The sleepy Arabic afternoon was disturbed by the bell.
- said Saddam, -
That same night, the Tavalkan tanks, throwing up clouds of sand, rushed across the border. Emir Jaber al-Salam fled to Arabia, where the remnants of his defeated army took refuge. Kuwait became the 19th province of Iraq.
At this time in the Middle East were on alert two aircraft carrier strike groups of the US Navy. Which did nothing to prevent the occupation of strategically important for the West, oil Kuwait. They stood and watched. The AUGs, who came to the rescue (in total, six of them had accumulated by the winter) were also doing idleness, waiting for the Air Force to come into play.
According to the laws of military science, the obvious solution was to launch a series of preemptive strikes on Iraqi troops, if only to slow down the deployment of the group and prevent the Iraqis from quietly entrenching themselves in Kuwait (by winter they brought a bunch of air defense systems there and built three defensive lines).
But the aircraft carriers were inactive. The admirals understood that an attempt at independent intervention would lead to heavy losses among the deck air wings without noticeable harm to the enemy. You can now continue your conversation about "agility," "tactical flexibility," and "power projection" with carriers and carrier-based aircraft.
This material is a response to an article published a day ago on "VO". In this article, my opponent, Andrei Kolobov, diligently argued the importance of the AUG's participation in Operation Desert Storm.
According to Andrey, the insignificant number of sorties against the general background was redeemed by the use of carrier-based aircraft. As a result, the pilots of aircraft carriers made their significant contribution to the victory, which, in some disciplines, reached 23 and even more than 40% !!!
My answer to Andrey will be like this.
1. There is no need to look for the hidden meaning there, it is not
In about the same way as in school they "pull out" a poor student so that he does not spoil the list. Trying to find any formal reason to put it “ud.”, Even if the reason is absurd and contrary to common sense.
The only reasonable explanation: the Americans drove aircraft carriers to Iraq because they had to use them somewhere. Admirals want orders too.
Neither tactically nor strategically, there was no need for the AUG to participate in that war. The Yankees and their allies had five times as many warplanes ashore.
“When the Americans lacked countless bases, aircraft were deployed without further ado at international airports: Al Ain (UAE), King Fahd (Saudi Arabia), Muscat (Oman), Sharjah and Cairo international airports - wherever there was a place and necessary infrastructure”.
In other words, even the existing forces had to be based at international airports, and what if carrier-based aircraft had to be deployed there as well?
Andrey, don't be afraid and frighten those around you. If desired, they would deploy a grouping equivalent to the air wings of six AB. For example, removing from the airbases of the region part of the useless aircraft of its allies. What did the 87 outdated Saudi F-5s, British Jaguars or the surviving Skyhawks of the Kuwaiti Air Force mean in that war?
And replacing all this air traffic with multi-role fighters of the 4th generation.
Also, do not forget about the higher characteristics of ground-based aircraft (one F-111 in terms of combat load and sighting systems cost as much as two or three deck bomber). Andrey will probably say: "How is it, I proved last time that the difference is only a couple of percent." But he took for comparison the best (and in fact the only) type of carrier-based aircraft with the most primitive of the land multipurpose fighters (F-16). Just take into account that the light and massive "Falken" is used to minimize costs, but if the need arises, then the F-15E and the company will go into battle.
As a result, we are talking not about three hundred, but about a much smaller number of units. aviation equipment. As for the fuel reserves and 2 thousand tons of ammunition on board aircraft-carrying ships … "Capella" would have brought bombs, spare parts and consumables for the year of war ahead, fortunately, it has a deadweight of 40 thousand tons and the speed during the transition is higher than that of an aircraft carrier.
In the absence of aircraft carriers, the war would have continued as we know it. Nothing would have changed other than lower operating costs for the Coalition.
2. Andrey asks the question:
And what's the point if they can't fight on their own?
Whatever one may say, there is nowhere without ground air bases. If the insidious enemy has time to bomb all airfields, the war is automatically lost. The presence of AB will help nothing. Or are you going to completely eliminate the bases and deploy aircraft on ships? No? Then why for the hundredth time the argument about the lesser vulnerability of "floating airfields"?
