This article does not pretend to be a serious analytical study, the conclusions and reflections in it are likely to cause, if not Homeric laughter, then at least a smile from people "knowledgeable" in the area under consideration. Smiling and laughter prolong life - at least that's what my article is already good at. But seriously, in it I wanted, if not to find an answer, then at least to state my vision and understanding of the current situation in the issue of domestic ballistic missiles of submarines (SLBMs).
The topic of Bulava and the question of what “fuck all polymers” was not considered only by a probably very lazy journalist. The talk that the Bulava is an analogue of a 40-year-old missile, that it is an inadequate replacement for Satan, but … and everything ends up eternally - everyone was stealing.
Why did you abandon the development of "Bark" with its high degree of readiness? Why was the development of a promising new SLBM transferred from the traditional maritime SRC named after academician V. P. Makeev to MIT? Why do we need "Bulava" if "Sineva" flies? Sawing of the boats of Project 941 "Shark" ("Typhoon" according to NATO classification), betrayal of the Medveputs? Future of the naval component of strategic nuclear forces?
As you can see, there are many questions and it seems that I am trying to grasp the immensity. It is quite possible that this is so, but as you have already noticed, sometimes the article is not as interesting as the comments under it. I do not exclude that in this way, in the course of discussions and discussions, many blank spots will cease to be such precisely during conversations from below)))
SLBMs have a wide range of ranges: from 150 km (R-11FM missile as part of the D-1 complex, 1959) to 9100 km (R-29RM missile as part of the D-9RM complex, 1986 - the legendary Sineva is the basis of the sea shield). Early versions of SLBMs were launched from the surface and required lengthy launch preparation procedures, which increased the vulnerability of submarines armed with such missiles. The most familiar example from the movie "K-19" (it initially used the R-13 complex, which, if you do not go into details, did not have a fundamental difference from the R-11FM). Later, with the development of technology, the launch from a submerged position was mastered: "wet" - with preliminary flooding of the mine and "dry" - without it.
Most of the SLBMs developed in the USSR used liquid rocket fuel. Such missiles were well developed and had excellent characteristics (the R-29RM possesses the highest energy and mass perfection among all ballistic missiles in the world: the ratio of the mass of the missile's combat load to its launch mass, reduced to one flight range. For comparison, for the Sineva this figure is 46 units, the American sea-based ballistic missile "Trident-1" - 33, and "Trident-2" - 37, 5), but they have several significant drawbacks, primarily related to operational safety.
The fuel in such rockets is nitrogen tetroxide as an oxidizing agent and asymmetric dimethylhydrazine as a fuel. Both components are highly volatile, corrosive and toxic. And although the rockets use an ampulized refueling, when the rocket comes from the manufacturer already filled, the possible depressurization of the fuel tanks is one of the most serious threats during their operation. There is also a high probability of incidents during the unloading and transportation of liquid-fuel SLBMs for subsequent disposal. Here are the most famous ones:
During the operation, there have been several accidents with the destruction of missiles.5 people were killed and one submarine, K-219, was lost.
When loading in violation of the loading and unloading process, the rocket fell from a height of 10 m to the berth. The oxidizer tank was destroyed. Two people from the loading party died from exposure to the vapors of the oxidizer on the unprotected respiratory system.
The rocket was destroyed three times in the mine of the boat, which was on alert.
During the Ocean-76 exercise on the K-444 submarine, three missiles were prepared for prelaunch. Two missiles were launched, but the third was not fired. The pressure in the tanks of the rocket, due to a number of human errors, was released before the boat surfaced. The seawater pressure destroyed the rocket tanks, and during the ascent and drainage of the mine, the oxidizer leaked into the mine. Thanks to the skillful actions of the personnel, the development of an emergency did not occur.
In 1973, on the K-219 boat, located at a depth of 100 m, due to a false operation of the irrigation system when the mine drainage valve and the manual valve on the lintel between the main drainage line of the boat and the mine drainage pipeline were open, the missile silo communicated with seawater. A pressure of 10 atmospheres destroyed the tanks of the rocket. During the drainage of the mine, the rocket fuel caught fire, but the timely operation of the automatic irrigation system prevented further development of the accident. The boat returned safely to base.
