There is hardly an issue that provokes the same heated debate as the need for Russia to have aircraft carriers (or lack thereof, depending on who and what proves what). Of course, none of the professional military personnel on active service can provide evidence of the uselessness of aircraft carriers in the Russian Navy: the source of such theses is completely different people, mostly "patriotic bloggers", as a rule, who have nothing to do with the Navy.
Nevertheless, it is worth clarifying this issue once and for all. Naturally, based on the needs of our fleet, and precisely in terms of the defense of our country, and not hypothetical semi-colonial expeditions somewhere.
This story began back in the thirties, when a group of military men offered to acquire an ersatz aircraft carrier on the Black Sea, built on the hull of an initially non-military cargo ship. Then there were proposals to complete the construction of a light aircraft carrier on the hull of one of the unfinished tsarist cruisers, then projects 71 and 72, the inclusion of aircraft carriers in the shipbuilding program of 1938-1942, postponement, war …
In 1948, created on behalf of N. G. Kuznetsov, a special commission to determine the types of ships necessary for the Navy made two fundamentally important conclusions. First, when ships request fighter cover at sea, coastal aircraft will always be late. Second, there are almost no such tasks at sea that surface ships, in a combat situation, could effectively solve without aviation. The commission concluded that, without carrier cover, the ship's relatively safe distance from the coastline would be limited to a strip of approximately 300 miles. Further coastal aviation will no longer be able to protect ships from air strikes.
One of the solutions to this problem was a light air defense aircraft carrier, and in 1948, TsKB-17 began work on a Project 85 ship, a light aircraft carrier, with an air group that was supposed to consist of forty fighters modernized for deck use.
Then there was the expulsion of Kuznetsov, Khrushchev and his rocket mania, the Potter's thirty-year-old "approvals", the R&D "Order", which showed that without air cover, the Navy ships would not be able to survive in the war, Dmitry Fedorovich Ustinov, with his enthusiasm for vertically taking off aircraft, and the "fruit" of this hobbies - TAVKRs of project 1143 "Krechet", just as destructive when striking from the direct tracking mode, as useless for the tasks of a "classic" aircraft carrier. It is customary to scold these ships, but they are scolded by people who do not understand why and within the framework of what strategy they were created, and what was the main tactical scheme of their combat use. In fact, the ships were, to put it mildly, not bad. And even, rather good, than just good. But - for a narrow set of tasks, which did not include the struggle for air supremacy or air defense missions of naval formations.
Nevertheless, no matter how long the rope twists, the end will be. By the mid-seventies, it became clear that the bet on missile attack submarines, URO ships and naval missile-carrying aviation (together with the Air Force Long-Range Aviation) might not work. The MRA and the Air Force were waiting for the appearance in the near future of the destroyers URO "Spruens" and the cruisers URO "Ticonderoga", interceptors F-14 and mass aircraft AWACS deck-based. Of course, the aircraft carriers could still be disabled, but the cost of the issue was becoming too high.
And the submarines were waiting for an absolutely fantastic concentration of anti-submarine aviation, which made it doubtful their deployment at the right line of missile launch. By that time, it was already clear that in the future, cruisers of projects 1143, 1144 and 1164, missile nuclear submarines, destroyers 956, supported by anti-submarine ships and submarines with anti-ship missiles, would be conducting surface battles, but they needed air cover.
There were two concepts of its organization.
The first one assumed that the coastal formations of the Air Force or the Air Force of the Fleet would allocate the required number of fighters, the new AWACS planes then conceived, and tankers, who in the future were supposed to be able to refuel light aircraft, and a permanent outfit from the composition of these forces would "hang" over waters, primarily the Barents Sea, and provide air defense for naval strike groups that were supposed to resist an attack by NATO forces.
They also had to ensure the safety of submarines from enemy anti-submarine aircraft. Boats going through open water to areas of combat duty in order to go under the pack ice there were quite vulnerable to anti-submarine aircraft of the enemy, and before they went under the ice, the sky had to be "closed" (in those years, the area of ice cover in the Arctic was significantly more, and the ice was closer to the coast).
