Preparing to leave the factory (abridged)
In June 1968, during mooring tests with the actual commissioning of the main power plant of both sides, steam supply to the turbine and other auxiliary equipment of the electromechanical warhead, the chemical service of the submarine discovered an increase in gas activity in the turbine compartment. Additional control carried out by portable devices for monitoring the gas activity in the reactor and turbine compartments, and the use of the steam generator density control system in the "turbine compartment overflow" mode made it possible to make an assumption about the titanium steam generator leak, which was reported on the "command".
After clarification, an order was received to withdraw the power plant. No one could believe that the titanium steam generator was leaking, and besides, representatives of the design bureau and the manufacturer's plant were nominated for the USSR State Prize. A "high" commission was created, consisting of representatives of the fleet, military acceptance, the Zvezda plant, the designers of the titanium steam generators and the manufacturer's plant. The power plant was put into operation and mooring tests continued, but under the control of the commission members. The measures taken to search for leaks confirmed the crew's assumption that the steam generator of the 4th pair of the starboard power plant was leaking. The current steam generator was found, it turned out to be steam generator No. 7. The commission decided: for now to turn it off "by water", and during the period of finishing work, cut the pipelines along the 1st and 2nd circuits and weld the plugs by "water" and "steam" on the steam generator No.-7. And that was done. Prior to the current repairs, the nuclear submarine "K-122" and passed without steam generator No.-7 at the power plant on the starboard side. For me, this incident was the first practical experience in ensuring radiation safety on a nuclear submarine. The second half of 1968 was spent on going out to sea for running and state trials. Since the submarine "K-122" was the lead submarine according to the 659T project, there were a lot of comments on the operation of mechanisms and equipment, and their plant and designers had to eliminate after each exit to the sea. I remember such a case. In the passageway of the residential part of the 2nd compartment, a distribution box (RK) of power consumers was installed, more than one submariner cut his head on it.
After each exit to the sea, they wrote a comment: to move the RK to the side by 150 mm, the length of the cable allowed. When the remark reached the chief designer O. Ya. Margolin, he wrote a resolution: “Refuse! Installed according to the project! ". On one of the exits to the sea, Osher Yakovlevich went to the latrine of the 1st compartment (he was tall, under 190 cm), passing along the corridor, crashed his head into this RK and cut his head to blood. The on-duty electrician of the 2nd compartment, seeing this, said that at last the RC would be put aside. In response, Osher Yakovlevich replied: "Never!" So it remained in its place until the state act of transferring the nuclear submarine after modernization from industry to the fleet was signed and, during the period of finishing work in early 1969, the electric welder digested this ill-fated RK, as it was convenient for us, for 250 g of alcohol. This is how this "difficult" problem with the Republic of Kazakhstan was solved at the level of a factory worker. The state act of transferring the nuclear submarine "K-122" after modernization from the industry to the Pacific Fleet, after a long red tape and coordination, was signed on December 31, 1968 with the condition that the comments on the operation of equipment and weapons identified at the last state tests, the Zvezda plant will eliminate during January and February during the period of finishing work on the submarine. As a separate clause of the act, a one-year warranty period was established to eliminate comments on the operation of the submarine's equipment and weapons, revealed during its operation at sea and in the base.
Search for US Navy SSBNs
In early April 1970, after eight days of cruise, the nuclear submarine "K-122" occupied its combat service area 100 miles west of about. Okinotori (Japan), 100x200 miles in size, in which, as assumed by the operational management of the main headquarters of the USSR Navy, a strategic nuclear submarine of the Lafayette type from the 15th US Navy Squadron is carrying out combat patrols. We began to carry out the main task assigned by the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy to the crew of the K-122 submarine at the preparatory stage of the Ocean exercise.
The search for strategic nuclear submarines of the US Navy was carried out using the MG-200 "Arktika-M" hydroacoustic station in the noise steering mode and experimental 2-channel equipment for the search for submarines and surface ships (ships) to control changes in the temperature and optical parameters of the wake water ships. The proposed area of combat patrolling of the strategic nuclear submarine of the US Navy was far from the recommended ocean routes for ships from the Philippine Islands to Japan, to the Polynesian Islands and to America, therefore, only on the seventh day, being in the area, using an experimental 2-channel search equipment for submarines and surface ships (ships) found a wake.
