The years 1945-1953 went down in history as the first period of the post-war construction of our armed forces and the development of domestic military art. It is transient, pre-nuclear. However, the theoretical development of many issues of military art of that time, especially such an important one as a strategic offensive operation, was relevant throughout the last century, and many of them have not lost their relevance today.
What did they leave important in the theory of strategic offensive operation? To begin with, it is worth remembering the general situation of those years. The Second World War has just ended. The country was engaged in the elimination of the severe consequences of the war, rebuilding the economy, destroyed cities and villages. The armed forces were transferred to a peaceful position, the demobilized soldiers returned to enterprises.
The war radically changed the balance of political forces in the world. A world socialist system was formed, which quickly gained the pace of its political, economic, scientific and technological development, and its weight in the solution of international problems was steadily increasing.
Soon after the war, the Western powers, led by the United States of America, set out to isolate the USSR, create a united front against our country and the socialist countries, and surround them with a system of military-political blocs. The Cold War, an arms race, was unleashed. The United States, using its monopoly on nuclear weapons, tried to blackmail the Soviet Union with a so-called "nuclear deterrent" strategy. With the formation of NATO (1949), the military threat to our country has increased even more. West Germany is included in this military bloc, which is turning into a staging area for the preparation of war against the USSR and the countries of the eastern bloc. The joint armed forces of NATO are being created. Wars are breaking out in Korea, Vietnam, Laos and a number of other countries.
With the creation of atomic (1949) and hydrogen (1953) weapons in our country, the power of the USSR and its allies increased. Aviation underwent rapid development, especially in connection with the introduction of a jet engine. The Il-28 light jet bombers, the MiG-15, MiG-17, Yak-23 jet fighters, the Tu-4 heavy bomber and the Tu-16 jet bomber, which had high combat qualities at that time, are accepted into service. The first samples of rocket weapons are being created: R-1, R-2 and others. Tanks are undergoing serious modernization: armor protection, maneuverability and firepower of medium (T-44, T-54) and heavy (IS-2, IS-3, T-10) tanks and self-propelled artillery units are being improved. Further development is received by rocket artillery (installation BM-14, M-20, BM-24), new models of heavy artillery (130-mm cannon) and mortars (240-mm) have appeared, recoilless guns with cumulative and high-explosive fragmentation have become widespread charges of high armor penetration, the proportion of automatic small arms increased.
An important achievement was the complete motorization of the Ground Forces, the introduction of armored personnel carriers and cross-country vehicles into them. The armament of the air defense and naval forces, control and communications equipment, and engineering equipment were further developed. In addition to technical development, Russian military science also played an important role in strengthening the country's defense capability in those years. Its first task was to generalize the experience of the Second World War. At the same time, all aspects of military affairs were studied, including issues of military art. All the most important operations of the Soviet troops and the armed forces of other participants in the Second World War were thoroughly described and comprehended. On this basis, the theoretical problems of military development and military art were developed. Particular attention was paid to the development of the theory of a strategic offensive operation (or operation of a group of fronts, as they were then called), in the theater of operations (theater of operations) using conventional weapons. At the same time, issues of military art related to the conduct of operations in conditions of the use of nuclear weapons were studied.
Even then, many military theorists abroad tried to belittle the role of the Soviet Union in achieving victory over Germany, to criticize our military strategy, to prove its backwardness, the inability to understand new complex issues related to the emergence of nuclear weapons, to convince the world community that it was frozen on the level of the second world war. This was especially notable for the speeches of G. Kissinger, R. Garthof, F. Miksche, P. Gallois and others. By the way, some of their works were translated and published in our country: G. Kissinger "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy" M., 1959; F. Mikshe "Atomic Weapons and the Army" M., 1956; P. Gallois "Strategy in the Nuclear Age", Moscow, 1962. In reality, there was no lag in the Soviet military strategy, let alone the military weakness of the USSR at that time.
Having atomic weapons, the United States and NATO in general in those years continued to maintain large groupings of conventional armed forces, consisting of ground forces, strategic and tactical aviation, the Navy and air defense forces. Suffice it to say that by the end of 1953 they numbered: personnel - 4 350 000 people (together with the National Guard and the reserve), divisions of land forces - 70 combat aircraft - more than 7000, heavy aircraft carriers - 19, destroyers - about 200, submarine boats - 123. At that time, the united NATO armed forces included 38 divisions and more than 3000 combat aircraft. At the same time, the FRG began to deploy its army. These data indicate that the United States at that time relied not so much on nuclear weapons as on conventional armed forces. In this regard, the development of a strategic offensive operation in Soviet military theory met the tasks of ensuring the security of our country and allies.
