The Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, carried out by the troops of the 14th Army of the Karelian Front and the forces of the Northern Fleet (SF), was carried out from 7th to 31st October 1944. At sea, Germany still had a significant grouping. By the beginning of October, the battleship Tirpitz, 13-14 destroyers, about 30 submarines, more than 100 minesweepers, torpedo boats and patrol ships, over 20 self-propelled barges, 3 air defense ships, 2 minelayers and others were stationed at naval bases in Northern Norway. strength. In front of the units entering the Northern Defense Region (SOR) of the fleet, on the Sredny Peninsula, the enemy concentrated about 9,000 soldiers and officers, 88 guns, 86 mortars, and, in addition, fire weapons. The German fleet continued to actively fight against our convoys, but its main efforts were focused on the tasks of protecting its maritime traffic, which during the evacuation of troops and equipment and the export of strategic raw materials from the Arctic was of particular importance.
The SOR of the fleet, which occupied defensive lines on the Rybachye and Sredny peninsulas, included the 12th and 63rd Marine Brigades, a coastal artillery battalion, 3 separate machine-gun and artillery battalions and one artillery regiment (10,500 people in total).
To participate in the upcoming operation, the Northern Fleet under the command of Admiral A. G. Golovko allocated (for the landing and operations in the sea) one leader, 4 destroyers, 8-10 submarines, over 20 torpedo boats, up to 23 large and small hunters and 275 aircraft.
In accordance with the developed plan of the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, agreed upon during a meeting of the command of the Karelian Front and the Northern Fleet, Admiral A. G. Golovko was given the following task: the fleet formations to begin active operations in the sea, as well as in the coastal areas. According to the operation plan, which was given the code name "West", the aviation of the Northern Fleet, submarines, torpedo boats and destroyers in the sea direction had to prevent the evacuation of German troops by sea, using the ports of the Varangerfjord on the Kirkenes-Hammerfest section, to destroy all floating crafts when they tried go by sea. In the seaside direction, the combat units and formations of the SOR (commanded by Major General E. T. Dubovtsev) should have broken through the German defenses on the isthmus of the Sredniy Peninsula, seized the road to Petsamo and prevented the withdrawal of German troops, and then attacked Pechenga, in close cooperation with parts of the 14th Army. It was also planned to assist the coastal flank of ground forces by landing amphibious assault forces behind the lines of the defending enemy, on the shores of Malaya Volokovaya Bay, on the Norwegian coast near Kirkenes and in the port of Liinakhamari.
The offensive of our troops began on October 7. After fierce two days of fighting, the formations and units of the 14th Army managed to break through the German defenses, crossed the river. Titovka and continued the offensive. Waging fierce battles for the roads, the Nazis on the night of October 10 began to retreat. By this time, the amphibious assault was in full readiness to land in the Malaya Volokovaya Bay. On 19 submarine hunters and 12 torpedo boats, 3,000 paratroopers of the 63rd Marine Brigade plunged, and on the evening of October 9, in three detachments from Zemlyanoye, they went to sea. At 23:00 the first detachment (7 small hunters, 2 torpedo boats with 700 paratroopers on board), commanded by the Guard Captain 3rd Rank S. D. Zyuzin, approached the landing site. Under the fire of enemy batteries, the ships illuminated by searchlights broke through to the coast and, covered with smoke screens and the fire of our artillery, landed an assault, which included reconnaissance detachments of the headquarters of the Northern Fleet and the SDR, which had the task of capturing the German artillery batteries located on Cape Krestovoy and ensuring the landing in Liinakhamari. The group of boats from which the reconnaissance sailors disembarked was commanded by Senior Lieutenant B. M. Lyakh.
11 large hunters of the second detachment under the command of Captain 3rd Rank I. N. Gritsuk was delivered to the Malaya Volokovaya Bay by the main landing force (1628 people). Under the shelling of enemy coastal batteries, having a relatively large draft, the boats could not immediately approach the coast, which is why the landing of the second echelon of the assault force was somewhat delayed.
The commander of the third airborne detachment, consisting of 8 torpedo boats and one small hunter, Captain 2nd Rank V. N. Alekseev did not wait for the end of the landing of the second echelon. The boats headed towards the shore at full speed, dodging enemy artillery fire. Having disembarked its landing group (672 people), Alekseev's detachment hurried to the big hunters and helped the landing of the main forces, using their boats as makeshift floating berths. By one in the morning on October 10, the entire 63rd Marine Brigade was parachuted. At the same time, her losses amounted to only 6 fighters. The success was ensured by surprise, high rates of landing and demonstrative landing operations in Motovsky Bay. Leaving one battalion to defend the captured bridgehead, the 63rd Brigade immediately launched an offensive in the southeast direction. By 10 o'clock in the morning, she reached the flank of the enemy defense on the Musta-Tunturi ridge. The combined reconnaissance detachment headed across the tundra to Cape Krestovoy.
