Interaction of partisans of Chernihiv region with the Red Army

Interaction of partisans of Chernihiv region with the Red Army
Interaction of partisans of Chernihiv region with the Red Army

Video: Interaction of partisans of Chernihiv region with the Red Army

Video: Interaction of partisans of Chernihiv region with the Red Army
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Interaction of partisans of Chernihiv region with the Red Army
Interaction of partisans of Chernihiv region with the Red Army

Literally from the first days of the occupation, the partisans of Chernihiv region began active operations, helping the units of the Red Army. So, the partisans of the Reimentarovsky detachment under the command of B. S. The tunic provided assistance to the Soviet troops in intelligence activities and the fight against fascist agents. At the beginning of 1942, the command of the regional united partisan detachment (commander A. F. Fedorov), through V. Grigorenko's reconnaissance group, abandoned in the enemy's rear, established constant radio communication with the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. In April 1942, radio communication was established with the headquarters of the Bryansk Front. The struggle intensified noticeably in the summer of 1942. On May 30, at the Headquarters of the Supreme Command, the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TsSHPD) was created, and at the Military Council of the South-West direction - the Ukrainian Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (USHPD). By order of the USHPD, an operational group with two radio operators was sent to establish direct communication with the headquarters of the regional partisan formation.

In June, the command of the Bryansk Front, with the help of aviation, transferred 37 demolition men and scouts to the disposal of the regional detachment. The arriving specialists trained the partisans in subversive work. Subsequently, they formed the backbone of the formed sabotage groups that were actively operating on the railway lines Kiev - Nizhyn, Gomel - Bakhmach and Gomel - Novozybkov. Receiving weapons, ammunition, medicines, the command of the partisan detachments sent back by air the seriously wounded, as well as the elderly and women with children from the burned villages.

Fulfilling the instructions of TSSHPD and USHPD on the use of raid tactics, the partisans of Chernigov region, receiving regular assistance from the fronts, continuously fought and committed sabotage. During the raids, specially abandoned partisan groups created new partisan detachments in Semenovsky, Shchorsky, Novgorod-Seversky and other districts of the region. Continuous strikes against the enemy, inflicted by Chernigov detachments during raids on the territory of neighboring regions of the RSFSR and Belarus, allowed the partisans to keep the initiative in their hands. In addition, the raids reduced the threat of defeating the guerrilla forces in unequal battles when the enemy had a numerical and combat superiority.

So, making a raid from the Bryansk forests, the Chernigov regional detachment (commander A. F. Fedorov), on the night of July 2, 1942, defeated a number of enemy garrisons in the settlements of the Kholmensky region. The head of the German security police in Ukraine reported to Berlin on this occasion: "A large raid by Fedorov's partisans was carried out in the Kholmy area … Fedorov has close ties with the front, and he is constantly informed about the progress of the fighting … There is constant and intensive air communication between the partisans and the Red Army." … The underground regional party committee, located 200-300 km from the districts of the region, systematically sent groups of partisans there with special tasks - to mobilize the population to fight the invaders, to conduct intelligence activities on the instructions of the fronts. Data from partisan intelligence on the movement of enemy troops, the construction of airfields, warehouses, defensive lines along the Dnieper and Desna by the Nazis were transmitted by radio to the headquarters of the fronts and armies.

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On July 28, 1942, the Chernigov regional united detachment named after Stalin was merged with the detachments named after Voroshilov (commander P. A. Markov), named after Kirov (commander N. M. Nikolenko) and named after Shchors (commander F. F. Tarasenko) of the Oryol region, in a large formation (commander A. F. During raids through the Mogilev and Gomel regions, the sabotage detachment of this unit, headed by G. V. Balitsky, together with the reconnaissance group of the Red Army N. Korobitsyn (Leo), derailed nine enemy trains, among which there were two government ones. As a result of the crash of the train with the officers of the Air Force and tank forces, the general and 372 officers were killed, 380 were wounded.

The unit had two lines of stable communication with the NKVD of the Ukrainian SSR, two with the headquarters of the South-West and one with the headquarters of the Bryansk fronts. During the connection, reconnaissance and sabotage groups of the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army and intelligence departments of the fronts were temporarily deployed, which had their own long-range communications. The presence of stable radio communication with the headquarters made it possible to coordinate the actions of partisan formations and detachments, with the conduct of front-line and army operations.

The successes of our troops on the fronts at the beginning of 1943, the victory at Stalingrad caused a new upsurge in the development of the partisan movement. On March 11, 1943, by order of the USHPD, the main forces of the regional formation in the amount of 1400 people began a raid in the region of the Right-Bank Ukraine. To continue combat work on the territory of the Chernigov region, a detachment (300 people) was left, under the leadership of N. N. Popudrenko. By May 1, 1943, its number had grown to 1,200 people, and soon it was transformed into a unit.

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Significant assistance to our partisans and underground fighters in the south of the region was provided by the reconnaissance and sabotage group of the Red Army Major KS Gnidash (Kim). She helped the commanders of the partisan detachments to establish and maintain contact with the USHPD and the front command. The personnel of the group, together with the partisans, participated in battles, and also organized sabotage. So, on April 24, 1943, the joint forces of the partisan detachments "Pobeda" (commander S. E. district of the Kiev region. More than 300 enemy soldiers were destroyed, and large trophies were taken.

