation system;
-installation of a laser rangefinder on the BMP.
The activities of the second group include:
-application on tanks and infantry fighting vehicles of built-in receivers of the satellite navigation system GPS, combined with the automated system of reconnaissance, control and communication being introduced on modernized vehicles;
-installation of an autonomous power unit on the Abrams tank;
-increasing the reverse speed and installing the driver's thermal imaging device (for the Bradley BMP).
In addition, adjustments were made to the plans for the development of support and maintenance vehicles, since the existing fleet of these vehicles did not interact satisfactorily with tanks and infantry fighting vehicles due to their lower mobility.
The article was received by the editorial board on 20.06.94.
Gur Khan: An article from a not so long ago secret magazine - you read and understand: it was not in vain that they secret! For envy take, how quickly the Americans work. They immediately carried out a collection of information, analysis, gave the industry tasks for improvements and modernization - we got the result. Why do we have some kind of slippage all the time? After all, we see our mistakes, and learn from others, and measures have long been developed, various new designs have been invented, but almost none of this is being introduced, and if it is introduced, then in some scanty and cut-off versions, in extremely insignificant quantities. It seems that in our Government and the Ministry of Defense in particular, all sorts of pests are sitting. One message that 2000 tanks are enough for the whole of Russia! Read above - the United States attracted more than 3,000 tanks to only one local operation, of which more than 2,000 were directly deployed in combat units. It's a shame, however …