After maneuvering with a change in course and depth, we determined that the wake was a submarine. They introduced the main power plant on the left side and transferred the operation of the turbines from the main power plants on their side. During the communication session, they reported to the command post of the Main Staff of the Navy about the discovery of the wake of the submarine, received an order from the command post to establish tracking of the submarine and switch to a 4-hour session of communication with the shore. They loaded down and began tracking the submarine along the wake, periodically increasing the speed of the submarine to 18 knots. The maneuvering of our submarine was very difficult, since the foreign submarine spent more than one day in the area, changing the diving depth and course, its wake did not dissipate, it remained. It was very difficult to understand the determination of its direction of movement, and only on the 2nd day of tracking, the operator of the 2-channel equipment reported that the temperature and optical parameters of the wake began to increase, that is, we entered the direct course of a foreign submarine.
Since we had to surface every 4 hours for a communication session to transmit a report on tracking a foreign submarine and once a day during the communication session determine our place, the foreign submarine broke away from us, increasing the distance between us. Therefore, so that it does not break away from us, we are forced to increase the speed to 24 knots, controlling the submarine in depth with large aft rudders. On the third day of tracking, we probably approached the foreign submarine at a distance of about 60-70 cab., At a distance of using its torpedo weapons with a high probability of hitting our submarine, it measured the distance between us in active mode, in echo direction finding mode. Our acoustics classified the sonar as belonging to a nuclear missile submarine, thus confirming the assumption of the operational command of the General Staff of the Navy about the presence of a strategic nuclear submarine of the US Navy on combat patrols in this area. Both for our nuclear submarines and for foreign ones, the best maneuver of separation from the tracking ship is to lift off at full speed, and from that moment the race began, "the race for the leader." The American submarine broke away from us at a full speed of 25.5 knots and periodically measured the distance between us in active mode, in the echo direction finding mode, 1-2 times a day, and since after 4 hours we had to ascend to the periscope depth to transmit submarine tracking reports, reporting W = … °, L = … °, Course = … °, and Speed = … knots, type of hydrology, then we had to keep the speed of the full speed to maintain the distance to the American submarine 30 knots and a diving depth of 150-170 meters.
On the second day when the American submarine was separated from us from 04-00 to 08-00, the 1st combat shift (the most worked-out) was on watch: the deputy division commander, Captain 1st Rank G. Suchkov, was in the central post, the commander's watch was carried by the senior assistant to the commander, the captain 2nd rank V. Pushkarev, officer of the watch captain 3rd rank R. Laletin, watch mechanical engineer captain 3rd rank G. Ogarkov. I will present my personal impressions, as well as the reports of the foreman of the turbine team, midshipman N. Grachev, to whom we owe a lot, but simply speaking our lives, and the senior assistant to the commander of the 2nd rank captain V. Pushkarev of the KTOF headquarters commission.
Personal impressions. I was on watch at the submarine's central dosimetry station in the 7th compartment. During the breakout of the watch, the officer of the watch, Captain 3rd Rank R. Laletin, informed us that we were tracking an American submarine, we were going at a depth of 170 m, the speed was 30 knots, and drew attention to the vigilant watch keeping. At about 6 o'clock in the morning, when the two combat shifts were sleeping, I felt that the submarine began to increase the trim on the bow. The vibration noise of the submarine hull indicated that the speed did not change. According to the water level in the decanter, it was possible to judge that the trim was growing - 10 °, 15 °, 20 °, 25 °…. Time stood still for me, I imagined how the submarine was rapidly rushing into the depths. I rested my feet on the power supply unit of the dosimetric control unit and asked myself the question: "Why are they not taking measures in the central post?" I looked at the solid hull of the submarine and expected that now there would be crackling and darkness … (the case of the death of the American nuclear submarine Thresher, described in the press in 1967, came to my mind).