The offensive of the SOR units from the front began in the early morning of October 10. At half past four, the artillery of the 113th battalion, which is part of the 104th cannon regiment, of the destroyers "Loud" and "Thundering" began fire training, which lasted an hour and a half. During this period of time, 47,000 shells and mines were fired by the COP artillery alone (209 barrels) at the front line, command posts, reserves and batteries of the enemy. Under cover of fire, the 12th Marine Brigade, the 338th Engineer Battalion, the 508th Airborne Engineer Company and other naval units attacked the fortified positions of the Nazis.
The task was complicated by the fact that at night from 8th to 9th October snow fell up to 30 cm thick. By the time the attack began, a strong blizzard arose. The icy bare rocks of Musta-Tunturi have become almost impregnable. All this greatly impeded the advance of troops and orientation on the ground. However, the soldiers of the 12th Marine Brigade, overcoming enemy obstacles, strong rifle, artillery and mortar fire, by 12 o'clock broke through the defenses, crossed the Musta-Tunturi ridge and joined up with the units of the 63rd brigade, which were attacking the Nazis from the rear. The battles were fierce. In them, the sailors showed courage and heroism. For example, at a difficult moment in the attack, Sergeant A. I. Klepach covered the embrasure of the fascist bunker with his chest. By sacrificing his life, he ensured the success of the unit.
Towards the end of the second day of the offensive, the Marines cut off the Titovka-Porovaara road. However, the pace of the offensive was low, artillery lagged behind. Affected by the lack of experience in offensive battles in the dark period of the day, the insufficient preparedness of the marines for the night march. As a result, the Nazis were able to break away from the Soviet units on the night of October 11. On the evening of October 13, units of the 63rd Brigade, meeting with units of the 14th Infantry Division of the 14th Army, reached Porovaara. The 12th brigade headed for Cape Krestovoy. At dawn on October 14, the troops of the 63rd brigade, overcoming enemy resistance, occupied Porovaar and reached the coast of the Pechenga Bay.
Consolidated reconnaissance detachment under the command of Captain I. P. Barchenko-Emelyanova on the night of October 12 was able to go unnoticed to the cape. Krestovy, where he attacked the enemy and after a short battle captured a 4-gun 88-mm anti-aircraft battery, after which he blocked the neighboring four-gun 150-mm battery, which blocked the entrance to the ships in the Pechenga Bay. After arriving to the aid of a detachment of reinforced reconnaissance of the Marine Corps, the garrison of the battery surrendered on the morning of October 13. This success deprived the Germans of the opportunity to oppose the forces of the fleet from one of the directions, which made it possible to make the landing at Liinakhamari.
The port of Liinakhamari, located on the western coast of the Pechenga Bay, was used by the Nazis as a transshipment base for supplying their troops. On the approaches to the port, the Nazis created a strong anti-amphibious defense, which included 4 large-caliber batteries, several batteries of automatic cannons, as well as a significant number of pillboxes and other engineering structures. The entrance to the harbor was covered by anti-submarine barriers.
The fleet commander's plan for the landing of troops in this port as a whole was part of the general plan for the offensive of the 14th Army units on Petsamo. The landing helped the troops to ensure the speedy release of the port and the destruction of the remnants of the defeated Nazi units trying to retreat to Norway.
To land a detachment of marines (660 people) commanded by Major I. A. Timofeev, it was decided on the night of October 13. The landing task was to capture the 210-mm battery at Cape Devkin and the commanding heights, seize the port, the military town and hold these objects until the main forces of the IDF approached. Also, in order to strengthen the landing and further develop the success, it was planned to deliver the marines of the 12th and 63rd brigades to the port. The landing force landed in a detachment of 14 torpedo boats and small hunters. The landing and combat operations of the landing force on the shore were carried out under the direct supervision of the fleet commander located at the auxiliary command post.
On the approach to the Pechenga Bay, intense artillery fire fell on the first group of boats. Further actions of all three groups were also carried out under heavy shelling. Each group was forced to break through to the shore independently, using smoke screens supplied by torpedo boats, constantly maneuvering course and speed. Despite this, the landing was carried out mainly at the designated points. The first group finished it at 23 o'clock, the second and third at 24 o'clock. A total of 552 people landed in the port area.
