The Great Patriotic War introduced a lot of new things into the development of issues of organizing and conducting combat operations of units of the country's Air Defense Forces in the defense of railway communications. Despite the surprise of Germany's attack on the USSR, the air defense forces managed to withstand a powerful blow from the enemy air force and ensured the safety of many railway facilities, including the bridges across the Dnieper and Dniester, which were of great importance. During the first months of the war, the Nazis were unable to destroy a single major railway bridge.
Having met strong opposition from air defense units at railway junctions, stations (their air defense deserves a separate article in this article is not considered) and bridges, the Germans began to launch air strikes on unprotected objects (small stations, sidings, etc.). For example, in July 1941, fascist planes in the section from Rudnya to Granki (Smolensk region) systematically bombarded patrols and fired at trains. To counteract them, the commander of the 741st anti-aircraft artillery regiment, Major A. I. Bukarev created a special maneuvering group consisting of two medium-caliber batteries, one battery of small-caliber anti-aircraft artillery (MZA) and four anti-aircraft machine-gun installations (ZPU), which covered various objects with their fire, which prevented bombing, and also misled the Nazis about the available anti-aircraft funds. As a result, the German aviation abandoned the bombing, covered by a maneuverable group of objects.
On the initiative of the commanders of air defense units, such groups were created on other fronts. They acted covertly and suddenly, and inflicted significant damage on the enemy. Taking into account this experience, the head of the Main Directorate of the Red Army Air Defense on October 2, 1941, sent a directive to the chiefs of the air defense of the fronts and the commanders of the air defense zones, in which he demanded to organize maneuverable air defense groups and widely use them in the fight against enemy aviation striking unprotected targets.
These groups usually acted from an ambush in areas identified by reconnaissance routes and flights of enemy air. Anti-aircraft units took up firing positions at night, and during the day they shot down enemy aircraft with sudden fire. This method of using anti-aircraft weapons forced the enemy to spend time on additional reconnaissance of the location of air defense forces and often abandon low-altitude flights, which reduced the aim of the bombing. Successful ambush operations of anti-aircraft subunits while protecting railroad communications were a new form of combat use of anti-aircraft artillery (ZA).
The reorganization of the air defense forces, carried out in the fall of 1941, had a significant impact on the development and improvement of the tactics of anti-aircraft units. A unified centralized command and control of the air defense forces was created. The formation of air defense zones began to obey not the fronts (districts), but the commander of the country's Air Defense Forces. This made it possible to more efficiently solve the issues of organizing air defense of the most important areas, facilities and railway communications, to carry out a wide maneuver of forces and means, to improve the quality of combat training, to establish a centralized generalization and dissemination of experience in combating enemy aviation.
By the beginning of 1942, new rules for the firing of anti-aircraft artillery were published and began to operate, which took into account the combat experience gained, outlined the methods of conducting barrage fire and firing at aircraft in a dive and using anti-aircraft maneuvers. Now the unit commanders could train personnel in new tactics for fighting enemy aircraft.
A significant role in the air defense of railway objects in the initial period of the war was played by individual anti-aircraft armored trains of the air defense, the formation of which began at the end of 1941. As a rule, they were armed with three 76, 2 mm guns, a pair of 37-mm automatic cannons and three or four large-caliber anti-aircraft machine guns. Armored trains covered the stations, provided the defense of the most important echelons on dangerous sections of the track.
Organizationally, armored trains were independent units. They were directly subordinate to the commanders of air defense formations, who maintained constant radio communication with their commanders and the VOSO bodies of the fronts (armies). Knowledge of the railway transportation plan allowed the commanders of air defense formations to transfer armored trains in a timely manner to threatened areas or use them to escort the most important echelons. At first, mistakes were made when using armored trains. So, the 130th anti-aircraft armored train, defending the Sebryakovo station (Stalingrad railway), was between the passing trains on July 23, 1942, which prevented it from providing a proper rebuff during the German air raid. Moreover, the armored train received damage from dropped bombs and fire, ignited neighboring echelons.
With the beginning of the war, air defense fighter aircraft began to be used to cover the railway lines. She solved this task along with the air defense of large centers and other important facilities of the country. So, in the summer of 1941, part of the forces of the 7th Air Defense Fighter Air Corps was involved in the defense of the October railway section from Leningrad to Chudovo. In 1942, 104 air defense IADs defended the Northern Railway, in the Arkhangelsk-Nyandoma-Kharovsk section. The main task of the 122nd Air Defense Fighter Aviation Division was to cover the Murmansk port and the section of the Kirov railway from Murmansk to Taibol.
The main method of combat employment of the air defense aviation forces was air patrolling. Usually the headquarters of the air regiment drew up a scheme for air protection of sections of the railway and a schedule for the departure of fighters on patrols. Sometimes, for greater clarity, they were combined into one common, graphically executed document. Each pilot plotted the patrol area, its boundaries, departure times, course to follow, alternate airfields and landing sites on his flight chart.