The third incident also occurred on the K-219 boat on October 3, 1986. For unknown reasons, when diving after a communication session, water began to flow into the missile silo. The crew tried to turn off the automatics and drain the water using non-standard means. As a result, at first, the pressure was equal to the outboard pressure and the tanks of the rocket collapsed. Then, after draining the mine, the fuel components ignited. Disabled automatic irrigation did not work and an explosion occurred. The cover of the missile silo was torn off, a fire began in the fourth missile compartment. It was not possible to extinguish the fire on our own. The personnel left the boat, the compartments were filled with seawater, and the boat sank. During the fire and smoke in the 4th and 5th missile compartments, 3 people died, including the commander of the BCh-2.
The operating experience of the RSM-25 missiles was analyzed and taken into account in the development of new complexes such as the RSM-40, 45, 54. As a result, during the operation of subsequent missiles, there was not a single case of death. However, whatever you say, but the sediment remained. Still, the combination of a harsh marine environment and explosive liquid fuel is not the best neighborhood.
Therefore, starting in the 1960s, work was carried out in the USSR to develop solid-propellant SLBMs. However, with the existing traditional leadership of the USSR in the development of liquid-propellant missiles and lagging behind the United States in the development of solid-fuel missiles, at that time it was not possible to create a complex with acceptable characteristics. The first Soviet two-stage solid-fuel SLBM R-31 as part of the D-11 complex entered trial operation only in 1980. The only SSBN K-140 became the carrier of twelve such missiles, which received the design index 667AM (Yankee-II, or Navaga -M ).
The new R-31 rocket with a launch weight of 26, 84 tons, close to the liquid-fuel R-29 (33, 3 tons) already in service by that time, had half the range (4200 km versus 7800 km), half the throw weight and low accuracy (KVO 1, 4 km). Therefore, it was decided not to launch the D-11 complex into mass production, and in 1989 it was removed from service. A total of 36 serial R-31 missiles were fired, of which 20 were used up in the process of testing and practical firing. In mid-1990, the Ministry of Defense decided to dispose of all available missiles of this type by shooting. From September 17 to December 1, 1990, all missiles were successfully launched, after which on December 17, 1990, the K-140 submarine went to Severodvinsk to be cut into metal.
The next Soviet solid-propellant rocket - the three-stage R-39 - turned out to be very large (16 m long and 2.5 m in diameter). To accommodate the D-19 complex consisting of twenty R-39 missiles, a Project 941 Akula submarine (NATO designation “Typhoon”) of a special layout was developed. This largest submarine in the world had a length of 170 m, a width of 23 m and an underwater displacement of almost 34,000 tons. The first submarine of this type entered service with the Northern Fleet on December 12, 1981.
Here I will step back a little, for all my admiration for the submarines of this project, I cannot but repeat the words of the Malakhit Design Bureau - “the victory of technology over common sense”! In my understanding, surface ships should be large in order to instill fear in a potential enemy by their very appearance. Submarines should be opposite, as small and secretive as possible. However, this does not mean that they had to be so ineptly sawed on pins and needles! (as in the photo above)
After a series of unsuccessful launches, the development of the rocket and trial operation on the head "Akula" in 1984, the D-19 complex was put into service. However, this missile was inferior in characteristics to the American Trident complex. In addition to its dimensions (length 16 m versus 10.2 m, diameter 2.5 m versus 1.8 m, weight with a launch system 90 tons versus 33.1 tons), the P-39 also had a shorter range - 8 300 km versus 11 000 and accuracy - KVO 500 m versus 100 m. Therefore, since the mid-1980s, work began on a new solid-propellant SLBM for the "Sharks" - the "Bark" missile.
The development of a variant of the deep modernization of the R-39 SLBM began in the first half of the 1980s. As of 1980, the development of design documentation was already underway. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, adopted in November 1985, instructed to begin the experimental design development of the D-19UTTKh complex in order to surpass the characteristics of the Trident-2 SLBM. In March 1986, the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a decree on the development of the D-19UTTKh "Bark" complex, and in August 1986, the Decree on the D-19UTTKh design and development project was adopted with the deployment of the complex on the modernized SSBNs of pr.941U.
The draft design of the D-19UTTKh complex was prepared in March 1987. In the period from 1986 to 1992, work was successfully carried out to test the strength of the rocket assemblies. After 1987, tests of components and assemblies were carried out on the subject of the ROC "Bark" on the vacuum-dynamic stand SKB-385. The first version of the rocket project envisaged the use of OPAL-type octogenic fuel at the 1st stage, and the higher-energy fuel TTF-56/3 produced by the Pavlograd chemical plant (now Ukraine) at the 2nd and 3rd stages.
