The threat hanging over the groupings of fascist troops in the North Caucasus and Crimea forced the German command to hastily strengthen them. In such a situation, the Black Sea communications acquired special importance for the enemy. In 1943, on the lines connecting the ports occupied by him, from 30 to 200 convoys passed in a month, not counting transportations along the Kerch Strait. That is why the main task for the Soviet Black Sea Fleet was to disrupt enemy communications. In a telegram sent to the military council of the fleet on the first day of 1943 by the People's Commissar of the Navy, it was indicated that, according to the information received, sea transportation from Romania to the Crimea and to the Kerch Peninsula is very important to the enemy, therefore violation of these messages at the moment will be of great assistance to the land front …
Using the combat experience that was acquired in 1941-1942. (see the article Actions of the Black Sea Fleet's Submarine Forces in the First Period of the War.) The Black Sea Fleet, including its submarine forces, continued to increase its efforts in the fight against enemy communications. In the first two months of 1943, only submarines (submarines) sank 11 transports, two schooners, five landing barges and damaged two tankers, a transport, and an enemy landing barge.
Organizationally, the submarines were grouped into a brigade (BPL) of five divisional personnel. At the beginning of 1943, there were 29 submarines in it (of which eighteen were in service, the rest were under repair). The creation of an operational formation under a single command significantly improved the control of submarine forces, the preparation of ships for combat missions and their material and technical support. By order of the command of the Navy on August 9, 1942, the submarine was formed by combining the 1st and 2nd brigades and the 10th separate submarine division.
The violation of enemy sea transport was carried out in a difficult situation. Day after day, increasing the intensity of the movement of the convoys, the fascist command at the same time took vigorous measures for their safety. So, to protect convoys on the Sevastopol-Constanta and Constanta-Bosphorus lines, the enemy had four destroyers, three destroyers, three gunboats, 12 minesweepers, 3 anti-submarine and 4 patrol boats, excluding several other ships converted from civilian ships. On communications along the southern coast of Crimea, the enemy used high-speed and maneuverable landing barges, which were specially re-equipped for anti-aircraft defense and anti-aircraft defense purposes. During the passage from Constanta to Constantinople, only one tanker "Ossag" had two destroyers, two gunboats, an anti-submarine boat and four minesweepers under guard.
Convoys moved mainly at night, which made it difficult for submarines to launch torpedo attacks. In addition, mines posed a serious threat. The Nazis, seeking to create a threat to our ships and fetter their actions, continued to mine the approaches to Sevastopol, Evpatoria, Feodosia and the Kerch Strait. In total, in 1943, fifty new enemy minefields (about 6000 mines) were delivered, of which two dozen were at the southern exit of the Kerch Strait. The search and attack of enemy convoys were also made difficult by the fact that submarines based in the ports of the Caucasian coast had to make long (up to 600 miles) transitions to the combat area.
Despite the difficulties, the Black Sea submariners persistently overcame the enemy PLO and inflicted considerable damage on the enemy. The greatest results were achieved by the D-4 crew of Lieutenant Commander I. Ya. Trofimov, who sank 3 transports. On the combat account of other submarines were: M-111 - 2 transport ships and a lighter; M-112 - transport and fast landing barge (BDB); L-4 - BDB and two schooners; Shch-215 - transport and high-speed barge.
Submarines made six mine-laying exits in 1943. The 120 mines they put up in the areas of busy shipping kept the Germans and their allies in constant tension, forced them to carry out constant trawling, disrupted the exit and arrival times of convoys, and led to losses. The total damage caused by submarines to the enemy's transport fleet in 1943 on the Black Sea communications amounted to 33428 reg. brt (registered gross tons). For 1942, these losses amounted to 28007 reg. brt.
By November 1943, 13 submarine positions were installed off the southern and southwestern Black Sea coast, which were actively used until the beginning of 1944. The number of submarines in the fleet remained the same - 29 units. But there were only 11 combat-ready boats, the rest required repair. Those in the ranks performed tasks in accordance with the operational directive of the Black Sea Fleet military council of January 22, as well as a combat order and directive of January 23 and 30, 1944. These documents indicated that the submarine forces should conduct active combat work independently and together with naval aviation against enemy ships, transports and floating crafts in the western part of the Black Sea in order to disrupt and even interrupt enemy communications. Subsequently, the General Naval Staff (GMSH) regarded the task of interrupting enemy communications as unattainable. For its success, according to the calculation of the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet, the positions required the simultaneous presence of three or four submarines. In fact, the Fleet could only put out to sea 2-3 boats at a time. In the same period, the submarines were entrusted with the conduct of daily operational reconnaissance during their stay in positions, as well as during the transition. In the first months of the year, the fulfillment of these tasks was difficult due to the harsh winter conditions. Also, the situation was aggravated by the limited opportunities for repairing boats. For example, during the first three months of the year, no more than 40% of submarines from the payroll of the brigade were in service. As a result, the effectiveness of submarine operations on enemy lines of communication was significantly reduced, and some ship crews had to stay at sea for up to 35 days.
