April 8 marks four years since the signing of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START) between Russia and the United States. More than three years have passed since its entry into force on February 5, 2011. In Russia, these dates were marked by formal interviews with officials and experts about the "full fulfillment by the parties of their contractual obligations", which, however, does not correspond to reality as far as the Americans are concerned.
The results of a systematic analysis show that the United States is committing a significant number of violations and circumventions of those articles of the START Treaty and its Protocol, the control of the implementation of which is not provided for by the inspections. At the same time, they pragmatically use the shortcomings of the treaty documents, creating conditions for themselves to achieve military-technical superiority in the area of strategic offensive arms.
The American side, unlike the Russian one, did not even think to proceed with the removal from combat duty and the elimination of deployed carriers and launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs. For more than three years, the United States has been engaged in the modernization of strategic offensive arms and the destruction of missile and aviation scrap metal.
At the same time, Washington periodically comes up with and throws in the media facts of violations of the INF and START Treaties, which the Russian side allegedly admits.
Mikhail Ulyanov, Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry's Department for Security and Disarmament, recently announced in an interview about the possibility of the Russian withdrawal from the START Treaty, "if the United States continues to develop its missile defense system." At the same time, it is noted that Washington does not comply with the provision of the preamble to the START Treaty on “the existence of an interconnection between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, the growing importance of this interconnection in the process of reducing strategic nuclear offensive arms of the sides”.
EMPTY OBLIGATIONS
Indeed, for Moscow, this "relationship" and its dynamics do not correspond to the interests of military security, since the deployment of the US global missile defense system and regional missile defense segments is in full swing. Despite the adjustment by the Iranian leadership of its nuclear program, the United States and NATO stated that “the European missile defense system is not aimed at protecting against any particular country. It is about defending against a real and growing threat, and we need real defense against a real threat."
As a result, the Americans successfully completed the first stage of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAP) program and began work on the second program. In violation of the indefinite INF Treaty, target missiles are being developed and successfully testing elements of the missile defense system. In the near future, they plan to practice anti-missile interceptions using undeclared ICBMs as target missiles, which already means a violation of the START Treaty. In Romania, the ground-based missile defense system "Standard-3" mod. 1B. The same complex is planned to be put on alert by 2018 in Poland. At the same time, the transformation of this anti-missile into a medium-range missile may pose a serious threat to Russia's military security.
Sergei Anuchin in the article "Umbrella against the dark forces" ("NVO" No. 12 for 2014) professionally proved that "the anti-missile" Standard-3 "is a mini-" Pershing-2 "near the borders of Russia with a flight time of 5-6 minutes … Simply put, the European missile defense system is a carefully concealed means of inevitable destruction of Russia, while the time for making decisions on response will obviously not be enough. " At the Rota Naval Base (Spain), work has been launched to equip the infrastructure for the deployment of four US Navy ships equipped with Standard-3 missile defense systems and Aegis control system, and the first Donald Cook ship is already at the base. In addition, the American partners announced plans to deploy the third positional area of the GBI anti-missile system in the United States. The reason for this is the alleged increase in the North Korean nuclear missile threat and the need to increase funding for the creation of Japan's missile defense system. It should be emphasized that this regional missile defense system is being created against the eastern grouping of Russian strategic nuclear forces.
It is pertinent to recall that at the Moscow ABM Conference (2013), using computer models, it was stated that by 2020 the Euro missile defense system would be capable of intercepting part of Russian ICBMs and SLBMs. In response, the Americans said: “… your models are imperfect, and the underlying data used are questionable. We have our own models …"
The question is quite reasonable: what is the mechanism for assessing the progress of the deployment of the US global missile defense and European missile defense system and their impact on Russia's nuclear deterrent potential? Unfortunately, such a mechanism is not spelled out in the texts of the treaty documents. There is only the term "anti-missile" and the Seventh Agreed Statement "Converted silo launchers (silos) of ICBMs at Vandenberg Air Force Base." We are talking about launchers (PU), which, in violation of the "old" START-1 Treaty, were secretly re-equipped for anti-missiles. Currently, they are used to conduct test launches of GBI interceptor missiles in order to modernize them, and possibly will be eliminated. At the same time, notifications to the Russian side about the planned launches are not presented, which is fraught with nuclear incidents, especially since the GBI product is identical to the Minuteman-3 ICBM.