From the compartment came the noise of falling objects. The sound of a turbine telegraph was heard through the bulkhead door, which was not battened down, from the control panel of the main power plant. The submarine shuddered, and there was the sound of a hiss of high-pressure air being fed into the main ballast tanks. “At last, measures are being taken in the central office. So we will live! - I thought. Gradually, the increase in trim stopped, as the operators of the main power plant said, stopped at 32 ° and began to retreat (decrease), then went aft and reached 20 °. Then the trim began to retreat and settled at about 0 °, from the noise of the submarine hull, I thought that they began to increase the speed.
Report of the foreman of the turbine team of warrant officer N. Grachev to the members of the KTOF headquarters commission after the campaign. After the separation of the watch with the shift, he arrived at the turbine 6th compartment. We took the watch, reported to the control panel of the main power plant about the operation of the mechanisms of the turbine compartment and that both turbines were working “The most complete forward!”. About 6 o'clock in the morning, the trim on the nose began to grow. With a 12 ° differential on the bow, without an order from the control panel of the main power plant and from the watch engineer, the mechanical engineer switched the turbine protection to "manual". With a constant increase in trim on the nose, I was waiting for a command from the control panel of the main power plant and from the watch mechanical engineer to supply steam to the reverse turbine blades. When a trim of 25 ° to the bow was reached, without waiting for an order to change the operating mode of the turbines from the control panel of the main power plant and from the watch mechanical engineer, he independently commanded the watchman to the shunting devices - "Reverse!" When the turbines were "taken away", working in reverse and taking control of the submarine, the trim stopped at 32 ° to the bow, and only then the order came from the central post and later from the control panel of the main power plant, transmitted by turbine telegraphs to both turbines - "Reverse". When a trim of 15 ° aft was reached, on the order transmitted from the central post and the control panel of the main power plant by turbine telegraphs "Both turbines small forward", he commanded the watchman of the shunting devices "Keep the speed" Small forward ".
Report of the senior assistant to the commander of the 2nd rank captain V. Pushkarev to the members of the KTOF commission after the campaign. At 04-05, he received a report from the officer of the watch, Captain 3rd Rank R. Laletin, on the admission to watch by the 1st combat shift. I reported to the deputy commander of the division, Captain 1st Rank G. Suchkov, who was in the navigator's wheelhouse, about taking over the watch, as well as tracking the American submarine, the submarine's immersion depth of 170 meters, the speed of 30 knots, under the keel-6100m. At 05-45 I asked the captain of the 1st rank G. Suchkov to go to the latrine on the 2nd deck of the 3rd compartment. Having battened down the latrine door, I felt the trim rising on the bow, there was a noise, the rumble of falling metal boxes with spare parts, placed behind the latrine door at the bulkhead of the compartment. I tried to open the latrine door, but the door jammed with a metal box with spare parts, leaving a small gap.
He sat down on the toilet and thought: "Do you really have to take death in the latrine?" I got up, barely put my left hand into the slot, took the handle of the box with spare parts, lifted it up and put it on the electrical panel of the ventilation system of the communications warhead converter room, located to the left of the latrine door and fixed at a height of 1.0 meter (then, in a calm atmosphere, I I was able to raise the box only to a height of 40 cm). He ran to the central post, by this time Captain 1st Rank G. Suchkov gave the command by turbine telegraphs to the turbine compartment "Reverse" and to the control panel of the main power plant, and the watch mechanical engineer Captain 3rd Rank G. Ogarkov gave high pressure air to the bow group of tanks main ballast in order to reduce bow trim and submarine sinking. When the trim retreated, the air from the bow group of the main ballast tanks was not removed in time and was not allowed to move forward in time, the submarine with a trim to the stern jumped to the surface and sank. He gave the order to the mechanical engineer on duty to remove air from the bow group of the main ballast tanks, and when the trim went down to 15 ° to the stern, he commanded to move "Both turbines forward small! Dive to a depth of 100 meters." When the differential is 0 °, he commanded "Look around in the compartments!" After the report from the compartments "The compartments have been examined, there are no comments," the submarine commander decided to continue tracking the American submarine.