The second concept included the following. The USSR must step over the ideological bogey known as "aircraft carriers - an instrument of imperialist aggression" and simply start building them. Then the question of air cover disappeared by itself - now the KUGs would have "their" fighters on the principle of "here and now." There would be no need to wait or ask for them. Serious battles in naval circles and the leadership of the military-industrial complex continued for several years. The naval aviation, which in all seriousness would be required to plan a loss "from the regiment" for each sortie, insisted on aircraft carriers capable of meeting bombers on the way to the target and providing them with their naval fighters. There were also opponents of such a decision, who held on to the "anti-aircraft" traditions that had developed in the Navy. Both among the top military leadership and among the "captains" of the military industry there were doubts as to whether the budget would "pull" the second method.
The aircraft carrier, meanwhile, was already being designed. Smoothly evolving from the "Soviet Enterprise", Project 1160 "Eagle", into a smaller, but also nuclear-powered 1153, the project that bore the "working" name "Soviet Union" eventually turned out to be a hybrid of "Krechet" - Project 1143, increased in size, and project 1153. At the last moment, the evil genius of Soviet aircraft carriers - D. F. Ustinov and demanded to replace the catapult with a springboard in the project, arguing that the catapults of the Soviet industry could not be produced. This was done, and by 1978 the future Soviet aircraft carrier bore almost all the signs we know today. But it was necessary to give the go-ahead to the transition of the project "to metal".
The fate of an aircraft carrier in the USSR Navy was finally decided by the research work of 1978, designed to determine which of the concepts of air defense organization is more economically profitable - constant combat duty in the air of base aviation or aircraft carriers with ship fighters. The results were shocking, even for carrier supporters.
Maintaining an air group close in size to the regiment in the air, in a continuous combat alert mode, with a sufficient number of aircraft on the ground for rotation, with fuel and measures to defend coastal airfields from air strikes, "ate up" the cost of an aircraft carrier in just six months. The calculations were made for the latest prototypes of the MiG-29 and the Su-27 being created at that time, both in land and in ship versions.
In 1982, the first Soviet aircraft carrier for horizontal take-off and landing aircraft was laid down in Nikolaev. The ship was named "Riga". Then he was “Leonid Brezhnev”, then “Tbilisi”, and today we know him as “Admiral Kuznetsov”.
The ship was not designed to deal with strike missions by the forces of the air group and, before preparing for participation in the Syrian war, even for storing bombs on board was poorly adapted (before the trip, the ammunition cellar had to be reconstructed). It was, and, in fact, is, an air defense aircraft carrier.
This is how its purpose determined by our Ministry of Defense: "Designed to give combat stability to strategic missile submarines, groupings of surface ships and naval missile-carrying aircraft in combat areas."
Simple and concise.
Let's consider the main tactical niche of "Kuznetsov" in relation to the place.
This scheme is a reflection of the "NATO" view of things, which, in turn, repels what they have been tracking in the course of our teachings. The dark zone is the so-called "bastion", a zone densely covered by surface ships and aircraft, in which, in theory, it is difficult for a foreign submarine to survive, but for a foreign patrol aircraft it is simply impossible. We will not now analyze whether the concept of bastions is correct (this is not entirely true), we will simply accept it “as it is”. RPLSN with ballistic missiles are withdrawn into this zone during the threatened period.
The lighter zone is the hypothetical battlefield - from the West Fjord to the mouth of the Kola Bay in the south, including the entire Norwegian Sea, right up to the Faroe-Icelandic barrier. In the northern part of this massif lies the boundary of pack ice, under which attack submarines can hide from enemy anti-submarine aircraft and from there carry out attacks on targets assigned to them. But first they need to get there from Gadzhievo.
And this is where Kuznetsov comes in handy. Acting in conjunction with URO ships north of the territorial waters in the Barents Sea, the Naval Aviation Group (CAG) provides an instant response to calls from surface forces and patrol aircraft, and a wide control zone in which enemy anti-submarine aircraft cannot operate freely. We can say that Kuznetsov does not have AWACS aircraft in order for his fighters to detect air targets at a great distance.