3. "We will be surprised to find that US carrier-based aircraft, which had only about a quarter of the total number of American tactical aircraft, provided 41.3% of all sorties of heavy fighters."
It might have been surprising if these carrier-based fighters were the last resort. However, the Yankees always had the opportunity to transfer a couple of additional F-15 squadrons to the theater of operations. And nothing would have changed from this.
All the same, the deck "Tomkats", despite thousands of sorties, could not intercept anyone, all 34 aerial victories went to the F-15C.
By the way, despite his reverent attitude towards numbers (up to tenths of a percent), dear Andrey forgot to take into account 50 heavy fighters of the Saudi Arabian Air Force (the Saudis also flew F-15s). However, against the general background, their significance was not great: only two declared victories.
4. "It only remains to repeat that the mass of bombs can in no way serve as a measure of the effectiveness of aircraft."
Andrey is absolutely right. For example, about 40% of the highest priority targets in Iraq were assigned to the stealth (there were 42 Nighthawks in the group, which made less than 2% of the total sorties). In fact, it was the most effective strike aircraft of that war.
The first raid on the Al Tuwaita nuclear center involved 32 F-16Cs armed with unguided bombs, accompanied by 16 F-15C fighters, four EF-111 jammers, eight F-4G anti-radar and 15 KS-135 tankers. This large group did not succeed in fulfilling the task. The second raid was carried out at night with only eight F-117A guided bombs. This time, we destroyed three of the four Iraqi nuclear reactors.
What conclusions will follow from this point?
1. As Andrey correctly noted, “the number of bombs dropped” is not the only measure of success. The only problem is that as a result of the Gulf War, carrier-based aircraft "blew" all points at once. A scanty number of sorties and dropped bombs, a lower combat load, the worst performance characteristics of aircraft, the absence of aerial victories … Finally, the aces pilots of naval aviation were simply afraid to entrust important missions. These are unfortunate facts that cannot be corrected with columns of numbers.
2. Always, as soon as the need arises, the command of the Air Force will "pull out" a trump card. Ultimate heavy interceptors (F-15C or Raptor), stealth aircraft, tactical bombers (F-111 and F-15E), specialized anti-tank attack aircraft, etc. etc.
3. In contrast to them, carrier-based aircraft in any situation will be limited to a set of light multirole fighters. During the events in question (1991), naval pilots had to fly in general on primitive aircraft. You can argue with the example of the Su-33, but physics cannot be fooled. When taking off from the deck, its fuel supply and combat load sharply decrease.
5. The magic of numbers
Taking this opportunity, I would like to draw your attention to an interesting approach to the analysis of the actions of the MNF air group. Many authors, incl. and Andrei obviously has a home supercomputer capable of taking into account many variables on which the outcome of the war depends. Daily ammunition consumption, selection and distribution of targets, bomb suspension schemes for each type of aircraft, analysis of the actions of airfield services, distribution of sorties in the first days of the operation …
If all the data is still missing, what are you trying to prove in tenths of a percent? What is this ostentatious precision for? if we do not have full access to the original data?
Did you use these numbers to give a scientific look to the discussion? So draw an integral sign in the middle of the text, it will be even more "scientific".
The format of a small introductory article for a wide range of readers is not suitable for serious calculations.
How to distinguish white from black? With your eyes! In simple words about simple things. The most understandable and obvious examples - and everything immediately falls into place.
I would argue about the effectiveness of AB in the open ocean. But to prove their importance by the example of Operation Desert Storm - this can only achieve the opposite effect.
All the facts about the participation of the AUG in a purely land war testify against.
This is evidenced by the number of aircraft deployed on the coast - 5 times more than at the "floating airfields".
And the ridiculous disposition with the deployment of half of the aircraft carriers in the Red Sea, so that naval pilots have to fly the longest, across the entire Arabian Peninsula.
And other shameful facts: the wing of the largest and most modern aircraft carrier (the nuclear-powered "T. Roosevelt") made its first sortie only on the third day of the war.