At 08-15, after the shift from the watch, I came to the wardroom for breakfast, the commander of the nuclear submarine, Captain 1st Rank V. Kopiev, was sitting there. Seeing the incoming officers, he said that he would make real submariners out of us, to which I joked: "You, comrade commander, bring us only to the pier!" He remembered my joke and, upon arrival at the base, ordered the assistant commander to intercede on duty on command. A day of sailing has passed. During this time, at all levels of the crew, there was a discussion of the incantation of large horizontal rudders to "dive" at a speed of 30 knots and dive from a depth of 170 m, in a matter of seconds, to a depth of 270 m. I'm a combat shift. The emergency jam of large horizontal rudders was repeated an hour and a half after taking over the watch, but the watch of the Submarine Central Station and the Main Power Plant Control Unit quickly worked out, preventing an increase in the trim of more than 12 ° on the bow and a dip in the submarine's immersion depth. This alarmed the command of the submarine. After breakfast, we dropped the speed to the smallest, adjusted the submarine and switched over to control of the large aft rudders from the local post in the 9th compartment. When they disassembled the manipulator for controlling the large aft rudders, they found and pulled out a small piece of ceramics, which lay on top of the contacts - closures for "immersion" of the rudders. The helmsmen recalled that at the end of February a guarantee group came from the Zvezda shipyard to deal with the rudders, while none of the helmsmen's team controlled them. There were no more cases of large stern horizontal wedges.
Analyzing what happened, we, the crew members, came to the conclusion that if the foreman of the turbine team, midshipman Nikolai Mikhailovich Grachev, did not know well the instructions for operating the turbine, was an uncertain and uninitiated person, then we shared, without any doubt, the fate of the crew of the nuclear submarine "K- 8 "of the Northern Fleet, which was killed in the" Ocean "exercise in the Bay of Biscay of the Atlantic Ocean. It is not for nothing that Warrant Officer Grachev bears the name of St. Nicholas the Wonderworker, the keeper of sailors, he probably kept our crew on this campaign. After 74 hours of tracking the American nuclear submarine, upon surfacing for a communication session and transmitting a tracking report, we received a radiogram to stop tracking. Upon returning from the cruise, the KTOF intelligence department confirmed that we were tracking the American strategic nuclear submarine of the Lafayette type of the 15th US Navy Squadron, stationed in the Agana naval base on the island. Guam (Mariana Islands). By our actions, we drove her out of the combat patrol area, and she was forced to surface and return to the base. The moment of surfacing and returning to the base was recorded by the KTOF reconnaissance ship. That is, the crew of the K-122 nuclear submarine has fulfilled its main task set by the Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Navy.
Having reduced the speed to 6 knots, we plunged to a depth of 60 m, which, according to hydrological conditions, ensures the maximum concealment of navigation from detection by enemy anti-submarine forces and the maximum range of their detection by our radio equipment. We set out on a course to the center of the combat service area, appointed by the Main Headquarters of the USSR Navy, suggesting that it was necessary to prepare for the task of the final stage of the Ocean exercise: search, tracking and attacking the main goal of the enemy warship detachment (in fact, the battleship detachment - ships KTOF, the main target is the missile cruiser "Varyag"), following through our combat service area, by a practical torpedo SAET-60 with its flooding after passing the distance of travel. Several days of calm sailing in the combat service area allowed the crew of the submarine not only physically, but also mentally to rest. During these days, they checked the material part of combat units and services, tried to find out the cause of the malfunction of the small aft horizontal rudders, but could not put them into operation. So they were forced to control the submarine in immersion depth with large aft horizontal rudders in the entire range of underwater speeds before returning from the campaign. In one of the communication sessions, we received a radiogram about the beginning of the final stage of the Ocean exercise. The commander of the submarine assessed the situation and decided to carry out a search, maneuvering a course perpendicular to the intended general course of the detachment of warships - 135 °. At night, a detachment of warships was detected at periscope depth using the Nakat-M passive radar signal detection station. Having approached in a submerged position at the distance of detecting surface targets using the Albatross radar station, we surfaced to periscope depth, measured the bearing, the distance to the nearest target and revealed the marching order of the detachment of warships and its main target. According to hydroacoustics, they covertly approached the main target, through the ships of the close anti-submarine security at the bow course corners of the main target at a distance of 60 cables, they torpedoed the missile cruiser "Varyag" with a SAET-60 torpedo from the torpedo tube No.-6. The shooting was successful, the torpedo passed under the Varyag missile cruiser, the torpedo movement was observed by the rackets fired from the torpedo.