In some cases, a method was used to ambush fighters on probable routes of passage of enemy aircraft. This is how subunits of the 44th and 157th fighter aviation regiments of the 7th Air Defense Air Corps operated in the Chudovo, Malaya Vishera, Lyuban area, which delivered a series of unexpected attacks on German bombers.
The experience of the air defense of railway facilities has shown that medium-caliber AA batteries must be placed around them at a distance of 1 to 2 kilometers, with a distance of 2-3 kilometers between them. MZA and anti-aircraft machine guns should, as a rule, be deployed by platoon, in the immediate vicinity of the most important structures: depots, water pumps, elevators, warehouses at intervals of one to one and a half kilometers. Near the entrance and exit points of the node (station), the positions of the platoons of MZA or anti-aircraft machine guns were necessarily equipped, since the dive bombers tried to destroy them or disable them in the first place. The air defense of the railway station was carried out jointly with fighter aviation units. Interaction was organized according to the principle of division of zones of action. At the same time, fighter aircraft operated at distant approaches to the covered object.
To defend the echelons along the route from air strikes, the air defense command organized anti-aircraft artillery escort groups. Each of them was located on 2-4 railway platforms, which carried one MZA cannon and a machine gun. The platforms were included in the train in two or three places (in the head, in the middle and at the tail of the train). When attacking trains, enemy aviation always tried to damage the steam locomotive in order to deprive the train of the course, so the head platform was usually reinforced with fire weapons. In the first half of 1942, escort groups began to be used on the Kirov, Stalingrad and other railways. However, they were especially widely used in 1943.
During the war, the control issues of air defense forces defending communications from the air were solved creatively, according to the current situation. Operational groups were created to control individual units detached from air defense formations. They usually had the following composition: chief, chief of staff, officers from the main divisions of the headquarters of the formation, the headquarters of artillery and the political department, scouts, telephone operators, radio operators and were provided with vehicles and radio and wire communications. The headquarters of the groups were usually located in the areas of important railway stations and their chiefs were the chiefs of the air defense of these objects.
Since in the second period of the war the intensity of the actions of the enemy air force on the front-line railways increased, it was necessary to increase the number of anti-aircraft weapons to ensure the defense of communication lines. So, in August 1943, in comparison with the beginning of the summer of 1942, the number of medium-caliber anti-aircraft systems and ZPU increased almost 3 times, MZA guns - more than 7 times. In 1942, German aviation carried out 5848 bombing raids on railway facilities. A total of 18,730 aircraft were involved in them. In 1943, the enemy carried out 6915 raids with 23,159 aircraft.
The choice of targets for bombing strikes and the tactics of German aviation against railroad communications changed during the war. If in the winter of 1942/43 the enemy tried to disrupt the uninterrupted operation of the Kirov railway by the actions of numerous small groups and single vehicles, then in the spring and summer its air force was already delivering mainly massive strikes against the communications of our troops in the Kursk Bulge area.
The combat operations of air defense units in the defense of railway facilities in these areas are of certain interest. After unsuccessful attempts to destroy our northern ports of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk, through which the main supplies under the Lend-Lease were going, the enemy decided to disable the Kirov railway on the Loukhi-Kandalaksha stretch, which has a length of 164 kilometers. The air defense of this railway was provided by units of the Murmansk Air Defense Divisional District and the 122 Air Defense Fighter Air Division attached to it. To strengthen the Loukhi-Kandalaksha railway section, in addition to the two batteries of a small-caliber ZA and an anti-aircraft machine-gun company located here, five ZA batteries of a medium caliber, two MZA and three ZPU platoons were urgently deployed. These units took up defensive positions at stations and crossings. Also, an armored train was used as maneuvering groups, part of the units of small-caliber ZA and anti-aircraft machine guns.
The enemy changed tactics and chose other targets for strikes. He shifted his main efforts to unprotected or insufficiently protected sections of roads. At the same time, pairs of Bf-109 fighters attacked trains en route throughout the daylight hours, trying to disable the locomotives and stop the trains. Following this, after 20-40 minutes, Ju-88 bombers flew up to the place where the echelon stopped and bombed it. To prevent the damaged sections of the road from being restored at night, specially trained groups of enemy aircraft in the late evening from a height of fifty meters dropped time mines onto the railroad bed.
The current situation demanded the adoption of the necessary measures, and first of all, ensuring the defense of trains along the route. Air defense groups were urgently formed to protect the echelons. In total, 5 groups of convoys were created, each of which consisted of several small-caliber ZA guns and two or three large-caliber machine guns, which were mounted on specially equipped platforms. The combat crews were constantly at the anti-aircraft systems and were ready to immediately open fire on enemy aircraft. To ensure control of the escort group, a telephone connection was carried out on the train. One officer of the group was located at the steam locomotive's tender and, receiving orders from the head of the air defense of the train, handed them over to the driver and monitored the exact implementation. Messages about enemy aircraft and the establishment of communication between the head of the air defense of the train and the higher headquarters were provided by radio communication.
