MiG-29 and Su-27: history of service and competition. Part 2

2024 Author: Matthew Elmers | [email protected]. Last modified: 2023-12-16 21:49

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Since 1991, the process of degradation of the armed forces of the USSR, and then of Russia, began. All subsequent processes negatively affected all types of aircraft of the Air Force, Air Defense and Navy, but the MiG-29 received the most painful blows. Of course, with the exception of those types that were simply destroyed completely and completely before the expiration of their service life (Su-17M, MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-27).

Of the 4th generation fighters in Soviet aviation, the MiG-29 was the most massive. However, after the division of the army between the union republics in the Russian Air Force, the number of 29s actually equaled the number of the Su-27. A large number of MiGs, and quite fresh ones, remained in the union republics. For example, almost all aircraft of this type, produced in 1990, went to Belarus and Ukraine. literally on the eve of the collapse of the Union, they filled the regiments in Starokonstantinov and Osovtsy. Airplanes from the "groups of troops" mostly ended up in Russia - and these were not the newest machines produced in 1985-1988. Also in the Russian Federation remained the aircraft of the very first issues, received in 1982-1983 in the 4th Center for Combat Use.

The situation with the Su-27 turned out to be better mainly due to the fact that mass production of this type began later than the MiG-29, and the entire fleet of the 27s was generally newer. In addition, the bulk of the Su-27 was deployed on the territory of the RSFSR, and the losses for the "division" of the Soviet legacy between the former fraternal republics did not undermine their numbers so much. Of particular interest is the following figure: the average age of the aircraft inherited by Russia in 1995 was 9.5 years for the MiG-29 and 7 years for the Su-27.

The initial balance of the system of two fighters was upset. Suddenly the fleet of a mass light fighter was almost smaller in size than the fleet of a heavy fighter. The very meaning of dividing into two types in this situation became rather absurd. Looking ahead, we can say that in the future the decline in the fleet of the 29s occurred faster than the 27s. So, in 2009, the combined Air Force and Air Defense of the Russian Federation included 265 MiG-29s of old types, 326 Su-27s and 24 newly built MiG-29SMTs (presumably intended for Algeria, which abandoned them in 2008). Naturally, not all of the aircraft in this number were in flight condition, but the total number on the balance sheet also suggests that the "heavy" fighter has become more widespread than the "light" one.

As mentioned above, some other qualities were sacrificed for mass character in Soviet fighters. In particular, the assigned resource, which for the MiG-29 was set at 2500 hours or 20 years. More was simply not required. The front-line fighter did not need an excess resource, which, at the beginning of a full-scale war, would die without flying off, maybe even 100 hours. On the other hand, the speed with which military equipment improved during the Cold War required regular updating. The plane has been aging for 20 years. In 1960, the MiG-21 seemed like a guest from the future, and in 1980, against the background of the MiG-29, quite the opposite, a guest from the past. Therefore, making an aircraft with a service life of 40-50 years is not profitable - it will simply need to be written off without using up the stock and by 50%. However, already in the 90s, the situation changed dramatically. The rapid change of generations of technology slowed down, and the economy required the maximum maintenance of the existing machines in service. In these conditions, the key opportunity to extend the life of aircraft was the extension of the service life. However, in the case of the MiG-29, such work was actually not carried out. In reality, the planes brought to Russia gradually stopped flying, getting up for a long time. In the open air, without any preservation. All this led to the fact that already in the 2010s, the design of many machines fell into disrepair.

The Su-27 initially had about the same life as the MiG-29 - 2000 hours and 20 years of service. The devastating consequences of the collapse of the USSR also affected it, but air defense planes still flew a little more often. As for the MiG-31, it was initially saved by a robust design, designed for high-speed flights and an abundance of titanium and steel alloys in the design. Therefore, it was the fleet of the 29s that underwent the most dramatic reductions. When aviation began to fly again in the 2010s, it was the 29s that were in the worst condition.