In May 1987, the schedule for re-equipment of Project 941UTTKh at Sevmashpredpriyatie was approved. On November 28, 1988, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted the Resolution "On the Development of Naval Strategic Nuclear Forces", which ordered to complete the development of the D-19UTTKh complex and begin the rearmament of Project 941 SSBNs by the beginning of the XIII five-year plan (until 1991). By the decision of the Ministry of the Industry and the Navy, the refurbishment and repair of the head submarine pr.941 (serial number 711) was entrusted to the Zvyozdochka shipyard. It was assumed that the shipyard "Zvezdochka" will carry out the modernization of the submarine. "Sevmorzavod" was instructed to prepare the submersible launch complex PS-65M for testing the rocket at the test site and an experimental PLRB pr.619 for testing and testing the D-19UTTKh complex with a 3M91 rocket.
Until 1989, funding for the creation of the D-19UTTH complex was carried out through the USSR Ministry of General Affairs. Since 1989 - under the State Contract with the USSR Ministry of Defense. In 1989, the general designer of the Rubin Central Design Bureau (RPKSN) SN Kovalev turned to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee MS Gorbachev with proposals on the further development of the naval strategic nuclear forces. As a result, the Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the USSR of 1989-31-10 was issued, which determined the procedure for the development of naval strategic nuclear forces in the 1990s and early 2000s. SSBN pr.941 was planned to be completely re-equipped with the D-19UTTH complex and in the second half of the 1990s it was planned to build a series of 14 SSBN pr.955 with the D-31 complex (12 SLBMs on submarines).
The production of missiles for testing began by 1991 at the Zlatoust Machine-Building Plant at a rate of 3-5 missiles per year. By 1992, a full cycle of development of sustainer and auxiliary engines of the first version of the rocket project was completed - using engines manufactured by Yuzhnoye (Dnepropetrovsk), final reports on the readiness of engines for flight tests were issued. In total, 14-17 bench firing tests of all engines were carried out. Completed ground testing of the control system. Seven launches were carried out from the stand (from the submerged - East - Zavyalov V. S.) before the start of flight tests of the rocket. In the same year, funding for the work was significantly reduced, production capabilities made it possible to produce 1 rocket for testing in 2-3 years.
In June 1992, the Council of Chief Designers made a decision to develop an addendum to the draft design with equipping the 2nd and 3rd stages with fuel similar to that of the 1st stage (OPAL-MS-IIM with HMX). This is due to the conversion of the Ukrainian fuel producer - Pavlograd Chemical Plant - to produce household chemicals. Replacing the fuel reduced the rocket's energy, which led to a decrease in the number of warheads from 10 to 8 pieces. From December 1993 to August 1996, 4 fire tests of engines of the 2nd and 3rd stages on OPAL fuel were carried out, a Conclusion on admission to flight tests was issued. As of August 1996, the development and ground testing of engine charges of all three stages and 18 charges of control engines for the Bark SSBN has been completed. The developer of the engine charges is NPO Altai (Biysk), the manufacturer is PZHO (Perm, historical source - VS Zavyalov).
Joint flight tests with launches from the ground stand at the Nyonoksa test site began in November 1993 (1st launch). The second launch was carried out in December 1994. The third and last launch from the ground stand was November 19, 1997. All three launches were unsuccessful. The third unsuccessful launch from the Nyonoksa test site took place on November 19, 1997, the rocket exploded after the launch - the site's structures were damaged.
As of the end of 1997, rocket No. 4 was in readiness for testing at the Zlatoust Machine-Building Plant - its tests, taking into account the modifications following the results of the 3rd launch, were planned for June 1998. Also, missiles No. 5 were in varying degrees of readiness at the plant., 6, 7, 8 and 9 - for the reserve of units and parts, the readiness was 70-90%. With this in mind, in 1998 it was planned to carry out 2 launches (missiles No. 4 and 5), in 1999 - 2 launches (missiles No. 6 and 7) and from 2000 it was planned to start launches from SSBN pr.941U " Dmitry Donskoy "(5 launches in 2000-2001). Since 2002, it was planned to start deploying the D-19UTTKh complex on two converted SSBNs of Project 941. The technical readiness of the complex was at this moment 73%. The readiness of the converted SSBN Project 941U is 83.7%. The costs required to complete the tests of the complex, according to the Makeev State Research Center, are 2 billion 200 million rubles (in 1997 prices).
