In recent months, one of the main programs of the American naval forces - the design and construction of fifty multipurpose littoral warships (LBK) - is experiencing one blow after another. After analyzing the progress of its implementation, the State Budget and Audit Office (GAO) submitted a report to Congress in August, in which it subjected the actions of the US Navy command and involved contractor companies to rather sharp criticism. In September, the costs of the program were significantly cut - so to speak "pending clarification", and then the news came that a gas turbine unit of one of the prototypes was out of order. True, the admirals were quick to declare that the replacement of the turbine "will not seriously affect the approved test schedule."
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The GAO report is titled “The Navy's ability to deal with littoral warships will have a direct impact on their capabilities” and was prepared based on a request from legislators concerned about the progress of the program, which is scheduled to spend more than $ 25 billion by fiscal 2035. … Moreover, in case of failure, the Pentagon not only risks losing huge appropriations, but also ending up with a bare "sea flank" - after all, the American fleet will then be left without LBCs designed to ensure security in coastal waters (the enemy) and on sea lines of communication, the fight against submarines, carrying out convoy service and conducting mine action.
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The main conclusion of the document prepared for the congress: the command of the Navy needs to "re-and more realistically" calculate the financial indicators for the creation of littoral ships, objectively assess the time frame for eliminating the identified deficiencies and making the necessary changes to the project, and also more effectively control the development and procurement of serial combat modules (sets of special weapons and equipment). The leadership of the naval forces agreed with all the "ideas", but the problems did not disappear from this.
Thus, making changes to the second ships of the Freedom and Independence types already on the stocks will definitely require additional costs - man-hours and money. This, in particular, could adversely affect the profit level of the main contractors for the program. Although representatives of "Lockheed Martin" so far declare that their second LBC, "Fort Worth", is already 60% ready, and the corporation has not gone beyond the time schedule and approved price parameters. A similar position in relation to their LBC "Coronado" is adhered to in the concern "General Dynamics".
The GAO was especially concerned about delays in the supply of specialized replaceable combat modules by various subcontractors, which include targeted weapons and equipment (more on this below). According to the experts involved in writing the report, if this issue is not put in order, one should not expect the exact implementation of the plan and compliance with the budget of the LBC program. In addition, the efficiency of the special modules and the ships themselves must still be proved in practice.
"Until the combat capabilities of the LBK are convincingly demonstrated during the relevant tests," the final part of the document says, "the Navy command cannot claim that the ships themselves and special combat modules that the fleet acquires will be able to effectively solve the tasks that the US Navy intends lay on them."
The main "sores"
Having decomposed each of the LBK types literally "on the shelves", the experts of the State Budget and Control Department found out that a number of very important structural elements, as well as weapons and equipment systems for the lead ships - "Freedom" ("Lockheed Martin") and "Independence" (" General Dynamics "and" Ostal USA ") - has not yet passed the full cycle of tests or has not yet been installed. Although ten years have passed since the beginning of the implementation of one of the most ambitious programs of the US Navy. Meanwhile, the sailors are analyzing the results of the combat service of the LBK Freedom (Independence is ahead of it).
The main potential threat to the Freedom-class LBC, until this is refuted by the test results, GAO experts considered the readiness of the ship's systems and the ability of the crew to use such complex "applications" as intended, such as uninhabited surface and underwater remotely controlled vehicles plus drones. True, the equipment intended for their movement around the ship, especially in the volume of specially allocated storage compartments, is still under development and will appear on board the LBC only … in 2013.
That is, the LBC are already being tested, but all of the above devices are not yet available, and the equipment for their proper operation will appear only in three years!
The experts were also alarmed by the too low location of the slip, with the help of which remote-controlled boats are launched and taken on board, because in case of strong waves it will be flooded with water, and this will complicate the actions of the team. The very same water can penetrate into the inner compartments of the ship. However, the fears of experts were partially dispelled during the recently completed combat service of the LBK Freedom: the sailors repeatedly launched and took on board an 11-meter inflatable motor boat on the move, the operation of which is in many ways similar to the use of an uninhabited surface vehicle.
Experts have identified similar problems associated with the possible unavailability of equipment of a similar purpose at the LBC of the "Independence" type. We are talking about a special crane for launching and lifting aboard surface and underwater unmanned vehicles, which has not yet passed the entire test cycle. However, it is not yet possible to fully study all the shortcomings of this LBK - like the Freedom, it was handed over to the US Navy in an unfinished form, with unidentified individual ship systems and unresolved remarks. The shipyards of the fleet will have to deal with the modifications, after which the ship will go for comprehensive tests.