During the entire period of destruction and degradation in the 90s and 00s, new equipment was almost never purchased. KB were forced to survive as best they could. And in these conditions, luck smiled at the Sukhoi Design Bureau. China and India were one of the main customers for the Su-27 and the new Su-30. The PRC acquired a license to assemble the Su-27, and the total sales abroad amounted to at least 200 Su-27 and 450 Su-30. The number of MiG-29s sold over the same period was an order of magnitude lower. There are various reasons for this. Firstly, the largest customers experienced an urgent need for an aircraft with the dimensions and characteristics of the Su-27/30. These are, first of all, India and China. They had enough light fighters of their own design in abundance. And they simply did not need a MiG-29 class car (China) or was bought in limited quantities (India). On the other hand, Russian exporters were clearly delighted with the sales of Sushki, and they began to pay less and less attention to the promotion of the MiG, realizing that since the demand went to Sushki, then it was necessary to promote it as much as possible. From the point of view of trade, it is quite logical and correct.

Sukhoi's firm, foreign orders allowed to keep up production (KnAAPO and Irkut), and to work on a serious improvement of the Su-27. Be that as it may, this fact has to be reckoned with. It was Sukhoi who received hard currency from abroad, and this became a serious trump card.

Combining the Air Force and Air Defense

The next step towards the destruction of the "peaceful" coexistence of the two fighters was the scrapping of the Soviet concept of the distribution of tasks between the Air Force and Air Defense. In 1998, the Air Defense Forces are reorganized and merged with the Air Force. In fact, front-line aviation also ceases to exist - now we are talking about a single, universal type of armed forces. The Soviet system with separate air defense troops was caused by the extreme importance of the task of defending its territory, which was constantly violated by reconnaissance aircraft of NATO countries. There was a danger of a massive attack by strike aircraft with nuclear weapons on key facilities in the country.

But at the same time, such an organization was extremely costly. All structures were parallelized - management, training of pilots, supply, administrative apparatus. And this despite the fact that there were no fundamental obstacles to the inclusion of air force front-line aviation fighters in the air defense. Technical issues (the difference in communication frequencies, radar frequencies, guidance and control algorithms) were surmountable. The only consideration that can be taken as significant is the impossibility of fighters from one regiment to simultaneously provide the country's air defense and follow the moving front of the ground forces. In Soviet times, this was important. The front-line aviation was supposed to support the ground forces without being distracted by anything. At the same time, the simultaneous beginning of hostilities by ground armies and a massive raid on the cities of the USSR was considered the norm. That is, the air defense and the air force had to act simultaneously in different places - in such a situation, the distribution of responsibilities was inevitable.

With the collapse of the USSR and a reduction in funding, it became impossible to maintain two structures - the air defense and the air force. The merger was a matter of time, and in a sense, justified. Nowhere in the world, even in countries with a large area, air defense troops are not allocated separately. Minimizing costs leads to the creation of versatile fighters. At the present time, in fact, air defense tasks are relevant only in peacetime and in a threatened period. With the beginning of a full-scale conflict with NATO, Russia is unlikely to immediately launch an active offensive in the West; rather, it is about the defense of its territory, i.e. about the classic task of air defense, not only the control centers and industry, but also their troops will simply be covered. Aviation has become too expensive a resource to tackle such highly specialized tasks. In addition, the invasion of the masses of bombers is not expected - the payload in the form of cruise missiles is dropped at the lines unattainable for the air defense missile systems and fighters of the defending side. With a high probability, after repelling the first massive raid, the country's air defense task will become not very urgent - either the nuclear end of the world will come, or the confrontation will move into the plane of combat operations of land armies, without repeated massive raids on the country's cities. The enemy simply does not have enough cruise missiles for several massive strikes, and the extended use will not allow in a short time to inflict decisive damage on the Russian Federation in a situation of surprise. Finally, the defended objects of the country are covered not only by fighters, but also by air defense systems, which, when hostilities begin, are not planned to be moved to the front line.

