The beginning of the use of cars in Russia dates back to 1900, and in 1910 the Russian-Baltic Carriage Works in Riga began to produce cars - at the same time, the company received a number of parts and special grades of steel from Germany. The productivity of the plant was extremely insignificant - up to 1914 it produced up to 360 cars. Leitner's factories in Riga, Frese and Leisner's and Puzyrev's in St. Petersburg produced only test copies of cars.
The import of cars from abroad in the period from 1901 to 1914 was about 21 thousand units. But of this total number of 21,360 vehicles, more than 30% (over 7 thousand units) by the beginning of 1914 were out of order, and on the eve of the war there were up to 13 thousand vehicles - of which only about 5.2% (259 cars, 418 trucks and 34 special) belonged to the military department.
At the same time, 40% of vehicles were concentrated in large centers - in St. Petersburg and Moscow.
For comparison: in 1913 in England there were 90 thousand (including 8 thousand trucks), in France - 76 thousand, Germany - 57 thousand (including 7 thousand trucks) vehicles.
During the period from 1901 to 1914, about 9 thousand motorcycles were imported into Russia, and on the eve of the declaration of war in the country there were (excluding those that had fallen into disrepair) a little more than 6 thousand pieces.
In general, German cars prevailed among imported cars - with the declaration of war, these cars were cut off from the supply of spare parts. In addition, the car park in Russia was distinguished by a variety of types of brands and models of cars, which eliminated the possibility of organizing a case for serial repair of vehicles. By 1913, there were up to 35 car repair shops in Russia, plus 93 workshops with garages.
Thus, the total resources of the country both in relation to vehicles and repair facilities that could be used by the military department when declaring war were insufficient.
AUTOMOTIVE MOUTHS
Back in 1910, the military department petitioned for the creation of special automobile companies and their introduction into the army. In the same year, with nine railway battalions in European Russia and the Caucasus, a fifth company was created, which were supposed to test vehicles, select the models of vehicles most suitable for serving in the troops, as well as train lower technical personnel. The personnel of the company is 4 officers and about 150 soldiers. Cash cars available in the army were transferred to the created companies. In addition, a training automobile company was formed, which was entrusted with the tasks of training non-commissioned officers and officers for automobile military units.
The general management of the automotive business in the Russian army was concentrated in the military communications department of the Main Directorate of the General Staff.
In 1911, the War Ministry purchased 14 trucks from the best foreign firms, testing them with a mileage of 1,500 miles. In 1912, competitive runs of cars were organized along the total length of the route - along the highway about 2 thousand versts and on dirt roads for about 900 versts - and trucks up to 2340 versts (along the highway).
In addition to the creation of automobile companies, measures were taken to supply the military headquarters with cars and motorcycles to individual brigades, as well as to supply the fortresses with cars and trucks.
In 1913, technical issues related to auto parts were transferred to the Main Military-Technical Directorate (GVTU).
The Ministry of War decided to form 29 separate autorot and assumed to implement this plan within three years - in 1914-1916. The peacetime company staff consisted of: 8 officers, 4 officials, 206 soldiers, and in wartime - 11 officers, 4 officials and 430 soldiers.
The mobilization received from the population: cars - 3562, trucks - 475 and motorcycles - 1632, and all cars - 5669. This figure was increased due to requisitions in the border provinces and in Finland on the basis of the Regulations on the field management of troops - but insignificantly …
GROWING NEED
With the beginning of the war, the army's need for cars and motorcycles began to grow rapidly, it became clear that it was necessary to increase the number of automobile companies, sanitary detachments, automobile teams at the headquarters of the fronts and armies, motorcycle teams to carry out communications services at the headquarters of the armies and cavalry divisions. In addition, cars and motorcycles were required to meet the special needs of artillery, aviation, aeronautical and other military units, as well as a reserve to replenish the loss.