Meanwhile, the Americans believe that clause 3 of Article V of the treaty was developed in the interests of the Russian side: “Each of the Parties does not re-equip or use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers to deploy anti-missiles in them. Each of the Parties does not re-equip or use anti-missile launchers to accommodate ICBMs and SLBMs. " It can be argued that the Americans will not be engaged in such an expensive re-equipment, since there are other economical ways to build up the forces and means of the SNS and anti-missiles. Also, the provisions of the START Treaty do not prohibit the "digging" of new mines for anti-missile missiles in the continental United States or in another region of the world, which is what the Americans intend to do after choosing the third positioning area.
It should be emphasized that the author proposed to formalize this "relationship" in a special agreed statement, which would contain: the composition, tactical and technical characteristics, combat capabilities of the interceptor missiles; presentation of data on US missile defense; composition and content of notification and control and inspection procedures; the procedure for presenting information on the build-up of elements of the US missile defense system, regional missile defense and other data. This would make it possible, with the involvement of research organizations of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, to form well-founded conclusions necessary for making decisions, including withdrawing from the treaty.
However, these proposals were rejected. Therefore, it is strange that the Russian governing bodies expect from the United States some kind of written legal guarantees that the European missile defense system is not directed against the Russian strategic nuclear forces. There is no doubt that these guarantees will be violated by the Americans, as happened with the ABM, INF Treaty, START-1, START-2, START, NPT, CTBT, MTCR, Geneva agreements in connection with the situation in Ukraine, etc.
Probably, the public of the NATO member states is not yet sufficiently informed that the objects of the European missile defense system and tactical nuclear weapons will be hit as a priority by high-precision missile and bomb strikes and other adequately asymmetric means, the effectiveness of which is beyond doubt.
It should also be pointed out that the United States is violating the provision of the preamble to the START Treaty, which envisages taking into account "the influence of ICBMs and SLBMs in conventional equipment on strategic stability." It has long been known that the creation of a grouping of non-nuclear strategic missiles in the United States is clearly destabilizing. Even the US Senate agrees with this, which does not approve the funding program until the Pentagon presents convincing evidence that the launches of these missiles, especially from SSBNs, will not lead to nuclear incidents with Russia and China. In addition, in violation of the INF and START Treaties, undeclared Minotaur and GBI missiles and hypersonic weapons are used to test non-nuclear ICBMs. In non-nuclear (and possibly nuclear) equipment, they will be included in the new strategic triad. In addition, four SSGNs of the "Ohio" type were reequipped under the SLCM "Tomahok" bl. IV in non-nuclear (and possibly nuclear) equipment (up to 154 on each boat), which are periodically on combat patrols.
It should be noted that Washington, within the framework of the START Treaty, has not yet provided information on the purpose and missions of non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs.
The American side also violates Article XIII, since it is engaged in the sale of the Trident-2 SLBM to the British NSNF, which was not declared at the time of the signing of the START Treaty. In addition, the Americans are training British specialists; assist in the development of operational and technical and combat documentation; are working on the technical interface of American SLBMs "Trident-2" with British warheads and SSBNs, etc.
In violation of Article XIII, the Americans are engaging in undeclared cooperation with Great Britain under the Successor program, which provides for the development of 3-4 new SSBNs to replace British Vanguard-class submarines. The laying of the head SSBN is planned in 2021 with a deadline for its acceptance into service in 2027. It is stated that the missile compartment is being designed by the American corporation General Dynamics with the given overall parameters for promising American-made SLBMs.
It is also worth mentioning that, in accordance with the provisions of NATO's strategic concept, various types of US cooperation with Great Britain and France are being carried out, which is not regulated by the START Treaty. Of particular concern is the organization of a unified planning for the use of strategic nuclear forces by the United States, Great Britain and France. Thus, in the context of the deployment of the European missile defense system, there is a "triangle" of nuclear allies, and besides, there are also NATO nuclear forces armed with tactical nuclear weapons.
