The United States has a long history of using multi-engine bombers in naval warfare. During World War II, US Army Air Corps aircraft were used as naval weapons. The success, however, was half-hearted.
Small twin-engine bombers performed very well in attacks on Japanese convoys and ships during the battles in New Guinea, and B-29s proved extremely successful in mine laying, causing damage with mines comparable to that of nuclear weapons.
But the attempt to use multi-engine bombers to attack surface ships was unsuccessful. The bombers sank several transports and damaged a few minor warships. The Americans tried to use them in the battles of the fleets, twice these machines flew to strike during the battle of Midway, but to no avail. The B-24s that replaced these aircraft were also noted in actions against naval targets and also with very modest results. The bombers did not destroy any significant warships. This was all the more disappointing because before the war, striking surface targets by the Americans was seen as one of the missions of bomber aviation.
After the end of World War II, the US Air Force periodically returned to operations over the sea. They were very large-scale during the Cuban missile crisis.
Over the sea, the basis of the planes of the strategic aviation command was reconnaissance. At the request of the Navy, several air units armed with RB-47 reconnaissance aircraft and KS-97 aircraft refuellers carried out reconnaissance missions in the area indicated by the Navy. They discovered the Soviet tanker "Grozny" and guided a US Navy destroyer at it. During reconnaissance missions, one aircraft and crew were lost (for non-combat reasons). But these were not shock tasks.
The US Air Force returned to strike missions over the sea later, in 1975. Then, after the slaps received from the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean during the Indo-Pakistani war, and, more importantly, in the Mediterranean in 1973, during the Arab-Israeli war, the Americans decided to take on the Soviet Union for real. It will not be possible to list everything that they decided to do (and then did) within the framework of one article, but one of their actions was to involve not only the US Navy, but also the Air Force (and later the Coast Guard) in the fight against the Soviet fleet.
The Americans, being the strongest side, used not only direct methods of confrontation (build more ships than the Russians, gain technological superiority), but also asymmetric ones
One of which was the involvement of bombers in naval strike missions, since the Soviet example was before our eyes. The author of this idea was Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who proposed to arm the B-52 bombers with the latest anti-ship Harpoon cruise missiles. In the same year, joint working groups of the Air Force and the Navy were formed and the mechanism of interaction of these types of the Armed Forces in operations to combat the Soviet fleet was determined.
Beginning in 1975, the bombers of the US Air Force Strategic Air Command began training in naval reconnaissance, mine laying and missile strikes against surface targets in the interests of the Navy.
The first and most important task was to practice the skills of searching for naval targets and interacting with the Navy. Then there was a development of a tactical model, the contours of which were, in general, clear. As the readiness of bombers to carry out such tasks increased, they would be armed with missiles.
Preparing for battle
The US Air Force Strategic Aviation Command (SAC) took pride in the training of its pilots. And they were really very well prepared in every sense. Constant "training" of pilots to break through the most powerful air defense system in the world - the Soviet one, plus the experience of the ten-year war in Vietnam, plus technology that was continuously improved (being perfect already at the time of creation), the tradition of strategic bombing dating back to World War II, a certain amount of fearlessness together, they made pilots truly high-class professionals. Since flights over a non-targeting surface for the US Air Force personnel have also always been the norm (otherwise they will not reach the target, it is overseas) and since the B-52 navigation equipment was very accurate, in training operations to search for surface ships, the B-52 pilots performed well immediately.
Since 1976, bombers began to actively practice the "hunt" for American and British ships in the open ocean and interaction with ships of the Navy, which, being constantly in the same areas in which the enemy was located (USSR Navy), could give and gave target designation to the pilots of the "fortresses ".
From the memoirs of the commander of the B-52 bomber Dag Aitken:
“I was the Operator Officer of the 37th Bomber Squadron of the 28th Bomber Wing in Ellsworth during the Iranian hostage crisis. In December 1979, we were caught by a sudden check of combat readiness from the headquarters of the SAC, and we were not explained in connection with what task. During this check, we were confronted with the fact that we immediately need to deploy to Guam airbase. Three hours later, three KS-135 tankers were already in the air, and after three more, the first B-52s also went on a mission."