Without waiting for dawn, the paratroopers attacked a heavily fortified stronghold that covered the firing position of the artillery battery. Detachment st. Lieutenant B. F. Petersburg began to move to the southwest. By dawn, the Nazis, having received reinforcements, counterattacked, and a difficult situation arose for the landing. The command of the fleet to help the marines sent a group of aircraft of Captain P. A. Evdokimova. During the storming of positions, they destroyed up to 200 fascists and 34 cars. Having regrouped our forces, our paratroopers resumed their offensive. On October 13, the port of Liinakhamari was liberated, the enemy was deprived of the opportunity to evacuate their units by sea, and our fleet improved the basing of its forces.
On October 15, Soviet troops occupied the city of Petsamo. The further offensive was carried out in the direction of Nikel, Nautsi and along the Petsamo-Kirkenes road. The Northern Fleet, together with units of the Red Army, was to liberate the territory of Northern Norway from the Germans.
The Nazis had several strong points on the coast near their coastal defense batteries, which could pose a threat to the right flank of the advancing 14th Army. The current situation set new tasks for the fleet to cover the flank of the 14th Army, to clear the coast of the enemy and to provide troops with ammunition, food and reinforcements. By October 25, the formation of the Pechenga naval base was completed. By this time, its main parts were relocated to Liinakhamari. To ensure the antiamphibious and ground defense of the base, as well as combat operations in the Kirkenes direction, the 12th Marine Brigade was transferred to the command of the base. The rest of the SOR were transported to Zemlyanoye and organized defense on the Rybachy and Sredny peninsulas.
On October 18-25, the Northern Fleet, to provide cover for the flank of ground forces and assist them in offensive operations on Kirkenes, landed three tactical amphibious assault forces on the southern bank of the Varanger Fjord. The first landing of the soldiers of the 12th brigade (486 people) was landed in two groups on the morning of October 18 in the bays of Sdalo-Vuono and Ares-Vuono. The next day, having captured Turunen, Afanasyev and Vuoremi, he went to the state border with Norway. The 3rd battalion of the same brigade, together with a separate detachment of marines of the 195th regiment (626 people), crossed to the coast from boats in Kobbholbn on October 23, in cooperation with the first landing force that launched the offensive, cleared the coast from the Germans from the state border to the Yarfjord …
After the withdrawal of the troops of the 14th Army on October 24 to Kirkenes, the Commander of the Northern Fleet decided to carry out an amphibious landing in the Holmengrofjord Bay. He was tasked with diverting and pulling off part of the enemy forces, creating a threat to the rear of the Germans and thereby assisting the ground forces in the assault on Kirkenes. On the morning of October 25, 12 torpedo boats and 3 sea hunters under the general command of Captain 1st Rank A. V. Kuzmin, two battalions of marines landed in Holmengro Fjord.
Fleet aviation was active throughout the operation. She struck at the fascist batteries, military equipment, the accumulation of manpower and strongholds. Attack aircraft and bombers, as a rule, operated in small groups of 6-8 vehicles with fighter cover.
In total, to support the advancing units of the SOR and paratroopers, the fleet aviation performed 240 sorties, of which 112 were carried out to suppress artillery batteries, and 98 for reconnaissance. In total, the Fleet Air Force fought 42 battles in October, shooting down 56 German aircraft and losing 11 of its own. 138 vehicles were destroyed, about 2000 enemy soldiers and officers, 14 depots, 36 anti-aircraft, 13 artillery and mortar batteries were suppressed. On the whole, the aviation units fulfilled the assigned task. Combined arms commanders have repeatedly noted the effectiveness of naval aviation strikes.
The military transportations carried out by the Northern Fleet during the preparation and direct conduct of the operation were of great importance for the successful actions of the troops. They included the delivery of manpower and equipment of the 14th Army through the Kola Bay, the transport of various types of supplies and ammunition by sea for the formations of the coastal flank of ground forces and the IDF, and the evacuation of the wounded. From September 6 to October 17, 5719 people, 118 tanks, armored vehicles and self-propelled guns, 153 artillery pieces, 137 tractors and tractors, 197 cars, 553 tons of ammunition and many other various cargoes were delivered to the western coast across the bay from September 6 to October 17.
The Northern Fleet provided significant assistance to the troops of the 14th Army in the liberation of the Pechenga region and areas of Northern Norway in the defeat of the fascist group. During the operation, units of the IDF, aircraft and ships of the fleet destroyed about 3,000 Nazis, 54 guns and mortars, 65 machine guns, 81 depots, 108 Nazis were taken prisoner, 43 large and medium-caliber guns were seized, as well as many other weapons and property.