Moreover, the United States, deploying TNW on the territory of a number of NATO member countries (150-200 bombs of the B-61 type), flagrantly violates Article I of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which prohibits nuclear powers from transferring or granting control of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. and Article II, which prohibits non-nuclear powers from acquiring and using nuclear weapons. In this regard, the Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Anatoly Antonov emphasized: “The deployment of the US tactical nuclear weapons in non-nuclear countries goes beyond the NPT. In theory, TNW deployed in Europe can be delivered to the borders of the Russian Federation in a short time, while Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons cannot be moved in a short time to the US border, and they do not pose a threat to American security. Nuclear weapons must be returned to the United States, and the corresponding infrastructure must be destroyed."
However, in the US nuclear strategy we read: “The tasks of deploying and using TNW outside the US are considered exclusively within the framework of the negotiation process within NATO, and it is considered necessary: as adopted into service - F-35); complete the program to extend the service life of B-61 bombs for use by F-35 aircraft; to ensure the possibility of storing TNW on the territory of NATO allies”.
In this regard, in 2013, the development of a project for extending the service life of B-61-3, -4, -7 aerial bombs began with the start of work on their modernization in 2018. As part of the modernization of these bombs, it is planned to develop a new B61-12 type bomb, which will be classified as strategic. In the future, promising F-35 fighter-bombers and US strategic bomber aircraft will be equipped with B61-12 bombs. In the interests of basing tactical aircraft - carriers of nuclear weapons and refueling aircraft, air bases Zokniai (Lithuania), Lillewaerde (Latvia) and Emari (Estonia) have been prepared, their development during exercises and combat duty have been organized.
THE MAIN THING IS TO RECORD
According to the START Treaty, “each of the parties shall reduce strategic offensive arms in such a way that seven years after its entry into force (by February 5, 2018) and thereafter, their total quantities would not exceed 700 units - for deployed ICBMs, TB and SLBMs; 1,550 units - for warheads on them; 800 units - for deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB.
The modern combat strength of the SNC and the results of the United States' fulfillment of its treaty obligations were recently announced by well-known American experts G. Christensen and R. Norris in the next issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (see Tables 1, 2 and 3). Based on these data, it can be concluded that the US SNA abbreviations are paper-based.
In particular, it is well known that two Ohio-class SSBNs are constantly undergoing major repairs and are kept in the combat composition of the NSNF. Strategic bombers (SB) B-1V have once again been declared as carriers of conventional weapons, although there are still opportunities for their reverse conversion to carry out nuclear missions. At the same time, Russian officials and so-called independent experts and sages of the disarmament persuasion are silent about the fact that under the "old" START-1 Treaty, these bombers were already nuclear-free. They also do not notice that in Article III, paragraphs 8a and 8c of the START Treaty, the launchers and ICBMs "Minuteman-II" (actually - stages) and "Piskiper" (also stages), and B-52G bombers (dismantled), long out of service. The very term "existing" in chapter one of the Protocol to the START Treaty "Terms and definitions" in relation to the above missiles and their stages is absent. The question also arises about the technical appearance and initial position of missile systems with ICBMs "Minuteman-II" and "Piskiper": there are no warheads for them, and the missiles are not loaded into silos. Meanwhile, the stages of these missiles, in violation of the INF and START Treaties, are used to assemble Minotaur-type ICBMs for testing non-nuclear warheads. The Americans traditionally do not react to Moscow's claims.
Of course, during the preparation and negotiation of the treaty, it was possible to understand that the obsolete stages of ICBMs and SBs were deliberately included by the Americans in the text of the treaty as a reduction quota, instead of the modernized Minuteman-3M, S missiles, which was confirmed. As a result, for more than three years, the United States has been reducing the warheads of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs and destroying obsolete stages of non-deployed missiles, sky-ready bombers and collapsed silos.
This conclusion is confirmed by the answers of G. Christensen in an interview with Russian media: “In fact, the United States in the previous years of the new START Treaty, the United States, in essence, was engaged in the elimination of the so-called ghost launchers. For example, “planes and missile silos, which, being very outdated, in reality were no longer involved in a nuclear mission,” but they were still “on the balance sheet. Only at this stage is the United States embarking on a genuine, and not on paper, reduction of its nuclear arsenal."