At that time, a strategic offensive operation (SSS) was understood as the joint actions of several fronts, large formations and formations of the Air Force and other types of the Armed Forces, carried out according to a single plan and under general leadership in the strategic direction or throughout the theater of operations. Its goals could be: the defeat of an enemy operational-strategic grouping in a certain direction or theater, the seizure of strategically important areas and objects, a change in our favor in the military-political situation. Moreover, the results of such an operation were to have a significant impact on the course of the war or on one of its stages.
During the First World War, as is known, the front-line offensive operation was the highest form of military operations. During its implementation, the fronts acted relatively independently, without direct interaction with neighboring fronts. Naturally, in such an operation, only the goals of an operational scale were achieved.
During the years of the civil war, there are cases of joint implementation of strategic tasks by two fronts in a direction or theater, with more or less close interaction (for example, in the summer of 1920). It was the embryo of the SSS, which became the main and decisive form of military operations during the Great Patriotic War.
The most important factors that led to the emergence of such a form include: a change in the material base of the war (the massive appearance of aviation, tanks, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, more effective artillery, especially reactive, automatic small arms, new control equipment, in particular, radio, mass introduction cars, tractors, etc.), which made it possible to create associations and formations with high maneuverability, great striking power and a significant radius of action; the increased scale of the armed struggle, the decisiveness of the goals of the war, the fierce nature of military operations; the need to unite large masses of ground troops and aviation, conducting combat activities on a vast front, to solve strategic tasks; the possibility of centralized leadership of large groupings of the armed forces, the concentration of their efforts to achieve the main strategic goals.
In the face of a clash of powerful adversaries with large armed forces, developed economic and military potential, and a vast territory, it was no longer possible to achieve serious military goals by conducting small-scale operations (even at the front). It became necessary to involve several fronts, to organize their actions according to a single plan and under a single leadership.
During the Great Patriotic War, Soviet troops successfully carried out many strategic offensive operations that enriched the art of war. The most prominent of them were: the counter-offensive and general offensive near Moscow, Stalingrad and Kursk, operations to liberate the Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine, as well as Belorussian, Yassko-Kishinev, East Prussian, Vistula-Oder, Berlin, etc.
In the first post-war period, the conditions for conducting strategic operations have changed significantly in comparison with the last war. This entailed important changes in the nature and methods of their implementation. According to the views of that time, the new world war was seen as an armed clash of two powerful coalitions of states belonging to opposite world social systems. It was assumed that the general goal of the war could be the defeat of groups of enemy armed forces in land and naval theaters and in the air, undermining the economic potential, seizing the most important areas and facilities, withdrawing the main countries participating in the enemy coalition from it, forcing them to unconditional surrender. The war could arise as a result of a sudden attack by an aggressor or a slow "creep" through local wars. Regardless of how the war started, the sides would deploy multimillion-dollar armed forces, mobilize all economic and moral capabilities.
It was assumed that in order to achieve the ultimate political goals of the war, it would be necessary to solve a number of intermediate military and political tasks, for which it would be necessary to conduct a number of strategic offensive operations. It was believed that the goals of the war could be achieved only by joint efforts of all types of the Armed Forces. The main of them was recognized as the Ground Forces, which bore the brunt of the struggle. The rest must conduct combat work in the interests of the Ground Forces. But at the same time, it was assumed that the formations of the Air Force, Navy and Air Defense Forces of the country could solve a number of relatively independent tasks.
The main types of strategic actions were considered: strategic offensive, strategic defense, counteroffensive. Among them, priority was given to strategic offensive operations. The most important theoretical provisions were reflected in the military press. The contribution of Marshals of the Soviet Union V. Sokolovsky, A. Vasilevsky, M. Zakharov, G. Zhukov, General of the Army S. Shtemenko, Colonel General N. Lomov, Lieutenant General E. Shilovsky, S. Krasilnikov and others.
In theoretical works, it was emphasized that aids to navigation is the main, decisive form of strategic actions of the Armed Forces, since only as a result of it it is possible to defeat the enemy's strategic groupings in the theater, seize vital territory, finally break enemy resistance and ensure victory.