In addition, on August 2 of this year, there was an "exciting nuisance" with one of the drones included in the target load of literal ships. During the next flight tests of the MQ-8B "Fire Scout" UAV, which were carried out near Washington, the ground crew lost control of the device for 23 minutes (!). The reason is either unknown or carefully hidden. But the result is known - all the "Fire Scouts" were temporarily "put on hold". This was recently reported by the American specialized media, suggesting that the "trouble" happened due to software flaws.
"Capricious" modules
Special attention was paid to specialized replaceable combat modules, the possibility of using which on the LBK is considered by the Pentagon as one of the most important advantages of these ships - 16).
Three of the most important combat modules are currently at various stages of development: for destroying surface ships, for fighting submarines, for conducting mine action. This year, a special module was formed specifically for the combat service of LBC Freedom, designed to solve problems in the field of safety at sea (it provides for the deployment of two inspection parties of 19 servicemen with appropriate weapons and equipment on the ship). The possibilities and feasibility of creating other specialized combat modules are being studied. And according to the GAO report, none of the already approved for development or promising combat modules are not working according to the schedule, and in some cases the situation looks catastrophic at all, capable of having the most negative impact on the implementation of the entire LBC program.
Experts have found that the combat module for mine action (mine defense, PMO) is in the most difficult position. A typical PMO combat module, designed to detect, classify, localize and destroy any sea mines in any areas of the World Ocean, should include an aviation laser detection and mine destruction system, AN / AQS-20A GAS, a remotely controlled mine action system ("robot - a mine hunter "), a coastal reconnaissance system (with the possibility of a comprehensive analysis of the data obtained), a unified non-contact mine-sweeping system (aircraft and ship-based), a 30-mm cannon installation for the destruction of sea mines, as well as an uninhabited minesweeper boat equipped with a special a non-contact mine-sweeping system as part of a magnetic trawl and an acoustic signal generator.
However, to date, none of the eight main elements of the PMO module has reached the combat readiness stage. According to the most optimistic estimates, three components will be ready no earlier than next year, two more - in 2012, two - in 2015. And RAMICS (Rapid Airborne Mine Clearance System) - a rapid-firing 30-mm gun mount with ammunition in the form of "supercavitating shells" for shooting sea mines - can be put into service as early as 2017! Then the LBK and will acquire full combat readiness.
In addition, as it turned out during the tests, one of the key elements of the PMO combat module - the ALMDS aviation laser mine detection system placed on board the helicopter is capable of determining the presence of mine-like objects with the required accuracy only at shallow depths - almost at the bottom of the ship itself, and not up to 9-10 meters from the sea surface, as required. The US Navy has had to suspend purchases since 2005 of both ALMDS and the remotely controlled mine action system, which also did not live up to expectations.
There are many problems with other components of the mine action module, which forced the developers and the customer to postpone its first tests to 2013 (they will involve the Independence LBC). Additional complications here are associated with the too slow certification of MH-60S helicopters and MQ-8B UAVs, which should be based on LBC. The first one went through certification this year and will reach a state of full combat readiness in 2011, and the "trouble" with the Fire Scout was already mentioned earlier.
In general, today only the aviation system for the classification and destruction of bottom and anchor mines in shallow water areas and the coastal reconnaissance system have proven their efficiency, which, during tests conducted with the participation of the MH-53 helicopter, was able to detect and correctly identify all the mines laid on the shore (in the future, this system is planned to be installed on the MQ-8B UAV).
Disappointing so far is the customer and the combat module for conducting surface warfare - detecting, classifying, tracking and destroying small surface targets, escorting convoys and individual ships, as well as ensuring security in designated areas.
This module is very important for the effective operation of the future LBK fleet, designed to operate primarily in the littoral zone of the enemy or off the coast of the allied countries, but so far its ability to solve the tasks assigned to it has not been confirmed in practice. By the way, this was reported not by the authors of the report to the Congress, but by representatives of the command of the US Navy. In addition, one of the key elements of the combat module is the NLOC-LS (Non-Line-of-Sight-Launch-System) missile system with a container launcher for 15 guided missiles, designed to engage stationary and mobile targets at ranges up to 21 miles (38, 9 km), did not pass tests in July 2009 and was rejected by the customer from delivery.
It is noteworthy that this system was borrowed by the Navy from the arsenal of the FCS program implemented by the US Army ("Advanced Combat System" or, as they often write, "Combat System of the Future"), where it also failed miserably - during six missile firing in January -February 2010 only two hits were achieved.
Problems also arose with the adoption of a ship-based MH-60R helicopter capable of carrying a lowered GAS, hydroacoustic buoys, an electronic warfare system, torpedoes and an air-to-surface Hellfire missile launcher. Despite the fact that the aircraft reached its initial operational readiness in 2005 and by January 2010 the fleet received 46 of the 252 helicopters planned for purchase, the first MH-60R entry into combat service on board the LBC is scheduled only for 2013 - during last year's tests shortcomings in the operation of the data exchange line and individual elements of the sighting system were identified.