Further, G. Christensen emphasizes: “At present, the United States is entering a new phase - this is the reduction of launchers that actually carry a nuclear mission today. In addition, the reduction in the number of warheads placed on ICBMs is in full swing. This year, the US administration will announce a procedure for reducing the number of ICBMs, presumably from 450 to 400 units. Approximately 30 of the 76 B-52H bombers will be refitted so that they cannot carry nuclear weapons, and in 2015 the US Navy will begin to cut the number of launchers on each SSBN from 24 to 20. It is clearly in Russia's interests to ensure further reductions in US SNA, as The United States now has a significant superiority in the number of missiles and bombers and the number of warheads that can be deployed on these carriers."
All these numbers have long been known, since the United States officially published the prospective combat strength of the SNC back in 2010. The next report of the US Congressional Research Service examines in detail the targets for the SNA for 2018 (Table 2), according to which, by February 5, 2018, the combat strength of the US SNA will include 420 ICBMs of the Minuteman-3 type in monoblock equipment (with The technical capabilities for completing the warheads breeding platforms with three warheads remain), all 14 Ohio SSBNs are planned to be retained, and the number of launch silos will be reduced from 24 to 20 per boat. It should be noted that such a reduction in silos and missiles for the US NSNF combat readiness is not critical, since there is a possibility of an operational increase in the number of warheads on other Trident-2 SLBMs to 8-12 units each. At the same time, it is doubtful that the dismantling and re-equipment of SSBN launchers will be irreversible. The procurement of SLBMs continues, and it is planned to modernize these missiles and SSBNs. Combat launch positions, launch control points and other infrastructure facilities are planned to be mothballed.
The number of deployed SB in nuclear equipment will be 60 units, it is not known how many warheads will be credited to them. In reality, the B-52N is capable of carrying up to 20 cruise missiles (the Russian Tu-160 - up to 12, the Tu-95MS - up to 16). Meanwhile, in accordance with paragraph 2b of Article III of the treaty, so-called conditional credits have been invented in relation to bombers: "for each deployed heavy bomber, one nuclear warhead is counted." The authorities of the Russian Federation do not know how to apply these rules in practice. Therefore, there is an ambiguous interpretation of them when assessing the declared levels of nuclear warheads at 1550 units; planning the implementation of the START Treaty; development of plans for strategic exercises; plans for the use, construction and development of strategic nuclear forces (SNF); the formation of state programs for weapons and defense orders; financial justification of various projects, etc.
The aforementioned forms and methods of the "illusory" implementation by the United States of its treaty obligations are largely due to the logical incompleteness of the content of individual articles of the START Treaty, which "work" in the interests of the Americans. Thus, it is clear from the text of the treaty that the intermediate stages, levels and timing of reductions in strategic offensive arms, as was the case in the previous treaty on strategic offensive arms, have not been determined. In this regard, the Americans are carrying out ghostly reductions in strategic offensive weapons, watching with satisfaction how we are destroying unique strategic offensive arms that have expired.
It is quite possible that in the event of force majeure circumstances affecting the national security interests of the United States and its allies, the Americans will withdraw from the treaty and build up the combat capabilities of their SNS. Moreover, they have found a solution to the problems of extending the service life, ensuring the reliability and safety of nuclear weapons under the conditions of a moratorium on nuclear tests.
At one time, the author proposed to define in article II of the treaty three intermediate stages with specific levels of reduction and elimination of strategic offensive arms and the conduct by the parties of control and inspection procedures with reports to the leadership of states on the results of each stage. However, the proposals were not accepted - and as a result, the Americans carried out "paper" reductions in strategic offensive arms for more than three years.
NON-REVERSIBLE ABBREVIATIONS ARE NOT PROVIDED
Ultimately, we can conclude that the United States is not fulfilling the main thing - irreversible reductions in strategic offensive arms, primarily delivery vehicles and launchers. At the same time, the judgments of a number of Russian experts look naive that the Americans will run to reduce and destroy modernized ICBMs, SLBMs, SSBNs and objects of the command and control system of troops and weapons.
