Disruption of the defense order, the collapse of the defense industry, lack of necessary production capacity, outdated equipment, no money, the Ministry of Defense puts forward its demands, manufacturers do not agree with them, and so on. Familiar theses from the not too distant past. The notorious five percent of GOZ-2011? according to some experts, they could result in a disruption of the entire rearmament program planned until 2020 (GPV-2020). But the remaining contracts were nevertheless concluded and it seems that no problems are foreseen. But only "like", because 280 billion rubles allocated for the very contracts are far from the last in the program. If only because there are eight years left until its completion, which means that in the future there may also be problems with agreements, prices and other production and economic things.
Most of the funds allocated this year will go to the construction of submarines. And the main item of expenditure is the construction of four submarines of the project 885M "Ash" - 164 billion, or about 60% of the total. Another 13 billion will receive SPMBM "Malachite" for the completion of the project. Also, Rubin Central Design Bureau plans to allocate about 40 billion to upgrade the Borey project to the 955A state. The rest, much smaller, shares of the allocated 280 billion will go to the repair of existing boats and the construction of surface ships.
What we want and what we have
The sums are considerable, and therefore require special attention. Considering the fact that contracts for updating projects and building new ships have already been concluded, it can be concluded that the Ministry of Defense has no claims for the total amounts and their components. In absolute terms, the funds allocated to submarines look neither good nor bad, but comparison with other government spending changes the impression. So, for example, by 2015, the Ministry of Emergency Situations will receive more than forty billion rubles for the renewal of the equipment park, thanks to which the current 30% of new equipment in the 15th year will turn into 80%. At the same time, almost the same amount should be spent on the construction of just one boat of the project 885M, even if the head one or for the modernization of the Borey. Another point, which clearly does not add clarity to the distribution of money, lies in the essence of the renewal of projects. If with the 955A everything is more or less clear (four more will be added to 16 missile launchers and the equipment and design will be modified accordingly), then the situation with Yasen is more complicated. There is almost no open data, and sometimes you have to rely even on rumors. The latter argue that most of the innovations in the project will relate to the use of domestic materials, assemblies, etc. At the same time, there is reason to believe that the modernization will affect not only the origin of the components: the 885 project is still not entirely new and therefore requires serious improvements.
In total, it turns out that our navy will include new boats of two projects. However, those boats that are only planned to be built are somewhat different from those already available. So, for example, at least three boats of the Borey project will correspond to the original design, and the rest will be built as 955A. A similar situation is developing with the Yasen project - the currently tested Severodvinsk was built according to the original 885, and Kazan (built since 2009) already corresponds to the 885M project. It turns out that the fleet will include new boats of two projects, but four "subspecies". There are reasons to fear some funding and operational problems due to the relatively low degree of harmonization.
Indeed, the number of types of equipment operated directly affects costs. In the past couple of decades, our country has had to seriously overpay for the construction of a submarine fleet. Due to the lack of normal funding, normal and understandable views on the fate of the fleet and a clear strategy, until some time, mainly only the lead ships of various projects were built. For obvious reasons, all this cost much more than mass production. In turn, the lack of plans for the development of its own fleet can be considered a consequence of the "reforms" of the late 80s and early 90s. Then, by the willful decision of the country's leadership, the worked-out system was destroyed, which connected the customer, developers, scientists and production workers. Research institutes (Central Research Institute named after Academician A. N. Krylov, Central Research Institute of Shipbuilding Technologies, etc.) carried out all relevant research on the prospects of the fleet and thereby helped both the Ministry of Defense and the design bureaus. Thus, the system made it possible to thoroughly study all the problems associated with the fleet development strategy and the creation of equipment for this strategy. After the destruction of this entire system, the renewal of the material part began to go in a simpler, but unprofitable way. The Navy issued requirements to the developer, and he created a project for them. Alternative options and proposals have now almost ceased to be considered. In addition, the market economy made every design or manufacturing organization "pull the blanket over itself." The extreme in the new situation was the fleet - many different types at a great price.
