Ukrainian rocketry: from Chelomey to Kolomoisky

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Ukrainian rocketry: from Chelomey to Kolomoisky
Ukrainian rocketry: from Chelomey to Kolomoisky

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Video: Ukrainian rocketry: from Chelomey to Kolomoisky
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Retrospective and prospects of Yuzhny Design Bureau and Yuzhmash

The tradition of creating rocket and space technology in Dnepropetrovsk goes back 60 years. The history of first Soviet and then post-Soviet Ukrainian rocketry has a rather serious list of achievements in the field of missile technology for both military and civil purposes. Today, in addition to the problems of the world conjuncture and budgetary financing, the rocket designers received a new "challenge" in the person of the personal supervision of the enterprise by the governor of the Dnipropetrovsk region Igor Kolomoisky.

The history of the Dnepropetrovsk missile center begins with the creation of the Dnepropetrovsk Automobile Plant (DAZ) in the city, liberated from the Nazis, in 1944. In the late 40s - early 50s, DAZ launched the production of truck cranes, forklift trucks, trucks and amphibious vehicles. However, on May 9, 1951, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution on the organization of serial production of missiles at DAZ. The next day, an order was signed by the Minister of Armaments of the USSR, Dmitry Ustinov, on assigning the plant number 586. Since then, the enterprise has been producing rocket and space technology.

The core of nuclear parity

In April 1953, on the basis of the department of the chief designer of plant No. 586, the Special Design Bureau No. 586 (OKB-586) was formed. The basis for this decision was the task of designing the R-12 medium-range missile, which the plant's designers began work on back in February. In 1954, Mikhail Yangel was appointed chief designer of OKB-586. From that moment on, the OKB and the plant existed as close partners. The well-known statement of Nikita Khrushchev is connected with the work of the plant that in the USSR rockets are made like sausages. It was born after the first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee got acquainted with the conveyor production of ballistic missiles at Plant No. 586.

Ukrainian rocketry: from Chelomey to Kolomoisky
Ukrainian rocketry: from Chelomey to Kolomoisky

In the 70s, on the basis of the plant, PA Yuzhny Machine-Building Plant was organized, in October 1986 - NPO Yuzhnoye as part of KB Yuzhnoye, PO YuMZ and the Dnepropetrovsk branch of the Scientific Research Institute of Technical Mechanics. However, the complete merger of the enterprises did not happen, it was quite formal, and the design bureau and the plant remained independent legal entities.

Since its inception, Plant No. 586, and then PO Yuzhmash, has been closely associated with the development and production of strategic missiles. First they were R-12 and R-14, first-generation missiles, then the world's first R-16 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Transfer of the production of these missiles to factories in Perm, Orenburg, Omsk, Krasnoyarsk allowed the plant to start implementing new projects.

In April 1962, the Council of Ministers of the USSR adopted a resolution "On the creation of samples of intercontinental ballistic and global missiles and carriers of heavy space objects." The document provided for the production of R-36 and R-36-O (orbital) missiles. The R-36 became the base missile of the second generation, the combat equipment of which included two types of monobloc warheads (MS) with the most powerful warheads in the world and a complex of means of overcoming antimissile defense. New technical solutions allowed the rocket to be on alert in constant readiness for launch for several years. On the basis of the R-36 multipurpose missile, missile systems with a multiple three-unit warhead and an orbital warhead were created. The peculiarity of the R-36-O orbital rocket consisted in the launching of a warhead equipped with a propulsion system into a near-earth orbit and in the subsequent deceleration of the warhead and its descent to any point in the world.

In the period from the 60s to the 80s, Yuzhmash, together with the Yuzhnoye design bureau, developed and introduced into production the R-36M, R-36M UTTH heavy ICBMs and the MR-UR-100 and MR-UR-100 UTTH light class ICBMs. with increased survivability and the ability to hit multiple targets, as well as the 15A11 command missile of the "Perimeter" system. At the end of the 1980s, serial production of fourth-generation missile systems began - the R-36M2 Voevoda ICBMs, the RT-23 UTTKh, which were adopted in 1988-1990 and still remain in the Russian Strategic Missile Forces.

At the time of the signing in 1991 of the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-1), the Strategic Missile Forces had 1,398 ICBMs with over 6,600 warheads. At the same time, 444 missiles produced by YuMZ, equipped with 4176 warheads, were on alert. This accounted for approximately 42 percent of the total capacity of the USSR's strategic nuclear forces.

In April 1992, by the decision of the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces and the Ministry of Industry of Russia, YuMZ was relieved of its duties as a manufacturer of fourth-generation ICBMs. In the same year, their assembly at the enterprise was discontinued. By the same decision, Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and YuMZ were relieved of their duties as the lead developer and manufacturer of the universal modernized RT-2PM2 rocket with the transfer of their production to Russia.