There is no doubt that the Americans will achieve the declared levels of strategic offensive arms reduction (3, 5 years left) by decommissioning part of ICBMs (as happened with the Piskiper ICBM in 2005) and SLBMs and transferring them to storage mode, reducing the number of warheads with the preservation of the platforms for the rearing of the warhead. Particular attention will be paid to the preservation of delivery vehicles, launchers and objects of the system of combat command and control of troops and nuclear weapons with a sufficient reserve of operational resource. Moreover, Clause 4 of Article III of the Treaty is in the interests of the American side: “For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs: a certain type is considered an ICBM or an SLBM of that type. The content of this article concerns Minuteman-3 ICBMs and Trident-2 SLBMs, as Russian ICBMs and SLBMs are maintained, stored, transported and disposed of as a whole.
In addition, there is paragraph 2 of Section II of Chapter III of the Protocol, which also “works” in the interests of the Americans: “The elimination of solid-propellant ICBMs and solid-propellant SLBMs is carried out using any of the procedures provided for in this paragraph: a) the first stage is destroyed by an explosion, about this a notification is presented; b) the fuel is removed by burning and one hole with a diameter of at least one meter is cut or punched in the first stage rocket engine housing, or the first stage rocket engine housing is cut into two approximately equal parts; (c) The fuel is removed by leaching and the first stage rocket motor case is crushed, flattened or cut into two approximately equal parts."
Thus, regardless of the method of destruction of the first stage, the withdrawal of American ICBMs and SLBMs from the account will be recorded after the elimination of their first stages. Where the second and third stages go in the protocol to the treaty is not defined. This type of liquidation has already taken place during the implementation of the START I Treaty with regard to the Piskiper missiles, which are now declared as the “existing” type, although in general they do not exist. That is, favorable conditions are created for the incomplete elimination of ICBMs and SLBMs (only in the first stage) and the creation of a return potential for missiles. It can be argued that clause 2 will ensure the unconditional preservation of the stages of the Minuteman-3 ICBM and the Trident-2 SLBM, since making the first stages is not a problem. By the way, the Americans have completed measures to concentrate the production of all stages of the Minuteman-3 ICBMs at one enterprise.
We also note that the Americans, in violation of the requirements of Article XIII, together with their nuclear allies, carry out various types of cooperation in the field of strategic offensive arms. As a result, the Pentagon can reduce the number of deployed nuclear warheads to the level of 1,550 warheads and below, since the list of potential enemy targets and the composition of nuclear weapons for their destruction is annually updated and redistributed among the allies in the course of joint nuclear planning.
BRIEF SUMMARY
Moscow, unlike Washington, punctually and responsibly fulfills its treaty obligations by eliminating unique types of strategic offensive arms with a repeatedly extended service life. Undoubtedly, the pace of development, adoption and deployment on combat duty of promising types of strategic offensive weapons equipped with modern US missile defense breakthroughs will be increased.
The United States, while formally implementing reductions in its strategic offensive arms, pays special attention to the creation of a recovery potential by retaining delivery vehicles, launchers and nuclear warheads. In the event of threats to the national security of the United States and its allies, the Americans have the opportunity to rapidly build up the combat strength of the SNC (Table 3). As if there were no reductions in American strategic offensive arms!
It should be emphasized that the proposed expert assessments did not take into account: the possibility of transferring 51 B-1B bombers to nuclear status; the possibility of equipping the Trident-2 SLBM with twelve BG; up to 100 non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, SLBMs and TB, which, according to the START Treaty, can be included in the combat strength; the presence of nuclear allies (Great Britain and France) and NATO nuclear forces; the impact of the US global missile defense system and its regional segments on Russia's nuclear deterrent potential.
It is important to note that in June 2013, the US announced some adjustments to its nuclear strategy. The results of its refinement are set out in the US Nuclear Weapons Strategy Report. The document pays special attention to maintaining combat readiness, building and developing the SNS with the creation of a new strategic triad. The document provides for a full-scale program for the modernization of US nuclear weapons, designed for more than 30 years with the financing of the program, in the first decade alone in the amount of $ 200 billion.
Table 1 The current combat strength of the SNC and the results of the United States' fulfillment of treaty obligations
Table 2 Planned composition of the US SNA
Source: Amy F. Woolf, U. S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues, February 22, 2012.