The scope of aids to navigation was determined by the experience of conducting them in the last period of the Patriotic War. It was assumed that along the front, such an operation could cover one or two strategic directions or the entire theater of operations, that it could be carried out throughout the depth of the theater. It was assumed that in some cases, in order to solve all strategic tasks, it would be necessary to carry out two or more successive operations in depth. The following could be involved in carrying out aids to navigation: several front-line formations with reinforcement means, one or two air armies, the country's Air Defense Forces, airborne forces, military transport aviation, and fleets in coastal areas.
The planning of strategic offensive operations was entrusted, as in the war years, to the General Staff. In the plan of the operation, the concept of its conduct was determined, i.e. the grouping of forces (number of fronts), the direction of the main strike and strategic tasks for the group of fronts, as well as the approximate timing of its implementation. The fronts received offensive strips 200-300 km wide. In the front zone, one or several sections of a breakthrough were outlined, with a total length of no more than 50 km, on which strong strike groups of ground forces and aviation were deployed. The armies of the first echelon were cut into strips of attack with a width of 40-50 km or more, breakthrough areas up to 20 km wide, and combat missions were set to a depth of 200 km. Rifle corps, operating in the direction of the main attack of the army, were set up stripes of offensive with a width of up to 8 km, and divisions up to 4 km. In the areas of the breakthrough, it was envisaged to create a high density of forces and means: guns and mortars - 180-200, tanks and self-propelled guns - 60-80 units per one km of the front; the density of bomb strikes is 200-300 tons per sq. km.
It is easy to see that these norms differed little from the norms of operations of the last period of the Patriotic War (Belarusian, Yassy-Kishinev, Vistula-Oder, etc.). In the areas of the breakthrough, large forces of troops were concentrated, while their density was low on passive ones. Before the attack, artillery and air training was planned for up to one hour or more, which was established depending on the strengthening of the enemy's defense. The attack of the troops was to be accompanied by a barrage of fire (single or double), to the depth of the enemy's first line of defense, and air assault operations.
Particular importance was attached to the development and mastering of methods of conducting strategic aids to navigation. Most often, they began with air operations to gain air supremacy. In carrying out the latter, it was planned to involve one or two air armies, the country's Air Defense Forces, long-range aviation, under the unified leadership of the commander-in-chief of the air force or one of the front commanders. The main attention was paid to the rout and destruction of the tactical aviation grouping at airfields and in the air. The main efforts were directed to the defeat of bomber and assault aircraft, but actions were also planned against fighters. It was also planned to destroy airfields, ammunition depots and fuels and lubricants, suppress the radar system. The total duration of the operation was determined at two or three days.
Concurrently with the operation to gain air supremacy, or shortly after it, combat operations were unfolded by the fronts. Three main forms of aids to navigation were allowed: encirclement and destruction of an enemy grouping; dissection of a strategic grouping; fragmentation of the strategic front and the subsequent destruction of isolated groupings.
The encirclement and destruction of the enemy grouping was considered the most effective and decisive form of conducting a strategic operation. Therefore, the main attention was paid to it, both in theoretical works and in practical exercises on operational training. When conducting an operation in this form, two strikes were delivered in converging directions, or one or two enveloping strikes, while simultaneously pressing the enemy grouping against a natural obstacle. It was also possible to inflict crushing blows in the initial stages of the operation. In both cases, a rapid development of the offensive was envisaged in depth and towards the flanks to encircle the main enemy grouping. At the same time, it was planned to dissect and destroy the encircled group. An indispensable condition for achieving success in the encirclement operation was considered the use of large tank (mechanized) formations and formations and air blocking of the encircled grouping.
Dissection of a large enemy grouping was also viewed as an important form of conducting a strategic offensive operation. It was achieved by powerful blows from interacting fronts along the entire depth of the encircled enemy, followed by its destruction in parts. The success of the operation carried out in this form was ensured by the massive use of tank forces and aviation, the development of offensive operations to great depths in the most important direction and high maneuvering with all forces and means.
The fragmentation of the enemy strategic front was achieved by a series of powerful strikes in several sectors on a wide front, with the further development of the offensive in depth along parallel and even diverging directions. This form provided a more covert preparation of the operation and the concentration of its troops in the starting position. It also made it difficult for enemy forces to maneuver to repel our offensive. However, this form required relatively large forces and resources to ensure the necessary density in several sections of the breakthrough.