Can't we stand behind the price?
The dynamics of the growth of the LBC purchase price also caused not at all positive emotions in the Congress. So, for example, if initially it was supposed to spend 215.5 million dollars on the construction of Freedom (LCS 1) (excluding R&D expenses), then its final price jumped to 537 million dollars. Excess - by 321.5 million, or 149.2%. For the head LBC of another type - Independence (LCS 2) - the overrun in percentage terms is somewhat more modest, "only" by 136.6%, but in absolute terms it is even more - by 350.5 million dollars. According to the second pair of LBK, the official growth is $ 97 million (7, 7%), but when recalculated from the original cost according to the 2006 budget of the fiscal year, there is an excess of $ 917, 7 million (208, 5%). In addition, the fleet received both Freedom and Independence in an "unfinished form and with significant technical deficiencies." At the same time, according to experts, if the American admirals continued to wait from the contractors for "completing and eliminating deficiencies," the ships would have risen in price even more - the completion of work at the naval shipyards cost the budget much cheaper than at the factories of private corporations.
And all would be fine if only the cost overruns on the program were recorded - the time frames for its implementation are also increasing: for the lead ships of the Freedom and Independence types, they were already 20 and 26 months, respectively.
"The ability of the naval command to ensure the deployment of ready-to-use missions and affordable LBCs remains unproven," the GAO said in a report.
It should be noted that the full version of the document is classified, and in its open part there is no information about what shortcomings were identified by experts in relation to anti-submarine weapons and the main power plant of littoral warships. However, it became known that the Navy specialists consider the PLO complexes "little increasing the combat potential of the ship and almost not contributing to the effective solution of their tasks." As for the power plant, then a lot - at least with the ships of the "Freedom" type - became clear two months ago …
The blades have failed
… The accident occurred off the coast of California on September 12 during the next exit of the "Freedom" to the sea for practicing various tasks. According to eyewitnesses, unexpectedly "there was a strong vibration" in the gas turbine on the starboard side, after which the commander decided to stop both gas turbines and return to the base on diesel engines. The inspection showed that the cause of the accident was the destruction of the turbine blades, which damaged the installation. And this is on the eve of the date of the final selection of the LBK type for serial construction and the issuance of a contract for the first series of ten ships.
The main power plant of LBC Freedom is a diesel-gas turbine unit, it includes two Rolls-Royce MT30 gas turbine units, two Colt-Pilstick diesel units and four Isotta Fraschini V1708 diesel generators of 800 kW each. The rated power of one gas turbine is 48280 hp. with. (36 MW - at 38 degrees or 40 MW - at 15 degrees). Freedom has no propellers and, accordingly, bulky propeller shafts and shafts - four water cannons of the Kameva company (a subsidiary of Rolls-Royce) are used as propellers, two of which are fixed, and the other two are rotary.
It is noteworthy that the gas turbine units of the British company hit the US Navy warships for the first time, and such an embarrassment at the very first LBK in the series! Exclusively - to the delight of General Electric, whose GTUs have been operated on ships of the American fleet since the 70s, including the LBC of the second type (Independence). Some experts warned about the probable negative consequences of using GTU MT30 at the initial stage of the LBC program, using as an argument the fact that MT30 is a new shipborne GTU, which does not yet have "authority" among the sailors.
On the one hand, this is so, but on the other hand, the gas turbine engine in the GTU belongs to the well-known Trent family. The operating time of these aircraft gas turbine engines (GTU MT30 was created on the basis of Trent 800, which is also equipped with the Boeing-777 aircraft, and has 80% compatibility with the aircraft engine), according to Rolls-Royce management, exceeded 30 million flight hours. The main contractor for the Freedom-type single-hull LBC, Lockheed Martin Corporation, preferred the British GTU to the American one because of its greater capacity - 48,280 hp. with. against 36,500 liters. with. at GTU LM2500, since initially the customer set the task to ensure the maximum speed of the ship of at least 50 knots (on tests, however, the developers did not manage to confirm this in practice). However, the MT30 is heavier and more cumbersome than the LM2500. Now it turned out that it has not yet been completely finalized.
But in the accident at Freedom, there is also room for positive emotions - it made it possible to work out the process of repairing a gas turbine unit, associated with the extraction of large elements of the installation, including the gas turbine itself. At the same time, the procedure for replacing the gas turbine unit can be carried out by the team and a small group of coastal service specialists, without being docked. That is, outside the place of permanent deployment of the ship.