In May 1915, the General Staff drew up a calculation, according to which it was planned to have: 2 authors for each army (15) and in the reserve of each front, a motorcycle command for each army, an ambulance detachment for each corps (60) and one motorcycle squad for each cavalry division (45). To meet the army's demand for cars and motorcycles in 1914-1915, orders were made in America and European countries for 12 thousand cars and 6.5 thousand motorcycles. The annual demand of the army was determined in the following figures: cars - 14 788, motorcycles - 10 303.
Up to October 1, 1917, up to 30.5 thousand cars were sent to the active army and ordered (of which 711 were in the military department before the war and about 3.5 thousand were received under military-motor service) and 13 thousand motorcycles.
OWN PRODUCTION
The entire mass of machines was extremely variegated in composition. Accordingly, the military department in 1916 tried to organize the production of cars in Russia.
In February 1916, GVTU signed five contracts for the manufacture of cars, the execution of which provided for the construction of the following factories:
- Joint Stock Moscow Society (AMO) in Moscow;
- Russian-Baltic - in Fili near Moscow;
- Lebedeva - in Yaroslavl;
- Russian Renault - in Rybinsk;
- Aksai - in Rostov-on-Don.
The contractors undertook to build, equip and put the factories into operation no later than October 7, 1916, and the order assigned to them for 7, 5 thousand cars to be fulfilled by October 7, 1918.
In May 1916, the GVTU signed an agreement with the British engineering society "Bekos" for the construction of an automobile plant near Moscow, in Mytishchi, designed for the annual production of 3 thousand cars.
Work on the construction of new factories was in full swing, but the Allies after the February Revolution slowed down the execution of Russian orders. As a result, work on the construction and equipment of automobile factories by October 1917 almost ceased.
Thus, the availability of road transport in Russia in 1914 in quantitative terms made it possible to meet the needs of the army for the first time after the declaration of war, but of this amount, it turned out to be possible to take into the army only 30% of the vehicles available in the country at the time of mobilization. At the same time, the vehicles from among those accepted for mobilization, which needed even minor repairs, could not be used for service for a long time due to the lack of funds for repairs.
The military department was not able to properly use the data of the runs and operation of cars organized by it in autotopes and did not stop its choice on any specific types of vehicles. The latter were purchased from almost all European factories. As a result, the military department was forced to take what was available on the market, thus adding even more variety to the military vehicle fleet.
SPARE PARTS PROBLEMS
During the war, spare parts for cars were ordered by the military department at the same time as cars. In the first period of the war, they were purchased for an amount of up to 35% of the cost of the cars themselves, and within two and a half years they were completely used up - thus, the annual consumption of spare parts amounted to 14% of the cost of cars.
The absence in Russia of the production and extraction of many materials necessary for auto repair (special grades of automotive steel, spring and spring steel, brass, tin, etc.), created the need to import them from abroad, which made the supply of the army dependent on the discretion of the allies - in particular, England, which controlled the sea tonnage. The result was frequent interruptions in the supply of materials, causing increased vehicle downtime for repairs (up to six months).
The front-line road network, which had a very limited number of highways, soon fell into disrepair due to heavy traffic and lack of proper repairs. Temporary roads - logs, planks, made of poles, etc., built by road parts were of little use for cars.
The low qualification of the driver's staff and the poor organization of the road business caused a large percentage (50–75%) of the loss of cars, and the repair shops created during the war could not cope with the task before them due to the lack of spare parts, materials and equipment.
The supply of military vehicles with operational materials depended on foreign countries only in terms of rubber. About 50% of the tires were imported, the rest was made domestically - but the raw materials came again from abroad. Lubricants and combustible materials were almost 100% Russian-made.
Finally, the organization of the autorot was very cumbersome, and this cumbersomeness increased due to the imposition of the tasks of supplying and repairing vehicles of military units and headquarters to the authors - this explained the low mobility of the autorot, which made their operational transfer extremely difficult.
But, despite all these problems, the First World War was an important milestone in the organization of the automobile troops of Russia.
