The fact that in the coming years tank units will appear in the armament of the internal troops, said Sergei Bunin, chief of the General Staff of the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation. This decision is due to the fact that the internal troops carry out various tasks and sometimes, without the powerful support of armored equipment, it is not possible to solve the assigned combat mission. General Bunin also recalled that recently the internal troops made a decision to restore artillery units as well: "For many years there was no artillery, it was disbanded, but now, based on the situation, they came to the conclusion: it turns out to be necessary." The artillery regiment, in particular, was restored and attached to the 46th separate brigade of the internal operational forces.
Against the background of this message, a completely logical and legitimate question arises: what determines the need for the presence of heavy military equipment in the forces of law and order? There are no intelligible comments from this department. Howitzers may be useful in special operations in the North Caucasus, the solution of which is entrusted to the "maroon berets". It is these units that are involved in heavy battles with the remnants of bandit formations. And it is true. But is it all? Some people are hesitant.
In this case, it is logical to recall that until 2006, tank units were part of the internal troops. They sometimes played a decisive role, for example, in 2000, in repelling a large-scale attack by Chechen militants on Dagestan. Then the first to take the main blow were the tanks of the 93rd mechanized regiment, which was part of the 100th division of the internal troops. In this unit, there were about 60 combat vehicles in service. And it must be admitted that they were all very useful in difficult battles.
The tanks of the internal troops fought successfully throughout the entire second Chechen campaign. But when the large gangs in the mountains and gorges of the North Caucasus were completely defeated, it was decided to abandon the tanks. All combat vehicles were transferred to the long-term storage bases of the Ministry of Defense. General Nikolai Rogozhkin, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs and Commander of Internal Troops, commented on the decision as follows: “To neutralize scattered, small armed bands of militants, the troops need more maneuverable means. Given the situation, the priority in technical equipment is aimed at new special wheeled armored vehicles. The experience of carrying out various counter-terrorist operations confirms that its use is much more effective in terms of maneuverability, mobility, effectiveness in fire and personnel protection."
In accordance with this, a new program was developed that provides for the arming of the internal troops. To help them, special vehicles of hidden reservation - "Tiger", which proved to be quite good in battles in the North Caucasus region, were sent to them. It is also planned to replace even the BTR-80 armored personnel carriers with more modern and versatile armored escort vehicles - "Shot", which are manufactured at the Kama Automobile Plant. Waiting for "maroon berets" and the promised armored car SPM-3, this is a special armored vehicle with mine resistance and a high degree of protection of personnel.
Commander-in-chief Rogozhkin summed up his story about all the new plans for the armament of the Internal Troops' units: economic conditions … At the moment, we perfectly understand which units and what needs to be armed within ten years. This story was heard two years ago. Confidence sounded in the words of the commander-in-chief, but why, after such a short time, the explosives again needed tanks. For what purpose?
They say that with their help it is easier to fight in the mountains with militants who have settled in bases and dugouts, to smoke them from all kinds of shelters in settlements and forests. But have there really been any changes in the North Caucasus since 2006, when the last tank of the "maroon berets" was handed over to the army? In principle, no. It is more convenient to knock bandits out of mountain shelters not with heavy and clumsy tanks, but with Buratino flamethrower systems - as evidence we can recall how difficult the battles were with the gang of field commander Gelayev, who settled in the village of Komsomolskoye, and how decisive was the heavy mortar systems played.
But perhaps the need for the presence of tanks in the units of the internal troops is completely different. In the events that recently took place in Egypt, it was the tanks that became the impenetrable barrier of the protesters in Cairo's Tahrir Square. For the most part, the presence of heavy armored vehicles, impassable for unarmed demonstrators, helped the Egyptian government stabilize the political situation.
Perhaps the explanation lies in Rogozhkin's words quoted above: "the structure and composition will be brought in line with the current political and economic conditions …"? Indeed: after 2006, political conditions in Russia changed, so did the “maroon berets” units need tanks? And by and large, what has changed? Is that the next presidential election on the nose …
It is also worth remembering that last fall, the first deputy. Head of the Russian CSTO Colonel-General Anatoly Nogovitsyn announced that the international forces entrusted to him would soon begin to receive tear gas, water cannons, traumatic weapons and stun grenades. All of these weapons have a non-lethal effect. The capabilities of these means were demonstrated in action at the CSTO exercises "Interaction-2010" near Chebarkul.
Tanks in service with the internal troops and water cannons in the CSTO battalions, if a single logical chain is created, inspire doubts that only militants and terrorists will become the only targets in these military preparations.