But not only the destruction of the system of interaction between organizations associated with the fleet had a bad effect on the state of the entire Navy. In the 80s of the last century in the naval circles, as some people from this milieu note, there was already a sense of the need to update the very concept of the Soviet navy. The principle of confronting the whole world required an increase in the combat strength of the fleet. The industry coped with this, but the accompanying infrastructure often lagged behind the pace of military equipment. By the beginning of Perestroika, there was a need to revise the doctrine of the use of the fleet, but the country's leadership already had other priorities. In 1990, the leadership of the Central Research Institute. Krylova made a last attempt to push through the idea of renewing views on the fleet in the Ministry of Shipbuilding. This attempt turned out to be unsuccessful - at first the responsible workers considered the proposal premature, and then it was not the best period for the fleet, and for the industry, and for the country as a whole. Since the early 2000s, a number of positive trends have emerged. Among other things, at this time, the restoration of the existing system of interaction gradually began. Currently, the overall management of production for the fleet is carried out by the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Industry and Trade and the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government. The coordination of various projects is carried out by the Central Research Institute. Krylov - his main task is to ensure that the work in one direction is not duplicated, and the actual projects meet the customer's requirements.
In general, there is some reason for optimism: funding is being restored, again many organizations are working on new projects together, and the state is showing its intentions to continue the directions it has begun. The main thing is that optimism does not grow into a hat-head, as is often the case. In particular, in the optimistic aspect, the total tonnage of the planned construction looks like a "dangerous section". From open sources it is known that only new ships will be built by the year 20 for 500 thousand tons. At the same time, in the second half of the 2000s, almost ten times less were built. And the last argument against optimism in the plans concerns the assessment of the prospects for the domestic shipbuilding industry. According to the report of the President of the United Shipbuilding Corporation R. Trotsenko (Forum Marine Industry of Russia, May 2011), before the deadline in 2020, our shipbuilding industry, while continuing the existing development trends, will hardly master 300 thousand tons. And from this figure it is also necessary to subtract export and civil construction.
Five points of academician Pashin
How can you achieve the required volumes? There is an absolutely logical, but controversial way: to reduce plans to reasonable limits. A more sophisticated and efficient method implies more attention to the development of the shipbuilding industry. But, perhaps, the most interesting and complete proposal was presented by the scientific director-director of the Central Research Institute. A. N. Krylova, Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences V. M. Pashin. He published his five-point views on efficiency gains in the article "Boating Confusion." These five directions look like this:
1. Strategy. There is an urgent need to revise the concept of the domestic navy and create a rearmament program until 2040. Part of GPV 2020 does not have to be included in it, but it must be taken into account. It is also necessary to reduce the types of ships under construction without prejudice to the required class composition. We are currently building or repairing about 70 types of ships, submarines, boats, etc. equipment used in law enforcement agencies. For comparison, the United States plans to build one aircraft carrier, 16 destroyers, 36 small ships, 4 landing ships, 2 dock transport and 18 submarines by the year 20. A total of half a dozen types, planned with the constant cuts in defense spending.
It is also possible to start abbreviating and class nomenclatures, but this is a much more complex matter. TsNII them. Krylova has already proposed creating a single base platform submarine that can be equipped with both cruise and strategic missiles. This proposal did not go beyond the initial research. But recently, the United States announced the start of its own project for such a platform. It is promised that such an American-made boat will cost up to one and a half times cheaper than the initially specialized one.
The reduction of operated and planned types of equipment, according to Pashin, should significantly reduce the cost of building ships - in this case, equipment will be built in series, and not in single prototypes. Thanks to the launch into mass production, it will be possible to create clear fixed price lists for all the necessary work, even if taking into account inflation and other factors. As a result, it is possible to reduce the price of a serial boat by 1, 5-1, 7 times relative to the head one.
2. Reasonable approach to equipment. One of the main factors that influenced the duration of the tests of the Yuri Dolgoruky submarine is often called the lack of knowledge of its main armament. This is often the case with other boats and ships. Equipment that has not yet been tested is installed on an already completed ship, and, as a result, its constant modifications directly affect the final cost of the ship itself. All over the world, it is considered optimal to use no more than 20-30% of new equipment. And even with such a share, the total cost of various electronics reaches 80% of the ship's price. But in the end, it is not only the customer's wallet that suffers - almost always, along with the cost, the terms "float away".