Show / Hide text But, despite the successful fulfillment of the assigned combat missions, troubles, more precisely accidents, awaited the crew of the submarine ahead. Since there was no need to develop the full speed of the turbines, the commander of the submarine made a decision: to take out of operation the main power plant on the left side and the turbine on the same side and leave the main power plant on the starboard side and the turbine on the same side in operation. Two days later, during the watch of the 3rd combat shift, I was awakened by a signal: “Emergency alarm! The feed pump of the starboard condensate feed system is on! " Arriving at the central dosimetric post, he reported to the submarine's central post on the readiness of the chemical service for an emergency alert. From the 7th compartment came the commands of motor telegraphs, I went into the compartment and asked the commander of the electrical division, Lieutenant-Commander Yuri Mitrofanov, what transitions were taking place. He replied that they had dropped the protection of the main power plant of the starboard side and were switching to driving under electric motors. The temperature and humidity in the submarine's compartments began to rise, as the refrigeration unit, which ensures the operation of the submarine's air conditioning system, was taken out of service. A few minutes later, from the central post, I received a command from the commander by phone: “To the head of the chemical service! Enter the turbine compartment, measure the carbon monoxide content!"
I did not specify why I should enter the emergency compartment, and not my subordinate midshipman L. Guryev, a chemist-medical orderly, whose functional responsibility was gas control. The order of the submarine's central post must be carried out. I prepared an express analyzer for monitoring carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides for work, turned on the IP-46M insulating gas mask and, with the permission of the central post, I was admitted into the emergency turbine (6th compartment) compartment through the airlock. The first impression: everything is in smoke, the temperature is 70-80 ° С, ventilation in the compartment, as expected in case of a fire, is turned off. In the compartment, along with the officers of the movement division, there were 20 people. Some of the turbine operators, not joining the IP-46M, ran around the compartment, following orders from the commander of the turbine group, Lieutenant-Commander B. Zavyalov and the commander of the 1st division, captain 3rd rank G. Ogarkov, to take the starboard turbine out of work.
Having settled down at the main turbo-gear unit on the left side, I turned on the express analyzer. After the measurement on the measuring scale, I calculated that the concentration of carbon monoxide in the turbine compartment is about 140 maximum permissible concentrations (MPC CO-0, 001 mg / l). By phone I reported to the Central Control Center on the content of carbon monoxide in the compartment, on the need to include the personnel of the turbine compartment in the IP-46M insulating gas mask and on bringing the insulating gas masks in the adjacent compartments to the "ready" position. The central post ordered me after 10 minutes to monitor the gas composition of the air in the emergency compartment and report to him. In the smoke near the shunting devices, I found the commander of the movement division, Captain 3rd Rank G. Ogarkov (without the IP-46M insulating gas mask), he was told about the carbon monoxide content in the compartment and the need to include everyone in the IP-46M insulating gas mask, otherwise there will be those who die from carbon monoxide poisoning … Through the loudspeaker "Kashtan" the Central Post gave instructions on the mode of using respiratory protection in the emergency (turbine) compartment and in the adjacent compartments.