Along with actions on the coastal flank of the ground forces, one of the main tasks solved by the Northern Fleet during the Petsamo-Kirkenes operation was the disruption of enemy sea traffic along the Norwegian coast, from Varanger Fjord to Hammer Fest. The main goal was to prevent the supply or the possibility of evacuation by sea of enemy troops, the export of ore and other types of strategic raw materials from the city of Nikel. This task was to be solved by submarines, naval aircraft and torpedo boats, and under favorable conditions it was supposed to use destroyers. These forces were to destroy transports and warships, destroy port facilities. The plan provided for the coordination of actions of different types of forces and their massing in limited areas. The operation on sea communications was led by the commander of the fleet. Along with centralized control, the commanders of the formations were provided with an initiative for action.
The communications struggle took place in difficult conditions. The weather was favorable for the enemy. The long duration of the dark period of the day (14-18 hours), an extensive network of ports, an abundance of natural anchorages and fjords on the way from the Varanger Fjord to the west allowed the Nazis to maneuver the transition time and shelter ships in the event of a threat of attack. From the end of the summer of 1944, the Nazis began to form convoys of 2-3 transport ships, guarded by 5-10 ships, which, under cover of darkness, made the transition from port to port, from fjord to fjord. The evacuation of German troops was carried out from Varangerfjord, mainly from the port of Kirkenes, as well as through Tanafjord, Laxefjord and other points. Despite the losses, the traffic intensity has increased dramatically. In September alone, our reconnaissance revealed more than 60 convoys along the Norwegian coast.
A brigade of Soviet submarines searched for enemy convoys in six main areas adjacent to the enemy coast, and acted in full autonomy. The submarines V-2, V-4, S-56, S-14, S-51, S-104, S-102, S -101 "," L-20 "," M-171 ". Their use was based on the hanging curtain method. For most of the time, the boats operated in the coastal part of the region, on the convoy routes according to the guidance of the fleet reconnaissance aviation, or conducted an independent search. The change in their tactics, persistence in searching and decisiveness in the production of attacks contributed to their success: in October, our submariners sank 6 transports (with a total displacement of 32 thousand tons), 3 patrol boats and 2 minesweepers, damaged 3 transports (with a total displacement of 19 thousand tons) and 4 ship. The greatest successes were achieved by the V-4 submarine (commander Y. K. Iosseliani), which sank a tanker and two transports; "S-104" (commander V. A. Turaev), which added to its combat account a transport and 2 escort ships, and "V-2" (commander A. S. Shchekin), which destroyed a large transport.
Destroyers took part in disrupting the evacuation of the enemy. So, on October 25, in bad weather, the leader of "Baku", the destroyers "Thundering", "Reasonable" and "Enraged" went to search for convoys. Finding no ships and transports, they fired at the port of Var-de, on the territory of which there were four large fires, accompanied by explosions. The port's activities were disrupted for a long time.
A brigade of torpedo boats operated from the Pum-Manka maneuver base, which contained up to 22 pennants. The boats were used mainly within the Varangerfjord. Management was carried out from the command post of the brigade commander located on the Sredny Peninsula. Independent and joint actions with naval aviation prevailed by groups using intelligence data and free search ("hunting") during the dark period of the day. The number of exits for free search was more than 50 percent. all exits for the operation, which is mainly due to the limited capabilities of the fleet in conducting night reconnaissance. Torpedo boats sank 4 transports (total displacement 18 thousand tons), 4 minesweepers, 4 patrol ships and 1 motorboat. Our losses amounted to 1 torpedo boat.
It should be noted that naval forces achieved maximum success in operations at sea when organizing operational and tactical cooperation between submarines, surface ships and aviation. So, on October 11-12, by successive and joint strikes of these forces, a German convoy consisting of 2 transport ships, 2 destroyers and 9 other escort ships, which left Kirkenes, was completely destroyed. The last transport was destroyed by the submarine "V-2" near Cape Nordkin on the evening of 12 October. In total, pilots and sailors sank more than 190 ships and ships in 45 days from September 15. The Northern Fleet, by its actions, managed to disrupt enemy sea communications, which significantly helped our ground forces to defeat the enemy. The systematic actions of the fleet did not allow the enemy to regroup forces by sea. The Nazis suffered significant losses.
It should be noted that the civilians of the Murmansk region also made a great contribution to the victory. Many sailors of the fishing fleet and crews of merchant ships, along with naval sailors, took part in hostilities, defended naval bases, transported troops and important military cargo.