In November 1997, the ministers of the Russian government Y. Urinson and I. Sergeev, in a letter to Prime Minister V. Chernomyrdin, raised the issue of transferring the design of the main SLBM of the Navy to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering.
In November and December 1997, two Interdepartmental Commissions worked, created by order of the Minister of Defense of Russia. The commission included representatives of the MIT, the Armaments Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense and the Strategic Missile Forces, who criticized the project - outdated solutions for the control system and warheads, cruise propulsion systems, fuel, etc. were used in the rocket. At the same time, it should be noted that the durability of the element base of the SLBM control system (3 y) was higher than that of the Topol-M ICBM (2 y), the accuracy is practically the same. The warheads have been fully worked out. The perfection of the main engines of the 1st and 2nd stages was higher than those of the Topol-M ICBMs by 20% and 25%, the 3rd stage was worse by 10%. The mass perfection of the missile was higher than that of the Topol-M ICBM. The second Interdepartmental Commission recommended to continue testing with the adoption of two SSBN pr.941U.
Representatives of the Arms Directorate and the Strategic Missile Forces predicted the need for 11 launches in 2006-2007, the amount of costs - 4.5-5 billion rubles. and proposed to stop the development of SLBMs. Main reasons:
- development of the most unified inter-service missile for the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy;
- spreading over the years the peaks of funding for the rearmament of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy;
- cost savings;
At the beginning of 1998, the conclusions of the commission were approved by the Military-Technical Council of the Russian Ministry of Defense. In January 1998, the issue was considered by a commission set up by an order of the President of Russia. Autumn 1998at the suggestion of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy V. Kuroyedov, the Russian Security Council officially closed the topic "Bark" and after the competition under the auspices of "Roscosmos" design of the Bulava SLBM at MIT. At the same time, the redesign of the SSBN pr.955 for the Bulava missile was started. At the same time, control over the development of SLBMs was entrusted to the 4th Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense (headed by V. Dvorkin), which was previously involved in controlling the creation of ICBMs, and the 28th Central Research Institute of the Russian Ministry of Defense was removed from work on SLBMs.
Carriers:
- submersible launch complex PS-65M - was used at the Nenoksa test site for test launches of SLBMs, 3 launches were carried out until 1998. The complex was prepared for testing by Sevmorzavod in accordance with the USSR Council of Ministers decree dated November 28, 1988. The use of PS-65M during missile tests has not been confirmed …
- Experimental PLRB pr.619 - according to the decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR dated November 28, 1988, it was supposed to use the experimental PLRB to test the D-19UTTKh complex. The submarine was to be prepared for testing by Sevmorzavod.
- SSBN pr.941U "Akula" - 20 SLBMs, it was supposed to replace P-39 / SS-N-20 STURGEON SLBMs on all boats of the project. In May 1987, a schedule was approved for re-equipping the SSBN pr.941 with the D-19UTTH missile system. The re-equipment was planned to be carried out at PO "Sevmash" according to the following schedule:
- Submarine factory # 711 - October 1988 - 1994
- Submarine factory # 712 - 1992 - 1997
- Submarine factory # 713 - 1996 - 1999
- Submarine factory # 724, 725, 727 - it was planned to put on refurbishment after 2000.
At the time of closing the "Bark" topic, the readiness of the SSBN pr.941U "Dmitry Donskoy" was 84% - the launchers were mounted, the assembly and technological equipment was located in the compartments, only the ship systems were not installed (they are at the manufacturing plants).
- SSBN pr.955 / 09550 BOREI / DOLGORUKIY - 12 SLBMs, the development of SSBNs for the D-19UTTKh missile system was started by the USSR Council of Ministers Decree of October 31, 1989. In 1998, the development of SSBNs for the Bark complex was discontinued, the boat was redesigned for the complex SLBM "Bulava".