Independent position

Since 1992, YMZ has stopped producing ballistic missiles in the interests of the RF Armed Forces. The main product of YuMZ in the 1990s and 2000s was space rockets, developed back in the days of the USSR. The largest income for the company was brought by the Zenit-3SL launch vehicle within the framework of the Sea Launch project. The joint venture for the provision of launch services was established in 1995 with the participation of the Russian corporation Energia, Yuzhnoye State Design Bureau, YuMZ, Boeing and the Norwegian company Kvaerner (now part of the Aker ASA Group). As part of the JV, 40 percent of the shares were received by Boeing (general management, marketing, construction and operation of the base port in Long Beach), 25 percent - by RSC Energia (the parent enterprise for the rocket segment of the project, produces the third stage of the Zenit-3SL LV - Upper stage DM-SL), 20 percent - Kvaerner (Odyssey launch platform based on floating drilling platform and Sea Launch Commander assembly and command ship). GBK Yuzhnoye and Yuzhmash received 5 and 10 percent of the shares, respectively. They were responsible for the development and production of the first two stages of the Zenit-3SL LV. From 1999 to the present, Sea Launch JV has performed 36 commercial launches of Zenit-3SL LV. They are carried out from the equator from the region of Christmas Island (Pacific Ocean), which allows launching heavier spacecraft into the geostationary orbit, which is most demanded by commercial customers today, compared to launches from cosmodromes located not on the equator. According to unofficial data, the launch contract costs $ 80-100 million, of which the Ukrainian side receives an average of $ 20-25 million.

During its operation, Sea Launch JV has become one of the leaders in the global launch services market (its share was 15-40 percent in different years). The main competitors were the International Launch Services JV (engaged in the marketing of Russian Proton-M launch vehicles) and the European company Arianespace (launch vehicles of the Ariane 5 family). In addition, the participants of the Sea Launch program established the Land Launch project to launch the modified Zenit-3SL LV (with the DM-SL upper stage) and Zenit-3SL (without the upper stage) from the Baikonur cosmodrome. Losing the sea option in terms of carrying capacity, the Land Launch is more economical due to the simpler infrastructure of Baikonur. When using the launch pad in Kazakhstan, there is no need for a relatively long transition of the launch platform from the base port to the launch area. The first launch under the new program took place on April 28, 2008.

The history of the company did not escape the scandalous events associated with the unexpected bankruptcy of Sea Launch. In 2008, the company unexpectedly stopped the launches, and the court of the city of Los Angeles received an appeal to declare the company bankrupt. The initiator of the bankruptcy is Boeing, which bore the main marketing load for the project. After a series of lawsuits, RSC Energia gained control of the company, paying Boeing more than $ 155 million, which were presented as losses to the company. Currently, Sea Launch controls RKK.

At the end of 2012, the management of the Swiss corporation Sea Launch AG, a subsidiary of RSC Energia, announced that direct losses at the end of 2011 amounted to more than $ 100 million, the result is no better in 2012, but to continue further work at least $ 200 million is urgently needed. In 2013, the Sea Launch launches were suspended after the missile accident with the Intelsat spacecraft on February 1, associated with an emergency shutdown of the engines immediately after the launch. The program resumed on May 27 this year with the launch of the Eutelsat3B spacecraft.

Until recently, launches of light spacecraft within the framework of the Dnepr project were in demand on the world market. The R-36M ICBM is used as a carrier in the project, and in the future - the R-36M2 Voyevoda. The missiles for launch are taken from the presence of the Strategic Missile Forces of Russia as they are removed from combat duty. In September 1997, the International Space Company Kosmotras (Space Transport Systems) was registered to carry out launches under the Dnepr project. The company's shares were divided in half between Russian and Ukrainian enterprises. Since April 1999, 19 launches have been carried out, one (on July 26, 2006) ended in an accident. All launches of the R-36M were carried out within the framework of the Russian Zaryadye program aimed at extending the service life of this type of ICBM, thereby significantly reducing their cost. The main competitor of the Dnepr program is the Russian launch vehicles Rokot and Cosmos-3M (produced by the Khrunichev State Research and Production Space Center). However, their prime cost is obviously higher: for Rokot (on the basis of the first two stages of the UR-100NU ICBMs that are being removed from combat duty), the Briz-KM upper stage and the head fairing are required, while the Cosmos-3M launch vehicle is generally produced entirely.

Ex-Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov is probably concerned with the issue of "leveling" competitive conditions. In 2008-2009, the launches of the "Dnepr" were stopped, as the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, according to Ukrainian experts, raised the price of the P-36 from a symbolic one to a market price. The cost of the rocket for the program turned out to be within the income from each launch. In this regard, the starts of "Dnipro" have become infrequent. At the special request of President Viktor Yanukovych to President Vladimir Putin, Ukraine received a rocket to launch the Sich-2M Earth Remote Sensing Satellite in 2011. With the change of the head of the RF Ministry of Defense, the Dnipro launch vehicle started more often, however, due to the current uncertain relations between Kiev and Moscow, the likelihood of the launch of the launch vehicle is significantly reduced.