In addition, serious advances have taken place in the nature of front-line aviation. In particular, not every conflict today is accompanied by the existence of a well-defined front line, and aviation has to operate in a difficult situation that excludes the stable presence of the rear and its own air control system. Of course, wars with the classical front also did not go away - but there is an increase in tasks and their complication for aviation, which was considered front-line in the USSR.

In the joint structure called "Air Force and Air Defense", and then "VKS", the two fighters were already cramped. Although the MiG-29 was an excellent front-line fighter, it was less adapted for air defense missions. It can be argued that the MiG-23, similar in performance characteristics, solved air defense tasks quite successfully. This is true, but the MiG-23 did it in the conditions of unlimited funding of the Soviet period. Then one could afford to maintain a fleet of "heavy" fighter-interceptors (MiG-25, -31 and Su-15) and a fleet of light interceptors. Their dislocation depended on the spatial scope of those covered. In particular, there was no MiG-23 in the Urals and central Siberia. But in modern conditions, the maintenance of such a motley fleet has become impossible - something had to be sacrificed. And in the air defense forces by the time of unification in 1998, there were almost no 23 left (like the Su-15 and MiG-25), but all the Su-27 and MiG-31 were preserved. With the exception of those transferred to the former republics of the USSR.

The military naturally wanted to give away what has more modest combat capabilities when it comes to reductions and savings - that is, light fighters. At first, they went to write off the MiG-21 and 23, and when they ran out, and the cuts of the end and the edge were not visible, we had to start gradually giving up the 29th. In matters of procurement, it was the same, if they were given to buy something, then I wanted to acquire the most powerful weapons, i.e. Sukhoi aircraft. This is logical, because the Su-27 could solve tasks that were inaccessible to the MiG-29. The "dual" designation originally incorporated in the Su-27 for the FA of the Air Force and the Air Defense Forces became a significant advantage.

In addition, all over the world there has long been a universalization of tactical aviation also for strike missions. American F-16 and F-15 have learned how to work effectively on ground targets. The disadvantages of avionics are compensated by hanging sighting containers. Specialization remains only in highly specific areas, such as "ground attack", where aircraft such as the A-10 are still in service. In Russia, work has also begun in this direction, both on the MiG and at Sukhoi. However, even here Drying looked preferable. The fact is that the limit of the combat shock load of the MiG-29 was the suspension of only 4 bombs with a caliber of 500 kg. While the Su-27 could take twice as much. MiG-35 can take 6 FAB-500, but Su-30 - already 10, and Su-34 up to 16 FAB-500. At the same time, our Air Force could not completely abandon specialized bombers - the Su-34 went into production, while no one builds such aircraft anywhere in the world.

Due to foreign orders, Sukhoi's aircraft were constantly ready for operation and production. They implemented measures to expand the resource up to 3000 hours for the Su-30 and up to 6000 hours for the Su-35. All this could have been done for the MiG-29, but the MiG company did not have such wide opportunities in view of much more modest funding - there were an order of magnitude fewer foreign orders. And there was no interest on the part of the domestic customer. The image of Sukhoi's company, which beautifully displayed its cars at exhibitions, began to play an important role. Well, and the administrative resource - Sukhoi pulled over the entire meager flow of public funds. The latter is very annoying for aviators of other firms, and there is some truth in this. However, in the new purely market conditions, everyone is forced to survive as best they can. Sukhoi did it successfully. It is always convenient to blame the state - they say, they did not create conditions, did not support other manufacturers. This is all true, of course, and there is something to criticize the state for. But on the other hand, in conditions of limited funds, the choice is very bad - either give everyone a little, or give one, but a lot. Both options have their pros and cons. In any case, a similar situation with the adoption of two combat helicopters (Ka-52 and Mi-28) at once does not look like an ideal solution.

As a result, the situation with the "main" fighter itself returned to its original position, when when announcing the PFI competition in the 70s, only one, heavy fighter was considered. The MiG-29 fleet was dying out faster than other aircraft of the Russian aviation, and the replenishment began with a weak stream of exclusively Sukhoi-designed machines.