But the ship is not very far from its shores, and can rely on coastal AWACS aircraft. It is unbearably expensive to keep this air regiment in the air, but one A-50 and a couple of tankers is a completely different matter. The A-50 is capable of loitering 1000 kilometers from the home airfield for four hours without refueling. With refueling, four hours can easily turn into eight. Three planes provide round-the-clock duty, and, what is important, they direct not only deck ships to targets. But theirs too. Thus, the issue with AWACS can be closed quite simply.
It may be said that the ship will not withstand an attack by fighter aircraft from Norway. But he acts in conjunction with URO ships, which provide him with additional air defense, and Norway itself becomes one of the high-priority targets from the very first day of the war, and after a while the airfields on its territory may be unsuitable for flights from them.
It can also be said that the Kuznetsova KAG will most likely not withstand a coordinated strike from the American AUS. Can't stand it, but who said that this fight should be accepted? In theory, the group leader is obliged to evade such a fight.
But the naval air regiment may well not allow other people's anti-submarine warriors to work, and protect their own. Or, at least, significantly complicate the enemy's combat mission to find our submarines, and facilitate the implementation of a similar mission for our aircraft. When the enemy attacks the order of surface ships of the missile defense system, the Kuznetsov's aircraft are able to strengthen the air defense of the formation, taking out the line of destruction of enemy aircraft beyond the range of destruction of the ship's air defense systems.
When attacking enemy naval formations with the help of the Kalibr anti-ship missiles launched from submarines, Kuznetsov's aircraft may well disrupt the actions of deck interceptors and allow missiles to break through to the enemy's ship warrant. There, of course, they will be met by the AEGIS system, but the calibers are low-altitude and, until the last throw to the target, are subsonic. This makes them a problematic target for naval air defense systems, they will be noticed too late, and then the factor of the accelerating second stage will work, which at least will lead to the disruption of the guidance of some of the ship's missiles.
The specificity of an anti-ship missile salvo from a submarine is, firstly, its noise, and secondly, the low density of the volley - the missiles are launched in turn. Enemy hydroacoustics will detect a volley long before their radar stations could detect missiles, and deck interceptors can be sent there, which will easily interrupt the slow "Calibers". But if you drive them away, then the situation turns over one hundred and eighty degrees, and now the high-speed qualities of the "Calibers" become their plus - there is no supersonic, which means there is no shock, the RCS is less, the detection range of the ship's radar is also …
And, of course, the Kuznetsov air group is simply invaluable as a source of intelligence. Moreover, it can operate according to the "armed reconnaissance" method of the Americans, when small groups of planes, finding a "convenient" target during a reconnaissance mission, immediately attacked it. This will "sweep" from the theater of operations all single ships, small ship groups without air cover, non-nuclear submarines on the surface, missile boats and patrol aircraft, forcing the enemy to "gather together" and maneuver only with large forces.
The role of the air group as a target designation tool for coastal strike aviation is especially important. Assault regiments, long-range aviation with Tu-22M, and even MiGs with Dagger missiles (if they really “work” on surface ships, which, to be honest, there are certain doubts) require target designation to deliver an effective strike. Moreover, in real time. The creation of such communication systems, with the help of which it is possible to transmit such a control center, is vital, but the "eyes" of these systems will need "platforms". It would be naive to think that an enemy with thousands of cruise missiles and SM-3 anti-aircraft missiles will allow over-the-horizon radars and reconnaissance satellites to be used against them. But air reconnaissance over the open sea is not so easy to drive. And, most importantly, naval fighters may well participate in aircraft attacks from the shore, escorting them, protecting them from enemy interceptors, conducting distracting, false attacks and covering the withdrawal of strike forces. A complex of basic strike and naval aviation may well turn out to be stronger than a separate base one and a separate naval one.
This is why Kuznetsov is needed as part of the Navy, this is what it was built for, and what tasks he and his air group must fulfill.
From this point of view, the Syrian campaign looks somewhat strange. Although, if there is an aircraft carrier, then it is sometimes worth training strike missions along the coast from it, but one must clearly understand that the task of striking the coast for an aircraft carrier is the last in importance, and it is not at all a fact that this should be done at all. Ship aircraft are naval weapons, not land weapons. Nails are not hammered in with a microscope.