It is also worth noting that each combat exit of the Soviet submarine was accompanied by strong enemy opposition. The enemy had radar and hydroacoustic means, a wide network of radio direction-finding stations. All this created a serious hindrance to the actions of our submarines. The greatest danger was posed by submarine hunters equipped with sonar equipment, carrying depth charges, automatic cannons, and large-caliber machine guns. Four squadrons of enemy seaplanes, based in Constance, systematically carried out aerial reconnaissance. Transitions of large convoys, as a rule, were provided by aviation, which searched for submarines along the course of the convoy.
All this was taken into account by our command, developing and using the necessary measures to ensure the safety of submarines. There were established special rules for their navigation and combat operations, specific guidelines for commanders. They set out requirements and recommendations characteristic of various situations. It was forbidden, for example, to maneuver for a long time near the coast in the areas of radar installations, to be in a positional position in daylight. After a torpedo attack, when evading pursuit, it was ordered to urgently dive to the maximum possible depth or go into the dark part of the horizon. The implementation of these and other instructions facilitated the actions of the commanders, increased the level of their tactical training, and ensured the high efficiency of torpedo attacks.
In just the first three months of 1944, submarines made 17 combat missions. In 10 cases they had combat contact with the enemy, in 7 they carried out torpedo attacks, and 6 - at night. The effectiveness of the actions of Soviet submariners on enemy sea lanes at that time could have been higher if closer interaction between them and other forces of the fleet had been maintained. So, in most cases, they acted against independently discovered enemy ships and ships. Therefore, summing up the results of the combat work of the submarine forces for three months of 1944, the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet noted a very significant drawback: the lack of their interaction with aviation. None of the 36 convoys and ships discovered by aerial reconnaissance were targeted by submarines.
Submariners showed good results during the operation to disrupt enemy communications, carried out by the Black Sea Fleet by decision of the Supreme Command Headquarters in April-May 1944. They fought the convoys on the high seas and off the Romanian coast. At the first stage, the task of the operation was to prevent the strengthening of the enemy grouping in Crimea. The second stage was aimed at disrupting the evacuation of the 17th German army from the Crimean peninsula. Already in March, intensive training of submarines began, the main components of which were the forced commissioning of ships under repair and an increase in the tactical literacy of officers. Taking into account the shortcomings noted by the headquarters of the Black Sea Fleet for the first quarter, the brigade headquarters issued a preliminary combat manual on interaction in the communications of submarines and aviation, clarified the issues of ensuring communication with the headquarters of interacting formations and units. The operational management documents were also carefully developed, which, in particular, provided for reliable (direct and reverse) radio communication between the command post of the brigade commander and the boats at sea with reconnaissance aircraft and with each other. Also, the headquarters of the BPL held a tactical game with the commanders of divisions and crews on a topic that corresponded to the planned hostilities. In the divisions, in turn, tactical exercises with naval officers were organized.
The Black Sea Fleet began the operation on the night of 9 April. On April 11-12, the number of submarines at sea was increased to seven. A week later, the total number of combat-ready submarines reached 12, and by May -13. For them, 18 positions were cut. This made it possible for the submarine commanders in the course of the operation to concentrate submarines where there was the greatest traffic intensity of the enemy ships. Submariners had to independently search for a convoy within their positions. In the event that the enemy changed routes, the submarine commander, based on aerial reconnaissance data, gave the boat commanders an order to move to other positions. This method of using submarines was called position-maneuverable. With an insufficient number of boats, but with good organization of their interaction with each other and with reconnaissance aircraft, it provided the ability to control a significant area and conduct active operations along the entire length of enemy communications that connected Sevastopol with the Romanian ports.
