According to numerous media reports, on April 12, Colonel-General Viktor Esin, a consultant to the Commander of the Strategic Missile Forces (Strategic Missile Forces), former chief of the Main Staff of the Strategic Missile Forces, said that in 2018 Russia should adopt a new silo-based heavy liquid-propellant intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) megaton class, which will replace the RS-20 "Voyevoda". The new ICBM will differ from the latter with increased survivability due to enhanced fortification protection of the launcher itself, as well as the adoption of a number of passive and active defense measures.
According to Yesin, the complex of protective measures "will force the potential adversary to spend significantly more of their nuclear warheads and high-precision weapons" for the withdrawal of new ICBMs in their formation. But even under these conditions, this does not guarantee the destruction of the entire group of such missiles, some of which will survive and be able to retaliate. At the same time, it is planned that the new ICBMs will be placed in the existing silo launchers (silos), which will save significant funds. And according to another source, the complex of protective measures envisages the use of silos with new ICBMs and missile defense systems of the S-400 and S-500 types, capable of destroying warheads of ICBMs and ammunition of the enemy's high-precision weapons, for protection. cruise and aircraft missiles; and guided bombs.
According to Esin, with reference to the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation Vladimir Popovkin, by the end of 2011 the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation must approve the tactical and technical assignment (TTZ) for the creation of a new heavy ICBM, the development and production of which are included in the State Armament Program until 2020. All domestic enterprises of the military-industrial complex, which had previously created a naval missile for the Sineva submarine missile carriers, will participate in the creation of a new liquid-propellant ICBM.
The new START Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States, which has entered into force, as the adviser to the Strategic Missile Forces commander emphasized, does not impose any restrictions on the development of new carriers and their combat equipment by the parties, provided that the established quantitative limits on delivery vehicles and warheads are observed.
To this it should be added that, in principle, this is not news and they have been talking about it for a long time. However, a number of experts and specialists in their fields of activity do not stop expressing their opinions, which are somewhat different from the above. One of the latest public events on this issue was the press conference "From Parity in Strategic Arms to Reasonable Sufficiency", which took place on March 17 this year at the Interfax news agency. The General Designer of the Moscow Institute of Thermal Engineering (MIT), the developer of strategic missile systems, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yuri Solomonov and the head of the Center for International Security of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences, member of RAS Correspondent Alexey Arbatov.
According to Alexei Arbatov, the conclusion of START-3, which determined the permissible number of nuclear warheads (1550) and their carriers (700), is an undoubted achievement. According to this treaty, in his words, "the main problem for the Russian Federation is not how to reduce its armaments to the level fixed in the new treaty, but, on the contrary, how to rise to this level." In other words, the objective process of the moral and physical aging of the Russian strategic forces by the end of the current 10th anniversary may lead to the fact that the actual number of delivery vehicles and warheads may be significantly lower than the established indicators and then it will take some time to achieve them.
In this situation, there are three ways, according to A. Arbatov, which can be chosen. The first is to agree with this and "not make a tragedy out of this," in his words, since the remaining funds will be enough to solve the tasks at hand. The second is to create a new heavy liquid-propellant ICBM and place it in the existing silos instead of Voevoda (Satan in the West) to fill a possible gap between the established START-3 and real quantitative indicators. The third is to accelerate the deployment of the spent missile systems Topol-M and Yars mobile and silo-based, which outstrips everything previously created in this area, incl. and abroad.
Arbatov noted that the second way is very popular and its supporters do not doubt the speed of creation and adoption of a new ICBM, as there are already ready mines and well-known technologies. The political scientist believes that in this situation, according to the "cost-effectiveness" criterion, the second option is more profitable and optimal, the implementation of which should be accelerated. He believes that the choice of the optimal path is "not only a very serious issue of national security, but also of international security in general; the prospects for agreements on a joint missile defense depend on this." He believes that "if we choose the option of creating a new heavy ICBM, then in this case we can forget about the joint missile defense", since "in this case, failure in the negotiations on the new treaty is guaranteed."
At the same time, he noted that talks about the high capabilities of the new ICBM to overcome missile defense can be regarded as what we deliberately think about the impossibility of reaching agreements in this area with the United States and NATO and, proceeding from this, create means of an asymmetric response in the form of a heavy missile.
As another option for solving this problem, A. Arbatov proposes to start negotiations on the conclusion of a new treaty by the end of the current 10th anniversary with even lower indicators that will approach Russia's capabilities by the specified date. Levels can be fixed in it, for example, in relation to warheads in the range of 1000-1100 units.
The well-known designer of solid-propellant strategic missile systems, incl. and "Poplar", Yuri Solomonov. He also noted that "the concluded START-3 treaty is difficult to overestimate" and believes that "even the reduction of the parity level to a lower value, especially the number of warheads, I am not talking about launch vehicles, of course, this is a step in the right direction" …
However, according to him, "we are trying to maintain parity with the country, whose gross product, not to mention the budget, is tens of times greater than ours, and that in itself raises the question - do we need this?" As an example of a balanced approach to this issue, he cited China, which is now officially recognized as the second largest economy in the world. Solomonov noted that with such "economic opportunities, in 2007 the PRC officially had 200 warheads capable of reaching the territory of the United States," and by 2015, according to official plans, their number should be 220 units. At the same time, there is no desire in China, by all means, to have parity in this matter with the United States or Russia. Yuri Solomonov noted that "we are once again stepping on those 'rakes' that we entered in 1983 in connection with the well-known American SDI program."
Referring to the experience, since he was a direct participant in all the events connected with this, Yu. Solomonov said: “Then it took me a lot of work, about which I wrote in my book, to convince the leadership of the military-industrial commission and representatives of the Central Committee that the information declared by the American media regarding X-ray pumped lasers, nuclear weapons on free electrons and the like are hypothetical questions."
According to him, the information about SDI was transformed into the requirements of the Ministry of Defense for the missile systems being developed, "which" nullified "everything we had developed over the years and required additional costs. Not to mention some programs on which huge money at that time was spent ". As the designer noted, there was nothing at the end of all that was announced in the United States about SDI. "In reality, they were engaged in research, experiments, creating" bricks "of that" building "that was never built. Solomonov.
Today he considers the "cost-effectiveness" criterion to be the unified systemic development criteria. "This is accepted all over the world and if we act differently, then once again we make a mistake, believing that it is possible to waste the financial, intellectual and material resources of the state absolutely mediocre," Y. Solomonov noted.
Answering one of the questions about the new heavy ICBM, Yuri Solomonov noted that “I have already expressed my reasoned opinion about the creation of such a missile and I have nothing to add to what was reported by several publications. occupation ". At the same time, he said that the technology of 30 years ago is at the heart of the creation of a new liquid ICBM. “And here the point is not even in the level of these technologies, but in the very principle of creating a missile system that does not have the necessary survivability in a retaliatory strike,” the well-known designer said. According to Yu. Solomonov: "This launch vehicle is not adaptive to modern concepts and means of anti-missile defense with space-based elements, which is associated with the peculiarities of using liquid-propellant rocket engines, which have a sufficiently long active climb segment."
Thus, judging by the statements of such well-known specialists and experts, it should be noted that the unambiguous opinion and, moreover, the decision on the issue of creating a new heavy liquid-propellant ballistic missile silo-based, designed to replace the ICBM "Voevoda (" Satan ") is currently No. While the issue of its creation can be considered resolved on the basis of what is one of the points of the State Armaments Program until 2020, it requires deeper research and revision. For reasons, the general public has not been informed of its details.