Perspectives

In 2007, MiG presented the "promising" MiG-35 fighter. The word "promising" is put in quotation marks because the same MiG-29, created in the late 70s, remained at the basis of the aircraft. If these are indeed our prospects, then, as it is said in one funny film, "your affairs are bad, comrade recruit." And this is not at all a prejudice against the aircraft of the MiG company, because we are talking about the future, which in fact does not exist, neither the Su-35, nor the Su-34, nor the Su-30, nor the MiG-35.

The only promising fighter-bomber of our Air Force is the PAK-FA. The situation with modern supplies looks rather absurd in this light. Aircraft are being purchased, the effectiveness of which is controversial, to put it mildly, against the background of foreign F-35, F-22 and domestic PAK-FA. A shocking thought, especially for a patriotic public, but the essence is just that. To some extent, the current situation can be justified by the fact that something needs to be flown, something needs to load the industry. Until the last engineers, workers and pilots from the front regiments fled. All this had to be done in the late 90s, but for obvious reasons we started only a couple of years ago.

Su-30 and Su-35 are good, but they were needed in a mass production 10 years ago. Nevertheless, the fact that in the interests of the Air Force they have been producing a lot of them for several years is still welcome. Let these be aircraft that are inferior in all characteristics to the promising PAK-FA - they have a key advantage - they go to combat units today, while the PAK-FA is still being tested. This also favorably distinguishes them against the background of purely experimental MiG machines.

The Su-34 is produced in principle for the same reasons as the Su-30/35 - you have to fly on something, because the Su-24's resource is not infinite, and they are slowly becoming a thing of the past. However, as mentioned above, today aviation is too expensive to have such highly specialized aircraft as the Su-34 bomber. Nowhere in the world, even in the wealthy United States, can they afford this. Let fighters in the role of strike aircraft lose some of their effectiveness (all American fighters are still less effective when working on ground targets than the previously decommissioned F-111 and F-117), but the savings are simply enormous. It would be much more logical to produce the same Su-30 in an increased number instead of the 34th. However, obviously, in this matter we are hindered by the inertia of thinking. But the situation will become even less clear and logical when the serial PAK-FA appears. Due to its powerful avionics, high speed and low visibility, it will solve strike missions many times more efficiently than the Su-34. What place and role will then be assigned to this bomber? It's hard to understand. Unless the PAK-FA will clear a corridor for him, mowing down the air defense system in the enemy's air defense system. And then, in the formed gaps, not covered by air defense, the Su-34 will be introduced. Nevertheless, the Su-34 is again good because it has already been brought to mass production and more than a dozen machines are in service.

The MiG-31 survived in the 90s and 00s mainly due to its sturdy structure, which survived a long downtime on the ground without catastrophic consequences for the power elements. Nevertheless, the avionics of this aircraft, which staggered the imagination in the 80s, no longer looks unique today. The combat capabilities of the smaller F-35, Rafale and EF-2000 are no worse, and even better in a number of parameters, than that of the 31st. The speeds and heights of the MiG are not in demand today. And the cost of operation is simply cosmic. Obviously, the plane will serve until the end of its resource and will not be replaced by anything "similar" in the new generation. The same PAK-FA solves all the tasks assigned to the MiG-31 more efficiently. A highly specialized high-altitude interceptor today is as expensive as a bomber, and therefore an endangered species.

And what about the MiG-35? With him, as usual, the most difficult thing. It would have had every chance of being a light fighter in the transition period, similar to the Su-30/35, if it had been tested in 2007, brought to mass production, and the only question was in its purchases. However, in 2017, only a few prototypes remain, the flight tests of which, although close to completion, are still not over. The series is planned for 2018. And so far this series is limited to symbolic 30 cars. More like trying not to let the "sick" die completely. A logical question arises - why? There is already an aircraft of the "transitional" period in the form of the Su-30/35, which has been supplied in significant quantities for several years. Having started production in 2018, the MiG-35 will actually become the same age as the PAK-FA, in the conditions when between them, despite all the "+" after the number 4 in the generation designation, there is a gigantic abyss. And this is in conditions when our "potential friend" is already purchasing three hundred F-35 fighters. Sadly, the prospects for the MiG-35 are extremely few. It does not have a decisive advantage in performance characteristics over the Sukhoi machines, it is absolutely inferior to the PAK-FA, and at the same time it is still in the "experimental" stage, i.e. lags behind in terms of commissioning from the Su-30/35, and possibly even from the PAK-FA.