What happens if this ship is decommissioned? All the most powerful anti-submarine aircraft of our "partners" will be able to operate near our shores almost unhindered. Coastal aircraft are unlikely to keep up with high-speed anti-submarine aircraft. This, in turn, will very quickly take out of the game our main striking force at sea - the submarines. Then the turn of the surface ships will come, which will be overwhelmed by strike aircraft in several stages. Then everything. The enemy can, for example, starve Kamchatka, Norilsk and Chukotka with hunger. Demonstrative.
Likewise, enemy surface ships will also operate relatively unimpeded. They just need to stay out of the kill zone of coastal missile systems.
And, of course, one ship is too little.
In the Pacific theater of operations, the Navy has similar problems in principle. Nearby is a potential enemy with a superior fleet and powerful anti-submarine aircraft. Its fighters will easily reach our PLO aircraft in the Sea of Okhotsk, bypassing the affected zones of coastal air defense systems, slipping "below" the radar field of ground-based radars. And from the outer, eastern side, the Sea of Okhotsk is a vulnerable water area. With an aircraft carrier fleet, any enemy will be able to concentrate superior forces against any military objective on the islands. It is necessary that behind the chain of islands there be reinforcements capable of engaging in battle immediately, within tens of minutes at most from the moment of the call. It is impossible to do this from the coastal airfields of Primorye.
According to some authors, the probability of repelling an attack by someone's AUG or even an AUS, having at least one aircraft carrier, is about four times higher than if you have none.
Alas, but in the Pacific Fleet we have no URO ships left, there are almost no small anti-submarine ships and minesweepers left, let alone aircraft-carrying ships.
But the United States has them and almost Japan has them, the latter announced the upcoming restructuring of its Izumo into light aircraft carriers, all of them will be armed with F-35B aircraft. Poor thrust-to-weight ratio and poor reliability of these machines could play into our hands if we were able to meet them in the sky with something, but alas …
The time has come to say out loud - we cannot even defend the near sea zone, without aircraft carriers and naval fighters. This does not negate the need to have PLO corvettes, minesweepers, frigates, but they alone will be incredibly difficult to fight off even an enemy of the level of Japan. We, of course, have nuclear weapons, but their use may turn out to be politically unacceptable in a given situation, and it will be impossible to hide behind them all the time. We must be able to fight with conventional weapons. And have these weapons at least in minimal quantities.
This also applies to aircraft carriers. In the future, in order to ensure that the enemy does not conduct any activity near our shores, it will be necessary to have at least one combat-ready aircraft carrier with a combat-ready air group both in the Northern Fleet and in the Pacific. Taking into account the fact that such ships are operated in a very stressful mode, and require frequent repairs, it is worth considering the possibility of a larger number.
However, one must understand that having an aircraft carrier itself or two is not even half the battle. We need naval air regiments - at least two to carry out the rotation of air groups and compensate for combat losses. We need a basing point with a normal berth, with a supply of electricity, steam and fuel, with an access for vehicles and, possibly, a crane. Now this is not the case. And, most importantly, teachings are needed. Practicing flights for aerial reconnaissance, for combat patrols, working out flights to repel an air strike, by different compositions of combat groups, from a couple to the entire air group, day and night, to attack weakly defended surface targets, to escort bombers, to cover a missile salvo and protect PLO aircraft. All these complex tasks should not cause difficulties, they should be worked out to automatism. It is also necessary that the actions of the deck crews also be worked out to automatism, including in the event of emergencies, such as a break in the air arrestor cable, a fire on the deck, an explosion on the deck. It is imperative that the crew be skilled in dealing with the consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, including the decontamination of the deck. Naval headquarters must be prepared to use the potential of naval aviation wisely. And, of course, the ship's radio and electronic weapons must be updated in a timely manner.
Unfortunately, today there is no certainty that when the repair of "Kuznetsov" is completed, all this will be done. Moreover, there is no certainty that the "holes" in the defense caused by the lack of such ships in the Navy will be closed in the foreseeable future. Rather, there is confidence in the opposite. Our shores will continue to be unprotected for a very long time.