3. Forecasts and projects. It is required to complete the creation of a system that coordinates the creation of forecasts, the development of the required appearance of the fleet and the development of new projects. Several steps have already been taken in this direction, including, the Military-Industrial Commission under the Government issued Regulations concerning the procedure for creating projects and conditions for the supply of shipbuilding products within the framework of the State Defense Order. In these documents, the Central Research Institute. Krylov is assigned a leading role in all measures of planning, appraisal, project appraisal, etc. Pashin believes that now it is necessary to give the Regulations the status of a Government Decree, thanks to which the decisions of the Krylov Institute will be of no less importance than the opinion of the naval leadership. As a result, the system for forecasting and developing terms of reference should work more efficiently.
4. Pricing. No manufacturer would argue that a generous customer is good. But, as the experience of some states shows, with excessive generosity of the customer, the price of the final product can take on simply indecent values. As for the production workers, they will all be happy to use all the allocated funds. To combat financial "hype" Pashin proposes to put before any of their leading shipbuilding Central Research Institute a new task: the development of standards for the cost of all types of work. They will need to be adjusted from time to time in accordance with forecasts and a three-year budget.
In addition, it is necessary to stop producing civil ships for private customers at state defense plants due to the peculiarities of the latter's economy. It is unlikely that a private trader will begin to pay for the indirect costs of the enterprise and, as a result, the plant will be forced to transfer the lost amounts to military contracts. If the Ministry of Defense does not intend to indirectly "sponsor" commercial organizations, then military shipyards should produce only military products, and civilian ones only civilian. If only because the principles of pricing in these areas are quite different.
You can take advantage of overseas experience. Since 2005, the US Navy has been on a cost-cutting policy. First of all, the US Navy requires manufacturers to reduce "associated" costs and optimize technological processes. It is expected that thanks to all the measures implemented in 2020, the Virginia-class boat will cost almost half the price of the lead ship of the project. In addition, the duration of construction will be significantly reduced. A very rewarding undertaking that should be adopted.
5. Discipline. To ensure the due diligence of the customer and the contractor, Pashin proposes to introduce a system of penalties. Industry should be punished with a ruble for failing to meet construction deadlines and failing to comply with tactical and technical requirements. The military, in turn, should be held accountable for violations of the funding schedule, delays in the signing of contracts, as well as for changing requirements after the start of construction. Perhaps someone will consider these methods too harsh, but this is how you can not only ensure the fulfillment of construction plans, but also instill the notorious mutual respect for customers and performers.
And again we can turn to the American experience. In US law there is a so-called. Nunn-McCurdy amendment. It was adopted at a time when defense spending began to take on large and dubious amounts. The main essence of the amendment is as follows: if the cost of the program is 15% higher than that planned for Congress, it is called by the commander-in-chief of the service for which the project is being developed. The commander-in-chief must explain to the congressmen why additional funding is required and prove its expediency. If the cost is exceeded by a quarter, the project is immediately closed. Its preservation is possible only if the country's defense minister proves to the congressmen the importance of the project for the security of the state and gives personal guarantees that the executor will cope with the task at hand.
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And yet, the implementation of the "Five Points of Pashin" does not guarantee the full implementation of all plans. But it is undoubtedly possible to increase productivity using this technique. If, nevertheless, there is not enough own production capacity, then perhaps it will be decided to place some orders that are not of strategic importance with overseas factories. Our country already had experience related to the construction of equipment for the fleet abroad. At the same time, political motives at the beginning of the 20th century led to very serious consequences for the fleet of imperial Russia. So before placing an order abroad, you should double or even triple check all its aspects and, of course, you should not trust foreigners with secret technologies.
Summing up and understanding the complexity of providing the Russian fleet with new equipment, I would like to hope that the Ministry of Defense, the Military-Industrial Commission and other bodies have a clear plan of action. There may already be a complete and specific program, but for some reason it is simply not published. But the fact of publication, it should be noted, is not so important - the main thing is that the responsible persons do everything as it should.