In the spring of 1943, the construction of an airfield for the Soviet fighter aircraft, which began air patrols in the Loukhi-Kandalaksha sector in May, was completed. A task force was created to manage all air defense units. It was located at Louhi station and had reliable communication with all air defense units on its section of the road, with the fighter aviation base and the air defense headquarters of the region. The headquarters of the group also closely interacted with the bodies of VOSO and the road administration.
As a result of intense hostilities, an attempt by the Germans to disrupt the operation of the Kirov railway on the Loukhi-Kandalaksha stretch was thwarted. In total, units of the Murmansk Air Defense District and the 122nd Air Defense Fighter Air Division in 1943 destroyed about 140 and knocked out at least 30 enemy aircraft.
When organizing the air defense system of front-line railway communications on the Kursk salient during the spring-summer of 1943, previous experience was creatively used, the importance of objects and the specifics of the actions of German aviation were taken into account.
Massive railway transportation in the Kursk Bulge zone could not fail to attract the attention of enemy aircraft. The fascists stepped up their actions in this direction, trying to disrupt the supply and replenishment of the Central and Voronezh fronts in order to create the necessary conditions for a favorable offensive of their troops. The Soviet command opposed the massive use of enemy aviation by massing air defense forces and means.
The air defense of the railway lines in the Kursk salient zone was assigned to the troops of the Ryazhsko-Tambov, Voronezh-Borisoglebsky, Tula and Kharkov, divisional air defense regions. Particularly important tasks were carried out by the forces of the Voronezh-Borisoglebsk divisional (later corps) air defense region and the 101st air defense fighter IAD. They defended the most important section of the Kastornoye-Kursk railway line.
Near Kursk, the country's Air Defense Forces worked closely with the air armies and air defense units of the Voronezh and Central Fronts. Medium-caliber FOR the Air Defense Forces of the country provided cover for the most important railway junctions and stations. During the defense of communications, maneuver groups for air defense were widely used, which included anti-aircraft systems of medium and small caliber, as well as large-caliber machine guns. 35 anti-aircraft armored trains accompanied the echelons, covered the stations at which the loading and unloading of military equipment and personnel was going on, were used to organize ambushes at small stations and patrols where there were no other air defense forces.
In turn, a specific object or railway section was assigned to each fighter aviation regiment. This was a new development in the use of fighters. Air units were based on airfields as close as possible to the defended sections of the road or objects. To provide a wide range of maneuvers, alternate airfields and landing sites were built. The main methods of action of air defense fighters when covering railway communications were on duty at airfields in readiness for a quick departure for interception and continuous patrolling in the area of train traffic.
Airfield watch was used when the enemy aircraft warning system ensured timely departure and interception of enemy aircraft before they approached the target. Continuous patrols were carried out over those railway sections that were located near the front line and where enemy aircraft operated especially intensively. Airborne fighters, as a rule, attacked enemy aircraft that directly threatened trains or covered objects. When enemy bombers appeared within the range of the fighter regiment, vehicles from the airfields were usually lifted to intercept them, and the patrolling aircraft continued to carry out their mission. It should be noted that in some cases airborne patrols could also be used to intercept, but fighters were always sent from airfields to defend trains. Airborne guidance was carried out using a radar. The provision of air defense for sections of the railway and trains along the route with forces and means of air defense fighter aircraft turned out to be very effective. The experience of hostilities has clearly shown that the successful provision of air defense of railway communications passing in the front-line zone is possible only under the condition of joint actions of the country's Air Defense Forces and the front-line air defense. The effectiveness of interaction, which was based on the principle of division of zones of action between anti-aircraft artillery and fighter aircraft, was also fully confirmed. With such a system of organizing interaction, enemy aircraft were subjected to successive strikes when approaching the covered objects and when returning. The assignment of railway sections (zones) to the units of the IA was a new phenomenon in the use of forces and means of fighter aircraft. Radar stations became the main means of targeting enemy aircraft. It is noteworthy that 80% of the VNOS platoons equipped with radars were transferred to aviation units and formations. Maneuverable antiaircraft artillery groups operated effectively. They were used to provide cover for loading and unloading points, intermediate stations, sidings, bridges, as well as places of congestion of echelons.
As for the air defense groups created to accompany the echelons on the way, they played a positive role. However, their control diverted the attention of the headquarters of the country's air defense units from the tasks of ensuring the air defense of the main objects. Therefore, in January 1944, all the individual units accompanying the trains were reassigned to the organs of the VOSO of the Red Army. They were preliminarily brought together organizationally in separate divisions (regiments).