"Bark" was built and sharpened initially for "Sharks", to put it more simply, it was a modernized version of the P-39. Therefore, this rocket can no longer be small by definition. Let me remind you that due to the large dimensions of the R-39, the Akula boats were the only carriers of these missiles. The design of the D-19 missile system was tested on the K-153 diesel submarine specially converted according to the project 619, but only one mine for the R-39 could be placed on it and were limited to seven launches of throw models. Accordingly, the potential "Borei" should have been either a little smaller than the "Sharks" or build up a hefty hump under the standard 667 design scheme. It is quite possible that the comrades competent in this matter will correct me and say that this is not so.
Further, why was MIT assigned to manufacture a new SLBM, which has always dealt only with land missiles? I am not an expert, but I think that the key moment was the creation of a solid-propellant compact sea rocket. Specialists from the SRC created a solid-propellant rocket, but it turned out to be huge and huge boats have to be made for it (which is very "pleasing" to the military budget and the characteristics of the secrecy of these submarines). For me, to create, roughly speaking, a weapon chambered for is stupid. But, unfortunately, this is the practice that existed in the Soviet submarine shipbuilding. In addition, if memory serves, the Bark turned out to be thicker for the mines of the Shark-type submarines and a little higher, i.e. and the submarines would have to be significantly rebuilt. At this very time, MIT is churning out and has a good track record of compact solid-propellant rockets. Still, putting a rocket on wheels (PGRK) is a task no less difficult than creating an SLBM. Therefore, they thought that MIT would cope with this task, since they already have a compact rocket, it only remained to make it "sea". What, as we can see, not so long ago they coped with (not without a "bitch", but when was it easy?).
Hence the question: did the military and the leadership act stupidly, having "shaved" the idea with the "Bark"? I think, based on the possibilities of the budget, they chose the cheapest, but no less effective option.
So, at that time (mid-2000s) the Akula submarines no longer exist (even today the three remaining Sharks are hovering between "heaven and earth"), and the Borei type is not yet (now, thank God, there are three). We still have several boats "Dolphin" of project 667, (7 units + 2 (3) "Kalmar"). The military, seeing that with the Bulava it was not yet "thank God", did not stir up panic, but pulled the "trump card" out of their sleeve. KB im. Makeeva very successfully modernized the RSM-54 missile, which was named "Sineva". According to the characteristics of energy efficiency (the ratio of the launch weight, 40.3 tons, and the combat load, 2.8 tons), reduced to the flight range, "Sineva" surpasses the American missiles "Trident-1" and "Trident-2". The missile is three-stage, liquid-propellant, and carries from 4 to 10 warheads. And recently, during a test launch, it hit a target at a distance of 11.5 thousand km. In 2007, President Putin signed a decree on the adoption of the Sineva missile. By government decree, the Krasnoyarsk Machine-Building Plant is urgently resuming serial production of the upgraded RSM-54 missile. The production facilities, which were recently closed by the decision of the same government, will be reopened. The enterprise has been allocated 160 million rubles for the development of the production of RSM-54.
Then the thought even began to express itself in the press: why do we need "Bulava" if there is "Sineva"? Maybe "Borei" to remake it? The commander-in-chief spoke out unequivocally on this matter: “We will not remodel strategic submarines of the Borey type for the Sineva complex. Simple talkers and people who do not understand the problems of the fleet and its weapons at all speak about the possibility of re-equipping these boats. We cannot put on the latest submarines even a reliable missile, but related to the technology of the last century."
"Makeyevtsy" were apparently offended by this and decided to modernize. In October 2011, tests of the R-29RMU2.1 "Liner" rocket (a modification of the "Sineva", to which one of the main complaints was in the possibility of overcoming missile defense), were recognized as completed successfully and the rocket was admitted to serial production and operation and was recommended for adoption. for service.
In February 2012, the commander-in-chief of the Navy V. Vysotsky said that the "Liner" should not be accepted into service, since "this is an existing missile that is undergoing modernization." According to him, strategic submarines on alert in the World Ocean were the first to receive the upgraded missile, but in the future all ships of the 667BDRM Dolphin and 667BDR Kalmar projects will be re-equipped with the Liner. Thanks to the rearmament on the Liner, the existence of the north-western group of submarines Dolphin can be extended until 2025-2030.
It turns out that liquid-propellant missiles and boats of Project 667 will serve as such fallback,. They are reinsured, in a word.