With the commander of the 1st division, they literally began to catch the turbinists in the smoke and forcibly force them to turn on in the IP-46M insulating gas mask. After the starboard turbine was taken out of operation from the Central Post, a command was sent to the emergency turbine compartment: "Find out the cause of the ignition of the starboard feed pump!" Lieutenant Commander B. Zavyalov ordered the turbine sergeant major of the 1st article of the long-term service A. Zadorozhny, who was in charge of the feed pump, to crawl between the pipes to the feed pump and find out the cause of its ignition, as well as the possibility of its operation. Since it was impossible to crawl to the feed pump with the IP-46M insulating gas mask due to the intertwining of pipes, the foreman of article 1 A. Zadorozhny was forced to remove the insulating gas mask in order to crawl to the feed pump to inspect it without it, it took about 10 minutes … After his return, the commander of the turbine group, Lieutenant-Commander B. Zavyalov reported to the central post: “The starboard feed pump is suitable for further operation.
The paint has burned from the outside and inside of the pump fan housing. Cause of fire: deformation of the case due to the high temperature in the compartment and contact with the case fan impeller. After the content of carbon monoxide in the compartment had stabilized at 150 maximum permissible doses and there was no possibility of reducing the concentration of carbon monoxide in the turbine compartment, the central post, assessing the situation about the possibility of further use of the reactors and turbines of the submarine, made a decision: position, start diesel generators, to ensure the progress of the submarine and enter the main power plant on the left side, turn on the ventilation system of the reactor and aft compartments to mix the air between the compartments.
We surfaced to the surface. We launched diesel generators to ensure the propulsion and commissioning of the main power plant on the left side, turned on the ventilation system of the reactor and aft compartments. Some of the turbine operators were taken out of the turbine compartment, leaving only five people, led by the commander of the turbine group, Lieutenant-Commander B. Zavyalov, to ensure the commissioning of the turbine. The commissioning of the main power plant on the left side has begun. The operation of the ventilation system of the reactor (5th) compartment ensured the operation of the special hold rooms when the main power plant of the left side was put into operation. But the high temperature in the turbine compartment of about 90 ° C and humidity led to the fact that the personnel of the 6th compartment began to faint from heatstroke and possible poisoning with carbon monoxide. In a grave condition, they carried Lieutenant Commander B. Zavyalov and Sergeant Major A. Zadorozhny to the 8th compartment. The head of the medical service, senior lieutenant m / s M. Medzhidov, administered camphor and other medications intravenously to them, besides this, they were watered with seawater, but the benefit from this was insufficient, since the seawater temperature was about 28 ° C. The sprinkling system installed at the shunting devices and designed to cool the turbinists while controlling the turbine supplied boiling water, so they had to turn it off. The situation was such that, due to the microclimate conditions in the turbine compartment, the team of turbine operators could not ensure the commissioning and operation of the turbine. Therefore, assessing the weather and the state of the sea, the commander decided to detach the escape hatch of the 8th compartment and diesel engines suck air through the 8th, 7th, 6th (turbine), 5th (reactor), 4-- nd compartments for ventilation of the turbine compartment and temperature reduction.
This decision of the submarine commander led to positive results: the temperature in the turbine compartment began to decrease, and the carbon monoxide content began to fall. Under the flow of air sucked through the shaft of the hatch of the 8th compartment, many turbinists cooled down, since their state was semi-faint. In the turbine compartment, they could work for 10-15 minutes. After entering the main power plant on the port side, steam was given to the refrigeration unit. After the refrigeration unit entered operating mode, the air conditioning system was connected. The mood of the crew began to rise. I went up the ladder of the shaft of the 8th compartment and looked out of the hatch. The weather was as ordered for us. The Pacific Ocean, and on it a hollow calm. Visibility - 100 cables. There was no wind, there was not even a slight ripple on the water. A crimson sun was rising over the horizon. As the sailors of the sailing fleet said: "The sun is red in the morning, the sailor is not to his liking!" Indeed, our crew was lucky. By evening, the ocean swayed, even at a depth of 50 meters it was felt. When the microclimate conditions dropped to normal, they plunged and continued to perform the tasks of combat service.
For a long time, the personnel of the turbinists complained of a headache, after the treatment carried out by the head of the medical service, captain of medical service M. Medzhidov, their state of health returned to normal, but until the end of the campaign, senior turbinist foreman A. carbon.