What fighter jet does the Air Force need today?

The Russian Air Force needs, first of all, a heavy fighter-bomber with a long range and powerful avionics.

The difficult 90s greatly reduced the airfield network, which did not completely cover the country even in the Soviet years. There is no hope for a full-fledged revival, and even in the case of partial commissioning of closed airfields, the coverage will remain insufficient.

To control vast expanses, an aircraft with a long flight duration and the ability to quickly reach the line of interception is needed. As for avionics, back in the 80s, a rule was deduced that an increase in the mass of equipment by 1 kg entails an increase in the weight of the glider by 9 kg. Since then, this ratio may have become less extreme, due to a slight decrease in the specific gravity of electronics, but the principle has hardly changed dramatically. You can only have a powerful avionics on a large aircraft. A heavy fighter will always benefit from a powerful avionics in long-range combat against a light fighter. In particular, the range of a stable radar contact directly depends on the area of the radar antenna, which is the larger, the larger the aircraft on which it is located. In a duel duel, a group of heavy fighters has a chance of being the first to spot the enemy and the first to attack with all the ensuing consequences. The first losses, even before eye contact is established, always inflict a heavy psychological blow on the enemy, reduce his number before entering close combat and thereby contribute to success.

A large supply of fuel on a heavy fighter can be converted not into a long flight range, but into the ability of the enemy on a light fighter to retain the ability to maneuver with afterburner for longer without fear of running out of fuel ahead of time. Either in the ability to patrol in the area for a long time, waiting for the enemy or a call to support ground forces. The latter is especially important - the infantrymen will not need to wait for an attack aircraft or light fighter to take off and get to them - the strike will follow many times faster.

With the universalization of tactical aviation, a heavy fighter is more effective in solving strike tasks, delivering a significantly greater mass of bombs to the target, or a load comparable to a light fighter, but at twice the range. The previously existing advantages of light fighters in maneuverable close combat are completely leveled by modern advances in wing mechanization, thrust vector control and aircraft control automation.

The MiG-29/35, unfortunately, does not fit into the future needs of the Air Force. This does not mean that this is a bad plane - quite the opposite. The aircraft turned out to be excellent, and ideally corresponds to the terms of reference. It ideally suited the front-line aviation of the USSR Air Force. However, the problem is that the front-line aviation of the USSR Air Force no longer exists. Conditions have changed. Defense money is no longer allocated "as much as necessary." Therefore, the choice will have to be made.

The United States also has its own wonderful aircraft - the F-16, for example. But there, no one passes off this fighter as a promising one. They are working on a brand new F-35. This work is not proceeding without difficulties. However, this is a difficult step into the future. The same cannot be said about the MiG-35. The Americans squeezed out of the F-16 design exactly as much as it was possible to squeeze, without harm and competition for the new generation. What are we doing? By 2020, when the Americans receive their 400th F-35, we will only begin production of the aircraft that was supposed to appear in the 90s. A gap of 30 years. The only argument in favor of the production of the MiG-35 is the desire to support the renowned MiG company, which we really do not want to lose.

A picky reader might think that the author set out to throw mud at a wonderful aircraft - the MiG-29 and its descendants in the form of the MiG-35. Or offend the MiG team. Not at all. The current situation is not the fault of the team, and the MiG aircraft are excellent. It is not their fault that wonderful technical solutions and a wonderful aircraft fell out of the once harmonious weapons system, and the upgrades were not implemented in time. The main question is - even if all this is so, but is it not worthwhile today to concentrate on creating something new, rather than giving out aircrafts from the past (albeit excellent aircrafts), for a great achievement of the present and the future.