New projects

The Zenit, Dnepr, and Cyclone launch vehicles remained for the Dnipropetrovsk rocket designers an opportunity to survive in the new conditions, the main feature of which was the lack of state defense orders. The old launch vehicles, however, are impermanent, and in order to prepare for the growing competition in the launch services market, the leadership of the space industry has persistently pushed the project to create the Cyclone-4 rocket and space complex in Brazil. The rocket itself is created on the basis of the Cyclone-3 launch vehicle. The LV will differ from the prototype with a new third stage, improved power characteristics of the engines, an improved control system, an enlarged nose fairing, the ability to operate in tropical conditions, the ability to launch a spacecraft with a mass of up to 1.8 tons into geo-transfer orbits (with an apogee height of 36 thousand kilometers). Cyclone-4 will be launched from the near-equatorial Alcantara cosmodrome in northeastern Brazil to circular low and medium orbits and a transition to geostationary orbit. The history of the project dates back to 2003, when Ukraine and Brazil signed an intergovernmental agreement on long-term cooperation in the field of space. In 2006, the joint venture Alcantara Cyclon Space was registered, where the Ukrainian and Brazilian parties participate on a parity basis. Initially, it was planned to start the starts in 2010-2011, but a number of difficulties, starting with Brazil's attitude to the project and ending with the search for finance in the era of the global economic crisis, lead to a permanent postponement of the date of the first start.

In addition to the new carrier in Dnepropetrovsk, they took up the implementation of a new technical project. Since 2006, the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau has been developing the Sapsan operational-tactical missile system with a range of 250-300 kilometers. According to expert estimates, the development of the missile system will cost $ 350 million.

The Sapsan complex is positioned as an analogue of the Russian Iskander operational-tactical complex. The demand for it in the Ukrainian armed forces will not exceed 100 copies. A later entry into the international market in comparison with the Russian Iskander will significantly complicate the promotion of this missile to foreign customers. In addition, taking into account the political course of Kiev for joining NATO, the Sapsan will certainly not be offered to the "rogue" countries interested in it according to Washington's classification.

Despite the absence of an export future, it was decided to bring the complex to mass production. In February 2011, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych announced that the Sapsan complex would be created, and NSAU General Director Yuri Alekseev estimated the cost of its creation by 2015 at 3.5 billion hryvnia (approximately 460 million US dollars). In 2012, over three million dollars were allocated for the work. But a year later, the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine stopped funding. Defense Minister Pavel Lebedev explained the refusal to continue the project by the ineffective use of budget funds. Further work on the complex was not financed, and the project is unlikely to receive budgetary support in the coming year.

Phantom fears

Although YuMZ has not been creating new ICBMs for more than 20 years, the plant continues to work on extending the service life of the R-36M2 Voevoda missile system of the Russian Strategic Missile Forces. The guaranteed service life of missiles produced at YuMZ and put on combat duty in the period 1988-1992 was originally 15 years. Under the terms of the agreement, work to extend the life of the complex is only allowed to be performed by the head developer and manufacturer - Yuzhnoye Design Bureau and YuMZ. As a result, it is planned that he will remain on alert until at least 2020.

This increased "survivability" of the missile as part of the Russian nuclear shield seems to be of great concern to the United States. After the loss of Crimea, the Ukrainian authorities announced that they would suspend military-technical cooperation with the Russian Federation. Among the main topics of work, the "closure" of which the Ukrainian authorities threaten, is the maintenance of the Voevoda missiles. In support of Kiev, even US congressmen spoke out, wondering why Ukrainians support the nuclear shield of the "aggressor". Perhaps this whole information campaign was played out from the very beginning by one director. How else to understand the fact of signing a memorandum between the governor of the Dnepropetrovsk region Igor Kolomoisky with and. O. director of Yuzhmash? The Governor solemnly took upon himself the solution of all political issues that concern Yuzhmash in order to facilitate the creation of a non-politicized industrial territory by the plant. The regional state administration, represented by Kolomoisky, also promises to provide assistance in the unconditional implementation by the enterprise of interstate agreements and long-term contracts with foreign and Ukrainian customers. This "memorandum" will be in effect throughout 2014 with automatic renewal for another three years.

The appearance of such a document may indicate a partial loss of the center's leadership functions, which the regional leaders have assumed. It doesn't matter in what form it is presented: as assistance and assistance, or vice versa.

Probably, on the way of the rocket-building segment of Dnepropetrovsk one more permissive link appears.

In such conditions, it is difficult to talk about the bright future of the Yuzhny Design Bureau and Yuzhmash. Current projects are directly related to the participation of the Russian Federation and enterprises of the space industry of the neighboring state. Perhaps now the green light for one direction or another will be given directly to the regional administration of Dnepropetrovsk. Will this enhance cooperation? More likely no than yes. Unfortunately, Ukrainian rocketry is expecting in the future a likely narrowing of the field of activity, the loss of specialists who can be lured away by Russian enterprises, but at the same time, one should not expect either financial compensators or involvement in alternative Western projects.

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