Aitken flew a bomber of modification "H" with bypass engines and a longer range than the old aircraft, in those years these machines were specialized in nuclear bombing, and the first month in Guam mastered new tasks for themselves: mining, conventional bomb strikes and naval reconnaissance … Along with the planes from Ellsworth in Guam, crews from other air bases, including "local" ones, also trained. After a month of training over the sea, most of the aircraft returned to their bases, but several crews, including Aitken's crew, remained and continued training. A new introduction soon followed.
“About a week later, we received directly from the OKNSh a task deep in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to track the Soviet fleet. At that time, the US 7th Fleet was operating in the area, which was continuously monitored by the Soviets (the word "Soviets", which we usually translate as "Soviets", is actually translated this way. There were "Soviets" - Soviet, now "Russians" - Russians. - Auth.), and their "Bear" (Tu-95) bombers flying from Afghanistan (so in the memoirs, in reality this is an extremely dubious statement. - Auth.) interfered with our aircraft carriers. The OKNSH wanted to clearly show the Soviets and Iranians that our strategic air power can reach them even at this range.
Our small headquarters, together with colleagues from the local (Guam. - Author.) Headquarters, planned the operation overnight and began it early in the morning. Since the Soviets were constantly conducting radar surveillance from their reconnaissance trawlers off the coast of Guam, two B-52s launched at night under the guise of KS-135 tankers flying to Diego Garcia according to the ICAO flight plan for these aircraft. The KOU operators were instructed not to turn on the sights, and the navigators were allowed to use only those frequencies used by the KS-135 during operation.
It was, without a doubt, a success. The crews made contact with the ships of the Navy, which gave them a bearing to the Soviet ships. During the first pass, the Soviet sailors relaxed on the decks, confident that their Bear bombers were on their way. During the second pass, there was no one on the decks."
This flight took 30 hours and 30 minutes in time and required five air refueling.
These flights were more and more frequent. With the development of such tasks, the pilots of the SAC "moved on" and trained in low-altitude breakthroughs to surface ships. The B-52 was initially not adapted for low-altitude flights, but later the aircraft's avionics and control system were modernized in order to give some opportunities to perform such flights, while their crews worked out such flights very intensively. It was believed that without this, bombs could not break through to targets deep in Soviet territory. Over land, these bombers could confidently go to the target at altitudes of several hundred meters due to the skills of the crews and avionics, allowing them to perform such flights.
At the beginning of preparation for naval operations, the B-52 crews flew at heights of tens of meters. From the memoirs of the commander of the B-52, and later the writer Jay Lacklin:
“We had more problems with missions to fly over American ships. Once, while working with a US Navy helicopter carrier, I asked them over the radio what the height of their mast was above the water. Surprisingly, they didn't know. It looks like it depended on the loading of the ship."
The height of the mast, in any case, did not exceed 50 meters, which means that the heights at which the B-52 worked then were measured in a few tens of meters and the risk of catching the mast with a wing was quite real. It's amazing how a high-altitude eight-engine bomber could do anything at such an altitude.
However, after several years of intensive training, the ability of the SAC pilots to "sneak" to surface ships became even better.
In the spring of 1990, in the Persian Gulf, a pair of B-52s, performing a planned flight as part of sea reconnaissance operations, requested permission from the Ranger aircraft carrier for a low-altitude training flight. Permission was granted.
The dialogue soon followed, which has become a legend in the American Air Force.
AW Ranger: Tell me where you are.
B-52: We're five miles from you.
AV Ranger: We do not observe you visually.
B-52: Look down.
And they looked.
Such a passage, even for a specialized low-altitude aircraft with appropriate aerodynamics, with a system for automatically following the terrain, would be a serious test. And here it was done by a bomber.
Soon, the same span was performed near AB Independence.
All this clearly shows how seriously the Air Force approached the preparation for naval operations.
But all this was needed to break through to the target and hit it with bombs, while the initiators of bringing the B-52 to the war at sea had completely different plans.