Significant success, for example, was achieved by the personnel of the Guards submarine M-35 Lieutenant Commander M. Prokofiev. On April 23, from a distance of 6 cables, the boat fired torpedoes and sank the Ossag tanker with a displacement of about 2800 tons, which had been damaged by our aircraft the day before. On the night of May 10, while charging the batteries, the M-35 was attacked by an enemy aircraft. During her dive, the entrance hatch of the sixth compartment was out of order from the explosion of high-explosive bombs, through which water began to flow. Having eliminated the damage, the crew continued their combat mission. May 11 torpedoed enemy transport from 3 cable submarines. The attack was carried out at night from periscope depth, which was an unusual tactical technique for the submariners of the Black Sea Fleet. Other crews also achieved good results. The GMSH highlighted the fact of close interaction of the commanders of the submarines, as well as their widespread use of cruising in the designated areas, which increased the efficiency of the search and ensured a quick rapprochement with the enemy.
The interaction of submarines with aviation also played a positive role, striking the areas adjacent to the zones of operations of submarines, directing them by radio to convoys and individual targets. With the loss of the ports of the Crimea by the enemy, his communications were greatly reduced, which caused a narrowing of the area of operations of the Soviet submarine forces. The number of their positions during this period often changed in accordance with the intensity of the movement of enemy ships and vessels. For example, in July there were only two positions, in August - 5. The Nazis were left with the opportunity to conduct convoys only between four ports (Sulina - Constanta - Varna - Burgas). Such an opportunity was ensured by their presence near the coast and by powerful minefields placed along these lines. Also, due to their small length, even slow-moving enemy ships could cover the specified distance in one night. Communications were mainly serviced by small vessels protected by coastal batteries with solid security and were characterized by low voltage. So, from May 13 to September 9, 80 convoys and single ships passed here. All this complicated the combat work of our boats. During this period, twelve submarines operated on the communications, which had 21 combat contacts with the enemy. They carried out 8 torpedo attacks, during which they sank five enemy ships.
The actions of the submarine forces of the Black Sea Fleet in 1944 confirmed the importance and role of this kind of forces; they accounted for 33% of the total tonnage lost by the enemy in the Black Sea theater. Submarines played a special role in the fight against fascist convoys during the Crimean operation. Along with aviation, they deprived the enemy of the opportunity to replenish the groupings of troops, disrupted the timeframe for conducting active operations, and limited the defenses of enemy units and formations. For example, the destruction of one medium tanker left 1,500 twin-engine bombers or about 5,000 fighters without fuel.
The success of the submarine's torpedo attack depended significantly on the position of the volley. The best results were obtained by those commanders who carried out an attack from a distance of 2-6 cables, since with an increase in the range, the enemy, having noticed a torpedo or its trace, had the opportunity to evade. The effectiveness of actions also depended on the skills acquired by the submariners, both in the course of performing combat missions and in the process of combat training. And the latter received much attention in 1944. An important role in the growth of submariners' skill was played by a thorough study and application of the accumulated combat experience in its own fleet and in other fleets.
It should be noted that the conditions for the operations of the Black Sea Fleet submariners during the war years turned out to be unfavorable. Enemy communications were located in coastal areas, well protected by minefields. The sections of the waterway between the ports were short, and the stress of communications was low. The enemy used mainly small ships for their transportation. All this, combined with the strong escort of the convoys, which consisted of ships and aircraft, made it difficult for our boats to operate.
At the beginning of the war, there was practically no interaction, both between submarines at sea and submarines with aviation. Since 1943, the episodic nature of such interaction, thanks to the arming of ships with new technical means, has become more systematic. The structural reliability and autonomy of submarine navigation also increased, which made it possible, in contrast to the first period of the war, to cover vast areas of navigation with a relatively small number of submarines.
The torpedo weapons of the Russian Navy have shown high reliability. The tactical and technical characteristics of torpedo tubes, torpedoes and firing devices were also good. At the same time, the latter were constantly improved, thereby causing the further development of methods for using submarines and carrying out torpedo attacks (from positional to positional-maneuverable and cruising in certain areas; from firing a single torpedo to salvo firing with a fan, etc.). Submariners acted on the enemy's Black Sea communications continuously, decisively and boldly, which was largely ensured by purposeful party-political work carried out in the pre-voyage period and directly at sea on ships.
The experience of submarine combat operations during the war years, and in particular in 1943-1944, revealed a number of shortcomings, which are instructive in themselves. So, it was required to improve the technical equipment of the ships. Its insufficiency was especially felt during the first period of the war. The fleet lacked well-equipped and protected bases, as well as repair enterprises, which reduced the possibility of organizing reliable defense of submarines at their basing points, uninterrupted and full support of combat exits, and rapid restoration of the combat effectiveness of damaged boats. The small number of submarines in service did not allow keeping all the enemy's Black Sea communications under their constant and full influence.