In the summer of 1943, on the eve of the decisive events near Kursk, the Supreme Command Headquarters gave instructions to intensify partisan combat activity and to conduct a rail war. The Chernigov regional party committee appealed to the population to intensify the fight against the fascists. At the direction of the USHPD, partisans began to carry out sabotage on a large scale on railway communications in accordance with the developed Operation "Rail War" in order to paralyze the movement of enemy troops, as well as the supply of equipment and ammunition to the region of Orel, Belgorod, Kharkov, thereby assisting the actions of Soviet troops in repelling German offensive. Numerous sabotage groups of N. N. Popudrenko, as well as the detachment of A. S. Yarovoy, operating on the railway lines Novozybkov - Novgorod-Seversky, Gomel - Bryansk, Kiev - Nizhyn, Gomel - Bakhmach. The Germans were forced to create strongpoints and bunkers along the railways, to allocate part of their forces to protect communications. In the battles with the partisans, the German units suffered heavy losses. Only in the 930th security regiment of the 231st security division, as a result of battles with partisans, 11-12 people left each company. In May-August 1943, soldiers of the Chapaev partisan detachment under the command of G. S. Artozeeva and the sabotage group of the regional connection blew up 40 train trains.

After successfully repelling the blow of the German troops near Kursk, the Red Army went on the offensive. The fascist command tried to use the lines along the Desna, Sozh, Dnieper, Pripyat rivers to create a solid defense. Under these conditions, in order to improve the interaction of partisan detachments with units of the Red Army, an operational group was organized under the military council of the Voronezh Front, headed by the head of the USHPD, Major General T. A. Strokachem, who began to coordinate the strikes of the partisans with the actions of regular troops at the front. The task force developed a plan for the seizure of the crossings across the Dnieper, Desna and Pripyat by partisan forces, approved by the military council of the front. In addition, it was planned to use partisan forces in the Kiev region, which was supposed to assist our troops in the liberation of the capital of Ukraine.

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At this time, the partisans also intensified intelligence activities in the interests of the troops leading the offensive. So, with their help, the reconnaissance group of Major K. S. Gnidasha opened the system of German fortifications on the water lines. The partisans of the Kozeletsky district passed on to the front command data on the accumulation of military echelons at the Darnitsa station, which our aviation then bombed.

About 12 thousand partisans took direct part in the capture, construction and holding of crossings across the Dnieper, Desna and Pripyat. On September 11, 1943, the partisan regiment of A. I. Shevyrev, formation "For the Motherland" near the villages of Senozhatskoye, Smolin sank a fascist caravan consisting of three steamers, two military boats and several barges. Having seized one of the barges, the partisans organized a ferry of Soviet troops across the Desna. Before the approach of the Red Army, the partisans of the formation held two crossings across the Dnieper near the village of Terenty, along which units of the 17th Guards were then ferried. rifle corps. The personnel of the partisan formation "For the Motherland" assisted the troops in crossing the Pripyat and the Dnieper, fighting together with the Red Army units and holding the captured bridgehead.

In mid-September 1943, the partisans of the M. Kotsyubinsky formation established constant communication with the headquarters of the 8th rifle division. On instructions from the command, they conducted reconnaissance of the enemy, cleared the roads. When the Soviet units approached the Desna, the formation organized crossings from large boats across the Desna, and then across the Dnieper and Pripyat. Partisan detachments, together with military units, also took part in battles in the Khoromnoye, Chikalovichi area and on the Pripyat River.

The partisan detachment of E. Kh. Sokolovsky, operating on the territory of the Priluksky, Varvinsky and Malodevitsky districts of the region, participated in the liberation of the city of Priluki. The Shchors formation organized a crossing for the advancing Soviet troops near the villages of Sivki, Okuninovo and Dung.

The military councils of the Voronezh and Central Fronts, noting the great merits of the partisans in helping the troops cross water obstacles and liberating cities and villages, declared gratitude to all the personnel of the partisan formations. According to the most conservative estimates, in two years of struggle, the partisans of the Chernihiv region destroyed more than 32,000 fascists, derailed 389 enemy echelons, sank 34 steamships and 22 barges, shot down 7 aircraft, and blew up many military depots and other important objects.

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Representatives of 47 nationalities fought in the formations and detachments that fought in the Chernihiv region. By the time the region was liberated, there were about 22,000 partisans in only 5 formations and large independently operating detachments. With the transfer of hostilities to the Right-Bank Ukraine, a significant part of the Chernihiv partisans joined the regular troops. The combat activities of the partisans of the Chernigov region were linked to the operations carried out by the troops of the Soviet Army. On the instructions of the USSHPD and the front command, the partisans carried out sabotage on communications on the eve and during the offensive, paralyzing the enemy rear, conducted reconnaissance in the interests of the troops, smashed the enemy garrisons in the rear, thus pulling off part of the forces of the German army.

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