The tactical scheme for using the B-52 against Soviet ships was developed in parallel with how the pilots mastered the search for sea targets and joint work with the Navy.
From article US Air Force Lieutenant General (Ret.) David Deptula:
“The concept of operations was that the naval E-2 or Orions, or Air Force-owned E-3 AWACS, allocated for the attack of the B-52, would attack the Soviet surface forces. Up to ten B-52s could descend to low altitudes and, approaching the target from different directions, carry out a massive salvo of Harpoon missiles, sufficient to “saturate” and break through the air defense”.
As the experience of low-altitude flights of the B-52 over the sea and their use in aerial reconnaissance shows, such a scenario was quite realistic.
In 1983, the armament of the Harpoon anti-ship missile bombers began. Aircraft of modification "G" were armed as less valuable than "H", which had more economical engines, longer flight range and intended for strikes with bombs and cruise missiles on the territory of the USSR. By this time, the crews of the bombers were fully prepared to perform any missions over the sea, no matter how difficult they were. Bomber groups were deployed in Maine in the United States and in Guam.
Since 1983, the United States has acquired the ability to use missile-carrying base aircraft against naval targets.
Would these operations have been successful? On this topic in the United States itself even during the Cold War, and at its apogee, in 1987, a group of Navy and Air Force officers conducted a special study "B-52 Maritime operations: the anti-surface warfare mission" ("B- 52 in naval operations: the task of countering surface forces "). It has long been declassified and has been freely available for some time. The conclusions in this study were as follows.
Assessment of the Air Defense Capabilities of Soviet Surface Formations in Repulsing a Missile Strike of Strategic Bombers
The American study sheds light on many issues, but we are interested in how the US Air Force evaluated the enemy, that is, us, in terms of the ability to resist. Based on intelligence collected over the years, the Americans made the following conclusions on the combat stability of a single ship of the USSR Navy.
Table 1
table 2
Table 3
Unfortunately, there is no methodology in the document and there is no decoding of what kind of ship is meant by "escort". All this is clearly some kind of averaged data, but they, apparently, are not very far from reality.
Any B-52 armed with anti-ship missiles carried up to 12 missiles on underwing pylons. This revision was carried out on all vehicles that took part in maritime operations. But the above study tells us that up to 8 missiles could be placed in the bomb bay "at the cost of minimal improvements." And then one aircraft could carry up to 20 anti-ship missiles. A group of ten vehicles, thus, guaranteed to penetrate any conceivable air defense of any ship group of the USSR Navy, at least if we start from American estimates.
At the same time, the Americans made a reservation: all of the above is true for the anti-ship missiles, which are aimed at the first target that fell into the GOS review sector. But if we assume that the anti-ship missile can carry out target selection, then the consumption of missiles to hit the main target, according to this document, will be significantly lower.
All tables are Russian adaptations of reference tables from the American document.
Note:
The most interesting thing in the study is one of the intermediate conclusions, which is very consonant with the Soviet approach to the problem:
“The conclusion is obvious: giving B-52s armed with Harpoons to surface combat groups is not at all a luxury in any scenario of a war at sea. In a preemptive strike against a large Soviet naval group with several high value units and escort ships, adding firepower to the B-52 may be absolutely necessary to seize the initiative and win the battle."
In fact, the Americans came to the same conclusions that at one time gave rise to the USSR naval missile-carrying aviation, and for the same reasons.
To fight their "naval" bombers, however, did not have to. The Cold War is over. In the early nineties, the program of attracting the B-52 to the strike missions of the Navy was discontinued, and when all the aircraft of the "G" modification were withdrawn from service, the remaining aircraft were not upgraded for the use of anti-ship missiles.
The strategic air command lost the ability to attack surface targets with missile weapons. In the conditions of the 90s, the Americans simply did not need it.
But this was not at all the last page in the history of US bomber strike operations in naval war. Another page is being written right now, in the course of the rapidly growing confrontation between the United States and China.
However, this topic deserves a separate consideration.