However, a curious and not completely clear situation was created for me:
- 8-10 Boreyevs will be built under the solid-propellant missile "Bulava" (finally, the analogue of the "Trident-2", although they write … 2800. But we must remember that the maximum range and maximum operating frequency for the Trident, in the best PR tradition, are given for different configurations (the maximum range with a minimum operating frequency of half a ton (4 BB of 100 kt), and the maximum throw weight at launch at 7.8 thousand.), and none of these configurations are on alert. So real Trident-II ballistic missiles fly on the same 9800 and carry the same 1, 3 tons). The rocket is modern, solid-propellant, which means that emergencies like Captain Britanov's are impossible. This is (3x16) +5 (7) x20 = 188 or 148 delivery vehicles.
- However, "Bulava" Yes, and the Borei submarines themselves are a new product, therefore they will retain (for another 10 years) 7 submarines of the Dolphin project (I will call it that for short), which have undergone modernization, have been tested by the fleet and are armed with reliable and proven liquid-propellant missiles. This is about 112 more delivery vehicles.
- There are still three submarines of project 941, capable of carrying 20 missiles. Doubtful, but suppose another 60 delivery vehicles. In total, we have a decent range of delivery vehicles: from 260 to 360.
What is all this calculus for? Under the START-3 treaty, each of the parties has the right to 700 (+ 100 non-deployed) delivery vehicles (to put it simply, missiles) and this is for the whole triad! Considering that each deployed and undeployed heavy bomber is counted as one unit by accounting rules for calculating the total maximum number of warheads, I am not inclined to believe that strategic aviation will be increased in the next 10 years. As there were 45 bombers, they will remain in this limit until the appearance of the PAK DA. It is quite possible that some of them will be used as non-deployed forces. With all due respect to the comrades from the strategic aviation, but, given the current level of air defense and interception forces of a potential enemy, the possibility of completing the assigned task has a very low probability. It is quite possible that with the advent of hypersonic stratospheric vehicles, the situation will radically change, but now the main role belongs to the sea and land components of the triad.
Then 700-45 / 2 = 327.5 (if we subtract strategic aviation, we get that on average 327 delivery vehicles remain for each of the components of the triad). Since historically, we have developed the prevalence of ground strategic nuclear forces (unlike the United States), I have great doubts that the sailors will be allowed to have 360 delivery vehicles with 19 submarines (for comparison, the "sworn friends" now have 12-14 SSBNs, although this is the basis of their strategic nuclear forces).
With "Sharks" it is not clear what they will do: to rebuild them under the "Bulava" is a costly business, and it means "slaughter" several new "Boreys". To cut into metal, it's a pity, the boats have not yet exhausted their resource. Leave it as an experimental platform? It is possible, but for this one boat is more than enough. Converting them to multipurpose submarines (as the US did with some Ohio)? But the boat was originally created purely for operations in the Arctic, and cannot be used anywhere else. The best option is to carry out modernization for the Bulava, but leave them as a reserve or non-deployed nuclear forces, and use one submarine as an experimental platform. Although not very economical.
But, “In March 2012, information appeared from the sources of the Russian Ministry of Defense that the strategic nuclear submarines of Project 941“Akula”would not be modernized for financial reasons. According to the source, the deep modernization of one "Akula" is comparable in cost to the construction of two new submarines of the project 955 "Borey". Submarine cruisers TK-17 Arkhangelsk and TK-20 Severstal will not be upgraded in light of the recent decision, TK-208 Dmitry Donskoy will continue to be used as a test platform for weapons systems and sonar systems until 2019"
Most likely, at the exit, or rather by 2020, we will have 10 (8) Boreyevs and 7 Dolphins (I am sure that Kalmarov will be written off in the near future, because the boats are already 30 years old). This is already 300 (260) delivery vehicles. Then they will begin to write off the oldest of the Dolphins, gradually making the solid-propellant Bulava the basis of naval strategic nuclear forces. By this time (God forbid) a new heavy ICBM will be created to replace the "Voevoda" (perhaps the Makeev Design Bureau, and they will work), they will use the developments on the "Bark", but if a sea analogue was made from a land-based one, then on the contrary it is not very easy to do more difficult) and therefore retaining 188 delivery vehicles for sea strategic nuclear forces is quite enough.
I don’t even dare to suggest what will be used for boats of the 5th generation, but one thing is for sure: this issue must be dealt with ahead of time.