It was assumed that the offensive operations of the fronts could begin and develop from the breakthrough of the prepared enemy defenses; breaking through hastily organized defenses; breakthrough fortified areas. The possibility of oncoming battles during the entire period of the operation was also not excluded. The breakthrough of the enemy defense to the depth of the main defense zone was assigned to the rifle divisions. Mechanized and tank formations were used in the first echelon only when breaking through the defense hastily organized by the enemy. The attack was carried out by divisions of the first echelon with the support of tanks, artillery and ground attack aircraft. Mechanized divisions usually made up the second echelon of rifle corps and ensured the completion of the breakthrough of the enemy's main line of defense (its depth was 6-10 km). The breakthrough of the second line of defense (it was built 10-15 km from the main line of defense) was envisaged by the introduction of the second echelon of the army into the battle, it was usually a rifle corps. It was considered advantageous to break through the second lane on the move or after a short preparation.
Thus, it was planned to overcome the tactical zone of enemy defense on the first day of the operation. Options were not excluded either. In any case, the formations and units were advancing in battle formations, the infantry - in foot chains behind the tanks with the support of escort guns. The artillery supported the offensive of the troops by the method of a barrage of fire or by sequential concentration of fire. If it was not possible to break through the enemy's defenses in depth on the move, then artillery was pulled up and a short artillery preparation was carried out. The assault aviation, operating in small groups (units, squadrons), was supposed to continuously support the offensive of the troops with machine-gun and artillery fire and bomb strikes. With the advent of jet combat vehicles with high speed and maneuverability, the methods of air support changed: the aircraft could no longer stay in the air over the battlefield for a long time, like propeller-driven attack aircraft, they delivered short fire strikes at the identified enemy resistance nodes in front of the advancing troops. Bomber aviation operated at more powerful resistance centers in the depths, at reserves, airfields and other objects. The tactics of actions of fighter aviation to provide air cover for troops from attacks by enemy aviation also changed: it no longer covered the advancing troops by loitering in the air, but acted on call or by the method of "free hunting".
For the development of a breakthrough into the operational depth, a mobile group of the front was intended, which was usually a mechanized army, which included mechanized and tank divisions. It was envisaged to enter the mobile group into the battle after the breakthrough of the enemy tactical defense zone, i.e. on the second day of the operation, in a strip of eight to twelve kilometers, with the support of artillery and aviation. Serious attention was paid to the comprehensive support of the mobile group, especially engineering. After entering the battle, the mechanized army of the front had to make a swift dash into the depths, boldly break away from the main forces, smash the enemy's reserves, close the encirclement ring, interacting with mobile groups of neighboring fronts and airborne assault forces, create an internal encirclement front or develop success on the external front.
In the area where the encirclement was closed, it was planned to land an airborne assault, most often an airborne division. It was also planned to use airborne assault forces to capture bridgeheads and crossings, sections of the sea coast, islands, important objects, airfields, road junctions, command posts, etc. The landing of an airborne assault was presented as a complex operation, often of a strategic scale, in which, in addition to the airborne troops, rifle or mechanized formations, military transport, front-line and long-range aviation could participate. The landing could be airlifted in one or more echelons. Before the landing, air preparation was planned with the aim of suppressing the air defense and enemy reserves in the landing area.
Landing operations began, as a rule, with a parachute echelon drop and glider landing in order to capture airfields and landing sites. In the future, the landing echelon could land. The airborne assault was to conduct active maneuverable military operations and hold the intended targets or areas until the front troops approached. At the same time, he was supported by aviation. In the course of operations, the landing could be reinforced with rifle or mechanized troops, supplied with weapons, ammunition, etc.
When carrying out aids to navigation in the coastal direction, important tasks were assigned to the fleet, which carried out its operation in cooperation with the coastal front. The forces of the fleet supported the advancing troops, destroyed the forces of the enemy fleet and did not allow their attacks on our troops, landed amphibious assault forces, together with the troops seized the straits and waged antiamphibious defense of the sea coast. In addition, the forces of the fleet were entrusted with the task of disrupting the enemy's maritime traffic and ensuring its own transportations in the sea areas. Along with this, it was envisaged to conduct relatively independent operations, using mainly submarines to disrupt communications and defeat the enemy fleet groupings.
An integral part of the SSS was the actions of the country's Air Defense Forces deployed in this theater. They were assigned the task of defending the most important objects of the frontal zone, communications, groupings of troops (second echelons and reserves), airfields and naval forces, rear services, as well as covering airborne assault forces from enemy air strikes.
These are the main provisions of the theory of preparation and conduct of strategic offensive operations, which were developed in 1945-1953. They fully corresponded to the level of development of military affairs and the needs of ensuring the country's security. This rather coherent theory took into account the entire experience of the Second World War.