The misadventures of the campaign did not end there. Ahead there was a loss of tightness of the front cover of the device (DUK) for ejecting debris from a submarine in a submerged position, which forced the command to make a decision: to shoot debris through a 533 mm torpedo tube No. 5, from which a practical torpedo was fired at the main target of a detachment of combat ships KTOF … But the experience was unsuccessful, the oncoming stream of water was clogged with debris niche of torpedo tube No. 5, which had barely closed the front cover. Therefore, having unloaded the hydroacoustic countermeasure from the 400 mm aft torpedo tube No. 7, they began to shoot debris through it. After 45 days of the campaign, we returned to base b. Pavlovsky with a large list of accidents with weapons and technical means of the submarine, despite this they met us with an orchestra and a fried pig, since the command of the nuclear submarine did not report to the shore about what was happening on the campaign.
After the report of the commander on the fulfillment of the tasks of the combat service, the commission of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet dealt with us. Upon arrival at the base, they learned that the nuclear submarine K-8 of the Northern Fleet in the Bay of Biscay of the Atlantic Ocean perished as a result of a fire in the electrical compartment and a depressurization of the solid hull during the Ocean exercise. The moral and psychological stress for the personnel of our crew was very high, not all of them withstood the psychological stress, for example, the assistant to the commander of the nuclear submarine, Captain 3rd Rank R. Laletin, had a drink during the campaign and was removed at sea from keeping a navigational watch, with his arrival at the base for low morale and combat qualities were removed from office and assigned to a coastal position with demotion. The post of assistant commander of the submarine "K-122" was offered to me, after the impressions of the campaign, I refused the offer of the command, and then after the vacation I agreed. On September 12, 1970, by order of the commander of the Pacific Fleet, he was appointed assistant commander of the cruising nuclear submarine "K-122" and this was the beginning of my service in the commander's path in the nuclear submarine fleet.
After returning from the campaign, from the exercises of the ships of the USSR Navy "Ocean-70", as I wrote above, the commission of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet dealt with our crew of the nuclear submarine "K-122" for a month, finding out the causes of accidents and incidents during the exercises, because we had a whole "bunch" of them:
- touching the "underwater summit" at a depth of 195 meters;
- failure of small horizontal rudders;
- double wedge of large horizontal rudders for "immersion" at high speed underwater speed;
- ignition of mechanisms in diesel and turbine compartments;
- loss of tightness of the device for the disposal of garbage "DUK" and, as a consequence, the disabling of torpedo tubes No. 5 and No. 7, through which they are forced to throw household waste overboard.
During the work of the commission, on May 15, 1970, the submarine was delivered to the floating dock of the Navy Shipyard, in the Chazhma Bay. The following works were carried out:
- inspection and repair of the fairing of the hydroacoustic station (GAS) after touching the "underwater summit";
- inspection and repair of the device for the disposal of garbage "DUK";
- inspection and repair of niches, pipes and front covers of torpedo tubes No. 5 and 7.
When inspecting the fairing of the hydroacoustic station, it turned out that it was destroyed in the lower part, in the area of the plutonium sonar emitter. About 1.5 tons of coral and silt were removed from the niche of the hydroacoustic station. The damaged fairing of the sonar was repaired within two weeks. When inspecting the DUK garbage disposal device, it turned out that due to mechanical damage to the sealing rubber of the front cover of the device, water entered the pipe. It took time during one work shift to repair the damage and check for leaks.
Inspection of the niches of the torpedo tubes showed that they were clogged with debris, dirt, no mechanical damage was found. After removing debris, dirt and painting pipes, niches, front covers of torpedo tubes No. 5, 7, they were ready for their combat mission. After completing these works, the submarine returned to the base, to Pavlovsky Bay. The rest of the remarks were eliminated by the employees of the Vostok Shipyard before the submarine was put into the floating dock in the Chazhma Bay.
The conclusions of the commission of the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet were very strict: for an accident on a nuclear submarine during the exercises of the USSR Navy ships "Ocean", Captain 1st Rank V. F. order of the commander of the Pacific Fleet.
